One of the goals of this paper is to define the most important concepts for the comparative study of the constitutional risk management of the V4 countries. For this purpose, first, it considers the theoretical difficulties of conceptualising emergencies, especially focussing on what kind of response can be given to the widespread view that considers emergencies as a kind of legal “black hole” due to their unpredictability. Then a general definition of “emergency” is discussed which is broad and flexible enough to serve as a basis not only for a comparative study but also for the constitutional discourse of emergencies. Constitutional crisis management as a core concept for such an undertaking is also canvassed. After defining the basic concepts essential for evaluation and comparison, the article outlines the general types of emergency regulatory regimes. The development of effective regulatory systems for emergencies also has to face certain problems that every constitutional polity must solve. Finally, the paper summarises assessment criteria necessary for the evaluation and a comparison of the emergency constitutions of different countries.

European constitutions differ greatly in the depth to which they deal with emergencies: while many constitutions devote more or less detailed regulation to emergency regimes, others almost completely neglect these issues or dedicate only some very short and vague references to emergency situations and powers. This article aims to carry out a systematic comparison of the emergency-related provisions of forty European constitutions, focusing on (1) the level of detail of the regulation, (2) the emergency regimes addressed, and (3) the restrictions on fundamental rights. As the study points out, only two out of the forty constitutions are completely silent on emergency powers. However, the remaining thirty-eight constitutions show wide variation in the level of detail of the emergency regulation; the vast majority of the emergency regimes are related to war or armed attack (or the danger thereof), to internal crises threatening the constitutional order, and to natural disasters. Concerning fundamental rights, the examination of the constitutional texts confirms that twenty-five out of the forty constitutions encompass some provisions on the restriction of these rights in a state of emergency.

The paper outlines Czech constitutional law and the development of emergency law. Initially, the legislature did not expect emergencies to occur, perhaps due to the idealistic optimism associated with the general atmosphere of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the “End of History” thesis. As a result, emergencies were not regulated by Czech law in the 1990s. This changed after the great floods at the end of the 1990s, when “history returned,” and the need for some special rules for emergencies became clear. The first decades of this century showed that Czech emergency law worked well for short-term natural disasters. The game-changer came in 2020, with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for a long-term state of emergency. It soon became clear that the rules that worked for floods and other disasters did not work for long-term global pandemics. In other words, the legal system was not prepared for a situation in which emergencies were the rule rather than the exception. Legislators were unable to prepare a long-term legislative response to fill this gap. The memory of COVID-19 is fading fast, and there are no plans to reform the relevant legislation. Accordingly, any new pandemic or similar event will lead to the same problems that the Czech legal system had to deal with from 2020 to 2022.

The paper offers a comprehensive overview of Hungary’s emergency law and its misuse over the four years since its introduction in March 2020. Hungary serves as a clear example of how a “state of danger” – initially intended as an exceptional legal measure – can become normalised through repeated declarations. The populist government’s continuous use of emergency powers has led to unchecked lawmaking and the manipulation of legal frameworks to advance populist agendas. The article argues that while Hungary’s detailed emergency provisions in the Fundamental Law were intended to serve as a form of constitutional risk management, after four years of living in a permanent “state of danger”, the scholarly debate has shifted to whether this very risk management has itself become the risk. According to emergency law theory, managing constitutional risks is equally vital in the emergency legal order. Yet in Hungary, both the black letter of the law and the constitutional practices observed during and after the COVID-19 pandemic – along with the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, which introduced a new emergency regime in 2021 – reveal that constitutional risk management has ultimately failed. This is manifest in the erosion of the separation of powers, the weakening of judicial review, and the shrinking of human rights protections. The article substantiates its argument by examining the related constitutional framework and constitutional practice in Hungary between 2020 and 2024.

This article analyses the constitutional framework regulating states of emergency in Poland and addresses key issues related to their interpretation and implementation. The first part discusses the conditions for declaring martial law, a state of an extraordinary situation, and a state of natural disaster, as well as the specific rules for the operation of public authorities in such emergencies. The next part analyses the practice, revealing the consistent reluctance of Polish authorities to invoke states of emergency, even in circumstances that seem to justify such measures. Consequently, a state of emergency under the 1997 Constitution was declared in Poland only once – in 2021, in response to a migration crisis on the border with Belarus. No constitutional emergency was declared during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the introduction of far-reaching restrictions on individual rights and freedoms. The article argues that state authorities can abuse emergency regulations, either through their unjustified application or by deliberately circumventing them.

This article contributes to understanding how inexperience and lack of commitment to evidence-based decision making may undermine an otherwise broadly functional framework for constitutional risk management. As part of a focus on the “Visegrád Four” countries, it also helps understand regional dynamics since the COVID-19 pandemic as the most visible emergency after 1989. The article starts with a brief elucidation of the political contexts that have shaped Slovakia’s constitutional risk management, focusing on the developments from 2020 through early 2025. An analysis of mechanisms of emergency risk management in the constitutional framework follows, that helps identify key state authorities attempting to make decisions under serious time pressures. The implementation of the constitutional framework during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the creation of new avenues for restricting rights and bolstering executive competence, with the formally powerful constitutional review mechanisms struggling to challenge these decisions. Ultimately, political context emerges as key: Slovakia entered the COVID-19 pandemic with a governing coalition enjoying constitutional majority and an aura of reform and hope. The emergency mismanagement not only facilitated the breakup of this coalition and early elections, but also a rise in emergency conspiracies openly hostile to institutions and actors committed to evidence-based decision making.

Our special issue examines the regulation and practice of constitutional risk management in the V(isegrád)-4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Unfortunately, the treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic made this enterprise relevant, as all four countries had to face a similar health emergency. This article presents the most important experiences and trends in the constitutional crisis management of the four countries, identifying the challenges that the constitutional emergency regulatory regimes have encountered so far. Our paper argues that despite the basically similar constitutional frameworks, these countries typically handled the crisis in a different way, and in the process many constitutional problems arose for which there was no clear or uniform solution. Since the purpose of the international comparative research that is the basis of our special issue was to examine the emergency constitution of these four countries in general (since it will have to be applied to possible later, other types of emergencies), in the last chapter of the article we examine the possibilities of a proposition that represents a novelty in the constitutional discourse on emergency situations: this is an option for the convergence of emergency constitutions.

After an introduction to the notions of cybersecurity and cybersecurity-related risks, this preface introduces four collected contributions on challenges and perspectives of EU cybersecurity policies in cyber-physical ecosystem.

The swift proliferation of connected devices in the Internal Market brought attention to their weak cybersecurity standard, reflected by widespread and oftentimes unpatched vulnerabilities and successful cyberattacks. Attacks on cyber-physical systems have a critical impact not only on the Union’s economy but also on consumers’ health, safety, and fundamental rights. Against the background of the failure of the cybersecurity market of connected devices, the 10 December 2024 entered into force Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act, CRA). After casting light on the three regulatory foundational choices underpinning this EU legal act in the field of cybersecurity (ie, horizontal approach, risk-based approach, product safety approach), the article investigates the extent to which the CRA enhances the protection of fundamental rights, as claimed in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission’s proposal.

Cybersecurity is a concern to be tackled not only by individual States but also by the European Union as a whole. Building on the recent adoption of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, the so-called Cyber Solidarity Act, the study intends to analyse the creation of a supranational capacity to prevent and respond to cyber incidents, by answering the following questions: how and to what extent is solidarity concretely declined in the act in question? How do the mechanisms provided for by this act concretely interact with the Member States’ prerogatives in the broader security domain?

In the early 2000, cybersecurity breaches were classified as “Internet crimes” and therefore managed through the tools of the criminal justice system. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime forged new incriminating provisions and new procedural guidelines, updating the categories of criminal law and criminal procedure for the digital age. This style, unfortunately, has proved to be insufficient. To face the growing number of threats, the EU has shifted towards a much more preemptive, administrative-law-based approach to cybersecurity, with a view to protect critical infrastructure and industries from disruptive attacks. The criminal layer, however, has not been replaced: the relevant, international instruments are still there, and they have been recently extended to cover more ground. The essay will examine the new wave of legislation on cybercrime such as the United Nations Cybercrime Treaty, trying to identify the interactions and the frictions between two different contrast strategies to abusive cyber operations.

The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based surveillance technologies such as facial recognition for national and public security purposes in the area of law enforcement raises serious concerns regarding the potential risks of abuse and arbitrariness it might entail, in the absence of adequate safeguards. At an international level, the impact of biometric identification systems on the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been consistently emphasised by international organisations, human rights monitoring mechanisms and the civil society, particularly with regards to the risk of mass surveillance possibly resulting in the infringement upon the right of privacy and freedom of assembly. This contribution will assess the international human rights and standards applicable to the use of these technologies for national security purposes especially in the context of peaceful protest by assessing the position of the European Court of Human Rights in Glukhin v Russia (11519/20) and recent regulatory attempts.

Toxic substances and endocrine disruptors are present in consumer goods on the European Union (EU) market, such as in food contact materials like cookware. This article investigates whether a legal recall obligation of such products exists in EU law, and in the absence of such an obligation, how the EU legislature has ensured that such products are disposed of in a manner that does not compromise human health and the environment when they become waste. For this purpose, this Article analyses recall obligations for food contact materials containing persistent organic pollutants, as well as their waste regulations. It focuses on a class of substances with non-stick properties, some of them formerly used in cookware, such as pentadecafluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS). We show that there is no single legal recall obligation; rather, many legal obligations are scattered among different provisions of EU law. When read together, they form a complex web of obligations, which may lead to recall measures for most of these products. However, doubts over the feasibility and effectiveness of such recalls remain.

Regulation is nothing without enforcement. This particularly holds for the dynamic field of emerging technologies. Hence, this article has two ambitions. First, it explains how the EU’s new Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) may be implemented and enforced by various institutional bodies, thus clarifying the governance framework of the AIA. Second, it proposes a normative governance model, providing recommendations to ensure uniform and coordinated execution of the AIA and the fulfillment of the legislation. The article explores how the AIA may be implemented by national and EU institutional bodies, encompassing longstanding bodies, such as the European Commission, and those newly established under the AIA, such as the AI Office. It investigates their roles across supranational and national levels, emphasising how EU regulations influence institutional structures and operations. These regulations may not only directly dictate the structural design of institutions but also indirectly request administrative capacities needed to enforce the AIA.

The 2022–2023 Qatargate scandal – which entailed the widespread undermining of Union democracy by members of the European Parliament acting on behalf of third countries – has rocked the European Union to its core. The proposal by the Commission aimed at establishing transparency and accountability surrounding such activities cannot therefore come at a more appropriate time. But does the proposal live up to its objectives? Here, this piece casts doubt on whether that is the case, with this piece exploring Qatargate as an example, as well as the content, constitutionality, and criticism of the proposal. This Article also makes comparisons to Union-based representation activities and the Commission’s approach to antidumping, and shines light on the Commission’s treatment of third-country actors and representatives thereof.

The analysis of liability aspects facing Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’)-generated outputs under copyright and related rights has been overlooked compared to other issues connected to the development and use of AI. This study fills this gap by exploring pertinent questions under international, EU and UK law. Specifically, the study tackles actionable reproduction, allocation of liability, and availability of defences. The analysis ultimately shows that, while it is clear that each case will need to be decided on its own merits, the generative AI output phase raises several profiles of liability under copyright law. If the goal of policymakers and relevant stakeholders is to ensure the balanced and sustainable development of AI, then the issues related to the generation and dissemination of AI outputs need to be given ample attention and a greater role in the debate than what has been the case so far, whether it is in the context of risk assessment and compliance, licensing initiatives, or in contentious scenarios.

This article discusses the EU supply chain legislation, by virtue of the recently adopted Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which aims to reduce negative sustainability impacts in global supply chains with regard to a list of human rights and environmental standards specified in its Annex I of the CSDDD.

We argue that the CSDDD marks a fundamental change on the EU level, from disclosure duties to mandating prevention of, and compensation for, adverse sustainability impacts in supply chains.

We further find that the CSDDD is a legal transplant combining the principles laid down in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business and those of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, along with elements of French supply chain legislation from 2017 (which relies on a private enforcement model) and the German supply chain law from 2021 (which is based on a public enforcement model). Like all legal transplants, the resulting legal text generally prompts questions about consistency and specifically raises doubts as to whether combining all of the components of a private and a public enforcement model is proportionate for the purpose of the CSDDD which is to ensure that companies take effective steps to counter violations of human rights and environmental standards in global supply chains. The scope provisions (including smaller in-scope EU firms while leaving non-EU peers of a similar size aside) paired with significant high compliance burden provide grounds to argue that the CSDDD impacts on the competitiveness of these smaller in-scope EU companies, and thus the EU economy at large.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union (EU) observed a major centralisation of competence in public health policy – the EU Vaccines Strategy. Yet increased centralisation or integration is not always desirable because the EU lacks a layer of democratic control to ensure transparency and accountability. This feature highlights the need to better understand and assess the EU’s actions during the pandemic. This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the EU Vaccines Strategy and contributes to the wider debate on the centralisation of power at Union level. The joint procurement of COVID-19 vaccines is considered a success, as it avoided a “vaccine scramble” by the EU Member States. However, the fact that the Member States were obliged to purchase more than they needed and the lack of transparency in the negotiations with companies on the procurement of vaccines have raised questions about the integrity of the Commission’s exercise of executive power.

The impact of the European Union (EU) in strengthening nanotechnology risk regulation in non-EU countries is still an under-researched topic. This article focuses on the EU’s influence on its trading partners, using the case study of Israel, which in 2023 adopted restrictions on nanotechnology in cosmetics products following the EU. It is argued that EU risk regulation have been both a trigger and a formative factor for the development of Israeli nanomaterials restrictions. The importance and economic interdependence in the EU market for cosmetics has prompted a response from Israeli policymakers. In addition, the EU regulatory capacity through its expertise and sanctioning authority have influenced the Israeli regulatory agenda. The article shows that the impact of EU regulation also coincided with domestic economic factors, concerns about technology policy and policymakers’ preference for stringent standards. Israel’s risk regulation of nanomaterials in cosmetics provides a useful case study for analyzing the EU’s regulatory impact on its trading partners. Once again, stricter EU’s health and safety regulation drives those of its trading partner upward.