Like many newer EU Free Trade Agreements, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) includes commitments concerning labour and social standards and environment and climate policy under the title the ‘Level Playing Field’. This title includes non-regression provisions, which prohibit reducing or weakening certain standards ‘in a manner affecting trade’, and novel rebalancing provisions, which allow the parties to take unilateral measures if material impacts on trade are arising as a result of significant divergences in levels of protection in specific areas of regulation. Although terminology linking trade to labour and environmental issues is becoming reasonably common in trade agreements, there has only been limited consideration as to what trade effects or impacts actually need to be demonstrated. This paper argues that the language of ‘manner affecting trade’ and ‘material impact on trade’ in the TCA denotes a ‘conditions of competition’ test as opposed to a stricter, and relatively more difficult to satisfy, trade remedies model. It further considers the possible application of the provisions in the context of the UK’s 2022 strikes measures, highlighting that even if a conditions of competition test is used, there are serious questions as to whether the non-regression and rebalancing provisions in the TCA are efficacious in achieving values-based objectives.

‘Trade wars are good, and easy to win,’ tweeted Donald Trump in 2018. The US–China trade war that followed proved otherwise – especially when confronting a major economic power. Yet, can trade wars ever be good? While the academic consensus holds they harm all participants, we argue that under certain circumstances they can produce positive outcomes. Set against the backdrop of the Liberation Day tariffs announced on April 2, 2025, this paper examines the limits of the Ricardian free trade model underpinning the current multilateral trading system, identifies when trade wars may serve strategic goals, and explores alternative rules to address state-capitalist distortions without costly, prolonged conflict.

This article considers the reciprocal duties proposed by the US administration, 2 April 2025. These are large import tariffs that will significantly disrupt the world trading system. Rather than considering the economic impacts of these tariffs, as others have and are doing, this article documents the rationale used to justify these destructive tariffs and their calculation. Using descriptive examples, the proposed duties are shown to be unfounded as reciprocal and generally ill advised.

This paper examines the likely economic consequences of a unilateral US trade policy, particularly those involving across-the-board tariffs and retreat from multilateral commitments. Drawing on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, dynamic macroeconomic frameworks, and a rich body of empirical literature, the paper demonstrates that the static efficiency losses, estimated by standard trade models, understate the true costs of protectionism. It identifies five key amplification channels – loss of economies of scale, supply chain fragility, diminished technological spillovers, investment hold-up under policy uncertainty, and financial market reactions – that interact to depress both short-run output and long-run growth potential. The analysis estimates that comprehensive unilateral trade measures could reduce US GDP by 2–3% in the short term and lower the long-term growth trajectory by 0.4–0.7 percentage points annually. While some strategic interventions may yield resilience or national security benefits, the paper concludes that unilateralism generates systemic economic risks and should be approached with caution. The findings underscore the need for integrated policy frameworks that combine targeted trade tools with domestic support and international cooperation.

The informal exit of the United States from the WTO under Trump is the culmination of US frustration with the organization's legislative and judicial rigidity, a frustration that has been building on a bipartisan basis for two decades. The WTO's commitment to a single undertaking, its reliance on consensus-based decision making, and an activist Appellate Body that imposed de facto stare decisis eroded political support for WTO rules in the United States and opened the door for political opportunists to cast them aside. We argue that the original GATT was, on balance, a more flexible and politically savvy bargain despite its imperfections. The 30-year history of the WTO that replaced it suggests the folly of trying to rein in powerful countries with a ‘rules-based’ institution, at least when the rules are unable to adjust to political shocks.

In 2025, the United States raised tariffs to rates not seen for more than a century. These tariffs were not part of a carefully designed industrial strategy. Instead, the second Trump administration distanced itself from existing industrial policy initiatives and indicated a desire to roll back government-funded subsidies for businesses. This article examines the rationale behind the United States’ pivot from subsidies to tariffs and explores implications for trade partners and multilateral institutions.

The two economic superpowers operate increasingly outside WTO norms. China's reliance on non-market practices challenges the competitive equality among WTO members, while the US, under a second Trump administration, has unilaterally raised tariffs in defiance of multilateral rules. This essay examines how the rest of the world is de-risking from the two rogue superpowers while shoring up trade multilateralism. It identifies three interlinked strategies: (1) recalibration – reducing trade dependency through targeted trade remedies against China and narrow bilateral agreements with the US; (2) shielding – collective and unilateral responses to economic coercion of both superpowers; and (3) containment – preventing illegality from spreading to the rest of the world. Together, these modes of governance not only mitigate systemic spillovers from rule-breaking but also help rebalance global trade by addressing structural imbalances in Chinese overproduction and US overconsumption. In doing so, the rest of the world may lay the groundwork for a renewed and more resilient multilateral trading system.

Early signs suggest that Trump may revise the Biden administration's incentive-driven semiconductor policy and instead rely more heavily on tariffs to restore US semiconductor manufacturing. To what extent can semiconductor tariffs serve as a form of policy whiplash to compel foreign companies to relocate their operations? This article argues that while tariffs can influence investment decisions, Trump overstates their effects on fab locations and supply chain diversification. Semiconductor manufacturers weigh a complex set of factors encompassing partners in the supply chain ecosystem, potential regulatory scrutiny, technological trends, and more. Tariffs in and of themselves may not be a determinative factor behind TSMC's recently announced plan to expand its US investment.

The US plan to impose reciprocal tariffs is a game changer. If you ask The Economist, Trump's tariffs ‘really mean chaos for global trade’. If managed well, the opposite could be true: it could be the largest round of trade negotiations since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a much-needed rebalancing of global trade relations to catch up with fundamental changes that occurred, but remained unaddressed, for close to a quarter century.

The second Trump Administration, in office since January 2025, has disrupted the prevailing trade consensus. The corner stone of the new US trade policy is the re-introduction of old-style tariffs at substantial levels to create a so-called ‘tariff wall’ turning away from long-standing practices of tariff liberalization. According to the US Administration, the tariffs pursue multiple objectives. They incentivize re-industrialization, generate revenue, and lower trade deficits with many trading partners. The imposition of new tariffs is coupled with the pursuit of bilateral deals to extract business-type concessions from governments and to encourage investments into the US.

As counsellor in the GATT Office of Legal Affairs (1983–1989), director of the GATT and WTO Legal Divisions (1989–1995), and first executive director of the Advisory Center for WTO Law (2001–2015), Frieder Rössler (1939–2024) is widely recognized as having contributed to the design and successful operation of the WTO dispute settlement system. This tribute focuses on Rössler's academic contributions to what has been described as ‘Geneva ordoliberalism’. Section 1 briefly recalls the long-standing initiatives by ‘Geneva ordoliberals’ – since William Rappard's founding of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies (Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales: IHEI) in 1927 – for promoting rules-based, multilateral trading systems based on close cooperation among the worldwide institutions at Geneva. Section 2 describes some of the legal, economic, and political justifications by GATT officials (such as GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel, Rössler, and GATT's former chief economist Jan Tumlir) for ‘ordoliberal’ (rather than ‘neoliberal’) conceptions of multilateral trade systems limiting ‘governance failures’. Section 3 concludes that the efforts of former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy at promoting a ‘Geneva consensus’ for an inclusive ‘multilateral trading system beneficial for all’ – and the current WTO initiatives for the digital and green transformation of the ‘brown economy’ (driven by fossil fuels) into a ‘green economy’ (driven by renewable energies) – have failed to overcome the geopolitical divides between European ordoliberalism, Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, and authoritarian state capitalism. Authoritarian power politics, ‘securitization’ of economies, and national protectionism disrupt the UN and WTO legal, political, and economic systems in ways Rössler's ‘public choice’ methodology had predicted. Without effective UN and WTO legal constraints, ‘governance failures’ and ‘constitutional failures’ tend to increase; they undermine an ordoliberal ‘Geneva consensus’ on protecting human rights and sustainable development.

This Review has occasionally taken note of the passing of individuals who have made seminal contributions to the public international law of international trade.1 When Frieder Roessler died on 25 July 2024, the editors undertook to memorialize Frieder's legacy with a Symposium about Frieder the international civil servant, Frieder the scholar and teacher, Frieder the institution builder in advocacy for the legal rights of developing countries, and Frieder the friend to admirers around the world and over the course of several decades.

The resilience of international supply chains is increasingly becoming a policy objective within international trade law making. Unilaterally, States have resorted to a myriad of trade tools to achieve this objective, including subsidizing domestic industries, facilitating critical minerals, and imposing tariffs on dominant supplying States to encourage supply diversification. In this context, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity Supply Chain Agreement is the first major international trade agreement primarily aimed at achieving regional supply chain resilience. This Research Note explores the WTO compatibility of the economic interventions that underpin the Supply Chain Agreement’s ‘managed trade’ approach to supply chain resilience. First, it outlines the firm-centred governance approach that is central to supply chain management under the Supply Chain Agreement. Second, it explores the likely challenges and justifications of the envisaged interventions under GATT 1994 and Agreement on Safeguards. Finally, it reflects on the potential role of the WTO to shape cooperative supply chain governance interventions.

Industrial policy interventions affecting international trade and investment are motivated by a mix of economic and non-economic objectives. Some are explicitly protectionist, targeting an expansion of domestic production; others are not but have adverse impacts on trade, reducing the potential role of trade as a means to help attain non-economic objectives efficiently. The prospects for open trade to contribute to the realization of non-economic objectives are enhanced if states consider the extent to which they have similar goals and cooperate in designing industrial policies to attain them. Cooperation to attenuate negative spillovers and improve the prospects of attaining underlying goals is in the self-interest of states. Arguments that international cooperation on industrial policy is politically infeasible or constitutes an undesirable erosion of sovereignty are misconceived given the significant opportunity costs of uncoordinated unilateral industrial policy interventions.

The exponential growth of cross-border data flows and fragmented national and regional data protection standards have intensified regulatory challenges in global trade. The effects of regulatory divergence are amplified by a lack of transparency, potentially masking discriminatory practices. Article VII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) offers a framework for recognition agreements to bridge these gaps but is not utilized in practice. This paper examines the interplay between GATS Article VII and the EU data adequacy decisions – currently the most comprehensive bilateral framework for assessing compatibility between data protection regimes among other WTO members. It argues that data adequacy frameworks qualify as recognition agreements/arrangements under GATS, offering potential to reduce the trade effects of differences in data protection laws globally while safeguarding regulatory autonomy. A roadmap for leveraging Article VII to advance international alignment is developed to help realize the dual goals of enhancing global cooperation and strengthening privacy protection.

This research note contributes to moving the scholarly field of international investment law beyond its dominant focus in recent decades on issues of post-admission investment protection and investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS). Specifically, it maps a future research agenda focusing on issues of investment facilitation and investment liberalization. This research note analyses several common and important themes that arise in relation to treaty-based investment facilitation and investment liberalization commitments. These include the value-added of international legally binding obligations, the impact of international commitments on States' applied policies, and a notable shift away from investor–State arbitration towards State–State dispute settlement only and mechanisms for ongoing cooperation between the treaty parties. These themes raise challenging questions, which often call for future empirical research employing methods other than traditional legal analysis. Nevertheless, this research note suggests that the scholarly field of international investment law has much to gain from shifting some of its focus away from well-versed issues of investment protection and ISDS towards under-researched questions concerning investment facilitation and investment liberalization commitments.

Amid a new era of disruption spawned by looming climate threats and significant geopolitical tensions, an increasing number of countries have favored a more robust green industrial policy (GIP) to reduce carbon emissions and achieve other economic, political, and geostrategic objectives. The use of multi-purpose GIPs not only raises questions regarding the policies' compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules but also, more broadly, profoundly implicates the interface between energy, trade, and the environment. This article selects China, the United States, and the European Union as case studies and provides a thorough analysis of the specific text and context of their GIPs to identify the new trends that deviate from past practices in order to capture the policy transformation. It highlights the disruptively adverse implications of the multi-purpose GIPs on the multilateral trading system. However, the WTO has an opportunity to mitigate such disruptions and avoid a seemingly unavoidable clash by facilitating international cooperation and coordination in the design and implementation of multi-purpose GIPs, particularly among major clean energy producer countries. In doing so, the WTO can strengthen its credibility and stability while also minimizing the misalignment of the diverse objectives and ensuring the decarbonization efforts will not undermined.

The exercise of environmental ‘leverage’ via trade-related measures and trade in environmental goods offers opportunities to tackle the climate crisis and advance transnational decarbonization. Inward-looking, adversarial, and short-term national security-centred approaches, however, are disrupting the trade and climate change mitigation linkage. This article employs the race for critical raw materials and US and EU strategies to promote the net-zero transition at the domestic level as case studies to illustrate the environmental pitfalls of the ‘securitization’ of the trade and climate change mitigation nexus. The article demonstrates that the pursuit of strategic dominance in key net-zero sectors, attempts to exclude systemic rivals and reshore supply chains, opportunistic forms of friendshoring and loose agreement on regulatory means jeopardize recourse to environmental ‘leverage’ and undermine decarbonization at both national and transnational levels. This analysis casts a light on the inherent tension between national security and climate change mitigation. Taking stock of these findings, the article advocates a radically different approach to the governance of the trade and climate change mitigation nexus.