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Why Splinter? Parties that Split from the FSLN, FMLN and URNG

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2016

MICHAEL E. ALLISON
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Abstract

Following the ends to the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the revolutionary coalitions that had led the fight against authoritarian regimes began to fracture. However, none of the splinter parties that broke from the Sandinista National Liberation Front, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit has succeeded on their own as political parties. In this article, I argue that there is no single reason to explain the poor performances of the Democratic Party (PD), the Renovating Movement (MR), and the Democratic Front Party (FDR) in El Salvador, the Sandinista Renovation Movement (Renovate-MRS) and the Movement to Rescue Sandinismo (Rescue-MRS) in Nicaragua, and the New Nation Alliance (ANN) in Guatemala. However, their limited financial resources, alliances with non-revolutionary centrist and centre-right parties, and voter tendency to overlook internal ideological and personal debates within the original political parties, especially the FSLN and FMLN, have not helped.

Spanish abstract

Tras el final de las guerras civiles en Nicaragua, El Salvador y Guatemala, las coaliciones revolucionarias que habían encabezado la lucha en contra de los regímenes autoritarios empezaron a fracturarse. Sin embargo, ninguno de los grupos que rompieron con el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, el Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional y la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca ha tenido éxito como partido político. En este artículo señalo que no hay una sola razón para explicar el pobre desempeño del Partido Democrático (PD), el Movimiento Renovador (MR), y el Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FRD) en El Salvador; del Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista (Renovación-MRS) y el Movimiento para el Rescate del Sandinismo (Rescate-MRS) en Nicaragua; y de la Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) en Guatemala. Sin embargo, sus limitados recursos financieros, sus alianzas con partidos centristas no revolucionarios y de centro-derecha, y la tendencia de los votantes de no fijarse en los debates ideológicos y personales internos en los partidos políticos originales, especialmente del FSLN y el FMLN, no han ayudado en este proceso.

Portuguese abstract

Após o término das guerras civis na Nicarágua, em El Salvador e na Guatemala, as coalizões revolucionárias que haviam liderado as lutas de oposição aos regimes autoritários começam a dividir-se. No entanto, nenhum dos partidos surgidos a partir das rupturas com a Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, e Unidad Revolucionária Nacional Guatemalteca obteve sucesso isoladamente como novo partido político. Neste artigo, argumento que não há nenhuma razão única que explique o fraco desempenho do Partido Democrático (PD), do Movimiento Renovador (MR), e da Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) em El Salvador; do Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista (MRS) e do Movimiento para el Rescate del Sandinismo (MPRS) na Nicarágua; e da Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) na Guatemala. No entanto, seus recursos financeiros limitados, as alianças com partidos não-revolucionários de tendências centristas e partidos de centro-direita, e a tendência do eleitorado a não levar em consideração debates ideológicos e pessoais dentro dos partidos políticos originais, particularmente o FSLN e FMLN, não ajudaram.

Keywords

Central Americarevolutionary movementspolitical partiescivil warselectionsCentroaméricamovimientos revolucionariospartidos políticosguerras civileseleccionesAmérica Centralmovimentos revolucionáriospartidos políticosguerras civiseleições

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Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , November 2016 , pp. 707 - 737
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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43 Allison and Martin, ‘Unity and Disunity’, p. 96.

44 Interview with Héctor Córdova, FMLN Congressman, 3 May 2004.

45 Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, ERP commander, 1 May 2004.

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48 Ibid .

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69 Monsanto.

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76 Monsanto.

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83 García.

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86 Monsanto.

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