According to Cassirer, Kant’s Critique achieves a new look at the dichotomy between “consciousness and actuality, the I-world and the world of things.” Indeed, the Critique of Reason “sets out a new positive concept of subjectivity and objectivity […]. The world of the subject and objects no longer stands as two opposing halves of one absolute being; rather, being constitutes one and the same realm of spiritual functions through which we obtain the content of both […]. This abstract result was introduced by Humboldt, through the mediation of language in the concrete consideration of spiritual life.” Humboldt seizes on a possibility indicated in the first Critique and builds his philosophy of language as a mediation of the subjective and the objective. This is an original way of understanding Humboldt. Understanding Humboldt’s philosophy of language in light of Kant will constitutes the first part of this chapter. In the second part, I spell out what this Humboldtian interpretation of language means for Cassirer. Cassirer sees Humboldt as a precursor to his own work on language. My chapter sheds light on a possibility regarding language indicated by Kant, worked out by Humboldt, and then exploited by Cassirer.

Much useful attention has been focused on Kant’s views of the relation between language and thought, as well as the relation between grammar and logic, asking especially whether Kant thinks that the activity of thinking depends on or involves linguistic phenomena – that is, whether Kant upholds the linguisticality of thinking. Here I focus instead on the relation between language and ‘the senses,’ and sensibility more generally. After sketching what such an interpretation might look like and providing some initial textual grounds for its support, I then turn to some of the details of accounts of the linguisticality of sensibility among Kant’s historical predecessors (Berkeley, Baumgarten), to help round out and deepen our understanding of what sorts of commitments might go into such a view, before returning to the closer examination of Kant’s own texts. I conclude that Kant does in fact maintain a fairly well-developed version of the linguisticality interpretation of sensibility, and raise some questions about what this means for the linguisticality of thought itself.

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on clusters of re-narrated episodes in Cyril’s response to Julian. Chapter 5 is organized by one of Julian’s own categories: the “gifts of the gods” which, he had argued, were given in surpassing quality and quantity to the Hellenic people. This chapter groups Julian’s various iterations of gifts and Cyril’s sprawling responses in three, interrelated categories: exemplary characters, intellectual superiority, and military and political domination. In Cyril’s responses, Minos was no legendary hero but rather imitated the fallen angels’ lust for domination; the Attic language itself (not to mention the convention of writing) derived from proto-Christian sources; and the Jewish people’s turbulent history and the present ascendance of Roman superiority equally reflect the Christian God’s management of the cosmos.

Brandom gives two inconsistent accounts of the prehistory of his inferentialism: that Kant only contributed its concept–>judgment component, which was not taken up again until Frege vs. that Kant also contributed its judgment–>inference component, which was already taken up by Hegel. This chapter supports a version of the latter account. It argues against Brandom both that by 1790 Kant, like Brandom, espoused an inferentialist position incorporating a ‘linguistic turn’ and that Kant’s inferentialism is superior to Brandom’s (by providing better arguments for its concept–>judgment component and a necessary limitation of its judgment–>inference component thanks to the analytic/synthetic distinction). The chapter also argues that Kant’s inferentialism led him to the additional project of a “transcendental grammar.” Finally, it pursues the influence of this whole Kantian version on successors: Hegel did indeed take over Kant’s inferentialism, but whereas Brandom detects this in Hegel’s Phenomenology, it is even more evident in Hegel’s Logic, and whereas Brandom leaves it at that, for Hegel inferentialism was only the beginning of a more original and daring project. Not only did Kant’s inferentialism motivate Humboldt’s holistic conception of language, but in addition Kant’s project of a “transcendental grammar” inspired Humboldt to the same.

In the first, introductory part of this chapter I explain the tension inherent in these dual beliefs by examining the rules that Leibniz set forth for the reform of the philosophical lexicon as well as the attempts to apply these rules made by two key figures prior to Kant, namely, Christian Wolff and Christian August Crusius. In the second part of the chapter, I show how this tension is explicitly discussed and presented as a central problem facing metaphysics in the writings of Johann Nicolaus Tetens, who exerted a profound influence on Kant’s intellectual development in the years leading up to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the last section of the chapter, I explain what I take to be Kant’s solution to this tension by examining hither-to ignored passages in the first and especially the second Critique. The key thesis I defend is that Kant proposes to overcome the above-mentioned tension regarding philosophical terminology using the same, revolutionary conception of systematicity that lies at the basis of his transcendental philosophy.

There is growing evidence that language plays an important role in emotion because it helps people acquire emotion concept knowledge. In this chapter, we argue that language plays a mechanistic role in emotion because emotion concept knowledge, once acquired, is used by the brain to predictively and adaptively regulate a person’s subjective emotional experiences and behaviors. Building on predictive processing models of brain function, we argue that the emotion concepts learned via language during early development “seed” the brain’s emotional predictions throughout the lifespan. We review constructionist theories of emotion and their support in behavioral, physiological, neuroimaging, and lesion data. We then situate these constructionist predictions within recent neuroscience research to speculate on the neural mechanisms by which emotion concepts “seed” emotional experiences.

This chapter provides theoretical and practical examples of how children’s meaning-making is enriched through teachers’ mediation. It shifts attention away from a traditional literacy perspective to a semiotic orientation that honours young children’s symbolic communication through art, music, play and dance. Exemplars are given of how children’s sign-making practices in the arts are of equal significance, and are the precursors, to sign-making in language and literacy. Indeed, the arts are children’s ‘first literacies’ because they help children find their way into the sign systems of reading and writing. Illustration of Practice 8.1 demonstrates the notable link between playing and drawing, and how children cross between graphic, narrative and embodied modes to communicate meaning. Illustration of Practice 8.2 foregrounds art making in a Reggio-inspired preschool classroom. Concluding sections focus on the building blocks of meaning-making, with an emphasis on its co-creation and the importance of documenting and interpreting children’s creative processes and learning.

From rap’s dense lyrical content to its speech-like vocal delivery, it seems apparent that few genres of music or cultural movements place a greater focus on language than hip-hop. As such, it should come as no surprise that hip-hop music and hip-hop culture have been the subject of a range of linguistics-oriented research. This chapter presents an overview of linguistic approaches to hip-hop, exploring sociolinguistic research on African-American English in the context of hip-hop, discourse analytical approaches to rap lyrics, and linguistic approaches to hip-hop musicology. Though the chapter’s literature review of linguistic research into hip-hop should not be considered exhaustive, it will serve as a starting point for those interested in diving deeper into the field of hip-hop linguistics. Following its literature review, the chapter shifts its attention to one of hip-hop’s most prolific artists – Tupac “2Pac” Shakur. It examines from several hip-hop linguistics perspectives how 2Pac’s lyrical content, speech, and style of rapping evolved throughout his career. The results of the case study indicate that 2Pac manipulated his speech accent and rap flow over time to express his newfound identity as West Coast hip-hop’s leading figure during the East Coast–West Coast hip-hop feud of the 1990s.

It is difficult to think of anything more widespread and enduring than the lure of a good story. It is the warp and weft that weaves old, young, rich and poor of different cultures together and enables the opening of new worlds, concepts and understandings of past, present and future. We can empathise, imagine and live vicariously through stories that are an inseparable part of who we are as human beings. History documents these stories based on evidence interpreted through different lenses over time; Geography lends its knowledge to significance of place, space, time and perspective, providing context and reason; and Civics and Citizenship stories help us to understand our roles and responsibilities, as we seek models of the heroes and heroines found in a good story. For this chapter, a broad view of literacy has been adopted, one that defines it as a social practice which involves teaching learners how to participate in, understand and gain control of the literacy practices embedded within society. This chapter will examine the integrated nature of literacy in HASS through the inclusion of picture books to open and explore issues relating to HASS.

If we approach Arts education as we might approach literacy, we would aim to develop Arts literacy in students. We would teach students the tools of language, ways of constructing meaning, vocabulary, structures, forms, genres and shaping cultural and social contexts. In literacy we allow children freedom to gain confidence and experiment with creative writing, but we also intervene when necessary to correct, guide and teach them explicit skills and knowledge. If we apply this approach to the Arts, rather than stand back and ‘let the child be free’, we can focus on developing proficiency in knowledge and skills as well as fostering creativity and imagination right from the start. As with any other Learning Area, child engagement and achievement in the Arts are determined by exposure to ongoing, sequential learning experiences. This chapter suggests ways in which teachers can achieve this in a way that is respectful of the needs and interests of the child.

In this chapter, we introduce and explain the key principles of integrated learning and outline ways in which it can be put into practice to provide quality Arts experiences, as well as quality learning in other areas. We suggest ways to achieve integrated learning that you can adapt to construct your own successful program. We also move beyond the concept of curriculum integration to look at child integration as it should be applied in the classroom. Schools do exclude, both intentionally and otherwise. We explore the justifications offered for, and ways to remove, these barriers to engagement in the Arts by all. We argue that everyone needs to experience the Arts equally, no matter what their background or what form of diverse learning is brought to the classroom. For some children, this is the only pathway to success. In the Arts, anyone can engage; everyone gets to live them.

This chapters argues that Plato’s notion of personal autonomy is closely linked to his understanding of the social dimension of rational deliberation. It begins with an assessment of Miranda Fricker’s influential account of epistemic authority and social power and raises some objections against the discursive notion of reason she develops. To substantiate these objections, it turns to Plato’s Cratylus and to Socrates’ analysis of logos as a language mediated form of rational deliberation. It argues that while Socrates suggests that the constitutive parts of language, the names (ta onomata), are ambivalent and deceptive, leaving discursive reason in doubt, Plato, at the same time, shows that it nevertheless can function to identify unwarranted claims of epistemic authority, as a form of codependent philosophical conversation. From this emerges a notion of Platonic autonomy closely tied to Plato’s analysis of the social dimension of rational deliberation and its embodiment in the Platonic dialogue.

Chapter 5 reveals the numerous specific challenges experienced by emigrant soldiers and explores the coping mechanisms they employed. Compared to other soldiers, they experienced additional difficulties related to sending and receiving letters from abroad, in finding their preferred brands of foreign cigarettes and, for those without close family in Italy, in using their infrequent periods of leave. In addition to such practicalities, integration into the Italian Army was often challenging. A significant obstacle was their weak grasp of the Italian language and the fact that they were often treated as foreigners by others. There was no widespread recognition of the need to consider the emigrant soldiers as a distinct cohort within the Army and the men often felt forgotten and disregarded. Within a few months of Italy’s entry into the war, intense feelings of regret surfaced for most of the emigrants, even those who had previously been patriotic. While feelings of being Italian may have increased for many non-emigrant soldiers, the opposite was true of large numbers of those who had returned to Italy from abroad and many of them found their feelings of national belonging severely weakened as a result of their military service.