Some critics contend that effective altruism is objectionably anti-political; they claim that by prioritizing individual action, effective altruism ignores the moral significance of political institutions. I argue that the prevailing versions of the political or institutional critique of effective altruism are mistaken. I begin by addressing the objection that effective altruism neglects the root causes of suffering. I then turn to a broadly rule-consequentialist argument from Brian Leiter alleging that an individual effective altruist ought to pursue institutional reform rather than private giving because more good would be done if all effective altruists pursued institutional reform instead of private giving. Next, I take up Julia Maskivker’s claim that engaging in private altruism is not enough to honor our duty to help others, because we also have a Samaritan duty to vote well. Lastly, I consider an objection from Alexander Dietz, namely, that a focus on doing the most good they can as individuals will cause effective altruists to fail to coordinate on collective philanthropic projects that would produce more good than their uncoordinated individual philanthropic projects would. I argue that none of these objections succeed and close by exploring what sorts of institutional reforms effective altruists should consider pursuing.