In this paper, I examine the factors associated with public attitudes toward foreign policy among white Americans and argue that racial attitudes play an important role. To test this hypothesis, I perform quantitative studies across four iterations of the American National Election Survey (ANES)—(1) 2012, (2) 2016, (3) 2020, and (4) the Cumulative Survey (1986–2020). While the results include white public opinion across several different areas of foreign policy across several decades of data, the findings are consistent: American foreign policy opinion among white Americans is highly racialized—meaning that their views on foreign policy are strongly associated with their views on race and racism. This study contributes to our knowledge of a relatively poorly understood phenomenon in American politics: how the American public forms their attitudes on foreign policy. Overall, I find strong evidence that racial attitudes play an important yet understudied role in the foreign policy attitudes of white Americans. This study also extends our knowledge of the role of racialization in public opinion and reminds us that while racism is one of the most central problems for U.S. domestic politics, we should also be wary of how these hierarchies of domination extend beyond our borders through its foreign relations.

Donald Trump has run for president three times with a distinct slogan of “Make America Great Again” (MAGA), endorsing an agenda that advocates for a return to traditional values, renewed support for gender hierarchies, and the exclusion of outsiders. This agenda has received widespread support from Americans mostly along party lines, but partisanship reflects only the tip of the iceberg. Going beyond party, we focus on the existing cross-pressures and intersections between race and gender to demonstrate the importance of attitudes supporting right-wing authoritarianism in explaining how Americans perceive the MAGA agenda. In contrast to the notion that women—characterized as primarily Democrats and supporters of peaceful activism—are less supportive of the MAGA agenda, our analyses demonstrate that white women do not meet this expectation. Utilizing a race-gendered intersectional methodology and data from the 2023 University of Notre Dame Attitudes Toward Democracy Survey (NDATD), we illustrate the nuances of right-wing authoritarianism as a political ideology that works differently across race-gender intersections in driving support for the MAGA agenda. Variation within gender by race, and in complementary fashion within race by gender, reveals crucial insight into the varied reactions within the electorate. Doing so challenges monolithic narratives of women voters and voters of color and highlights the advantages of an intersectional approach to analyzing contemporary politics.

When do survey respondents choose to withhold feelings on questions related to polarizing and democratically important events such as the January 6th insurrection? While extant research has shown that “don’t know” responses or skipped questions in survey research function as a way to avoid expressing a socially undesirable opinion or feeling, no work has explored how nonresponses may be impacting our understanding of the American public’s support for the January 6th insurrection. Through analysis of the nonresponse answers within the 2022 Health of Democracy Survey, we show that a persistent pattern of item nonresponse was present among all racial groups asked to provide their feelings toward insurrectionists, and that women were significantly more likely to refuse sharing their feelings—warm or cold. Additionally, we find that although racialized feelings previously linked with support of the insurrection (racial resentment, racial affect, and white replacement theory) were not significantly related to January 6th item nonresponse, racial attitudes did hold an important relationship with January 6th item nonresponse among Non-Whites. Our results therefore highlight the importance of the intersection of race and gender in conversations about democratic norms, racial attitudes, and withholding views about highly politicized and polarizing events.

A large literature considers the mid-century a key turning point in punitive public opinion in the United States. This article examines racial and geographic heterogeneity in changing public opinion during the mid-century using data on death penalty support from as early as 1953. I find that the punitive turn is characterized by divergence in death penalty support between Black and White people, and that White Southerners grew more supportive than Whites in the non-South from before to after the turn. Additional tests identify that this regional divergence is unlikely to have arisen by chance. Heterogeneity in partisanship and responsiveness to regional violent crime support is consistent with the idea that crime rates themselves were meaningful in punitive attitude formation only insofar as they were mediated by additional socio-political forces.

Some theorists and practitioners argue that public schools in liberal democracies should teach students to be engaged, participatory citizens. Others argue that schools function as disciplinary training grounds, producing docile workers and obedient members of society. How can we reconcile these normatively different views? In exploring this question, we analyze school documents from a national random sample of U.S. public charter schools, examining the terms schools use most frequently and how schools discuss normative conceptions of citizenship. Using text-as-data methods and qualitative analysis, we suggest that both models appear in U.S. schools, but are implemented largely along racialized lines, with majority White schools tending to emphasize democratic values and majority non-White schools emphasizing obedience.

This article examines the dynamics of youth identity formation at a boarding school for “at-risk” children. The school prepares its young boarders for adulthood through systematic intervention in their everyday cultural practices. By inducing a state of social liminality, or felt in-betweenness, the school seeks to guide its students—mainly youth of color—towards particular social roles, norms, and beliefs. However, children respond and adapt to this ambivalence, which leads to lasting effects as they transition into young adulthood. Utilizing extensive fieldwork and longitudinal data, the analysis employs an interpretive approach to provide context-specific insights into these dynamics. The study details the cultural interventions observed in 2013-14 and revisits the children, now young adults, a decade later, to understand the policy and ethical implications of those interventions. In so doing, this study contributes to understanding the complex interaction between authority, conformity, and identity management within institutions devoted to transforming the lives of children at the social margins.

Since 2021, 18 states in the USA have restricted education on race and structural inequality. Conservative coalitions frame these restrictions as a war on “woke” ideologies. Through interviews with youth and educators in locales (Florida; Georgia; and York, Pennsylvania) that restrict education on race and structural inequality, I investigate the following: What discourses do students and educators use to describe bills that restrict race-related studies? What, if anything, do their discourses suggest about the perceived political implications of these restrictions?

In this study, I argue that gleaning students’ and educators’ views on “anti-woke” legislation sheds light on the perceived political consequences of these bills for American democracy. I find that students and educators perceive restrictions on race-related studies as epistemic injustices that divest society of the knowledge to identify, problematize, and redress the structural conditions that (re)produce racial subordination. For participants, the health of democracy is contingent on addressing racial disempowerment. Hence, they suggest that restrictions on race-related studies encumber democracy precisely because these policies impose epistemologies of racial ignorance that impede racial redress and allow systems of racial inequality to fester.