The right to rehabilitation for prisoners is a fundamental human right recognized under international standards, imposing a positive obligation on states to ensure its fulfilment. This Article undertakes an in-depth examination of prisoners’ rehabilitation through both micro and macro lenses, examining individual experiences alongside broader societal impacts. Drawing on insights from scholars like Edgardo Rotman and Amanda Ploch, contrasting rehabilitation models are explored, highlighting tensions between institutional discipline and individual empowerment. At the macro level, rehabilitation addresses socio-economic inequalities and collective benefits, yet may overlook individual dignity from a human rights perspective. In contrast, Rotman’s humanistic model emphasizes personal insight, dialogue, and prisoners’ intrinsic rights at the micro level, fostering empowerment and a sense of responsibility. A dual perspective—from macro policy indicators to micro-level prisoner experiences—is crucial for a nuanced evaluation of rehabilitation efficacy. This exploration underscores the need for effective execution and resource allocation to uphold principles of human dignity and ensure the right to rehabilitation becomes a tangible reality for every individual within the criminal justice system.

The digital revolution has transformed the dissemination of messages and the construction of public debate. This article examines the disintermediation and fragmentation of the public sphere by digital platforms. Disinformation campaigns, that aim at assuming the power of determining a truth alternative to reality, highlight the need to enhance the traditional view of freedom of expression as negative freedom with an institutional perspective. The paper argues that freedom of expression should be seen as an institution of freedom, an organizational space leading to a normative theory of public discourse. This theory legitimizes democratic systems and requires proactive regulation to enforce its values.

Viewing freedom of expression as an institution changes the role of public power: this should not be limited to abstention but instead has a positive obligation to regulate the spaces where communicative interactions occur. The article discusses how this regulatory need led to the European adoption of the Digital Services Act (DSA) to correct DPs through procedural constraints. Despite some criticisms, the DSA establishes a foundation for a transnational European public discourse aligned with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and member states’ constitutional traditions.

While there is growing evidence that employers hold substantial market power and that workers suffer from worsened working conditions as a result, interventions against employer conduct through EU competition law remain limited. A possible reason for this reserved approach is the predominance of consumer welfare as the objective of the law. To be sure, harm inflicted on workers by employers may under certain circumstances translate also into harm to downstream consumers. But in other cases the effect on consumers may be neutral or even positive. Against this background, this Article offers two lines of argument for EU competition law to recognize harm suffered by workers from restricted competition between employers as a form of harm relevant in itself. First, the Article argues that harm to any market counterparty, including workers, is a sufficient condition for intervention. Second, in the alternative, the Article argues that at least harm to individuals at the edges of supply chains, that is final consumers as well as workers, warrants action. In any case, EU competition law should not be more Catholic than the Pope: The pursuit of consumer welfare, as an objective borrowed from U.S. antitrust, should not lead to less intervention against employer conduct than we see in the United States.

Kenya’s 2010 Constitution represents a landmark shift towards equality, incorporating diverse conceptions through provisions such as Article 27 on non-discrimination, Article 43 on socio-economic rights, and Article 56 on cultural and religious diversity. This progressive framework seeks to address historical inequalities that marginalized groups—such as women, persons with disabilities, and minorities—have faced in accessing resources, services, and political participation. However, implementation remains the critical determinant of whether these constitutional ideals translate into tangible societal change. This Article examines the role of the judiciary as a constitutional guardian in ensuring the realization of equality-related rights in Kenya’s hybrid democracy, characterized by democratic aspirations alongside authoritarian tendencies. It highlights the judiciary’s dual responsibility to balance deference to State organs with holding them accountable to constitutional mandates. By analyzing key cases, it identifies how courts have navigated tensions between promoting substantive equality and respecting the separation of powers, especially in the context of socio-economic rights and governance challenges. The Article advocates for an equality-sensitive approach to judicial review that integrates both strong-form and soft-form oversight, depending on the case’s circumstances. It emphasizes the application of a contextual and multi-dimensional equality framework—addressing redistribution, recognition, participation, and transformation—to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected. In addition, it proposes a mixed standard of review in socio-economic rights cases, balancing reasonableness with prioritization of the needs of vulnerable groups, and the use of structural interdicts to enforce compliance. Finally, this Article emphasizes the judiciary’s pivotal role in fostering constitutionalism and mitigating systemic inequalities. It calls for continued judicial vigilance, collaborative constitutionalism, and active civil society engagement to uphold the transformative promise of the 2010 Constitution, particularly in Kenya’s complex hybrid democracy.

The development of brain-reading technologies has raised expectations that it will finally be possible to detect lies. However, the existence of these new technologies has also raised fears that the authorities might use them to read people’s minds without their consent and obtain evidence that could be used against them in criminal proceedings, a scenario that raises questions about possible violations of the right against self-incrimination. The aim of this Article is to analyze whether the obtaining of incriminating information through the non-consensual use of brain-reading technologies can violate the right against self-incrimination under its traditional interpretation, according to which the scope of application of this right includes only “testimonial evidence,” thus excluding “real or physical evidence.”

This article explores how the new generation of legalistic autocrats consolidates power—not by committing mass human rights violations as a way of consolidating power as authoritarians of the twentieth century did, but instead by attacking checks and balances so that democratic institutions are weakened. Judges at transnational courts, faced with evidence of these attacks, are developing a jurisprudence through which they transform the vindication of individual rights into requirements that states maintain democratic structures. While it is not clear if this jurisprudence prevents backsliding, it may become useful as new democrats attempt to restore constitutional institutions using these decisions as guidelines for democratic reform. In doing so, new democrats would be giving meaning to the rule of law writ large.

The numerous scandals that have marred the world of football suggest that reform is badly needed. As governing bodies like FIFA and UEFA fail to make meaningful improvements, calls for public regulation are gaining ground. This article explores what the European Union (EU) could do to effect change. Although long hailed as a powerful sports regulator, there is a widespread feeling that the EU’s regulatory potential remains unfulfilled. The article argues that the Union is in a unique position to leave a positive mark on football governance if it decides to regulate the sport more extensively. Three options are outlined: increasing the intensity of scrutiny exercised under the internal market rules, changing the approach towards cooperation with football stakeholders, or enacting a European Sports Act. After examining the benefits and drawbacks of each route, it will be claimed that, on balance, the most promising avenue is EU legislation which sets out minimum governance standards as well as substantive requirements, including on human rights, gender equality, and athlete welfare. The conclusion will offer some reflections on what would need to happen for the proposal to materialize, discussing the role of advocacy coalitions and crises in bringing about regulatory change.

In this Article I suggest that, due to the changing nature of the polarization of Western societies, another important factor should be taken into account in assessing the relationship between public trust in the judiciary and judicial independence, namely court communication with various segments of the society, including the ordinary people. More specifically, my key argument is two-fold. First, we live in the disinformation age and apex courts can easily be portrayed as detached from the ordinary people. This endangers their social embeddedness, which in turn might increase the likelihood of the acceptance of court-curbing. Second, apex courts should proactively respond to this challenge by adopting embedding strategies aimed at all segments of society, and not just the elites. I identify four such strategies: (1) The media strategy; (2) proactive engagement with the precariat via “reaching out” activities such as social events and holding hearings outside the courts’ seats; (3) minimalization of controversial off-the-bench activities of judges; and (4) self-awareness and avoidance of structural judicial bias. Finally, I discuss the risks and limits which courts and judges face when they engage in these embedding strategies.

A major challenge for contemporary legal constitutionalism is a crisis of public ethics that manifests in the lack of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance towards the judiciary. To showcase the importance of these norms in the relationship among co-equal branches of government, I focus on three cases, one where these norms have been present—South Africa—one where they have been absent—Mexico—and one case in between—United States. Until this crisis is addressed, the authority of apex courts will continue to be under threat. The Article suggests that a starting point to address the public ethics deficit may lie in shifting comparative constitutional law scholarly attention to the political sphere.

Democratic decision-making processes tend to take less account of future interests than of present ones, thereby jeopardizing not least the foundations of future democracy. Democratic short-termism causes considerable problems, especially when decisions made now have serious consequences for the future and can hardly be reversed. Thus, the current climate protection legislation, which is far too weak worldwide, threatens to impose unbearable and unjust burdens on people in the future and deprive them of any political leeway for shaping their own policies, thus also undermining the very basis of democracy. In general, it is one of the functions of constitutional law to help overcome such short-termism of decision-making processes. However, in the case of climate protection, this is difficult because the veto power of constitutional law and constitutional courts has comparatively little impact here—for reasons related to the factual characteristics of climate protection. Nevertheless, constitutional law and courts have their own potential in climate protection that needs to be further developed in order to overcome some of the democratic short-termism.

In recent years, courts across the world have increasingly held governments accountable for addressing climate change. While such rulings have fueled optimism about constitutional law as a vehicle for climate ambition, this Article argues that the role of constitutional law in advancing climate goals is far more complex and contested. Constitutions encapsulate diverse and sometimes conflicting values, which can create tensions when courts adjudicate climate policies. As government climate measures become more concrete, conflicts arise between rights, institutional structures, and political realities. Drawing on examples from Germany, Canada, and Mexico, this Article highlights the challenges of adjudicative uncertainty, the underspecificity of constitutional norms, and the polyvocality of constitutional values in the context of climate change. This Article concludes with recommendations for judges to adopt a principled, context-sensitive approach to constitutional climate adjudication, balancing the urgency of climate action with the complexities of state capacity and constitutional structures.

This Article is based on the author’s farewell speech at the Federal Constitutional Court on May 26, 2023.1