Reparations for African Americans reflect both material concerns aimed at eliminating the Black–White racial wealth gap and symbolic political aspirations, including the end of structural racism. But do material or symbolic considerations drive policy evaluations across racial and partisan divides? What knowledge and experiences undergird processes through which individuals weigh the symbolic importance of a policy against its actual benefits? Leveraging a set of forty-one in-depth interviews with Black and White residents of Evanston, Illinois—the first municipality in the United States to approve a publicly-funded reparations-related ordinance—we highlight a mechanism through which individuals develop their opinions about reparations: political socialization. Black interviewees linked their understanding of reparations to robust financial compensation while White Democrats viewed their support for Evanston’s policy as symbolic of their longstanding, affective commitments to racial equality. Drawing from these observations, we present a framework highlighting policy attributes that frame how different constituencies respond to reparations-related policies. We test this framework using a conjoint experiment about reparations policies fielded in the 2022 Cooperative Election Study. We find Americans—especially White Republicans—possess less familiarity about reparations and remain strongly opposed to these policies, regardless of the form they take. While White Democrats are more familiar with reparations and more supportive of policies mirroring Evanston’s, Black Americans—those who are most familiar with reparations—support direct cash payments regardless of their political identification.

In this article, we show that the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a pro-democratic reaction from citizens in liberal democracies, which we term the “rally for democracy.” Unlike the conventional “rally ‘round the flag” effect that boosts government popularity, this involves citizens rallying behind democracy as an international ideal. It includes expressing stronger proximity to democratic powers, stronger approval for democratic leaders abroad, and greater aversion to authoritarian regimes. Through a survey quasi-experiment conducted in six countries between February and May of 2022, we provide evidence that the “rally for democracy” emerged immediately following Russia’s invasion. Exploring this observation further via analysis of data from 55 countries between 2014 and 2023, we find this to be the intensification of a longer-term trend in response to the rise of authoritarian great powers. A new cleavage exists in geopolitical loyalties, based on the degree to which citizens feel attachment to democracy, and this divide runs both between and within countries.

Numerous studies show that women are less likely than men to express attitudes and opinions about politics. To explore the origins of this gender gap, we use data from a series of surveys of the general public and international relations scholars in the United States between 2014 and 2023. These data show that the gender gap in political expression exists, even among knowledge elites; female IR scholars say they don’t know the answer to survey questions at higher rates than their male colleagues. We also find that differences in political knowledge explain a significant part of the gap in political expression; the highly educated female scholars we surveyed were less likely than women in the general public to say they didn’t know the answer to survey questions. At the same time, factors other than knowledge, including confidence, also matter. Our public opinion survey shows that women select extreme answers, such as “strongly agree/disagree” rather than simply “agree/disagree,” at lower rates than men. Despite high levels of education among the female scholars we surveyed, they too are more hesitant than their male counterparts to select extreme answers. These findings have important implications for civic participation as well as for the recognition of women’s expertise within the academy and society more broadly.

Recent studies portray civil servants as potential guardians against populist attempts to undermine liberal democracy. However in polarized societies, bureaucrats, like citizens, tend to hold divergent perceptions of the threat that politicians’ actions pose to democracy. This, in turn, likely shapes bureaucrats’ responses. We examine this in the context of the attempt by Israel’s extreme right-wing populist government to curtail the powers and independence of the Israeli Supreme Court and replace legal advisors with political appointees (hereafter the “legal overhaul”). We employ a mixed-methods design, combining a survey, interviews, and a focus group with career civil servants, showing that those who perceive the legal overhaul as a threat to democracy are more inclined to exit government and less likely to voice and exert effort at work. These findings are attributed to respondents’ views of the legal overhaul as leading to future politicization, curtailed influence, and a threat to their role as civil servants.

Building on the experience of Russian antiwar emigration in 2022, this article reinterprets the categories of “exit” and “voice” to better understand dissent under repressive political regimes. It argues that exit can function as a form of voice in contexts where other forms of voicing discontent are effectively eliminated by repression. This perspective on exit opens the category of voice to a normative conceptualization, defining it as an expression of civic identity. Acting on this identity in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine leads dissenting citizens either into self-imposed exile or inner exile. The article identifies three key modalities of voice available to dissenting citizens: exit-as-voice, voice-after-exit, and oblique voice. In all these modalities, voice is primarily performative, shaped by the political and ethical constraints that emerge from the interplay between repression and resistance. The article draws on an autoethnography of exit within Russian academia and on accounts of resistance both inside and outside Russia.

Houses of worship hold specific political significance because they shape the political attitudes and behaviors of their congregations. I argue that they also have broader political significance because their impact extends beyond the congregation to the local community. I support this argument by analyzing the locations of more than 300,000 mosques in Indonesia and national panel data of more than 16,000 Muslim respondents. Employing a difference-in-difference approach, I find that the presence of new mosques in a kecamatan (district) correlates with increased exclusionary attitudes toward non-Muslims. To a more limited extent, the presence of more mosques also correlates with a greater emphasis on religious similarity in voting decisions. Further exploratory analysis suggests that mosques serving as channels for information and communication within the community plays a more significant role in producing these effects than their functions in enhancing religiosity or reinforcing religious identity.

More autonomous humanitarian international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have greater capacity to determine who receives aid among conflict- and crisis-affected populations than their donor-following counterparts. The latter are more likely to become instruments of states seeking geostrategic influence in places like Syria and Ukraine. Drawing on more than 120 interviews with INGO and donor agency workers, 10 months of political ethnography among INGOs working with refugees in Lebanon and Jordan after the war in Syria, and content analysis of organizational documents, this article investigates the ways that INGOs secure autonomy from donors. In a theory-building exercise, it introduces the concept of negotiation experience to explain why some INGOs develop skills and strategies that allow them to resist donor demands. It also identifies some of the tactics used by experienced negotiators to do so. The findings have implications for who controls and is accountable for humanitarian policy and practice, as well as the abilities of state donors to influence humanitarian behavior. They call into question expectations that INGOs “scramble” for funds under conditions of funding scarcity.

Do populist governments bend their economic policies to the preferences of bondholders? Populist governments should be a “least likely” case for the market discipline hypothesis. Populist parties typically run on platforms that scapegoat wealthy elites as “enemies of the people” and hence should be more resistant to changing policy positions in the face of market pressure, given their reluctance to alienate their base. Employing most-different case studies of the Five Star Movement/Lega coalition in Italy and Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, we find that populists do bend to market pressure but that this “disciplining effect” does not stem primarily from foreign investors. Rather, it was the inaction of domestic investors in bond auctions that caused these governments to reverse course on headline economic policies. Because domestic investors served as both governments’ “buyers of last resort,” they needed to maintain their favor amidst foreign capital flight.

Housing scarcity is a widespread social and economic problem. Prior studies have attributed this scarcity to local control over land use, which has been seen as making policy makers more responsive to small electorates. Challenging this argument, we suggest that smaller jurisdictions have stronger incentives and greater capacity to raise tax revenue by building housing. Therefore, expanding the electorate that policy makers are responsive to could lead to a more restrictive housing policy. To explore this question empirically, we study a reform that consolidated some Danish municipalities, increasing the size of their jurisdiction. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that consolidated municipalities issue fewer permits and complete less housing than smaller jurisdictions. Our study thus shows that politicians permitted more housing when they were accountable to a smaller electorate. This upends conventional wisdom and suggests that local control need not be at odds with more liberal land use policy.

Labor organizations increasingly rely on political communication campaigns to win broader support from bystanders. How do framings of worker mobilization influence public support for strikers’ demands? This paper explores the effects of different framings of teacher strikes on support for labor unions and strikes in Mexico by employing an original vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey. We find that how strikes are framed alters responses to them. Our treatment effects indicate that mentioning the political interest of union leaders decreases support for unions, while informing voters about teacher grievances increases support for ongoing strikes. Our finding suggests the importance of disaggregating attitudes toward strikes and unions and proposes new avenues for research on how media strategies are used by various actors to gain political leverage during labor conflicts.

How do patterns of racial inequality shape policing behavior in the United States? We investigate whether police engage in boundary maintenance at geographic points of racial difference. Critical race scholars suggest that police explicitly serve this function. Yet empirical studies are rare and limited to snapshots of a single city, making it hard to distinguish practices employed across departments from agency- and officer-level idiosyncrasies. We leverage high resolution data on police activity in seven U.S. cities to evaluate how police engage with racial boundaries. We find evidence that police activity is elevated in racial boundary zones relative to non-boundary zones, exceeds observed crime, and that racialized outcomes are as much a product of policing practices as they are of conflict between private citizens. We reorient the study of boundaries around top-down processes that lead to their regulation and identify an agenda for future research.