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This chapter offers a new way of understanding the workings of the Indian Constituent Assembly. We move beyond studying the script, or the published Constituent Assembly debates, making visible the labour, infrastructure and ideas that went into the staging and the atmospherics of the assembly itself as a public and a lived space. The procedural rituals, the pulse of the debates, and the physical setting of the Constituent Assembly building enabled and shaped the constitution-making process. We follow a few actors from the Constituent Assembly as they moved across different assemblies in India and abroad while the constitution was still in the making. In doing so, we reveal the Indian constitution’s part in an emerging international regime of human rights and practice of comparative constitutional law and reconstruct a sense of the everyday ordinary life of the Assembly, which was deeply connected with the Indian public and the world outside.
Chapter 7 frames Kenyan attempts of archival retrieval as a matter of decolonization at the international, bilateral, and national levels. Importantly, it also draws attention to how the concealment of the “migrated archives” affected political activity not only within Kenya but also in England, as a country undergoing its own re-nationalization process at the end of empire. The process of recovering records from the UK provided the Kenyan Government a framework in which to invoke a sovereign and unified Kenyan polity as the rightful home for the “migrated archives,” while dissent over Kenyatta’s centralized authority grew within the country. Meanwhile, British engagement with the “migrated archives” throughout the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the consolidation of postcolonial archival secrecy with other European partners as evident in the voting blocs formed in the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.
Transnational corporations pose a dilemma for scholars of normative political economy. On the one hand, many think that such entities must be tamed by instruments of legal accountability and political control, lest they be allowed to act relatively untamed by legal and moral concerns. On the other hand, the very concern about regulating transnational corporations lends itself to suspicion of such efforts. Just as corporate power often reflects the interests of some class or national interest, efforts to extend normative standards can be seen as a vehicle for powerful nations and actors to extend their influence in the guise of moral or legal accountability. Reviewing three books that touch on different aspects of corporate accountability, this essay considers the way business ethics, human rights due diligence, and extraterritorial legal enforcement attempt to find the balance between these concerns. It concludes that meso-level institutions, which play an important role in all three books, may provide unique spaces for the mediation of normative accountability and power politics.
This article advances research on ‘collective securitisation’ by theorising how ostensibly separate securitisation processes within different international organisations (IOs) interact and shape each other’s policy outcomes. Focusing on climate change adaptation within the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), the study uses an extensive database of documents (1972–2023) and interviews with officials to trace these dynamics. The analysis reveals that the UN initially securitised climate change through a risk-oriented approach emphasising long-term risk management, subsequently influencing the EU’s adaptation policies. Conversely, the EU intermittently reintroduced threat-based framing into the UN, highlighting recursive interactions between these organisations. Findings suggest key moments of cross-organisational influence, notably during the audience acceptance and policy output stages. By incorporating insights from transnational policy learning and norm diffusion, the paper theorises precisely how and when these interactions occur, enriching the analytical framework of Collective Securitisation. This article contributes to understanding how international organisations’ securitisation processes interact and shape climate adaptation policies, emphasising the nuanced interplay between threat-based and risk-based logics.
United Nations peacekeeping seeks to protect civilians from violence in conflict. The UN’s ‘hard’ power, in the form of armed units, has been found to be effective in civilian protection. However, the UN also wields ‘soft’ power in various ways, including such aid investments as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that seek to meet local needs, build confidence in the operation, and foster support for peace. Yet, we know little about the effect of QIPs in supporting peacekeeping objectives. We argue that QIPs are unique, as they disincentivize rebel groups from engaging in plunder and strategic violence against civilians to acquire resource benefits. Further, QIPs incentivize rebels to reduce violence against civilians out of concern for losing civilian support. We therefore expect that QIPs should reduce rebel attacks on civilians. We test this hypothesis with disaggregated data on QIPs and rebel attacks on civilians in Africa. The findings support our expectations.
Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution.
While often described as a unified process imposed by external actors on weak, conflict-ridden countries, international state building increasingly comprises a variety of actors involved in different ways in (re)building a diverse set of institutions. Civilian preferences are often excluded from this fragmented environment. We identify and explicate three dimensions along which postconflict state building meaningfully varies: the actor involved, the type of institution targeted, and the form of involvement. We then examine how variation along each dimension impacts civilians’ state-building preferences with two rounds of original survey experiments fielded in Liberia. We find that Liberians largely prefer state-building processes overseen by a subset of international actors; that they prefer state building focused on security-oriented institutions over non-security-oriented institutions; and that different forms of involvement in the process meaningfully influence their preferences. We also find that these preferences depend on civilians’ characteristics. Ultimately, we provide an initial, conceptual mapping of the diversified landscape of international state building, as well as an empirical “unpacking” of the conditions that may shape civilians’ preferences toward the process.
Law-making is not a straightforward process in international law. This chapter focuses on the various law-making processes and structures available for creating international law. It first considers the traditional sources of international law as set out in art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice generally and the concept of hierarchy of norms and relative norms before considering each of the art 38(1) sources in turn. The chapter concludes by considering alternative sources of international law not covered by art 38(1): 'soft law' including that created by non-State actors, and the role of the UN in creating international law.
Human rights are commonly invoked by States and individuals alike. Most recently there has been a spate of cases with a State accusing another of acts of genocide. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) is the first human rights treaty which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1948. As an example, it gave South Africa the basis for accusing Israel of acts of genocide for their activities against Palestinians living in Gaza even though it had no immediate and direct interest in the situation. Since the Genocide Convention a host of other treaties have been adopted and ratified by States and the United Nations machinery for administering them is now complex and sophisticated, despite the traditional enforcement mechanisms that domestic lawyers are accustomed to having behind them.
International law is constantly adapting in response to developments in State practice, new treaties and an expanding international jurisprudence. International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives provides students with up-to-date coverage of changing laws and their practical applications through a uniquely Australian lens. The fourth edition re-examines the principles and application of international law following major world events including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing Israel–Palestine conflict. The student-friendly text has been thoroughly updated to reflect landmark cases and developments in the law resulting from these events, as well as the ongoing challenges of climate change, crimes against humanity, genocide, human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, resource management, self-determination of peoples, and new treaties dealing with the high seas. Each chapter includes suggested further readings to encourage independent study. Written by an expert author team, International Law remains an essential resource for Australian law students.
This chapter is a short intellectual biography focusing on my interest and engagement in questions of political legitimacy over the years. The chapter is organized into three parts. I begin by discussing how the issue of legitimacy has been one of my key intellectual concerns ever since I started to do research on politics, initially in the context of the study of political and legal regimes in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay). Next, I highlight my understanding of political legitimacy as a responsibility and what this means for the evaluation and judgment of politics. This understanding builds on one of my previous books, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Finally, I focus on how, gradually, in particular in connection with my work with the United Nations (UN), I became interested in the question of political legitimacy at the international level.
An international authority is necessary for the features of international legitimacy—that is, international membership, rights holding, fundamental principles of international law and hierarchy of rights holding, and rightful conduct—to be identified and operationalized, to become the expression of legitimacy and legitimacy in action internationally. Since the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) has embodied this international authority. Having been established by the will of states and the UN Charter, the UN serves as the international authority of the time, the framework in which most of the construction and evolution of international law—be it through lawmaking treaties, the resolutions of the UN Security Council, or the work of the UN General Assembly and other UN organs—has taken place since the end of World War II. In the process, it has played a central role in determining what is and is not legitimate in international life.
This chapter concentrates on the conditions of access to and the nature of membership in the international system as established by international law—specifically, three issues. The first issue is the type of society that is presented as a legitimate collective member of the international order. One of the first steps that international law takes to determine legitimacy at the international level is to identify the criteria necessary for a collective actor to be viewed as a full-fledged legitimate member of the international community. The second issue is that after World War II and the creation of the United Nations (UN), access to international membership in the international order moved toward a form of universality that has been relatively pluralistic. The third issue is that despite this movement toward a pluralistic universality, there are limits to the universality and pluralism of international membership in the international system as defined by international law.
While the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were being negotiated, global policymakers assumed that advances in data technology and statistical capabilities, what was dubbed the “data revolution”, would accelerate development outcomes by improving policy efficiency and accountability. The 2014 report to the United Nations Secretary General, “A World That Counts” framed the data-for-development agenda, and proposed four pathways to impact: measuring for accountability, generating disaggregated and real-time data supplies, improving policymaking, and implementing efficiency. The subsequent experience suggests that while many recommendations were implemented globally to advance the production of data and statistics, the impact on SDG outcomes has been inconsistent. Progress towards SDG targets has stalled despite advances in statistical systems capability, data production, and data analytics. The coherence of the SDG policy agenda has undoubtedly improved aspects of data collection and supply, with SDG frameworks standardizing greater indicator reporting. However, other events, including the response to COVID-19, have played catalytic roles in statistical system innovation. Overall, increased financing for statistical systems has not materialized, though planning and monitoring of these national systems may have longer-term impacts. This article reviews how assumptions about the data revolution have evolved and where new assumptions are necessary to advance the impact across the data value chain. These include focusing on measuring what matters most for decision-making needs across polycentric institutions, leveraging the SDGs for global data standardization and strategic financial mobilization, closing data gaps while enhancing policymaker analytic capabilities, and fostering collective intelligence to drive data innovation, credible information, and sustainable development outcomes.
As the first chapter in Part One (which describes the book’s two main characters – sustainable development and the World Bank exemplifying the IFIs – and narrates how their paths meet), chapter 1 maps the international community’s varied and evolving understandings of sustainable development, drawing particular attention to how these understandings overlap with and echo themes from early attempts to reform international economic law, ie the legal rules governing the global economic order, and the contemporary efforts to codify the human right to development.
This chapter explores the relationship between Holocaust and genocide, beginning with the the emergence of the concept of genocide and its relationship to prior law on war crimes. The chapter offers a close examination of Lemkin’s evolving thinking, and that of other contemporaries on the relationship between the Jewish experience under Nazism and other mass atrocities. It argues that Lemkin’s genocide concept blurred some critical distinctions, notably whether genocide necessarily implied biological extermination. This ambiguity was, however, critical to its political utility in the early postwar context, but the resulting law and terminology has become a political weapon, often obscuring the reality of the violence it purports to describe.
When reflecting on this book’s insights, a key question is highlighted: What is the prospect for effectively preventing and resolving armed intrastate conflicts globally? The threat of such conflict erupting remains a constant risk for policy-makers and researchers to investigate, and to prepare for constructive intervention. As discussed throughout this text, the challenges inherent to establishing effective peacekeeping policies and resolving intrastate conflict remain. Furthermore, this chapter addresses how areas of non-violent conflict, but high tension, threaten to escalate in the future. Is it possible to successfully intervene and to deescalate future intrastate violence? From the timing of intervention to international cooperation, the debates and critical lessons that we conclude with here will encourage thought-provoking discussions on formulating effective policies to prevent and end intrastate violence.
In addition to right representation, our new framework for democratic global governance must comprise global circles of participation chosen by global sortition. We must make something new work for the world by giving new life to human institutions at every level of governance. To accomplish this, we must employ random selection to create an interlinked network of global participation that will be a central part of a new system of democratic global governance. We must establish, globally, multiple levels of multidimensional and multiconnected circles of participation through random selection, reflecting the diversity of views in the entirety of the world, ascending and descending through interaction at different tiers of governance, linking, overlapping, and jointly acting in different sectors and on different subjects of governance, in an ongoing expression of human imagination and democratic will. Among these sortition circles must be circles for nature and circles for the future. We must make these global circles into rings of human action in which everyone throughout the world will have an equal opportunity to participate.
Women are eligible to serve in virtually all roles in the Australian Defence Force and the Canadian Armed Forces. The contributions of women at home and abroad reach back to the establishment of women’s services during the Second World War, and to nursing services during the First World War and other conflicts such as the Korean and Vietnam wars. More recently women have served in numerous conflict zones, including on the battlefields of Afghanistan. While there are notable differences in the historical journey, there are also important similarities that have shaped the experiences of women in the militaries of Australia and Canada.
United Nations peacekeeping is an important instrument for maintaining international peace, but the mandates that peacekeeping operations are expected to implement are increasingly complex. This trend has consequences. We argue that certain member states are incentivized by the benefits of partaking in complex missions. These include ‘process’ benefits such as reimbursement payments, training, and reputation building. Specifically, non-democratic states are more likely to make greater contributions to missions with complex mandates than democratic states. In a global analysis of UN member peacekeeping contributions from 1990 to 2022, we show that as mandate complexity increases, non-democracies make larger contributions relative to democracies. While democracies do not shy away from supporting peacekeeping, they resist substantial contributions to the ambitiously mandated missions that they have often themselves promoted. These findings contribute to ongoing academic discussions about the challenge of recruiting sufficient resources to pursue peacekeeping while insisting on a liberal global order.