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Thomas Aquinas and the Certainty of Hope in Relation to Faith and Charity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2025
Abstract
Having hope is important for motivation and human agency, especially when it is certain. People with unwavering hope are more likely to succeed in their endeavours than those without. However, in modern debates, hope is usually seen as characterised by vain optimism. Thomas Aquinas, in contrast, argues that the virtue of hope is characterised by certainty – a view that could contribute significantly to these debates. Nevertheless, there seem to be problems with Aquinas’ view. He says that, while certainty essentially concerns the cognitive faculties, it can also concern other faculties by participation, insofar as the cognitive faculties influence them. He adds that hope can only be said to be certain by participating in the certainty proper to faith. But this reference to the certainty of faith and the cognitive faculties seems to imply that faith is endowed with conclusive evidence, since it is this evidence that enables the cognitive faculties to attain certainty. And throughout his writings, Aquinas denies that faith enjoys conclusive evidence. In this article, I will show that one can resolve this difficulty by understanding that for Thomas faith is indeed an intellectual act, but its certainty is different from the certainty of reason. This will enable us to gain an understanding of Aquinas’ view of the certainty of hope, as well as other aspects of his reflections on hope and faith.
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- © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers.
References
1 See Barbara V. Nunn, ‘Getting clear what hope is’, in Jaklin A. Eliott (ed.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hope (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), pp. 63–77.
2 See David Elliot, Hope and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) p. 61. The author refers to ‘secular hope’. See note 30.
3 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, tr. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, second and revised edition (London: Oates and Washbourne, 1920), II-II, q. 18, a. 4, s.c.
4 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad2.
5 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 23, a. 1.
6 Joseph Wawrykow provides a concise overview of how this position relates to hope: ‘By charity people are made friends of God; God is their Friend. And by hope God’s friend trusts in God’s aid’ (Joseph Wawrykow, The theological virtues, in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas [New York: Oxford University Press, 2012], p. 294).
7 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 18, a. 4. See also Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 2, ad 4, in Disputed Questions on the Virtues, tr. by E.M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
8 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 2, a. 9.
9 Of course, this does not mean that there is no evidence to support faith. At the very least, consider the ‘signs’ of faith that Aquinas talks about, ranging from miracles to the arguments that can be used to support it and make it credible (see Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 5). Some might argue that Thomas never openly states that there is no conclusive evidence to support faith. In response, it should be noted that he uses the term ‘evidentia’ to refer to that which enables us to know (see II-II, q. 1, a. 4). In this sense, it can be said that Thomas uses the word under discussion here to mean conclusive evidence. However, given the enormous quantity of signs that he believes make divine revelation credible, one can still speak of evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence. To distinguish Thomas’ use of ‘evidentia’ as ‘conclusive evidence’ from how it is usually understood in English, Robert Pasnau refers to it as ‘evidentness’ (see After Certainty. A History of our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017], p. 190).
10 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 4, a. 3.
11 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3.
12 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2.
13 I have argued this in several publications. See Roberto Di Ceglie, Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity (New York: Routledge, 2022).
14 Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, tr. by J. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), q. 14, a. 1, ad 7.
15 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 6.
16 See David Elliot, ‘Hope in Theology’, in Steven C. van den Heuvel, ed., Historical and Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Hope (Cham: Springer, 2020), p. 123. Note that this is the position eventually achieved in the Summa, to which I have referred throughout. However, as N. Lombardo pointed out, Aquinas’ view of the object of hope evolved: ‘In his Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas holds there is one object of hope, namely God. In the Summa, Aquinas holds that there are two goods or objects to which hope tends: God and the assistance necessary to reach our final end’ (The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion [Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011], p. 156 n. 35). Aquinas’ passages to which Lombardo refers are Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum III d. 26, q. 2, a. 2 and Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, aa. 4 and 7, and q. 19, a. 1.
17 At least on a paradigmatic level, ‘the believer does not hope for God as one might instrumentally use something created in order to achieve a specific personal perfection’ (Romanus Cessario, ‘The theological virtue of hope’, in Stephen Pope, ed., The Ethics of Aquinas [Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002], p. 235).
18 See David Elliot, ‘Hope in Theology’, p. 122.
19 Thomas also says that, in addition to the hope of attaining goodness through God, there is the fear of God, caused by the evils avoided through union with Him. Based on what has been said so far, it is evident that ‘both of these attitudes, by their very nature, derive from the imperfect love of God’ (Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 3).
20 However, this does not mean that those who have perfect love or charity, and then perfect or formed hope, are not viatores: ‘Both the one who presumes and the one who despairs live as if the human person has already and permanently arrived at one final end or another … Aquinas implicitly characterizes both presumption and despair as types of false rest – false because they deny that one is yet in via’ (Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, ‘Practicing Hope’, in Adam C. Pelser and W. Scott Cleveland, eds, Faith and Virtue Formation. Christian Philosophy in Aid of Becoming Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 170).
21 Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 1, ad 4.
22 As is well known, the traditional doctrine to which Aquinas himself adheres is that the corresponding habits are bestowed simultaneously by grace (see Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 62, a. 4), for example by baptism. These are referred to as ‘infused virtues’.
23 Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 3.
24 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 2.
25 Some might argue that if Aquinas views hope as certain, then his assertion that presumption is a vice related to hope by excess is incorrect. How could presumption be an excess of hope if hope is already characterized by firmness? In reply, let me point out that, although Aquinas clearly states that presumption is a vice, he does not consider it quantitatively (see Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 21, a. 4). While commenting on Herbert McCabe’s reflections on the theological virtues, especially hope, Elisabeth Phillips states that ‘presumption is not an excess of hope but rather hope wrongly oriented’ (Elisabeth Phillips, Apocalyptic Theopolitics [Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2022], p. 141).
26 Robert Miner thus suggests that despair should be viewed as a ‘perverse act of will caused by sin’. However, if hope is considered a passion directed towards a specific good rather than the universal good, then despair is not necessarily negative. In fact, ‘the passion of despair in human beings may signal the advisability of giving up when the arduous good proves impossible to obtain’ (Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], p. 220).
27 Thomas makes it clear that the object of hope must be a future good that is difficult to achieve, yet possible. This distinguishes hope from fear, joy, pleasure, desire and despair (see Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 1).
28 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, arg. 3.
29 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3. Lombardo conveys the shift in focus from knowledge to a loving relationship with God effectively in the following sentence: ‘For Aquinas, hope involves certain expectation, but this certain expectation is an affective tending toward God, not a judgement about the future’ (Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire. Aquinas on Emotion, p. 156). In other words, ‘acts of theological hope are not acts of knowing’ (ibid., p. 157).
30 This is why certainty can only characterize theological hope, whereas secular hope is characterized by ‘vain optimism’ (David Elliot, Hope and Christian Ethics, p. 61).
31 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 4, a. 7, ad2.
32 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 7, ad1.
33 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 8. See also Disputed Question on Hope, a. 3. Daniel Schwarz elegantly summarises this position: ‘Because we both desire and hope for happiness, we come to love the being who can make this happiness possible. The believer loves God first with interested love: he loves Him because His assistance is instrumental to the prosecution of his own goal’ (Daniel Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007], § 5.2.1.4).
34 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 83, a. 9.
35 As Christopher Kaczor points out, ‘infused with hope, human beings can endure even the worst of circumstances. Lacking hope, even an earthly palace can feel like a prison’ (Christopher Kaczor, ‘Introduction to Hope’, in Christopher Kaczor, ed., Thomas Aquinas on Faith, Hope, and Love [Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008], p. 83).
36 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 62, a. 4.
37 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 7.
38 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
39 See Roberto Di Ceglie, Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity, pp. 115-23; see also Roberto Di Ceglie, ‘Aquinas on Faith and Charity’, New Blackfriars 102 (2021), pp. 551ff.
40 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 5, a. 2.
41 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3.
42 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2.
43 Traditionally, it has been taught that mortal sin causes a person’s faith to become formless by nullifying their charity, and Thomas is part of this tradition. However, mortal sin can be forgiven. Consequently, charity can be regained and faith can be formed again.
44 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 4, a. 1. I proposed this interpretation in Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity, Ch. 5.
45 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, ad 2.
46 Aquinas, Disputed Question on Hope, a. 3, ad 12.
47 Thanks are due to two anonymous reviewers for this journal. I found some of their comments on the first draft of this essay very useful.