While Chapter 4 outlines the national pattern of visibility projects and the forced exit of private firms from the urban bus sector, this chapter uses comparative case studies, in-depth interviews, and process tracing to explore the causal mechanism linking visibility projects to deprivatization. Guangzhou and Nanning, two capital cities in neighboring provinces in southern China, are selected for a most-similar case comparison. Guangzhou deprivatized its bus sector in 2007, whereas Nanning continues to have a privately controlled bus sector.

Guangzhou initiated multiple visibility projects in its urban bus sector, driven by ambitious city leaders seeking attention from the Party-state. In contrast, Nanning launched only a few projects, as its city leaders sought to avoid attention following recent political turmoil. By contrasting these two cases and demonstrating why deprivatization occurred in Guangzhou but not in Nanning, this chapter illustrates how visibility projects led to the end of marketization in China’s urban bus sector.

The Chinese government and its officials often demand political services from companies in China. Chapter 1 examines the phenomenon of politicizing business, its institutional origins, and its consequences. It introduces two political services that have largely gone unnoticed: political contributions to visibility projects and supplements to the authoritarian state for the purposes of societal control. The former advances the careers of authoritarian officials, while the latter helps the state maintain social stability. Some of these political services resemble bribes; others resemble regulations.

The chapter then traces the institutional origins of business politicization to the authoritarian mechanisms used to control both government officials and the general public. To maintain these mechanisms, the Chinese state has preserved its authority to politicize business and has never granted full autonomy to companies during China’s economic reforms. The outcome is the retreat of the market. Political services demanded by the state often place private firms at a disadvantage compared with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), altering the competitive landscape of entire sectors. Ultimately, the politicization of business is a key factor behind the inconsistency between China’s nominally promarket policies and its frequent, seemingly arbitrary, antimarket actions.

Even in the most mundane sectors, firms are still required to provide political services. This chapter examines how the urban bus sector across Chinese cities became a focal point for visibility projects starting in the early 2000s and how this trend led to an uncoordinated, nationwide deprivatization of the urban bus sector by city governments beginning in 2005. These actions contradicted policies that encouraged private provision of bus services.

Using an original dataset on visibility projects and sectoral data from 288 Chinese cities covering the urban bus sector between 1996 and 2016, the chapter demonstrates how successive waves of visibility projects were closely linked to the reversal of marketization in the sector. The chapter opens with an account from a city government official describing their efforts to force private firms out of the urban bus sector, and is enriched with detailed interview notes throughout.

This chapter shifts the focus from the “masses” to “elites” and examines state legislative roll call votes on bills dealing with school curriculum. It compares how states have approached the teaching of reading over time, a policy area once highly polarized (“This is worse than abortion.”) but now moving toward bipartisan consensus, to debates about the teaching of history and race. I argue that legislators, like voters, follow the cues of national partisan leaders, and that media narratives and coverage play a big role in how education issues become nationalized. That suggests that efforts by highly divisive national leaders to engage in “leadership” on education issues (akin to Kernell’s “Going Public” strategy) are likely to backfire and turn half of the country against their ideas. Importantly, polarization of education policies is not a one-way ratchet that is always increasing, as the reading controversy shows.

This chapter argues that the resurgence of strong religion has forced liberal states to find new answers to its effects on women’s rights. It discusses two examples. The first is recognition of the jurisdiction of private Muslim Sharia Tribunals to decide Muslim divorces and family disputes, and the second is intervention in Jewish divorce cases in which Jewish religious women find themselves anchored to their marriages due to their husbands’ refusal to grant them a religious divorce. The chapter offers a novel classification of religion–state relations, which sheds new light on the different solutions offered to such dilemmas and their compatibility with women’s rights and with religious freedom. It employs a comparative perspective on religion–state relations to distinguish between three approaches toward religion – nationalization, authorization, and privatization. It assesses the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches and claims that, contrary to liberal inclinations, measured state intervention that enables the liberal state to acknowledge the importance of religious belief in people’s lives, while at the same time protecting the rights of all its citizens, is required.

In 1967, Tanzania nationalized many foreign companies as part of the Arusha Declaration’s effort to create socialism and self-reliance. Among the most important were the dominant British banks that shaped investment and exported capital. Building on transcripts, private diaries, correspondence from Barclays Bank, as well as other sources, this chapter analyses how politically independent Tanzania endeavored to remake finance. Economic self-determination depended, in part, on the negotiations between Barclays and Tanzania over how much compensation government would pay for the 1967 expropriation. At stake was not merely a final price; instead, the struggle for economic sovereignty depended on the ability to determine the accounting protocols through which price would be calculated and even to define the bundle of different assets that would be subject to valuation. It was on these technicalities that postcolonial statecraft depended, meaning formulas and figures were imbued with political importance and ethical significance. Yet, ultimately, Tanzania found its authority to govern value was stymied by the enduring inequalities of the global capitalist order.

The chapter examines the role of forced displacement in increasing the demand for state intervention and expanding the size of the state bureaucracy in West Germany. It discusses the government elites’ strategies for dealing with the needs of expellees and receiving communities and reviews expellees’ ability to influence government policy. Statistical analysis is used to demonstrate that counties with a greater proportion of expellees to population had more civil servants per capita.

The chapter examines how the size and diversity of the migrant population shaped economic outcomes in western Poland using statistical analysis. It shows that when state institutions were extractive, the composition of the migrant population played no role in shaping economic performance. Once institutions became more inclusive, however, municipalities settled by more regionally diverse populations registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates. The chapter then rules out a series of alternative explanations for these findings.

The chapter examines the process of state building in the territory transferred from Germany to Poland in 1945, showing that mass uprooting shored up the demand for state-provided resources and weakened resistance to governance. It exploits the placement of the interwar border between Poland and Germany to estimate the effects of postwar population transfers on the size of the state. It then examines the political legacies of population transfers in post-1989 Poland.

This chapter identifies why the descriptive changes observed in Chapter 2 took place. To answer this question, it proposes a model of structural change being responded to by the key actors during the nomination process. These structural changes are grouped into three categories: changing electoral incentives, new regulatory reforms, and technological developments. These changes elicited responses from actors within the party network in terms of organizational structure and electoral strategy, by candidates in terms of whether and how they ran for office, and among voters in terms of their participation and motivation in nationalized congressional primaries.

This chapter considers the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as articulated in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) project. At the NIEO’s core was the push to consolidate the legal status of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources. This idea’s champions argued that ownership and control of resources is an essential and necessary element of statehood, one that involves the right to nationalize foreign-held property. By contrast, its critics contended that no state could lawfully seize assets of foreign investors without compensation. They also insisted that the quantity of such compensation should be determined by international law, or through international arbitration, in the event of disagreement. While most aspects of the NIEO, including resource sovereignty, had been debated for some time, partly during broader discussions of neocolonialism and uneven development within the UN Conference on Trade and Development, it was only in 1974 that the project was formalized in a set of General Assembly resolutions. This project was largely the expression of a desire on the part of political and legal elites in the global South to renegotiate their roles in the world capitalist system, reforming rather than repudiating the existing international order.

This chapter explores the reclamation of property rights in the 1980s at a local state-owned enterprise in eastern Shanxi. It draws on previously unexamined company archives and local government documents to trace how descendants of Shanxi’s “small capitalists” petitioned the government to recognize their ownership and redeem the loss of private property when the new communist government had nationalized the factory without compensation in the early 1950s. The chapter highlights the tensions in administering historical justice in a transitional environment, where a mix of revolutionary practices, family traditions, and modern law came to shape the procedures, capacity, and legitimacy of a socialist state.

In 1951, Mohammed Mosaddeq rose to power in Iran and nationalized the country’s British-owned oil industry. The nationalization triggered an international crisis as the British, together with major oil companies, placed an embargo on Iran, effectively de-integrating Iranian oil from the global oil market. Convinced that pressure on Mosaddeq would worsen Iran’s political instability and push the country toward communism, the United States attempted to broker a settlement that would produce a suitable definition of “nationalization,” satisfying Iranian nationalism while preserving the dominance of the oil oligopoly. Successive negotiations in 1951 and 1952 failed to produce a settlement. A myth of Iranian incapacity obscured the companies’ use of market power to isolate Iran while the United States helped redirect flows of oil to make up for Iran’s de-integration.

This chapter engages with the neglected correlation between the religionization of the Israeli military and the religionization of politics. It is argued that we can identify four main stages of the relationship between the religionization of military and politics. During the formative period of the state and the military (1950s–60s), the partial religionization of the military reflected similar processes in the general society. In the second stage, following the 1967 War, the responses to the war’s aftermath strengthened ethno-national religionization. However, ethno-national religionization prompted the proponents of this process – the national-religious sector – to develop an extra-military avenue for upward mobility in the form of the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories. The third stage (1980s–90s) was characterized by the denationalization of Israeli politics with the Oslo Accords at its center, during which the national-religious sector increased its strongholds in the military by leveraging new opportunities created by the partial retreat of secular groups from the military as an avenue of upward social mobility. The fruits of this move were felt in the fourth stage (2000s), when the religionization of the military occurred in tandem with, and was bolstered by, the religionization of politics.