Comparative research documents substantial education- and income-based class gaps in parent spending on children’s education, with important repercussions for the perpetuation of intergenerational (dis)advantage. Spurred by higher levels of income inequality and associated economic transformations, some speculate these gaps may have widened, as parents feel intensified pressure to best position their children in increasingly competitive labour markets. We examine the size and evolution—over time and in response to higher inequality—of these class gaps in the Canadian provinces, a context where we propose competitive pressures may be muted by the country’s relatively unstratified post-secondary education system. Exploiting provincial and temporal variation in Statistics Canada’s Survey of Household Spending (2006–2019), we show that more highly educated parents, and to a lesser extent high-income ones, place distinct emphasis on education spending. However, we find limited evidence of changes in these spending patterns in response to income inequality or over time.

This paper examines whether the democratic shortcomings of Restoration Spain influenced the expansion of education spending. Specifically, we discuss how electoral outcomes conditioned the allocation of primary education investment across provinces from 1902 to 1922. Our results show that voting for minority parties and the extensive political patronage at the provincial level hindered public primary schooling outlays. We argue that the government punished “rebellious” provinces to preserve the regime, and that education was not well suited to support patron–client relationships. We also show that these effects diminished after World War I, as government control over electoral outcomes declined. Accordingly, by the end of the period, political voice gained a more salient role.

This paper argues that output can respond to public education spending in a delayed and persistent manner through human capital accumulation. We refer to this as a “time-release” response, reflecting that the output response grows as students exposed to increased expenditures sequentially enter the labor market. We first develop and calibrate a stochastic overlapping generations model to formalize the propagation of spending shocks over a long time horizon. We then empirically explore this time-release aspect of shocks to government education expenditures on output using US state-level data for the period 1963–2016 and a panel structural vector autoregression methodology. Consistent with the model, our empirical results show that the dynamic response of output to shocks to government education expenditures is positive, significant, and long-lasting.

Proceeding population aging might fuel generational conflicts about the distribution of welfare state resources in the future, but the existing evidence on the extent of generational cleavages in attitudes towards the welfare state is mixed. We argue that these mixed findings are partially related to an underestimation of trade-offs on the level of individual preferences. Using novel data from a survey experiment conducted in eight Western European countries, we show that age-related self-interest is an important determinant of social policy preferences. When elderly respondents are confronted with hypothetical cutbacks in pensions, they are much less likely to support additional education spending. However, we also find evidence for a mediating effect of social trust: high-trusting elderly individuals are more likely to support education spending – contrary to their narrow self-interest – than low-trusting elderly.

Although it is commonly believed that democracy promotes public services such as education, efforts have just started to evaluate empirically how the recent trend of democratization affects education services in the developing world. This article reports on the first regionwide investigation in East Asia. By studying the effects of democracy on multiple education indicators in a time-series-cross-section dataset of eight East Asian countries/political entities, the article examines whether democratic governments increase education spending and access and which social groups are favored in the process. The statistical results, which are corroborated by findings from two case studies, show that democracy plays a progressive role in promoting education spending and school enrollment at the basic level in East Asia.

We develop a theoretical model where child labour results from a household'strade-off between sending a child to school or to work. Education isconsidered as a risky investment, since the survival of the child is notcertain. We explore the effects of public expenditure on education andhealth on child labour, specifying a transmission mechanism for each kind ofspending. On the one hand, we establish that health expenditure reduceschild labour all the more as child mortality rate is high. On the otherhand, a moderate aversion to risk is a necessary condition for educationexpenditure to reduce child labour. Our theoretical results are empiricallyvalidated on panel data from 66 developing countries between 1985 and2000.