In this article, we build a model to predict the state-level results of the 2024 election. We do so by using both polling from similar points in past election cycles and the results of the previous election. Notably, we update our model over time, and the coefficients of the two variables change as a result: the model puts more weight on polling as the election gets closer. As of September 1, 2024, we find that Kamala Harris is a narrow favorite to win the 2024 election, with a 57% chance of doing so. Currently, the model predicts she will win 289 electoral votes to Trump’s 249. However, there remains significant uncertainty, and the model will continue to be updated as the election nears.

As the US Supreme Court was preparing to overturn Roe v. Wade, the Mexican Supreme Court issued a series of sweeping rulings to liberalize abortion—part of a larger trend across Latin America (Daby and Moseley 2022; Fernandez Anderson 2017; Reuterswärd 2020; Ruibal 2014). Mexico has created a nationwide standard of access to abortion services, whereas the United States has abandoned universal legal abortion and embraced a patchwork system in which each state has different laws regulating reproductive healthcare. Why are these two neighbors on such divergent paths? This contribution to the symposium compares the ways that federalism and judicial politics have interacted in Mexico and the United States to explain the different trajectories of abortion policy. The divergent paths of the United States and Mexico can be explained by the two countries’ different experiences with democracy and political and institutional differences between the judiciaries. A different civil-society and constitutional context also has played a role.

Although linked fate has been recognized as a driving force in the politics of various identity groups, should this theoretical framework be applied to queer politics? I ask, what are the outcomes and dynamics of linked fate among members of the queer community? How does linked fate shape queer political participation? Is the concept an adequate indicator of politicized queer identity? Drawing on data from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, I uncover widespread linked fate among queer Americans, with significant variation along the lines of intersectional identity. Linked fate can motivate participation, but more powerfully shapes participation beyond the ballot box. I close by calling for a queer-specific metric of linked fate that accounts for several dimensions of queer political identity. As the queer community grows increasingly salient in US party politics, this study identifies avenues for future research into this diverse population.

Despite governors’ crucial roles in shaping important policies, including abortion, education, and infrastructure, forecasters have paid little attention to gubernatorial elections. We posit that institutional idiosyncrasies and lack of public opinion data have exacerbated the classic problem facing all election forecasts: there are too many predictors and too few cases, leading to overfitting. To address these problems, we combine new governor and state-level presidential approval data with a machine-learning approach, LASSO, for variable selection. LASSO examines numerous variables but retains only those that substantively improve model performance. Results demonstrate the efficacy of gubernatorial and presidential approval ratings measured two quarters preelection in predicting both incumbent-party vote share and election winners in out-of-sample predictions. For 2022, our approach outperformed the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voting Index and compared well with 538’s Election Day prediction. For 2024, our LASSO-Popularity model predictions indicate that it will likely be a difficult year for Democrats in gubernatorial contests.

The outcome of the 2016 election made it abundantly clear that victory in US presidential contests depends on the Electoral College much more than on direct universal suffrage. This fact points to the importance of using state-level models to arrive at adequate predictions of winners and losers in US presidential elections. In fact, the use of a model disaggregated to the state level and focusing on three types of measures—namely, changes in the unemployment rate, presidential popularity, and indicators of long-term patterns in the regional strength of the Democratic and Republican parties—has in the past enabled us to produce fairly accurate forecasts of the number of Electoral College votes for the presidential candidates of the two major American parties. In this article, we bring various modifications to this model to improve its overall accuracy. With Joe Biden out of the race, this revised model predicts that Donald Trump will succeed in winning back the presidency with 341 electoral votes against 197 for Kamala Harris.

This article examines the effectiveness of LGBTQ groups in Congress by looking at voting in favor of bills concerning queer rights. I find that the effect of donations is present in the early period of queer bills before Congress but disappears in bills post-2018. Instead, party is the dominant explanation for votes on bills. This has implications for the strategies that should be employed by LGBTQ+ interests at the national level and implications for how political science should examine the interactions between interest groups and new venues of change.

Across Latin American countries, there is remarkable heterogeneity in abortion legislation, ranging from full prohibition to legal elective abortion.1 However, abortion policy does not seem to clearly map onto implementation on the ground. On the one hand, even in countries with very restrictive abortion laws, (clandestine) abortion rates are comparatively high, and legislation that criminalizes abortion is rarely enforced (Blofield 2006; Htun 2003). On the other hand, in countries that allow abortion under all or some circumstances, access to abortion is not guaranteed. In Argentina, for instance, different reports have stressed the difficulty in accessing abortion procedures both before and after legalization was enacted in early 2021.2

Using a forecasting model based on economic pessimism and recognizing the difficulties of making such a forecast in such atypical times, the forecasting model predicts a narrow loss for the incumbent presidential party and a loss of 12 seats in the House of Representatives. Even with the unusual nature of politics in the United States over the past decade, this model does a good job of predicting election outcomes. The more pessimistic people are, the worse the incumbent party does in presidential and House elections. Moreover, the power of incumbency shows strongly.

Taiwan’s achievement in passing a marriage-equality law in 2019 and the democratic backlash against LGBTQ+ rights deserve scholarly attention in Asia and beyond. Specifically, Taiwan’s road to marriage equality led to these empirical puzzles: What explains the conservative shift in Taiwan’s public perceptions toward LGBTQ+ rights? How would the backlash against LGBTQ+ rights impact Taiwan’s democracy? What does Taiwan’s experience inform us about norm localization and LGBTQ+ politics in Asia and beyond?

The strategic framing of the Christian right—that is, the symbolic use of family and its localization of conservative values using Confucian norms—enabled them to couch their religious beliefs and facilitate collective action among different groups. This study offers a culture-based explanation of how the Christian right successfully established a single-issue coalition against LGBTQ+ rights. The article is organized as follows. First, it engages current literature on discourse analysis, norms contestation, and contentious politics. Second, the study proposes a two-part framework for understanding how the Christian right effectively constructs their conservative claims to gain public support. A comparative analysis of the discourse from the conservative and progressive sides sheds light on how their narratives shaped the marriage-equality debate. Third, it addresses how this countermovement impacts Taiwan’s democracy and human rights.

The Southern Cone has been at the forefront of the fight for abortion rights in Latin America. Due to the legacies of Hispanic legal traditions and the overwhelming political influence of the Catholic Church, the region historically has been known for its restrictive policies on abortion and reproductive rights more broadly.1 However, in the past 15 years, Southern Cone countries began to challenge those restrictions and embarked on a feminist revolution that led to what is now widely known as the “Green Wave” because of the color embraced by abortion-rights activists. Uruguay began this trend of legalizing abortion on demand in 2012, followed by Argentina in 2020. Chile experienced a moderate reform in 2017 when it moved from a total ban to a system of exceptions. Feminists have been trying ever since to pass abortion on demand through both legislative and constitutional reforms, which have not yet yielded the expected results.

How are LGBTQ+ issues represented within labor organizing and how are they linked to broader debates about inequality? We answered these questions by examining press releases, internal resolutions, and online resources from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Pride at Work (PAW) constituency group. We find that they significantly differ in their approaches to symbolic and substantive representation and agenda setting. Across all three outcomes, PAW and the AFL-CIO vary in LGBTQ+ issue representation. The AFL-CIO engages in more symbolic representation but also devotes resources to collective action that can improve the lives of LGBTQ+ people. PAW places greater emphasis on the interconnectedness of LGBTQ+ and labor issues to mobilize LGBTQ+ people. Our findings highlight the marginal position of LGBTQ+ labor activism in the labor and LGBTQ+ movements, and they demonstrate the challenges associated with linking LGBTQ+ issues to broader debates about inequality in American politics.

Our political economy model, as it has come to be called, has offered up forecasts of the American presidential election outcome since the early 1980s. The model, based on referendum theory, as measured by the job performance of the president and the economy (1948 to the present), yields a forecast from data available in the summer of the election year. We consider alternative specifications of this parsimonious model, examining the possible effects of other economic measures, Covid-19, and incumbency advantage on forecasting. The current point estimate of the core political economy model predicts the Democratic candidate will receive 48 percent of the two-party popular vote, which translates into a narrow Electoral College loss for the incumbent party. This point forecast, however, comes with a considerable amount of uncertainty. There is an 11-point spread around our point estimate, which effectively means we have a horserace on our hands, with both horses close to the finish line.

The conflict over abortion in the United States shows no sign of abatement. Both supporters and opponents of abortion rights have mobilized movements, engaged in collective action, suffered defeats and won victories, and survived over many decades. To understand how the current battle is likely to progress, we need to examine the movement/countermovement dynamics that drive the mobilization and outcomes of the opposing movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). This article demonstrates how ongoing mobilization is fueled by the strategies and tactics of each side, which are strongly influenced by the actions of their opponents.

Election forecasting in modern democracies faces significant challenges, including increasing survey nonresponse and selection bias. Moreover, there are limitations to the current predictive approaches. Whereas structural models focus solely on macro-level variables (e.g., economic conditions and leader popularity), thereby overlooking the importance of individual-level factors, survey-based aggregation methods often rely on intuitive procedures that lack theoretical foundations. To address these gaps, this article proposes a combined (i.e., both standard and Bayesian) logistic regression approach that leverages voter-level data and incorporates a theory-based specification. By testing these models on recent waves of the American National Election Studies Time Series, this study demonstrates that the proposed approach yields notably accurate predictions of Republican popular support in each election.

Political science was once silent about—and for many decades continued to be slow to address—LGBTQ+ politics as a topic worthy of scholarly research. One of the longest-standing gaps in the literature has been the lack of work that was pioneered by Ken Sherrill: research that centers LGBTQ+ people and politics as subjects, rather than objects, of study. Here I make the case for sustained scholarly attention to LGBTQ+ political behavior and discuss how quantitative empirical research in this vein is more feasible than ever before. I then provide an example of what is possible today with analyses of the 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES), a large representative sample survey (complete case N = 45,240; LGBTQ+ N = 5,213) that includes questions about respondents’ sexual and gender identities. The analyses reveal several discoveries about LGBTQ+ people’s political behavior and lived experiences, including that they are no more politically engaged than the typical American, are in much poorer health than any other group, and belying stereotypes, are not of higher socioeconomic status than other Americans. A spatial representation of groups’ positions on the US political landscape shows that LGBTQ+ people are relatively distant from other groups, indicating that they may struggle to find natural coalition partners because of lack of shared interests.

The rise of populism as a global phenomenon has captured the attention of scholars and raised concerns about its impact on democracy. Thanks to a growing academic consensus around an ideational definition of populism, one can observe the generation of important cumulative knowledge on the relationship between populism and democracy. Political science has been at the forefront of this development, and this symposium seeks to both offer state-of-the art information on this topic and discuss blind spots that future studies should try to address.

When the impact of populism on liberal democracy is examined, the focus often is on populists in power. After all, when in office, populists have the possibility to change legislation, thereby negatively affecting individual freedoms and rights, and to transform the political system, often toward democratic decline and illiberalism (Pappas 2019; Ruth-Lovell and Grahn 2023).1 Far less attention has been devoted to populist parties in opposition, even though this is the position in which populists find themselves most frequently.2 Prominent examples of Western European populist parties with a decades-long position in opposition include the Rassemblement National in France and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium on the right and Die Linke in Germany and the Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands on the left. Outside of Western Europe, populist parties often have less longevity and more frequently assume office. However, many of these parties spend years in opposition before taking on government responsibility and/or have returned to the opposition benches afterwards (e.g., Partido Justicialista in Argentina and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Poland).

Anti-LGBTQ+ narratives are deployed by extremist groups with contrasting ideologies, from Jihadis to right-wing extremists and QAnon to Incels (involuntary celibates). Using these different movements as case studies, this article highlights the convergence of ideologically conflicting extremist organizations around antiqueer sentiment. Given the enhanced vulnerability of LGBTQ+ populations, fueled by politically charged rhetoric, this article makes an appeal for more research to explore and analyze narratives through a scholarly lens and link queer issues to current debates in the study of terrorism and political violence. Research should focus on the experiences of queer populations within conflicts abroad and experiences of domestic extremism in the United States. Without adequate attention given to the experiences of LGBTQ+ victims, it is impossible to develop protocols for trauma-informed care for vulnerable populations.

We present Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) forecasts for the popular vote shares in the 2024 US presidential election. We discuss the differences between IEM forecasts and polls, the influence of the first presidential debate, the changes resulting from Biden dropping out of the race, and the degree of uncertainty implied by IEM forecasts. On September 29, the IEM forecast a 9-percentage-point Democratic popular vote margin according to a thinly traded vote-share market and an 85.7% chance the Democrat will receive more votes than the Republican in a thickly traded winner-takes-all market. Using a distribution derived from both markets, the forecasts are for a 6- to 7-percentage-point Democratic margin and 87.0% chance of winning. However, significant uncertainty remains.

The Partisan-Bounded Economic Model forecasts popular vote and Electoral College vote results in the 2024 presidential election based on economic growth, presidential popularity, and shifts in party identification within the electorate. Due to the partisan vote and voter inertia, presidential elections are unlikely to result in lopsided outcomes even in the face of economic turmoil or prosperity. In the Partisan-Bounded Economic Model, outliers in the annualized GDP growth are adjusted to fall within a fixed range of 5 percent to -5 percent. Any GDP growth values exceeding 5 percent or falling below -5 percent are re-coded as 5 percent and -5 percent, respectively. The model predicts that Vice President Kamala Harris will secure 52.3 percent of the party vote, 49.4 percent of the total popular vote, and 59.1 percent of the Electoral College votes.