In this paper, I present an analysis of purgatory from an issuantist perspective – an approach that seeks to reconcile the concept of a loving God with the doctrine of eternal hell. Issuantism posits that both heaven and hell originate from God’s love, and I extend this framework to purgatory, offering a new interpretation of its eschatological significance. After examining the views of influential figures such as Joseph Ratzinger and Jerry Walls, I argue that purgatory must be understood as a condition outside of time to maintain theological consistency. I propose a model of purgatory located within an aeveternal dimension – an intermediate state between time and eternity – as a way to resolve tensions concerning temporality, moral agency, and the soul’s orientation toward heaven.

Having hope is important for motivation and human agency, especially when it is certain. People with unwavering hope are more likely to succeed in their endeavours than those without. However, in modern debates, hope is usually seen as characterised by vain optimism. Thomas Aquinas, in contrast, argues that the virtue of hope is characterised by certainty – a view that could contribute significantly to these debates. Nevertheless, there seem to be problems with Aquinas’ view. He says that, while certainty essentially concerns the cognitive faculties, it can also concern other faculties by participation, insofar as the cognitive faculties influence them. He adds that hope can only be said to be certain by participating in the certainty proper to faith. But this reference to the certainty of faith and the cognitive faculties seems to imply that faith is endowed with conclusive evidence, since it is this evidence that enables the cognitive faculties to attain certainty. And throughout his writings, Aquinas denies that faith enjoys conclusive evidence. In this article, I will show that one can resolve this difficulty by understanding that for Thomas faith is indeed an intellectual act, but its certainty is different from the certainty of reason. This will enable us to gain an understanding of Aquinas’ view of the certainty of hope, as well as other aspects of his reflections on hope and faith.

All orthodox believers accept that ‘God’s ways are not our ways’ and that ‘the peace of God passes all understanding’. The sceptical theist tries to apply these principles to the mystery of evil in the world, by arguing that we cannot tell what the divine purpose might be in the sufferings that we cannot explain. There is a danger that an undisciplined putting of evil into the fog of mystery might free our understanding too much from rational constraint. I argue that by combining sceptical theism with the way that Peter van Inwagen deploys the fact of our fallen nature to explain Divine withdrawal, we can give a rational account of the limitations there are on how we can judge God’s justice.

Aristotle’s views about the female body are commonly held to be an insurmountable obstacle to aligning his philosophy with feminism. Sarah Borden Sharkey, however, has attempted a robust Aristotelian feminism that alters only the minimum. She argues that to succeed it must give positive and detailed reasons for sexual equality, a task that she leaves open. Building on Sharkey’s work, this essay argues that Thomas Aquinas’ view of the will allows such a position, by combining it with Aristotle’s notion of thumos as the main dividing factor between the sexes. The result is an Aristotelian–Thomistic view that keeps female biological difference, while allowing equality in attaining virtue and prudence.

Commentary on the election of Pope Leo XIV has been framed in terms drawn from political and cultural oppositions: conservative vs liberal, traditionalist vs progressive, made vivid by the 2024 film Conclave based on Robert Harris’s 2016 novel. Part of my concern is to urge rejection of these as general terms of analysis of Catholicism, or at least to circumscribe their applications to matters inessential to Catholic faith and morals per se. In aid of that, and by way of broader purpose, I discuss the nature of Catholicism itself. Observing the long history of challenges, crises, and divisions, I then proceed to distinguish between subjective and objective modes of identifying the nature of individuals and institutions. Catholicism has a robust objective nature comprising a synthesis of Hebrew and Christian scripture, apostolic tradition, conciliar and other authoritative teachings, and sacramental practices, together consolidated and expressed in orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Political and cultural classifications are irrelevant to and distracting from this identification.

Among the less considered ‘conversions’ of the Confessions is the conversion of grief. The Confessions traces how Augustine learns to grieve justly and with hope. Augustine’s grief in book four is presented in stark contrast to his grief in book nine. In many ways, these two books serve as a counter image of each other. The striking narrative similarities that Augustine presents between the death of his boyhood friend in book four and that of his mother in book nine serve, however, to highlight the significant differences that Augustine wants to accent between these two experiences of death and grief. Holding these two scenes next to each other allows us to witness another profound conversion of the Confessions, namely, how Augustine learns to grieve profound loss in hope.

The article considers various grounds on which lying is forbidden, even in the case of Nazis at the door searching for Jewish refugees. It discusses eight such grounds, seven philosophical (natural law) arguments, and one theological argument. It is concluded that whilst only one of the initial seven grounds appears to permit lying to the Nazis, the theological ground prohibiting lying is the strongest of all.