Using constructivist representation theories, this article presents a framework for understanding how political staff shape representation. Using a survey of 366 parliamentary and constituency staff working for members of Parliament (MPs), I identify four key roles: proxies, liaisons, advisors, and gatekeepers. Proxies embody absent elected officials. Liaisons facilitate communication between elected officials and constituents. Advisors’ expertise and experience shape elected officials’ actions. Gatekeepers manage people’s and ideas’ access to elected officials. Constituency staff primarily act as proxies and liaisons, emphasizing local service and constituent connection. Parliamentary staff more often take on advisory and gatekeeping roles, which can influence elected officials’ perspectives. This framework provides insight into how staff mediate the representative process between elected officials and constituents. Staff actively shape who is heard and which issues gain attention, ultimately influencing the quality and inclusivity of democratic political representation. Thus, understandings of representation without staff are inherently incomplete.

Cet article étudie le rôle des fonctionnaires parlementaires de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec et la nature des relations qu'ils entretiennent avec les acteurs politiques. En prenant appui sur la séparation classique entre les sphères politiques et administratives, cette étude illustre l'ambiguïté inhérente à cette relation au plus haut niveau de l'État. Les hypothèses examinées portent sur la perception de la hiérarchie, la distinction des rôles entre fonctionnaires parlementaires, fonctionnaires de l'exécutif et le personnel politique, ainsi que les qualités attendues des fonctionnaires parlementaires. Sur la base de données empiriques originales, les résultats mettent en évidence des perceptions communes entre élus et fonctionnaires parlementaires, tout en faisant ressortir certaines nuances. Il conclut que la séparation entre les domaines politique et administratif observée dans le cas étudié favorise le bon fonctionnement du parlement et protège l'institution des querelles partisanes, mettant en évidence le rôle essentiel des fonctionnaires parlementaires pour assurer la stabilité de la branche législative de l'État.

This article analyses the distribution of staff resources between party offices. While earlier studies have compared central and parliamentary offices, this study also includes ministerial offices. To capture fully the differences in staffing, I examine both the quantity (staff size) and quality (education, experience, tasks) of their staffs. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional analysis of original survey data collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands (N = 1,009). While the Belgian cabinet system includes extensive ministerial offices, ministerial staff is limited in the Dutch non-cabinet system. The results show how this institutional difference shapes parties' internal distribution of resources. While the party in parliament does not have a clear staffing advantage over the party in central office in Belgium, they are both eclipsed by the large, highly qualified party in the executive. In the Netherlands, the impact of ministerial offices is negligible and the staff of the party in parliament is both larger and more qualified than the staff of the party in central office.