Before returning to the Philippines, MacArthur and his subordinates first had to forge the instrument that would propel the Allies along the road to Tokyo. These forces next had to learn how to survive in a forbidding and alien environment. Then they had to learn how to fight and coordinate their efforts among the various arms and services. By the end of the New Guinea campaign, MacArthur’s forces had honed their capabilities in amphibious operations and island warfare. MacArthur found commanders of his air, naval, and ground forces who were competent and loyal. MacArthur and his subordinate commanders created the powerful joint team that would propel US forces back to the Philippines. With the Bataan Gang at its core, SWPA headquarters had grown from scratch to become a robust theater staff. Also built from humble beginnings, the Central Bureau had cracked Japanese codes, providing MacArthur and his key subordinate leaders with invaluable intelligence. SWPA had created a logistics structure that could support operations over oceanic distances. Allied medical personnel had largely eliminated malaria as an impediment to future operations.

War has been a central part of American life in the twentieth century, but paradoxically the historical profession has been deplorably inattentive to its study. Military history is seen as largely a popular genre of history done by amateurs for what academic historians considered an unsophisticated readership. This chapter nevertheless demonstrates the important contributions made by two military historians whose research supported and extended the orthodox interpretation. They showed that American decision makers were influenced by facts on the ground, especially a massive Japanese buildup to defend against an American invasion which helped impel the decision to use the bomb. Military history is increasingly incorporating cultural and social history, recognizing that war embraces much more than politics and is always an expression of culture. We discuss how recent work that integrates military history with cultural and social history has helped it gain more academic respect and has contributed to further understanding of the Hiroshima decision.

War service completed Kindleberger’s intellectual formation, establishing him as fundamentally an intelligence analyst. First in London as Chief of the Enemy Objectives Unit, then on the Continent as advisor to General Bradley, and then after the war at the State Department working first under William Clayton on the reconstruction of Germany and then under George Marshall on the reconstruction of Europe, Kindleberger’s government service career provides a staffer’s eye view of the dramatic events of war and reconstruction.