Trade and human rights have had a complex and contentious relationship. While trade experts assume that human rights and trade law are mutually supportive, human rights lawyers have seldom shared this opinion. Rather, they argue that across different contexts, such as climate change, culture, and development, the hard rules of international trade law focus almost exclusively on economic values and sideline human rights. This essay seeks to shed more light on these interfaces, focusing particularly on the tensions between trade law and the first generation of human rights, like privacy and free speech, that have been rarely discussed so far. It also addresses a gap in the literature on international economic law and human rights with respect to the impact of digitization. In particular, the essay focuses on the human rights implications of digital trade rulemaking, as a relatively new and dynamic subset of international trade law.

The links between and among digital trade, development, and inequality are multifaceted and ever evolving. They depend on what is understood as development and as inequality, concepts that transcend the North-South divide, and the fora in which these issues arise. Conceptually, development and inequality are intrinsically intertwined as the measures to address both are often complementary or even the same. In this essay, we consider development and inequality as pertaining to the ability of developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) to shape and participate in the digital economy, and particularly, the regulatory framework for digital trade. We explore how the relationships between digital trade, development, and inequality are addressed in the main venues for digital trade rulemaking: the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). We then examine two contentious issues in digital trade: the customs duty moratorium and data governance.

This essay addresses the challenges of the digital economy in the context of cybersecurity threats that have growing implications for national security. It analyzes cybersecurity-related exceptions to international trade rules to explore whether and how these exceptions protect the state's digital policy space. The essay argues that the pre-digital era exceptions to trade rules are too narrowly framed to address cybersecurity concerns. This is in contrast to trends in the new generation of international trade agreements that create expansive security exceptions that are designed to reset the balance between international trade and national security. These new approaches must, however, be carefully guarded against potential abuses.

Scholarship concerned with international law, technology, and computation has been burgeoning since the mid-to-late twentieth century. Over the past decade, it has taken shape as a discernible sub-field of international legal scholarship. An International Law and Technology Interest Group was created within the American Society of International Law in 2013, for instance. By 2021, international law and technology was already considered ripe for “rethinking.” Some of this work has been solutionist, aimed at generating order-restoring answers to the “upset[s]” caused by technological change. Some of it has been constitutionalizing, canvassing prospects for “a transformative constitutionalism for the digital human condition.” Much of the scholarship has sought to give humanist (or post-humanist) pause to the ever-increasing pace of technological change.

The making of legal subjects has long been a crucial terrain for critical theory, also in relation to international law, where both emancipatory promises and expressions of power or discipline are tied to how subjects are recognized and enacted. International law's modes of subject-making have therefore been an important site of aspiration, struggle, and critique. While some have celebrated the rise of the individual on the stage of international law, the liberal ideal of legal and political subjectivity lingering in these celebratory accounts has been confronted by different strands of feminist, post-colonial, and Marxist critique. With proliferating use of digital technologies in practices of (global) governance, the making of legal subjects has taken novel forms. Big data manufacture subjects in ways that spark new legal anxieties and destabilize or problematize established patterns of critical engagement. In data-driven practices that we will describe, subjects are no longer exclusively enacted as abstract autonomous entities or classified along stable criteria (of difference or enmity). Sustained by tools of pattern recognition and technologies for the “unsupervised uncovering of correlations,” nascent forms of global governance by data produce subjects as transient clusters of attributes and data points within transient clusters of attributes and data points—bundles of vectors within vectors, only tentatively and temporarily tied together. In this essay, we map out how this mode of subject-making has become prevalent in different domains of international legal practice. We trace these dynamics to changes in the exercise of state sovereignty and the technoscopic regimes—assemblages for information flow, processing, retention, and surveillance—that states rely on.

In a global context where political campaigning, social movements, and public discourse increasingly take place online, questions regarding the regulation of speech by social media platforms become ever more relevant. Companies like Facebook moderate content posted by users on their platforms through a mixture of automated decision making and human moderators. In this content moderation process, human rights play an ambiguous role: those who struggle with marginalization may find a space for expression and empowerment, or face exacerbation of pre-existing bias. Focusing on the role of human rights in Meta's content management, this essay explores how the protection of speech on social media platforms disadvantages the cultural, social, and economic rights of marginalized communities. This is not to say that speech on social media platforms is devoid of emancipatory potential, but that this potential is not uniformly or equally accessible. We see the incorporation of human rights considerations into decision-making processes as an avenue for alleviating this challenge. This approach faces obstacles from the platforms’ business models, which decenters human rights concerns, and from the limitations of liberal accounts of human rights. From within and against these constraints, human rights can be mobilized as emancipatory power in an effort to decrease marginalization.

The adoption of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the steady development of international environmental law in the twentieth century shaped the marine environment as an object of legal protection. However, the exponential growth of substantive obligations to protect the marine environment, conserve marine biodiversity, and prevent marine pollution, has been largely ineffective due to lack of enforcement. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) deployed for marine environmental protection are seen, in scholarship and policy, as a means to close the enforcement gap, thereby revolutionizing the field by significantly increasing states’ maritime awareness. In contrast, our tentative analysis shows that while UAVs can translate complex environmental concerns into data readily available for analysis and action, such datafication of marine environments comes with high risks. More specifically, datafication enables multiple uses of gathered data, including for surveillance, military, and commercial purposes. These concerns tend to fall outside current debates on the international regulation of the use of UAVs in marine environments. In our essay, we explore whether international law recognizes the possibilities and risks involved in deploying UAVs into the marine environment. We draw on doctrinal and posthuman feminist legal approaches to analyze how UAVs interact with the wider context of “marine ecosystem bodies” in terms of international law, as well as how those terms may need to be reconfigured to accommodate the complexity of the many actors, agents, and materials of marine ecosystems.

Databases are increasingly used in international law settings. This requires new strategies for those who want to critique international legal practices and their effects. In this essay, we claim that legal scholarship tends to conceptualize the database in ways that leave older and inadequate ideas of legal method(s) and sovereignty in the context of international law largely unquestioned or even serve to reinforce them. Further, we argue that these tendencies obstruct proper understandings of international legal practices and prevent adequate critique. To illustrate the extent of these tendencies, we provide examples from our own research areas: migration law and international corporate income tax law. We contend that empirical studies of how databases are used in these and other legal settings, can help demystify and rework well-established assumptions through which international law, and the database, are seen.

From the continuation of colonial power structures in global economic development institutions, to immigration policies that favor applicants from white-majority European countries, to the use of counter-terrorism law to target primarily Muslim people, international law and its domestic analogues reflect and further inscribe racial distinctions and hierarchies. Racialization in international law occurs in the more visible areas of public decision making but also in mundane, administrative practices. In this essay, I argue that digital technologies are at the heart of automating processes of racialization in international law. Digital technological instruments effectively divide the global population, decision by decision, in adherence to the logics of racial hierarchy: they distribute social and material rights and privileges through financial, welfare, and immigration decisions while simultaneously deepening and entrenching state surveillance, policing, and violence.

In July 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. Its proponents hope that the resolution will catalyze further action, but many of the states voting for it expressed the view that it has no legal effect in itself. Will UN recognition of this right nevertheless change international law? If so, how? This symposium brings together the perspectives of six distinguished scholars on this question. Philip Alston and Carmen Gonzalez examine how recognition may change our understanding of human rights law; Hélène Tigroudja and Maria Antonia Tigre analyze its impact on the burgeoning environmental jurisprudence of the UN human rights treaty bodies and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Rosemary Mwanza explores how the right may affect parallel efforts to codify the crime of ecocide; and Louis Kotzé concludes by arguing that the right still falls short of the transformational shift necessary to recognize and protect the rights of nature and of future generations. Before describing their contributions in more detail, this introduction reviews the background of the resolution and describes its main provisions.

The lengthy process culminating in the UN General Assembly's recognition of the right to a healthy environment provides important insights into the nature of today's international human rights regime. In particular, it shows that human rights have moved well beyond the impoverished conceptions of rights that dominated the second part of the last century, that new norms develop in ways that are more complex and flexible than traditional doctrinal accounts would suggest, and that today's process of norm generation involves a wide and diverse array of actors, with states sometimes struggling to keep up.

This essay explores the implications of the right to a healthy environment for the long-standing criticisms of international human rights law as a project and product of the Global North. It examines the Southern origins of the right to a healthy environment and its interpretations in regional human rights tribunals. The essay analyzes the responses offered by this evolving jurisprudence to various objections to human rights-based approaches to environmental protection. These include the human rights-based framework's individualism, anthropocentrism, failure to address transboundary harm, and failure to challenge the economic law instruments that perpetuate environmental degradation.

Since the end of the 2010s, some of the UN human rights treaty bodies have affirmed and enhanced states’ obligations in relation to the environment. This “green turn,” deeply influenced by the jurisprudence of the regional human rights tribunals and the work of UN Special Procedures, raises the question of the potential recognition of an autonomous right to a healthy environment—that is, a free-standing right that is not primarily derived from existing human rights. The claim of this essay is that in the absence of a clear mandate from states to the treaty bodies to monitor the implementation of the right, its symbolic affirmation will have only limited impact. Inspired by the discussions at the Council of Europe on the adoption of a new Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights, states at the UN level should go further and work toward a binding protocol. However, this raises the difficult issue of connecting the right to civil and political rights, to economic, social, and cultural rights, or to a specific instrument such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Ultimately, this essay reflects the shortcomings of the binary approach separating human rights into hermetic categories.

Although there is still no United Nations treaty on the right to a healthy environment, the recognition of the right by the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council have helped solidify its status as customary international law. The overwhelming recognition of the right at the national and regional levels, and now at the United Nations, evidences greater uniformity and certainty in understanding human rights obligations relating to the environment. But what value do the resolutions add to the regional recognition of the right in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)? Through judicial and legislative developments, LAC has provided fertile ground for the flourishing of the right to a healthy environment. The region has seen some of the most innovative responses to the fragmented fields of human rights and the environment, providing a model for progressive legal development. Within this context, this essay focuses on how UN recognition of the new right may impact the burgeoning law on human rights and the environment in LAC. I argue that the resolutions should support the already rich environmental and climate jurisprudence in the region to realize the full potential of the right to a healthy environment. The right to a healthy environment can further solidify the role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) as a leading human rights court in environmental protection, with wide-ranging implications for rights-based environmental (and climate) litigation.

This essay explores some of the reasons why the recognition by the UN General Assembly of the human right to a healthy environment could catalyze the codification of ecocide as a crime under international law. It argues that even though the two concepts fall within distinct areas of international law, their potential for a synergistic interaction derives from the right's rhetorical and normative aspects. The right's rhetorical dimension refers to the communicative value derived from phrasing calls for responsive action in the language of rights, while the right's normative dimension alludes to its legal or juridical character.

In this essay I reflect upon whether and how the recent international recognition of the right to a healthy environment might––or might not––provide greater support for efforts to define and protect the rights of what one could term “law's hidden subjects,” namely future generations and nature. Although there are several examples of rights-based regimes that aim to protect future generations and nature, few would disagree that these hidden subjects require better legal protection, and that thoroughgoing reform of existing human rights law is overdue. I argue that the international recognition of a human right to a healthy environment might contribute less to such reforms than what one would have intuitively expected. One reason for this is because the formulation of the right does not provide anything new in terms of more comprehensive recognition and protection of rights of nature and future generations. Although it is an important symbolic event that signifies broad consensus on the importance of rights-based environmental protection, many domestic and regional legal regimes already protect future generations, while some even offer innovative rights of nature provisions. At best, UN General Assembly Resolution 76/300 merely reinforces the status quo ante.

The International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International (IDI) were both founded in 1873 at a critical juncture in the history of pacifism and internationalism, in the immediate aftermath of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War and the 1872 British-American Alabama arbitration. Frustrated by the blatant violations of international rules during the war and then emboldened by the arbitral resolution of the protracted Alabama dispute between Britain and the United States, pacifists and international jurists joined forces to promote an ordered system of international law and advocate for legalized international dispute settlement. The aim was to marshal the scattered reformist forces of international law in furtherance of international legal reform—“international law needed to be institutionalized,” as Gerald Fitzmaurice put it.1 This resulted in the almost simultaneous establishment of the pacifism-originated ILA and the legal-scientism-oriented IDI, and helped to explain the similarity in institutional telos and the high degree of overlap in membership between the two institutions in their early years.2 Nevertheless, the ILA and the IDI differed in their working agendas and strategies. In terms of agendas, while the ILA tended to adopt an idealist view of international law hardly succumbing to compromises, the IDI mainly adhered to a scientifically pragmatic approach. With respect to strategies, the ILA sought social influence based on expansive membership, while the IDI's membership consisted of a limited number of international jurists. Despite changes over time, these organizational structures and distinctions between the two institutions at their founding moment are still visible.

The 150th anniversary of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) and the International Law Association (ILA) provides an opportunity to assess the role of legal scholarship in the codification and institutionalization of international law. This essay argues that academic expertise is a form of social and political capital that is at once individual, institutional, and structural. Empirically focused on international dispute settlement mechanisms (interstate adjudication and arbitration), this essay underscores that academic expertise shapes the professional status of international lawyers, and influences the clout of international institutions as codifiers of international law.

This essay examines the activities of the Institute of International Law (the Institute or IIL) during its 150 years of existence, dealing directly or indirectly with the colonial phenomenon. It distinguishes between two major periods of roughly equal length: first the period between the years 1873 and 1945; and second, the period from 1945 to the present. These correspond to two important periods of international relations: the second wave of colonial expansion and its remnants and the regime of mandates following World War I, on the one hand, and the era of the United Nations Charter, the promotion of human rights, self-determination, and decolonialization, on the other hand.