In the past, Vietnam was impacted by numerous epidemics, particularly during the Nguyễn Dynasty from 1802 to 1883. Based on data from the Đại Nam Thực Lục (1961) (The Veritable Records of the Great South), this article investigates the frequency and nature of these epidemics, identifies the types of common diseases at that time, and explores the underlying causes of these outbreaks. The study further examines the Nguyễn Dynasty's strategies for managing these health crises. During these outbreaks, the dynasty faced significant challenges, with frequent epidemics leading to high death rates, widespread social disruption, and economic decline. The dynasty's primary preventive measures, heavily reliant on spiritual practices like prayer, highlight the limited medical understanding at the time and the constraints of its socio-political framework. However, there was a progressive shift towards the incorporation of Western medical innovations, particularly in the vaccine approach to treat diseases like smallpox. This transition not only marked a critical evolution in the local healthcare approach but also set the stage for more systematic medical advancements in Vietnam during the colonial period (1884–1945).

The evolving global order and regional dynamics have profoundly impacted China-Southeast Asia relations. As the world grapples with the geopolitical implications of intensified US-China competition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries find themselves navigating a complex interplay of opportunities and challenges. The US-led Indo-Pacific strategy has significantly reshaped the geopolitical landscape, yet Southeast Asia’s relations with China are marked by interwoven challenges and opportunities. This special issue includes six papers that cover Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines, illustrating how small and medium-sized states navigate an increasingly multipolar world. A central theme across the papers in this special issue is the critical role of domestic factors in shaping each country’s relationship with China.

When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to domestic than external determinants, i.e., the needs to balance security, prosperity, and autonomy, as necessitated by the prevailing pathways of elite legitimation. This explains why Malaysia's open deference vis-à-vis China has been accompanied by an indirect and quiet defiance especially in recent years, as best evidenced by the second Mahathir administration's dualistic approaches toward the Belt and Road, South China Sea, and Xinjiang.

This article explores the militarisation of the North Korean police and the establishment of specialised units, including the Railroad and Maritime Police, and the Korean-Manchurian border guard. The analysis primarily draws from unpublished Soviet archival material. Contrary to the assumption that strengthening the North Korean police under Soviet military administration was aimed at providing a backbone to the North Korean regime, our examination reveals that, at least initially, it was driven by the urgent need to address immediate challenges in public security. The initial crisis arose with anti-trusteeship protests and worsened when the Soviets initiated land reform, coinciding with a series of terrorist attacks against North Korean politicians and Soviet military units. The article also sheds light on the background processes that led to the creation of specialised police units such as the Railroad Police and the Maritime Police. Contrary to common perceptions, these units were not designed to become military units from the outset. Soviet documents clearly reveal that their primary function was to assist the Soviets in guarding the North Korean railroad and coastline. The Soviets initiated and controlled the establishment of the Korean-Manchurian border guard to address issues on the northern border of Korea.

This paper analyzes the Jin Yong novel The Deer and the Cauldron through the lens of Etienne Balibar's theory of super-nationalism and supranationalism. The novel employs a pan-Asian racial ideology to expand national identity from Han Chinese to other ethnic groups (supranationalism) by introducing a racial Other, white Europeans, to unify warring groups. Simultaneously, Han culture is consistently uplifted as superior (super-nationalism). A critical sequence features the Kangxi Emperor asserting his legitimacy as the ruler of China to the protagonist Wei Xiaobao by claiming the Mandate of Heaven has passed from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. However, Han Chinese gallants and intellectuals constantly challenge his legitimacy because, as a Manchu, he is considered foreign. To resolve this issue, Wei Xiaobao begins constructing a racial national framework that includes Manchus. This paper further argues that Wei Xiaobao's moral relativism, unusual for a protagonist in martial arts fiction, enables the flexibility to redefine Chinese identity on racial grounds instead of moral or cultural. The Deer and the Cauldron illustrates the transition from the Mandate of Heaven to modern nation-state ideology in China, in the form of an irreverent martial arts fiction novel, crafted by the genre's greatest master.

Vietnam has tried to maintain a delicate balance between the United States and China by pursuing a hedging strategy. In a shifting strategic environment marked by structural uncertainty caused by the rise of China, weaker Southeast Asian states like Vietnam are projecting a non-alignment posture. However, this rational behavior is not the product of systemic factors alone but also certain domestic political dynamics. We argue that regime legitimation – how the Vietnam Communist Party seeks to generate and sustain internal and external legitimacy – weighs heavily on Vietnam's strategy toward US–China competition. In particular, three legitimation strategies employed by the Vietnam Communist Party – performance-based legitimation, nationalism-based legitimation vis-à-vis China, and defensive legitimation vis-à-vis “hostile forces” – produce dynamics that ensure Hanoi does not get inadvertently pulled into the orbit of either Beijing or Washington. Theoretically, this article contributes to the literature on domestic determinants of foreign policy with a focus on regime legitimation. Empirically, we seek to supplement the discussion on the salience and relevance of domestic politics in informing Southeast Asian states' strategic calculation amid great-power competition.

This article provides the first in-depth systematic comparison of foreign banking in pre-World War I China and Japan. As the article shows, after their entry into China and Japan, the presence and activities of foreign banks in China and Japan differed markedly, with these banks developing a much more prominent position in China. Making use of sources in German, English, Chinese, and Japanese, this article aims to explain why foreign banks in China and Japan developed so differently before World War I. It does so by first providing an overview of the development of foreign banks in both countries and then discussing their activities and development with regards to Chinese and Japanese financial institutions, trade finance, and public finance. The article shows that it was Japan's emphasis on financial reforms that led to the limited presence of foreign banks in that country.

Studies on Indonesia–China relations have emphasized the central role of Indonesia's domestic politics in shaping its foreign policy toward China. However, there has been little discussion on the context in which and the extent to which internal struggles for power have contributed to shape Indonesia's China policy. Contributing to such a discussion, this article specifically focuses on the roles of Indonesian Islamist groups in affecting Jakarta–Beijing ties. It examines their political maneuvers in responses to the attitudes and policies of two governments, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) administration and that of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo (2014–), on China-related foreign policy issues. Both Yudhoyono's and Jokowi's governments display the same friendly attitude toward China. On the South China Sea issues, nevertheless, Jokowi's government adopts tougher measures against China's maneuvers. Despite Jokowi's implementation of such policy, the Islamists put up considerable resistance to his China policy, even compared to his predecessor. This article finds that the extent of power sharing between the Islamists and the regime in power determines the former's responses toward the latter's China policy. This suggests that in the management of bilateral relations, the Islamists are not a hindrance per se in Indonesia–China relations.

From 1860 to 1900, a modern system of property rights emerged in the International Settlement in Shanghai. This paper examines the largely overlooked process by which the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) brought about a system of well-functioning property rights through land surveys, mapping, and assessments. These methods worked hand-in-hand with road planning and construction in facilitating the expansion of the International Settlement to the Chinese-controlled area. Colonial officials, merchants, and Chinese intellectuals worked collectively and sometimes separately to generate knowledge about land and property by translating terms in the Chinese tradition. It argues that the efforts in institution-building and translation helped normalize the definition of property rights as things exclusively owned, strengthening the SMC's control over the land in Shanghai. These processes illuminate the relationship between empire-making and property rights by showing how property rights emerged and functioned in a semi-colonial context where multiple foreign authorities coexisted with the local government. The relatively secure system of property rights, which both foreign and Chinese merchants exploited, formed the foundation of a prosperous Shanghai in the twentieth century.

No country in Southeast Asia is as close to China as Cambodia is at present. Under Hun Sen's leadership, Cambodia has actively participated in the Belt and Road Initiative and repeatedly blocked ASEAN's statements on the South China Sea (SCS). How can we better understand Cambodia's embrace of China? We argue that Hun Sen chose to embrace China due to the convergence of challenges posed by Cambodia's domestic opposition forces and international democratic pressures. The more severe the domestic political challenges, the more Hun Sen and his ruling party need China's support. Since Hun Sen remains the most powerful figure in Cambodia despite his recent resignation as prime minister, whether Cambodia's dependence on China can be altered depends on the ability of the West to modify its approach and attitude toward Hun Sen, his successor, and their domestic opponents. Nevertheless, regardless of how the future unfolds, domestic politics is likely to play an important role in Cambodia's foreign alignments in the foreseeable future.

The European Union and China have a relationship that is characterized by strong economic interdependence. But since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power, the gap in power and interests between the EU and China has widened, and cooperation has become more difficult. As a result, the EU’s China policy has shifted towards a more structural realist perspective, strategy, and policy. The EU’s realist turn will be analysed in two major areas of the EU–China relationship: security and defense with a focus on Taiwan, and trade. The EU has increased support for Taiwan and for maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by bandwagoning with the United States. In external trade, the EU is strengthening its own economic security and is balancing against China through diversifying its trade relations in the Indo-Pacific region.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, China extended significant medical aid to international communities, aiming to combat the virus's spread and foster global solidarity. However, despite the appreciation expressed by recipient governments for China's assistance, the general public's perception of China did not significantly improve. This prompts the question: why did China's COVID-19 health diplomacy fail to resonate with foreign audiences? This article delves into the cases of Thailand and the Philippines to argue that public perceptions of countries providing aid can be heavily influenced by domestic political dynamics, particularly when incumbent governments already face legitimacy challenges prior to aid delivery. By scrutinizing the implementation of China's aid and the state-to-state relations between China and incumbent governments, political opposition forces can exploit any shortcomings or missteps, placing blame squarely on the incumbents. Given the existing distrust toward incumbent governments, the public is more inclined to accept messages propagated by opposition groups, thereby hindering any positive shift in perception toward China. This perspective complements existing research that predominantly focuses on the diplomatic strategies of donor countries, suggesting instead that the domestic politics of host countries play a pivotal role in shaping the effectiveness of foreign nations' efforts to cultivate favorable images among foreign audiences.

In Japan, the discipline of food culture studies has developed since the 1970s under the initiative of Naomichi Ishige. Ishige's works have been referenced widely, but no one has attempted a critical reading of his writings. Therefore, the objective of this paper was to trace his life and contributions to the development of Asian food culture studies. Ishige's first contribution was to identify the commonality in Asian food cultures, tightly connected to rice and umami. Second, Ishige greatly contributed to institutionalising an interdisciplinary dialogue on food cultures in Japan and Asia. In fact, food culture studies are a product of food modernity because their disciplinary development has been conditioned by an increasing globalisation of food systems and the collapse of modern family systems since the 1970s and 1980s. Third, this paper analyses Ishige's food philosophy. Unlike Asian food culture studies in general, which mainly focuses on the genealogy of specific foods and dietary practices before modernisation, Ishige was also a careful observer of food modernity. His food philosophy, backed by long-term civilisational perspectives, was full of balanced ideas about how to cope with the loss of family meals, economic inequalities, and the rise of nutritional sciences during his period.

Political discourse is a persuasive device used to gain public support, and official counterterrorism narratives are no exception. Drawing on theoretical convergence between Critical Terrorism Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in their understanding of discourse as a persuasive tool, this research aims to demonstrate the utility of discourse analysis in deciphering the political ideology sustaining official counterterrorism rhetoric. Through quantitative diachronic observation of key terms (terrorism, separatism, and extremism) and the systematic codification of Xinjiang White Papers (2003–2019), this research applies van Leeuwen’s (2008) model of social practice analysis, participant representation, and legitimation categories to reveal the specific rhetoric tools ultimately aimed at securing the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) political legitimacy. This article builds on CDA theory by linking discourse and political practice, reflecting on the pragmatic consequences of implicit power structures within official counterterrorism discourse, involving in this case the CPC and ethnoreligious groups in Xinjiang.

The oeuvre of the philosopher Leo Strauss (d.1973) pivots on the audacious thesis that political esoterism – the protective covering of truth through an exoteric shell – has been central to Islamic intellectual life. Strauss’s work focusses on philosophy, but this article argues that it can be productively extended – while not applied integrally - to Sufism, Islam’s similarly contested, primary esoteric tradition. It investigates the Straussian thesis in a Sufi discussion on valāyat, “spiritual authority” or “Friendship with God,” which idea is central both to Shiite Sufism and Shiism generally. The discussion concerns the Valāyat-nāme, an Iranian treatise of the early twentieth century by the Neᶜmatollāhī master Solṭānᶜalīshāh (d.1909), revealing the dilemmas that Shiite Sufis have faced in simultaneously retaining identity and acceptance to the juristically dominated canon. Four sub-topics are elaborated to assess the validity of Straussian analysis in rendering the treatise and its author: persecution as a context for esoterism; esoterism as a veil for dangerous knowledge; the drive for epistemic subordination; and the political nature of religious knowledge. It is proposed that rather than as “between the lines” dissimulation, as per Strauss, the Neᶜmatollāhīs’ political esoterism ought to be read more subtly as accommodation “along the lines” of Shiite orthodoxy.

Post-independence national historical writings have often been seen as a product of nationalist advocacy and modern nation-state formation. Moving beyond this perspective, this article considers how political leaders took a direct role in promoting different kinds and forms of collective historical thoughts to strengthen their leadership. Specifically, the article explores an active engagement of independent Cambodia's leaders such as Prince Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot, who independently saw national historical understanding as one's own monopolized source of power. It also discusses how different historical accounts in the country were shaped by, and kept up with, other important factors such as Cold War confrontations and regional and global historiographical trends, including “Modernist” and “Marxist” approaches. Discussing these factors helps us understand more critically national historical accounts, which were closely intertwined with specific socioreligious and political circumstances such as political rule and legitimacy, widespread public anxieties, and geopolitical tensions. It also sheds light on the substantial impact of state-imposed historical interpretations on society. As informed by the Cambodian case, this impact can be seen in the implementation of state projects stirred by certain kinds of historical understanding which consequently transformed the living conditions of thousands of people.

This study investigates the impact of warfare on nuptial patterns, focusing on the trends and characteristics of age differences within marriage. Specifically, it explores the socio-demographic outcomes of the Imjin War (1592–1598) and post-war reconstruction in Korea, using the earliest extant Chosŏn household registers, compiled between 1606 and 1630. Individual-level microdata were derived involving 2,336 married couples based on 11,749 entries in these registers, covering four administrative districts located in the southeastern region of the Korean peninsula severely devastated by the war. Factors such as status, property, warfare, social practices, and legal regulations influenced spousal age differences. First, social rank and family wealth played pivotal roles, with age gaps widening as a husband's socio-economic status increased. Second, females born after 1580, whose first marriages were affected by the Imjin War and post-war circumstances, experienced an average marital age gap of about ten years. Third, this effect was further complicated by the imposition of socio-legal rules on remarriage; that is, the yangban entailed a pronounced age difference owing to the Neo-Confucian norm of chaste widowhood. This study enriches the understanding of historical marriage customs in Korea and offers insights for studies on age disparity in marriage.

Pandemics present opportunities for states to acquire emergency powers by narrativizing pandemics as “acts of God,” “acts of war,” “acts of outsiders,” “sanitation-hygiene,” or “acts of the invisible enemy.” These narratives conveniently justify the imposition of undefined and often unrestrained constitutional or extra-constitutional emergency powers to reshape individual, social, and governance modalities. These narratives conveniently establish the setting for states to justify the imposition of broad emergency powers by determining the plot of pandemic-appropriate modalities for individuals, society, and governance mechanisms and classifying the characters of pandemic as protagonists and antagonists as per the plot and settings of the preferred narrative. This article attempts to reveal the theoretical and applicational interconnections between state-sponsored narratives and exercise of emergency powers during the pandemic governance in plague, cholera, influenza, and Covid-19 pandemics.