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146 results in Trends in Southeast Asia

Page 5 of 8

Between Social Services and Tolerance
  • Explaining Religious Dynamics in Muhammadiyah
  • Ahmad Najib Burhani
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 January 2020
    Print publication:
    20 September 2019
  • Muhammadiyah, together with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), are seen as the two pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah is currently often perceived to be the more conservative of the two and to have more affinity with Islamist groups. On political issues, for instance, it is steered by Islamist imagery. On cultural issues, Muhammadiyah is often guided by old enmity towards what is called the TBC (takhayul, bid'ah dan churafat; delusions, religious innovation without precedence in the Prophetic traditions and the Qur'an, and superstitions or irrational belief). This position has placed Muhammadiyah in an uneasy relationship with both local cultures and traditionalist Islam. Three issues that were raised in 2017—the banning of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the recurrent controversy on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan—are issues where Muhammadiyah has been easily drawn towards Islamist and conservative tendencies.Be that as it may, Muhammadiyah remains a social movement guided by its long-held theology of al- Mā`ūn (kindness) and with a strong emphasis on social services. It is this doctrine that has prevented Muhammadiyah from dwelling on mythical or abstract issues and neutralized it against Islamism, making its members more realistic in viewing the world, more prone to distancing themselves from the utopian vision of a caliphate, from the dream of shariah as the Messiah that will solve every problem, and from the temptation to create an Islamic state.The "pragmatic Islamism" that Muhammadiyah has adopted allows it to handle social dynamics well.

Whither Myanmar's Garment Sector?
  • Nick J. Freeman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    24 January 2020
    Print publication:
    14 March 2019
  • The EU has threatened to suspend Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status for Myanmar, under which the country's exports can enter Europe without any tariffs or quotas. The official reason cited by the EU is a growing concern over human rights violations and issues around labour rights in Myanmar. If this threat were to be carried out, the business sector that will be most affected is Myanmar's burgeoning garment sector, which employs around 700,000 people, most of whom are women. The principal worry in Myanmar is that if EU buyers and brands have to start paying tariffs to import Myanmar-made garments, then they will opt to shift their sourcing to other countries. Without GSP, Myanmar's garment exports may no longer be price competitive. As one of the few manufacturing sectors in Myanmar to employ semi-skilled women, many of whom migrated from poor rural areas, the garment sector has come to play an important socioeconomic role in the country. Whether or not the EU decides to withdraw GSP status, Myanmar's garment sector faces a number of challenges. How Myanmar's policymakers and garment industry leaders respond to global industry trends will be just as important, in the long run, in determining the sector's commercial sustainability.

Military Capitalism in Myanmar
  • Examining the Origins, Continuities and Evolution of "Khaki Capital"
  • Gerard McCarthy
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    24 January 2020
    Print publication:
    06 March 2019
  • Military enterprises, ostensibly set up to feed and supply soldiers, were some of the earliest and largest Burmese commercial conglomerates, established in the 1950s. Union Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are two profit-seeking military enterprises established by the military after the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1988, which remain central players in Myanmar's post-2011 economy. Military conglomerates are a major source of off-budget revenue for the military and a main employer of retired soldiers. Yet few veterans receive more than a small piece of the profits from UMEHL. The vast bulk of formal dividends instead disproportionately benefit higher ranking officers and institutions within the Tatmadaw. Military capitalism entrenches the autonomy of the Tatmadaw from civilian oversight. Despite this, obligatory or semi-coerced contributions from active-duty soldiers are a source of cash flow for UMEHL, effectively constituting a transfer from the government budget to the military's off-budget entities. The most significant source of livelihoods support for most veterans is the service pension dispersed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoPF). Despite delivering suboptimal welfare outcomes for most soldiers and veterans while eroding the legitimacy of ceasefires, successive governments since 1988, including Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, have entrenched military capitalism by encouraging commercial activities of armed groups that enter into ceasefire agreements. Extending military pensions already paid by the Ministry of Planning and Finance to retired members of armed groups could deliver a far more consistent and tangible "peace dividend" than the commercial extraction of resources from ceasefire areas. More balanced civil-military relations, and fairer social outcomes for military personnel, will rely on civilian-led state institutions delivering effective and substantive welfare support beyond the commercially oriented welfare arrangements of military conglomerates.

The Significance of Everyday Access to Justice in Myanmar's Transition to Democracy
  • Helene Maria Kyed
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    24 January 2020
    Print publication:
    13 June 2019
  • Legal pluralism in Myanmar is a reality that is not sufficiently recognized. A lack of recognition of and clear mandates for the informal justice providers, along with the absence of coordination between these providers and the judiciary, present critical challenges to local dispute resolution and informal legal systems. This results in a high level of unpredictability and insecurity concerning the justice outcomes and in the underreporting of cases. The lack of jurisdictional clarity represents an even greater challenge in areas of mixed control and where numerous armed actors are present. Discussion of reform of the justice sector in Myanmar and debates surrounding peace negotiations and the role of the ethnic armed groups in service provision are separated. This situation reinforces the divide between ceasefire areas and the rest of the country and raises concern that the improvement of justice systems will leave conflict-affected populations behind. Recognition of and support for community-based dispute resolution are crucial to reducing the escalation of conflict at the local level. Justice systems like those of ethnic armed groups can contribute significantly to stability and order at times when the official system has limited territorial reach and is mistrusted by civilians.

Interreligious Conflict and the Politics of Interfaith Dialogue in Myanmar
  • Nyi Nyi Kyaw
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    23 January 2020
    Print publication:
    26 June 2019
  • Amidst successive episodes of interreligious violence in Myanmar between 2012 and 2014, interfaith dialogue emerged as a crucial conflict resolution and prevention mechanism. The 2011–16 Union Solidarity and Development Party administration often indirectly promoted the use of interfaith dialogue to defuse interreligious tensions and conflicts, though its political will was questionable. Various governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors have engaged in interfaith dialogue, peace, and harmony initiatives in the past seven years. The present National League for Democracy administration has more actively sought to engage in intrafaith promotion of Buddhism and in interfaith peace and harmony initiatives. Intergovernmental, international and local interfaith actors also work in the interfaith dialogue field, but their impact is relatively weak because the government remains the most important actor in Myanmar in transition. Although the National League for Democracy has largely eliminated Buddhist nationalist groups such as Ma Ba Tha, Buddhist identity politics remains influential after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army's attacks in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017 and the consequent refugee crisis. Although extreme anti-Muslim Buddhist identity politics may not see a resurgence in the approach to the 2020 general elections, it may come back in more nuanced forms. Interfaith dialogue and other training and activities for interreligious peace and harmony will thus remain relevant to the political scene.

Emerging Political Configurations in the Run-up to the 2020 Myanmar Elections
  • Aung Aung
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    23 January 2020
    Print publication:
    04 January 2019
  • While facing international pressures relating to Rakhine State, and under tense civil—military relations, political parties are preparing for the 2020 Myanmar general elections. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the ruling party, is taking a more democratic platform focusing on the creation of a democratic federal union, while the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) adopts a more nationalist approach, emphasizing the prevention of foreign interference regarding Rakhine State. Taking lessons from the 2015 Myanmar general elections, and in order to effectively contend with the NLD and the USDP, the ethnic political parties are at the same time merging into single parties and new political parties are now also being registered at the Union Election Commission. The current situation indicates more uncertainty in politics and economic downturns, and many indicators suggest that the NLD is now in a defensive position. But be that as it may, because of Aung San Suu Kyi's personality cult following and the ingrained hatred for the military dictatorship, the NLD is still expected to receive the majority seats in Bamar-dominated regions. It may be at risk in ethnic-dominated states nevertheless.

The Johor Sultanate
  • Rise or Re-emergence?
  • Francis E. Hutchinson, Vandana Prakash Nair
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    13 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 November 2016
  • Malaysia's sultans have in recent years taken on an increasingly discernible role in the country's political life. However, rather than something new, the rulers' resurgence should be viewed as part of a longer term negotiation over the precise boundaries of their role. The Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Ismail, is arguably the most visible of the country's rulers at present. Since ascending to the throne in 2010, he has constructed a prominent media profile and been active in many areas of policy-making. Sultan Ibrahim Ismail has also weighed in on national-level issues, such as the quality of national education and bilateral relations with Singapore. While the more ceremonial aspects of his actions are inspired by the pivotal role traditionally played by Malay rulers, the more operational aspects hark back to the colonial era when Johor had a reputation for modern administration, well-developed infrastructure, and a high degree of autonomy. At its core, the Sultan raises questions about Malay leadership, and may revive a long-standing contest between the rulers and the political elite, sometimes referred to as a battle between "princes and politicians".

Thailand's Hyper-royalism
  • Its Past Success and Present Predicament
  • Thongchai Winichakul
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    13 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016
  • Thailand's political impasse in the past decade is partly attributable to the royalist dominance of the parliamentary system, a dominance developed and strengthened under the cultural condition of hyper-royalism. Hyper-royalism is the politico-cultural condition in which royalism is intensified and exaggerated in public and everyday life. It is sanctioned by legislation that controls expressions about the monarchy in the public sphere. Hyper-royalism began in the mid-1970s as a measure to counteract perceived communist threats. Despite the fact that these threats had disappeared by the early 1980s, hyper-royalism persisted and was strengthened to support royalist democracy. Hyper-royalism generates the concept of the ideology of modern monarchy -- a charismatic king who is sacred, righteous and cares for his people, and who is indispensable to Thailand -- and the belief that royalist democracy is best for Thailand. Hyper-royalism also generates the illusion that the monarchy is divine, thanks to visual performances and objects, especially through television and majestic pageantry. Accordingly, the ideal monarch is found in King Bhumibol. Given the mortality of Bhumibol, however, future prospects of hyper-royalism and royalist-guided democracy are grim. Thailand's political future is highly uncertain.

Parties in the Periphery
  • Organizational Dilemmas in Indonesia's Kepri Province
  • Ulla Fionna
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    26 December 2017
  • Political parties in Indonesia's Kepri (Kepulauan Riau, or Riau Islands) Province suffer from low organizational capacity. The set-up of their branch offices is barely adequate, with cadres and volunteers acting as the main administrators, while activities, funding and recruitment remain erratic, insufficient and disorganized. Rather uniquely, the province's capital Tanjungpinang is not its commercial centre, resulting in discrepancies in the organizational priorities of political parties present there. Instead, it is Batam, the commercial capital, that receives greater attention and is more attractive as a location for crowd-intensive events. Electoral trends and the parties' lack of organizational capacity have allowed for local figures to exercise greater influence, particularly during elections. In contrast, the parties themselves take a back seat during elections while their ground teams take charge. The parties' organizational incapacity in Kepri Province also translates into failure at the local level, and not much change can be expected in the near future.

The Traditionalist Response to Wahhabi-Salafism in Batam
  • Norshahril Saat
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    18 July 2017
  • The rise of Wahhabi-Salafi ideology in neighbouring Batam is causing concern in Singapore. There are worries that some Singapore Muslims are being radicalized by Batam's Islamic radio station Hang FM, which openly promotes Wahhabi-Salafi teachings. The uncovering by Batam police of a plan by five Indonesians to launch a missile from the island, targeting Singapore's Marina Bay, and the arrest of some individuals linked to ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in Batam in August 2016 strengthen these fears. This article argues that Batam Muslims are non-violent traditionalists in their orientation, and key religious leaders from the state have come out against Wahhabi-Salafi's anti-pluralist ideas. Contrary to expectations, key traditionalist practices like mass prayers (zikr), and praises to the Prophet Muhammad (selawat), which Wahhabi-Salafis frown upon, continue to attract a huge following in Batam. In contradistinction to perceptions that Batam influences Singapore, the city-state does in its own right exert influence on its neighbour, and monetary flow from Singapore Muslims help keep traditionalist rituals alive.

Rowing Against the Tide?
  • Batam's Economic Fortunes in Today's Indonesia
  • Francis E. Hutchinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 August 2017
  • Despite its good infrastructure and proximity to Singapore, Batam's economic performance has taken a turn for the worse, with declining levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports. Well-known firms in the electronics sector have closed shop, the shipping industry is in the doldrums, and unemployment rates have begun to climb. The environment for business is not as conducive as it used to be, with bureaucratic overlaps, persistent red tape, and shortages of land for investors. And, rather than seeking to attract large-scale investments in manufacturing or services, government campaigns have focussed on traditional economic activities such as fishing and farming. There are three reasons for this state of affairs. First, Indonesia's decentralization reforms have made doing business in Batam much more complicated than it used to be. Rather than dealing with one all-powerful central government agency, investors need to deal with three levels of government -- each with veto power. Second, Batam's economic transformation over the past quarter-century has attracted large numbers of migrants from other parts of the country. This has engendered a cultural sub-nationalist movement, which has sought to protect local interests and identities -- to the detriment of the economy. Third, structural changes in Indonesia's economy and changing corporate strategies have meant that investment into the country seeks to tap its domestic market -- as opposed to producing for export. In this context, Batam is not a viable destination due to its distance from large population centres, bad connectivity, high labour costs, and unattractive tax framework. While recent measures have sought to reduce red tape, fight corruption, and improve the island's infrastructure, it is possible that Batam needs to re-orient its business model away from producing for export and towards enabling firms on the island to also cater to Indonesia's burgeoning domestic consumer base.

The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in Cambodia
  • Vannarith Chheang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017
  • China suffers from a trust deficit in the region, and Southeast Asian countries have adopted hedging strategies, at varying degrees, aimed at diversifying their economic and strategic interests from Chinese investments and influence. Cambodia considers China as an important strategic and economic partner in providing performance legitimacy and as a countervailing force against its immediate neighbours. Cambodia's economic overdependence and power asymmetry have enabled China to exert significant political leverage over the Kingdom, especially on international issues affecting China's core national interest such as the South China Sea dispute. Local communities are discontented with some Chinese investment projects, especially hydropower plants and land concessions, which have infringed on labour rights and environmental protection. Given the public resentment and dynamic changes and transformations of politico-social environment in Cambodia, China needs to address the concerns and issues raised by local communities in order to sustain and enlarge its political and economic footprint. Promoting good corporate governance, as well as social and environmental responsibility, would help.

Harnessing the Potential of the Indonesian Diaspora
  • Charlotte Setijadi
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    20 November 2017
  • In recent years, the Indonesian government has increased efforts to harness the economic, political, and social potential of its diaspora. A recent high-profile event was the fourth annual Congress of Indonesian Diasporas that took place in Jakarta on 1 July 2017. Opened by former U.S. President Barack Obama, the event was intended to draw the Indonesian public's attention towards the contributions of Indonesian diaspora communities abroad. Current estimates put the number of overseas Indonesians at up to 8 million people worldwide. Members of the Indonesian diaspora are lobbying for legislative amendments, including dual citizenship, parliamentary representation, property ownership rights, and constitutional recognition. There are plans to set up a separate governmental office for diaspora affairs. Presidential Regulation Number 76/2017 also put into law the "Diaspora Card" that will provide Indonesians abroad with special entitlements such as long-term visas and property ownership rights. The Indonesian government needs to take the potential of its diaspora seriously in order to harness their enormous capital and skills contribution.

The Natunas
  • Territorial Integrity in the Forefront of Indonesia-China Relations
  • Leo Suryadinata, Mustafa Izzuddin
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    11 July 2017
  • In May 2017 the Indonesian military conducted a large-scale exercise in the Natuna Islands. This was in the wake of three incidents in 2016 that involved Chinese fishing boats. Jakarta accused the vessels of "stealing fish" within the Indonesian EEZ but Beijing considered these boats to be carrying out "regular activities in Chinese traditional fishing grounds". Both Beijing and Jakarta acknowledge that the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia. But while the Chinese avoid mentioning the issue of the islands having an EEZ, Jakarta openly claims that the islands definitely do have an EEZ. The two countries are "strategic partners", and while China needs Indonesia to help realize some of its "One Belt One Road" ambitions, Jakarta eyes funding from Beijing to help its "Maritime Power Dream". Indonesia has adhered to its claim of being an Archipelagic State and has relied on UNCLOS to support its territorial claims. China has also openly stated that the South China Sea issue would be resolved with reference to UNCLOS. However, Indonesians are divided over the issue. There are those who wish to bring the problem to an international tribunal, because they have no faith in bilateral negotiations as a possible path to a solution. The rise of hardline Muslims in recent months and their critical view of Chinese investments in Indonesia may also affect Jakarta-Beijing relations. While the Natunas is likely to remain a perennial issue between Indonesia and China in the short to medium term, it is unlikely to derail the bilateral relationship as economics is likely to continue trumping politics in Sino-Indonesian relations, at least under Indonesian President Jokowi's administration. It is also unlikely to bring about an outright naval confrontation between Indonesia and China.

Old Stereotypes, New Convictions
  • Pribumi Perceptions of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia Today
  • Johanes Herlijanto
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 July 2017
  • Despite improvements in the position of ethnic Chinese in the reformasi era, critical and negative perceptions of them persist among prominent pribumi personalities, particularly in recent years. These include leaders of several Islamic organizations, nationalists who harbour suspicions about foreign powers, and some who were in mid-career and/or were well placed in the last years of the Suharto era. This latter group consists of retired senior military officers, senior scholars, as well as current and former senior government officials. The ethnic Chinese are often portrayed as outsiders who are already dominant economically, and who are trying to be politically dominant as well. Furthermore, it is often claimed that ethnic Chinese tend to be loyal towards China. At the same time, there are others, including politicians affiliated with pro-government political parties, high-ranking officials, leaders of NGOs sympathetic to President Jokowi, as well as advocates of multiculturalism (many of whom are scholars and Muslim leaders), who believe that Chinese Indonesians are first and foremost Indonesians. The evidence they cite to support this belief varies, from past heroic actions by ethnic Chinese to the identity constructs of Chinese Indonesians, which is usually based on Indonesia or some Indonesian region.

The Indonesia National Survey Project
  • Economy, Society and Politics
  • Diego Fossati, Yew-Foong Hui, Siwage Dharma Negara
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    05 September 2017
  • The ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute commissioned a nationwide survey in Indonesia, called the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP) to enhance understanding of economic, social, and political developments in Indonesia. President Joko Widodo's approval rating hovers at around 68 per cent, and respondents generally think that the President has made improvements to the economy, although there are concerns with the price of necessities and job-seeking prospects. The Widodo administration scores well in infrastructure development, which is its signature policy thrust. Roads, education and electricity supply remain the top priorities for respondents, while corruption is still considered the most important problem facing Indonesia today. Some key issues that have emerged during the Jakarta gubernatorial election, such as punishing blasphemy against Islam and voting a Muslim leader into office, receive significantly high support from respondents, suggesting that these issues have currency beyond Jakarta and the election. On the political front, state institutions, especially the Army, are more highly trusted than politicians. Key elements of Indonesia's political infrastructure, such as democracy, Pancasila, and decentralization are supported by an overwhelming majority of respondents. Indonesians identify strongly with Indonesia and consider traditional economic partners such as Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and ASEAN to be most important for Indonesia.

Speculating on World-Class Transportation Infrastructure in Ho Chi Minh City
  • Hun Kee Kim
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    18 September 2017
  • Population, cars and motorbikes have increased at higher than expected rates in Ho Chi Minh City, leading to increased congestion and strain on existing transportation infrastructure. While the city has a transportation infrastructure plan, it lacks adequate funds and is reliant on official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance it. Amidst the backdrop of an opaque regulatory environment and intense competition among global ODA institutions, city officials speculate on multiple and contradictory transportation projects simultaneously. Conflicting interests between Bus Rapid Transit and Metro projects in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City exemplify the state's speculative forms of governance in capturing transnational flows of ODA capital to finance infrastructure and call into question dominant framings of infrastructure as rational processes and technologies that work against the so-called irrational and unplanned structure of the city.

The Growing "Strategic Partnership" between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges
  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 November 2017
  • Jakarta-Beijing relations have experienced significant progress, especially since the Yudhoyono presidency. Economic links between the two countries have expanded rapidly and tourism and cultural exchanges have also shown improvements. Issues that may affect Indonesia-China relations negatively in the future include: 1. mainland Chinese workers in joint projects; 2. the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Natuna Islands; 3. the rise of pribumi-ism in Indonesia; 4. domestic anti-Chinese sentiments; and 5. changes in China's policy on Chinese overseas.

Parti Amanah Negara in Johor
  • Birth, Challenges and Prospects
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    24 August 2017
  • In 2015, a new party called Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) was formed following the departure of progressive Islamists from the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), leaving the latter to be a party dominated by conservative Islamists. Much of the groundwork for the formation of Amanah took place in Malaysia's southern state of Johor. A prominent Johor PAS activist, Mazlan Aliman, was among the first to propagate the idea that a new, progressive platform needed to be formed. This eventually led to the "Bakri Declaration" which forms the basis for the establishment of Amanah. Working in the Pakatan Harapan national opposition coalition, Amanah is eyeing for around a third of the state legislative assembly seats in Johor. It has potential in constituencies with mixed-ethnicity voter demographics, especially those with 30-45 per cent Chinese voters. Johor PAS is badly affected by the crossing over of a sizeable portion of their active members and leaders to Amanah. In the next election, it is likely that PAS will be decimated in the state if it refuses to partner with any other mainstream parties.

Beneath the Veneer
  • The Political Economy of Housing in Iskandar Malaysia, Johor
  • Keng Khoon Ng, Guanie Lim
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 March 2019
    Print publication:
    18 September 2017
  • The rise of Iskandar Malaysia as a regional hub has profoundly altered the domestic landscape, generating a knock-on effect on Johor's housing development, both economically and politically. Housing policy and development in Johor, as illustrated in the formation of Iskandar Malaysia, is riddled with conflict along two dimensions — "bumiputra versus non-bumiputra" and "federal government versus state government". The first one is entangled with international real estate development and foreign investment, while the latter has more to do with the rise of sub-national autonomy in Johor. Particularly in southern Johor, housing policy has increasingly been influenced by foreign investment through implementations of mega projects (e.g., Forest City). These mega housing projects not only boost the state's coffers, but also change the way housing is produced, financed and governed. Given the importance of sub-national governments in many large-scale housing projects in Iskandar Malaysia, the changing political conditions urge us to rethink the long-standing practice of national-centric development policy in Malaysia. Taking housing as a point of departure, the timing is ripe to revisit the role of state government in policy-making and urban governance.

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