In the first, introductory part of this chapter I explain the tension inherent in these dual beliefs by examining the rules that Leibniz set forth for the reform of the philosophical lexicon as well as the attempts to apply these rules made by two key figures prior to Kant, namely, Christian Wolff and Christian August Crusius. In the second part of the chapter, I show how this tension is explicitly discussed and presented as a central problem facing metaphysics in the writings of Johann Nicolaus Tetens, who exerted a profound influence on Kant’s intellectual development in the years leading up to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the last section of the chapter, I explain what I take to be Kant’s solution to this tension by examining hither-to ignored passages in the first and especially the second Critique. The key thesis I defend is that Kant proposes to overcome the above-mentioned tension regarding philosophical terminology using the same, revolutionary conception of systematicity that lies at the basis of his transcendental philosophy.