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The Understandability of Accessible Consumer Banking Services Disclosures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2025

Melvin Tjon Akon Open the ORCID record for Melvin Tjon Akon [Opens in a new window]
Melvin Tjon Akon*
Affiliation:
Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands, www.melvintjonakon.com
*
Email: m@melvintjonakon.com
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Abstract

Directive (EU) 2019/882 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (AA), provides that the information disclosed by providers of consumer banking services to persons with disabilities in the European Union must be understandable (the understandability rule), a rule that is especially relevant to access barriers related to neurodiversity. Understandability is an open-textured term which, in the multilayered and pluralistic context of financial services regulation, gives rise to ambiguity as to its scope of application. It is not clear, prima facie, whether the understandability rule merely applies to (1) disclosures required under the AA (the narrow application), or also (2) disclosures regulated by other EU Directives applicable to consumer banking services (e.g., Directive 2023/2225 on consumer credits), and (3) contractual documentation provided in accordance with these EU Directives. This article undertakes this interpretation exercise and concludes that the rule should be applied narrowly, on the basis of established EU interpretation methods (grammar, teleological, systemic and comparative), analysis of the contrast between the AA and its regulatory context, and general regulatory principles.

Keywords

accessibilityconsumer lawdisclosure obligationsunderstandability

Information

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , First View , pp. 1 - 15
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

I Introduction

Since 28 June 2025, entities providing consumer banking services (CBS) to customers in the European Union (providers) must comply with Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (AA). The AA was adopted to support Member States to achieve their national commitments and their obligations under the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities of 2008 (UN CRPD), by adopting harmonised accessibility requirements to promote the full and effective participation of people with disabilities in society.

One of the AA’s requirements is the “understandability rule,” which requires that information disclosed by providers is understandable. The scope of this rule is hard to discern. Specifically it is not clear, prima facie, whether the understandability rule merely applies to (1) disclosures required under the AA (the narrow application), (2) the disclosures under (1) and all disclosures required under the frameworks governing CBS as defined in the AA (broad application), or (3) the disclosures under (1) and (2), as well as contract terms and conditions in respect of these CBS agreements (holistic application). There are reports suggesting that supervisory authorities may apply the standard broadly and even holistically.Footnote 2 Ascertaining the rule’s scope of application is not only interesting from an academic perspective, but also from an economic perspective. Should the rule be applied broadly or holistically, providers would have to consider amendments to existing documentation and incorporate AA-related risks in their regulatory compliance reviews. However, this article makes the case that the rule should be applied narrowly.

The argument is structured as follows. After (II) introducing the notion of understandability, (III) the AA and the understandability rule, it proceeds with (IV) the interpretation of the rule using settled interpretation methods of EU law, and (V) the distinction between the AA and the other EU legal acts that regulate CBS. The conclusion of that interpretation exercise is bolstered by (VI) considering a set of underlying legal principles and policy objectives, before (VII) ending with concluding remarks.

II Understandability

This section discusses (1) the rationale of understandability standards in the context of consumer protection regulation, (2) the elements of understandability, and (3) the limits of understandability as a regulatory strategy.

1 Rationale

Understandability standards as laid down in the UN CRPD and adopted by other organisations, are aimed at promoting inclusion, which remains challenging when it comes to people with disabilities using financial services.Footnote 3 One potential way to interpret these objectives is to conclude that the understandability rule forcibly enlists providers to address the societal issues associated with reduced access to financial services by persons with disabilities, by increasing the number of alternatives to people with disabilities in understandable language,Footnote 4 but a discussion of that perspective is beyond the present scope.

As this section will explore, the core regulatory technique behind understandability standards is imposing standards on the content of written disclosures disseminated by service providers. For this reason, they dovetail with standards applicable to mandatory disclosures of consumer law, which also regulate this content.Footnote 5 What they have in common with understandability standards is that they seek to regulate the linguistic complexity of product documentation, in order to reduce information asymmetries between consumers and providers and to empower consumers to make informed decisions.Footnote 6 However, the consumer law disclosures differ from understandability standards, as their main objective is to provide information. While they seek to protect the entirety of the consuming public, they do not specifically address concerns of exclusion due to cognitive diversity.Footnote 7

2 Elements

In common parlance, an “understandable” text is a text that is “able to be understood.”Footnote 8 It is an adjective that describes a property of an object (the document) by reference to the outcome (understanding) of an action (cognitive processing) by a subject (the consumer) in relation to that object. Therefore, this definition suggests that understandability depends on two key elements: the document’s features and the literacy of the consumer. These elements are assessed next.

a Complexity of the document

When assessing understandability through the features of a document, an important notion is complexity, i.e., whether those features make the document difficult to understand.Footnote 9 Complexity, in this context, has two key aspects: linguistic complexity and product complexity.

Linguistic complexity refers to the linguistic features of the document, such as the use of jargon, complicated sentences, cross-references, ambiguity, as well as high-level document structuring choices (e.g., use of definitions, layout).Footnote 10 Some economists and legal scholars tend to focus on linguistic complexity, in particular when positing that providers use linguistic complexity strategically to make documents more difficult to understand for consumers.Footnote 11

Product complexity refers to the features of the service, and the common perspective is that product complexity is an increasing function of the number of features (the more features, the more complex the product) and the intricacy of these features (the more intricate the feature, the more complex the product).Footnote 12 For example, a standardised single currency instalment loan is considered less complex than a foreign currency loan, and a plain-vanilla bond is less complex than a structured note.Footnote 13 While some authors focus on product complexity as an ill-intentioned way to increase profitability,Footnote 14 product complexity is not necessarily negative. Providers can create products with more features to customise them to the needs of individual consumers, which is particularly sought after by more affluent consumer segments for wealth management purposes.Footnote 15 The regulatory response to product complexity has been to require product simplification and standardisation, as well as to restrict the target market to subsets of sophisticated consumers.Footnote 16 While interesting, further discussion of these policies is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Policymakers have addressed linguistic complexity with disclosure standards in consumer law. Requiring that documents are written in “plain language,” is a common policy objective.Footnote 17 For example, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has suggested plain English to ensure the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers.Footnote 18 More generally regarding consumer understanding, it requires firms to take additional steps to improve such understanding, for example, by taking a “layered approach.”Footnote 19 Providers have also addressed linguistic complexity through industry initiatives and self-regulation.Footnote 20

b Literacy of the consumer

Making informed consumption choices regarding financial services requires a basic understanding of domain-specific concepts, numeracy and some attention.Footnote 21 For example, in order to understand the economic consequences of a simple instalment loan, a consumer must understand the relationship between the interest rate, the repayment obligation and the payments made or received by the consumer. Still, knowledge and attention are not enough. Financial literacy is generally understood as having three equally important components, as set out in the table below.Footnote 22

Component of financial literacy (source: OECD/INFE 2023)

3 Limits

There are a number of limits to using disclosure standards to promote inclusion. First, they cannot include persons who lack legal capacity and capability to enter into agreements.Footnote 23 Second, the fact remains that many consumers lack financial literacy, do not take the time to read terms and conditions and fail to understand the products.Footnote 24 Third, consumers with neurodevelopmental conditions (e.g., attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism and dyscalculia), may be limited in their ability to gain financial literacy and as a result, fully understand disclosures without assistance.Footnote 25 Here, efforts of providers to improve financial literacy – whether voluntary or through self-regulation – can be very helpful.Footnote 26 Fourth, disclosure does not imply action – a person with financial knowledge does not necessarily engage in financial behaviour that would be considered rational by standard microeconomic models. This behaviour can be impacted by factors such as biases, external circumstances and preferences.Footnote 27

Moreover, it is hard to operationalise understandability, just like other disclosure standards, because it is difficult to measure it objectively. Examples of standards are descriptive standards (tests), readability standards (scores) and feature-based standards (rules prohibiting specific text features), but each standard has its drawbacks.Footnote 28 This hurdle may explain why the evidence of the effectiveness of these disclosure rules is mixed.Footnote 29 Finally, the relationship between requiring (overly) plain language and linguistic efficiency is inherently strenuous: banning jargon and advanced vocabulary may lead to longer and more ambiguous texts, which may cause cognitive overload and legal uncertainty. The existing EU financial and consumer protection Directives require providers to perform this balancing act, which could be called the “simplicity–efficiency conundrum”.Footnote 30

These limits to fostering inclusion through disclosure do not negate the usefulness of the understandability standard, but they do underscore that the standard complements standards under other applicable sector-specific and consumer protection Directives.

III The understandability rule

To understand the AA’s understandability rule, it is useful to discuss key definitions and the obligation to provide accessible services.

1 Persons with disabilities

The AA defines “persons with disabilities” as “persons who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”Footnote 31 Due to the broad formulation, this definition could benefit persons not traditionally associated with the term, such as persons of advanced age or low literacy, as the AA’s recitals clarify.Footnote 32 The inclusion of mental and intellectual impairments means that impairments arising from neurodevelopmental conditions that affect a person’s cognitive abilities (i.e., capacity to process information), are also in scope.

2 Consumer banking services

While the rules on products may also be relevant for certain lenders, such as main street banks which operate ATMs,Footnote 33 the present analysis focuses on the AA’s rules applicable to services. The AA applies to a wide range of services provided by private actors, including “consumer banking services”Footnote 34 and e-commerce services, which could also pertain to banking services.Footnote 35 The definition of CBS is the provision to consumers of an exhaustive set of banking and financial services:Footnote 36 (a) credit agreements under the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD1) and Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD),Footnote 37 (b) certain investment services under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II),Footnote 38 (c) payment services under the revised Payment Services DirectiveFootnote 39 (PSD2), (d) services linked to payment accounts under the Payment Account Directive,Footnote 40 and (e) electronic money under the e-Money Directive.Footnote 41 Thus, the providers that must comply with the understandability rule are therefore entities authorised to provide these services under these Directives (CBS Directives), i.e., credit institutions authorised under the Capital Requirements Directive (and entities authorised under national law to sell credit products), MiFID II-authorised investment firms, PSD2-authorised payment service providers and EMD-authorised e-money issuers.

3 Accessibility requirements

The AA imposes three key obligations that involve accessibility requirements. First, providers can only provide CBS in the European Union if they comply with the accessibility requirements set out in the AA, to the extent that they do not impose a disproportionate burden on the economic operator concerned, or they require a significant change in the products and services which would result in their fundamental alteration.Footnote 42 Second, they must prepare publicly available information in respect of those services, in accordance with Annex V AA, and explain how the services meet those requirements.Footnote 43 Third, in case of non-conformity, they must take corrective measures to bring the service into conformity and immediately inform the competent authority of the non-compliance and of the corrective measures taken.Footnote 44

The AA sets out an exhaustive set of general accessibility requirements related to all services. More specifically, to “maximise their foreseeable use by persons with disabilities,”Footnote 45 the provision of services must be achieved by (1) ensuring the accessibility of the products used in the provision of the service; (2) providing information about the functioning of the service (and products where applicable), as well as sub-requirements that address more technical aspects of accessibility (e.g., the use of text formats); (3) making websites and mobile device-based services accessible by making them perceivable, operable, understandable and robust; and (4) where available, support services providing information on accessibility and compatibility with assistive technologies.

The AA also sets out additional accessibility requirements for specific services, again to provide services in a way that seeks to maximise their foreseeable use by persons with disabilities.Footnote 46 Here, the provision of services must include “functions, practices, policies and procedures and alterations in the operation of the service targeted to address the needs of person with disabilities and ensure interoperability with assistive technologies.” For CBS, the requirements are (i) providing identification methods, electronic signatures, security and payment services which are perceivable, operable, understandable and robust; and (ii) ensuring that the information is understandable, without exceeding a level of complexity superior to level B2 (upper intermediate) of the Council of Europe’s Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) (the understandability rule).

The understandability rule is a descriptive standard, because the CEFR sets out descriptions of a person with level B2 proficiency. A B2 language user is an “independent user,” who “can understand the main ideas of complex text on both concrete and abstract topics, including technical discussions in his/her field of specialization.”Footnote 47 However, the CEFR lacks details on the financial literacy of the user, unless the user is specialised in financial services. Therefore, the understandability rule does not provide sufficient clarity on the maximum level of linguistic complexity, in particular concerning the use of jargon.

4 Disclosure obligations

The AA contains a rule requiring providers to disclose information on how the consumer banking service meets the AA’s accessibility requirements.Footnote 48 The information must be included in the general terms and conditions or an equivalent document, setting out (a) a general description of the service in accessible formats; (b) descriptions and explanations necessary for the understanding of the operation of the service (as far as relevant for the assessment); and (c) a description of how the relevant accessibility requirements set out in Annex I are met by the service.

The AA expressly stipulates that this information must also contain the consumer information elements of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU), which is noteworthy because the text does not refer to the CBS Directives. Similarly, the AA contains a conflict rule in respect of the Consumer Rights Directive, but not of the CBS Directives.

IV Interpretation

To interpret the understandability rule, this analysis will employ four established interpretation methods: the (1) grammatical, (2) teleological, (3) systemic and (4) comparative methods. These methods can be considered established, because they are used routinely by the Court of Justice of the European Union.Footnote 49

1 Grammatical and systemic methods

The starting point of the interpretation exercise should be the grammatical (or literal) method, which involves using the ordinary or usual meaning of the words contained in the provision.Footnote 50 In this respect, the ordinary meaning of “information” in the understandability rule is facts about the referent-object.Footnote 51 A factor complicating this exercise is to find the referent (the information), for which the systemic method is well-suited. With the systemic (or contextual) method, one interprets a provision by considering the general scheme of which it is part (e.g., other provisions of the legal act or other legal acts in the relevant body of law) and ensuring that there is no conflict between the provision and the general scheme.Footnote 52 The CJEU routinely uses the systemic method by analysing other parts of the legal act in which the same word appears and attributing the meaning to the provision that ensures coherence of the general scheme.Footnote 53

Because of the rule’s position in Annex I, restricting the application of the systemic method to this part of the AA, and in particular Sections III and IV, is a priori a legitimate choice. From the headings and introductory paragraphs of Sections III and IV, one can infer that the understandability rule is an additional requirement that complements the general requirements, applicable to CBS. Within Section III, item (b) stipulates the requirement to “provid[e] information about the functioning of the service,” and subitems (i)–(iv) refer to “’the information.” In light of the relationship between Sections III and IV, it is reasonable to conclude that the referent of “the information” in the understandability rule, is in fact the information indicated in item (b) of Section III. A comparison of several other language versions of the AA, leads to the same conclusion.Footnote 54 It should be noted that this internal reference, considered in light of the missing references to the CBS Directives, can be prima facie understood as a confirmation that the EU legislature did not foresee the application of the understandability rule to the disclosures and agreements covered under the CBS Directives.

Given that the understandability rule requires providers to disclose information about the service, it is useful to determine the meaning of “service.” The AA defines this notion by reference to the definition of the Services Directive, i.e., “a self-employed economic activity, normally provided for remuneration, as referred to in Article 50 TFEU,”Footnote 55 in addition to the definition of CBS. Given the general nature of the former definition, it makes sense to use the Services Directive’s definition to understand the scope of this requirement. In other words, the understandability rule should apply to the requirement to information about the economic activity performed by the provider in respect of the enumerated agreements, services and monetary value, as a service to the consumer. While the activity (or more specifically the set of actions) constituting the service is based on one or more agreements (e.g., general terms and conditions, product-specific terms), those agreements will generally not stipulate all the relevant actions performed by the provider and can therefore not be equated with the service.Footnote 56 As the understandability rule refers to information about the service, that requirement should not include the agreements.

Now, the term “understandable” merits closer scrutiny. The reference may seem superfluous, given that sub-item (b)(ii) of Section III already requires information to be presented in an understandable way. Yet, the term imposes a separate and undefined understandability standard on the content of the information, while also specifying the linguistic complexity aspect of that standard by setting an upper bound on that complexity. By imposing this particularisation exclusively on CBS Directives, and not imposing a similar particularisation on the other services regulated under the framework, the AA singles out this class of services.

In sum, the grammatical and systemic methods provide support for the narrow application of the understandability rule.

2 Teleological method

The teleological method also supports this position. This method involves uncovering the meaning of a provision in light of the objectives it pursues, by using documents that indicate the legislator’s intention to produce certain effects by passing a legislative act (e.g., legislative history).Footnote 57

Recital 39 of the preamble to the AA (short: Recital 39 AA) states that the AA’s objective is to “establish common accessibility requirements for certain banking and financial services provided to consumers,” with a view to “enabling persons with disabilities to use those services throughout the Union (…) to make well-informed decisions, and to feel confident that they are adequately protected on an equal basis.” The recital also explicitly mentions that EU banking law “aims to protect and provide information to consumers of those services across the Union but does not include accessibility requirements” (personal emphasis), a void which the AA seeks to fill.

The purpose of recitals is to set out concise reasons for the main provisions of a Directive’s enacting terms; they do not need to cover every individual provision.Footnote 58 Now, while Recital 39 AA seems useful to interpret the understandability rule, the legislative history does not suggest that this recital was in fact adopted to contextualise the rule.Footnote 59 Neither the understandability rule nor the recital featured in the EC’s original proposal of 2015.Footnote 60 The understandability rule was proposed by the European Parliament (as part of the general requirements),Footnote 61 while the recital was proposed by the Council,Footnote 62 and both proposals were included in the text adopted at the European Parliament’s first reading in 2019.Footnote 63

Thus, it seems more likely that the recital and the rule embody different intentions: to explain why the AA covers CBS (the recital), and to give the notion of “understandable” more granularity (the rule). Moreover, the European Parliament understood the AA to function as a safety net for accessibility requirements, applying “in addition to existing legislations.”Footnote 64 That perspective also supports the narrow application.

Even if one would assume that the recital contextualises the rule, it should be recalled that recitals do not have binding force and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of a directive.Footnote 65 They can be used to resolve ambiguity and determine the scope of provisions,Footnote 66 but their value as evidence of general purpose must be weighed against the specific purpose of an individual provision and its wording to understand the specific trade-offs made by the EU legislature in the text.Footnote 67 It is submitted that the understandability rule does not feature such ambiguity and that its purpose is more specific than the general purpose set out in Recital 39 AA.

In conclusion, the teleological method also provides support for the narrow application, based on the observed evolution of the AA in the legislative process as well as the stated understanding of the Parliament.

3 Comparative method

Finally, the comparative method does not provide further material to address the scoping matter, but it yields further insights into the meaning of “understandable” in the understandability rule.

The comparative method involves using other legal acts for the purposes of interpreting provisions of EU law, such as acts of foreign law, the laws of the Member States, other legislative acts of the EU legislature, and other language versions of the same act.Footnote 68 As recital 47 AA refers to the Web Accessibility Directive (WAD), it is justified to consider this Directive for the comparison.Footnote 69 The WAD states, in relation to websites and mobile applications, that the “information and the operation of the user interface must be understandable,” referring to the European norm of digital accessibility (EN 301 549) which stipulates implementing requirements and in term incorporates the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) to further specify those requirements.Footnote 70 It should be noted that the European norm, (together with the Design for All norm (EN 17161:2019)), will be incorporated in the AA’s framework once the EC adopts these norms as harmonised standards – following that adoption, services meeting those norms will be presumed to be in conformity with the accessibility requirements.Footnote 71

The language in the WAD closely mirrors Guideline 3 WCAG. That guideline contains three sub-guidelines, of which sub-guideline 3.1 (“Make text content readable and understandable”) is relevant for present purposes. That guideline adopts a multi-faceted approach to implement these concepts, as it prescribes a mix of technical requirements to facilitate processing by adaptive technologies, mechanisms to identify unusual words and abbreviations (e.g., linking to definitions or online dictionary), and layering. With respect to layering, success criterion 3.1.5 (“reading level”) dictates that if a text requires reading ability more advanced than the lower secondary education level after removal of proper names and titles, supplemental content or a version that not exceeds that reading level, must be available. Making a text summary available, or adding visual illustrations, pictures, and symbols to help explain ideas, events, and processes, are all ways to meet that criterion. On the basis of analogous reasoning, it is fair to apply this interpretation of understandability in the WAD (as implemented in the WCAG) to the understandability rule, replacing the reading level requirement with level B2 of the CEFR.

In sum, the comparative method yields an interpretation of “understandable” in the understandability rule and supports a layered approach to its implementation. The WCAG allows providers room to explore state-of-the-art technologies to implement this approach, e.g., by providing disclosures using agentic artificial intelligence.Footnote 72

5 Interim conclusion

The interpretation exercise of this section demonstrates ample support for the narrow application, especially the grammatical, systemic and teleological methods.

V EU financial and consumer protection law

The narrow application is not only supported by the interpretation exercise of the preceding section. The analysis of the EU financial and consumer protection rules applicable to CBS undertaken in this section, demonstrates that the relevant disclosure and mandatory content standards are formally and teleologically different from the understandability rule’s form and objective.

It will become clear that these frameworks capture linguistic complexity in various notions. One notion is transparency, under the UCTD. That standard requires both formal transparency (whether the term’s features allow consumers to process its content) and substantive transparency (whether a consumer can understand the economic consequences of the term, in the context of the entire agreement).Footnote 73 Another notion is comprehensibility, which incorporates both linguistic complexity and a normative consumer image, the average consumer.Footnote 74

However, because of the differences in form and objective, the understandability rule should not apply to these norms. To substantiate this claim, the section discusses the rules regarding (1) advertisements, (2) pre-contractual information, and (3) mandatory contractual elements.Footnote 75

1 Advertising

The CBS Directives impose disclosure standards on advertising in order to allow consumers to compare different offers.Footnote 76 On the one hand, they impose general standards on the contents, which must be “fair, clear and not misleading.”Footnote 77 On the other hand, they prescribe the inclusion of information elements that must meet similar, but different standards, such as specification in a “clear, concise and prominent way.”Footnote 78

These Directives are complemented by the horizontally applicable Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD), which prohibits unfair commercial practices in order to protect consumers from unfair influence over their decision-making, and acts as a safety net underneath sector-specific rules.Footnote 79 Advertisements which (a) are contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and (b) (could) materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer addressed by (or reached with) the advertisement regarding the services, are prohibited. When the advertisement is directed to a specific group of consumers, the standard is not the average consumer, but the average member of that group. If that group is both clearly identifiable and particularly vulnerable to the advertisement or service because of their mental infirmity or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, that vulnerability is taken into consideration. This group-based benchmarking mechanism makes the UCPD particularly suitable to address the variance in vulnerabilities stemming from neurodiversity. In fact, the UCPD also allows “average consumers” some protection, as the norm considers that their decisions can be impaired by cognitive biases and other constraints.Footnote 80

2 Pre-contractual information

The Directives also regulate “pre-contractual information,” i.e., the information about the service to be provided prior to the conclusion of the agreement, again in order to enable consumers to make well-informed decisions.Footnote 81 They prescribe a list of mandatory information elements and a standard of linguistic complexity, such as “clear and comprehensible”;Footnote 82 “in a comprehensible form” such that consumers are “reasonably able to understand the nature and risks” and take “informed decisions”;Footnote 83 “in easily understandable words and in a clear and comprehensible form.”Footnote 84 Where the Directives require general information disclosure via websites, similar standards are used.Footnote 85 The pattern continues with standards applicable to specific disclosures. For example, the “clear and comprehensible” norm applies to personalisation disclosure and creditworthiness explanations in the CCD2.Footnote 86

Finally, these disclosure standards are geared to the normative image of the average consumer, who is assumed to process the disclosed information and make reasonably well-informed decisions.Footnote 87

3 Contractual provisions

The Directives also impose disclosure standards and mandatory elements on contractual provisions, to enable the consumer to know his rights and obligations.Footnote 88 Examples of these standards are specification in a “clear and concise manner”Footnote 89 and “easily understandable words and in a clear and comprehensible form.”Footnote 90 Similarly, the horizontally applicable Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) requires a term to be drafted “plain, intelligible language,” so the consumer is capable of evaluating the economic consequences for him which derive from it.Footnote 91 Not only do these norms differ from the AA, they also differ from each other in terms of imposed requirements.Footnote 92 However, they have in common that the CJEU views these standards as objective norms that set a uniform lower bound for information disclosure. For example, the CJEU has ruled that the aim of Article 10.2 CCD1 is “to ensure that the consumer is aware of his or her rights and obligations through knowledge and good understanding of those elements,” leading to an equivalent level of protection for all consumers in the EU through the CCD’s maximum harmonisation.Footnote 93 Similarly, the CJEU considers that the notion of “consumer” in the UCTD is objective and distinct from the concrete knowledge the person in question may have, or from the information that person actually has.Footnote 94 They focus on sufficient disclosure as a means of protecting consumer decision-making, without emphasising the accessibility of the information or setting an explicit upper bound on linguistic complexity.

4 Interim conclusion

In conclusion, the sector-specific Directives applicable to CBS stipulate disclosure and content requirements are fundamentally different from the AA’s understandability rule, both formally and teleologically. These differences preclude a broad or holistic application of the understandability rule. Note however, that it may be possible that these norms converge somewhat through interpretation by the CJEU.

VI Broader considerations

Finally, this section discusses two broader considerations that solidify the case for the narrow application: compliance with the principles of (1) legal certainty and (2) coherence.

1 Legal certainty

In the application of an act of EU law, regardless of the aims pursued with the act, the general principle of legal certainty must be observed. This principle requires that legal rules are clear and precise, in a way that their application is foreseeable, and that subjects understand the law so that they can plan their actions and can properly exercise their rights and obligations.Footnote 95 The observance of this principle has two consequences.

First, based on the principle of proper law making, which is derived from the principle of legal certainty, the amendment of an existing legal act by a subsequent legal act should ideally take place by means of an express textual change to the text of that prior act by the subsequent act.Footnote 96 The EU legislature regularly follows this course of action. For example, the proposed Directive as regards the Union retail investor protection rules amends the disclosure standard in Article 24.5 MiFID II through an explicit amendment of the provision. Second, legal certainty also means that EU institutions cannot create situations in which two contradictory rules would co-exist, as that situation would violate that principle because the rules would not be certain and foreseeable.Footnote 97 As shown above, applying the understandability rule and the norms under the CBS to sector-specific disclosures and contract terms may lead to contradictions, for example, where disclosures must be both concise and understandable to people with very low levels of financial literacy. The narrow application would avoid that situation, but the broad and holistic applications are liable to cause contradictions, given the fundamental differences between the standards under the CBS Directives and the understandability rule.

2 Coherence

Just as legal certainty, coherence is a core principle guiding regulation. Essentially, the principle of coherence requires that multiple legal acts or policies are consistent (do not conflict) and are ultimately based on a single fundamental principle or common value.Footnote 98 It also involves ensuring that different interventions or policies work well together and are consistent with high-level and long-term objectives.Footnote 99

As discussed above, the purpose of the AA is to facilitate equal access to financial services for persons with disabilities by improving their access to information, so they are empowered to make decisions to promote their financial well-being in the same manner as people without disabilities.Footnote 100 Empowering consumers more generally to make these decisions is a core aim of the European Commission and the EU legislature. The idea is most recently expressed in the EC’s Savings and Investments Union Action Plan,Footnote 101 in the aforementioned Retail Investment Strategy and in the preambles of the CBS Directives. These initiatives are all based on the same consumer protection paradigm, i.e., protection through sufficiently clear disclosure of mandatory information elements.Footnote 102 As they may be stipulated in language that not all consumers will understand (to adequately balance simplicity and efficiency), due to neurodiversity,Footnote 103 the AA should be considered as a means to bridge this gap by prescribing an additional information layer that tailors this information to the needs of persons of disabilities in particular.

Put more aptly, by considering the AA as an additional information layer that allows these persons to digest uniform consumer disclosures, it can serve the goal of financial inclusion next to the overarching goal of protection through disclosure, rather than to conflict or interfere with it. That interpretation, which aligns with the narrow application of the understandability rule, would respect the coherence principle.

VII Concluding thoughts

The purpose of this article was to analyse whether the understandability rule in the AA should be applied to (1) information disclosures required under the AA (narrow application), or (2) all information disclosures required under CBS Directives in addition to existing rules (broad application), and (3) mandatory contract elements in those Directives (holistic application). The conclusion is that the narrow application should be followed, based on established interpretation methods, existing EU financial and consumer law and broader legal principles. The rule prescribes an additional disclosure layer, without prejudice to the norms in these Directives. However, the narrow application does not preclude the pursuit of other regulatory strategies which are better suited to promote inclusion. Those strategies should consider industry initiatives with promising technologies, for example agentic artificial intelligence, which would enable disclosures that are personalised and tailored to the specific conditions of individual consumers.

Funding Statement

Open access funding provided by Leiden University.

Footnotes

1

Attorney-at-law, Knowledge Development Lawyer at DLA Piper International and PhD Candidate in Law at Leiden University. The article is written on personal title. The author has no conflicts of interest to declare. On 16 July 2025, the research for this article was completed – developments after this date have not been considered.

References

2 According to one consultancy, the Dutch supervisory authority (AFM) has expressed that it prefers agreements and general conditions written in B1 (but that B2 is acceptable in financial services), as part of an application for authorisation as a financial service provider by one of its clients. See Danielle Geelen, “Case studie: financiële documenten herschrijven in toegankelijke taal,” Projective Group, proctivegroup.com accessed 16 July 2025.

3 For example, Art. 12 UN CRPD; ISO-IEC, “Guide for addressing accessibility in standards,” Guide 71, 1 December 2014, rule 6.2.6; World Wide Web Consortium, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, v2.2,12 December 2024, rule 3.1; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Guiding Principles of the Convention,” social.desa.un.org, accessed 16 July 2025. On inclusion, see B. Bierens, “Financiële inclusiviteit in een mondiaal, Europees en Nederlands perspectief,” Reeks “Inclusiviteit” – financiële inclusiviteit 76, SEW 2023, al. 5, pp. 212–24, 219; J. Journée, G. Pierrard and S. Rougeron, “21 – L’accessibilité des produits et services bancaires au Luxembourg au regard de la loi du 8 mars 2023 : le pari de l’inclusion,” in: Droit bancaire et financier au Luxembourg 2024 – Vol. II: Droit bancaire, 1e édition, Bruxelles, Larcier-Intersentia 2024, 1109–33.

4 E. van Praag, “Het Europese en Nederlandse betalingsverkeer: publieke taken voor private spelers,” Ondernemingsrecht 2025/55, 418–30, 418. Some banks explicitly take on this role, together with interest groups, such as the Dutch banking association, see “Gezamelijk plan van aanpak intensivering Toegankelijk Bankieren 2025 en verder,” 14 May 2025.

5 For example, the obligation to disclose pre-contractual information on credit agreements. This article considers a subset of EU financial services and consumer protection Directives, see Section V.

6 Many consumer law scholars have questioned the effectiveness of disclosure as a means of protection. See for a popular account, Omri Ben Shahar and Carl Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know – The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton University Press 2014).

7 Current policy initiatives are stretching this fairly monolithic paradigm of consumer law to protect “vulnerable consumers,” see OECD, “Understanding and responding to financial consumer vulnerability,” Business and Finance Policy Papers, No 83, 2025. An in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article.

8 Cambridge Dictionary, “Understandable,” dictionary.cambridge-org.demo.remotlog.com, accessed 16 July 2025.

9 Cambridge Dictionary, “Complexity,” dictionary.cambridge-org.demo.remotlog.com, accessed 16 July 2025.

10 Kathy Conklin, Richard Hyde, and Fabio Parente, “Assessing plain and intelligible language in the Consumer Rights Act: a role for reading scores?”39 Legal Studies 378–97, Section 5. See also the WCAG guidelines in Section IV.3.

11 Bruce Carlin, “Strategic price complexity in retail finance markets” 91 Journal of Financial Economics 278–87.

12 John Campbell, Howell Jackson, Brigitte Madrian and Peter Tufano, “The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies,” M-RCBG Faculty Working Paper Series | 2010-09, Section V.

13 See, e.g., the discussion in London Economics, “Consumer Protection Aspects of Financial Services,” European Parliament Study IP/A/IMCO/ST/2013-07, February 2014; ESMA, “Structured Retail Products – the EU market,” Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities No 2, 2018, 52–3.

14 For example, Claire Célérier and Boris Vallée, “Catering to investors through security design: Headline rate and complexity”132 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1469–508; US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “CFPB Publishes Research Finding Higher Price Complexity Leads Consumers to Pay More,” Press Release, April 2024.

15 FCA, “A New Consumer Duty,” PS22/9, para. 8.10.

16 FCA (n 15), para. 8.10, on customer base and target market characteristics, different approaches for mass-market and complex products; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, OECD/LEGAL/0394, 12 December 2022, Principle 8.

17 See, for example, Willem H. Van Boom, Pieter Desmet, Mark Van Dam, “‘If It’s Easy to Read, It’s Easy to Claim’ – The Effect of the Readability of Insurance Contracts on Consumer Expectations and Conflict Behaviour”39 Journal of Consumer Policy 187–97.

18 FCA, “Guidance for firms on the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers,” FG21/1, para. 4.14.

19 FCA (n 15), para. 8.7.

20 Toegankelijk Bankieren, “Verbeteringen sinds November 2023 en geplande verbeteringen per bank Toegankelijk Bankieren,” toegankelijkbankieren.nl, accessed 16 July 2025; Finance Latvia Association, Guidelines Accessibility of Financial Services, April 2023, financelatvia.eu, accessed 16 July 2025, guideline 2 (easy-to-understand service agreements), advocating plain language.

21 For example, Commissioner McGuinness, Opening remarks at “Money Matters: Financial literacy, resilience and inclusion” conference organised by the European Commission and the Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority, 20 February 2024.

22 OECD, OECD/INFE 2023 international survey of adult financial literacy, 17–25; OECD, OECD/INFE Toolkit for measuring financial literacy and financial inclusion 2022; EBA, Factsheet “Coordinating Financial Education and Literacy,” March 2020.

23 Eliza Varney, “Redefining contractual capacity? The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the incapacity defence in English contract law” 37 Legal Studies 493–519.

24 David Hoffman, “Consumers’ Unreasonable Textual Expectations,” Harvard Business Law Review 15 (2025), 45–58, 45; European Banking Authority, “EBA Consumer Trends Report 2024/25,” 26 March 2025, EBA/REP/2025/8, para. 128. For an older study involving EU-based consumers, Ecorys, University of Amsterdam, Tilburg University, GfK, Study on consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), Final report, March 2016, chapter 2.

25 Moira O’Neill, “Financial services: time to take account of neurodiversity ADHD and similar conditions are a growing challenge for firms and customers,” Financial Times, 8 December 2023; Financial Health Network, “The Financial Health of People with Disabilities – Key Obstacles and Opportunities,” August 2023.

26 See for an example of a voluntary initiative, JP Morgan Chase, “Banking on Inclusion: Teaching Financial Literacy to Neurodiverse and Disabled Communities,” 17 July 2024, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/newsroom/stories/kye-muse accessed 16 July 2025, for an example.

27 Sandra Huston, “Measuring Financial Literacy” 44 The Journal of Consumer Affairs 296–316, 310.

28 For this taxonomy, based on empirical analysis of plain language laws in the US, Michael Blasie, “Regulating Plain Language,” Wisconsin Law Review 687 (2023), Section II.B and IV.A.3.

29 For example, Alessandra Rossetti, Patrick Cadwell, Sharon O’Brien, “The Terms and Conditions Came Back to Bite”: Plain Language and Online Financial Content for Older Adults, HCI International 2020 – Late Breaking Papers: Universal Access and Inclusive Design: 22nd HCI International Conference, HCII 2020, Copenhagen, Denmark, July 19–24, 2020, Proceedings, 699–711.

30 See, for example, the “clear and concise” disclosure standard, in Section V.

31 Art. 3.1 AA.

32 Recital 4 AA; E.M.W. Reinders and T.R. de Smet, “De European Accessibility Act – Het streven naar een samenleving zonder ‘digitale’ drempels” (2023) 31 Bedrijfsjuridische berichten, para. 3.

33 Art. 2.1 AA; J. Elsenburg, “544. De European Accessibility Act - Toegankelijkheidsvereisten in de financiële Sector” (2024) 5 Tijdschrift Financieel Recht in de Praktijk 37–42, para. 3.

34 Art. 2.2.d AA.

35 Art. 3.30 AA. See also Autoriteit Financiele Markten, Toegankelijkheid (digitale) dienstverlening, https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/sector/themas/dienstverlening-aan-consumenten/toegankelijkheid accessed 16 July 2025.

36 The definition is poorly written, as the set mixes agreements, services and a monetary value.

37 Directive 2008/48/EC, which will be replaced by Directive 2023/2225/EU on consumer credits (CCD2), and Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property.

38 Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments.

39 Directive 2015/2366/EU on payment services in the internal market.

40 Directive 2014/92/EU on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts.

41 Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions.

42 Arts. 4.1, 13.1 and 14.1 AA.

43 Art. 13.2 AA.

44 Art. 13.3 and 13.4 AA.

45 Annex I, Section III AA.

46 Annex I, Section IV sub (e) AA.

47 Council of Europe, “Global scale _ Table 1 (CEFR 3.3): Common Reference levels,” https://www.coe.int accessed 16 July 2025. The texts concerned are articles and reports concerned with contemporary problems and literary prose, see Council of Europe, Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, teaching, assessment – Companion volume (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing 2020), available at www.coe.int/lang-cefr accessed 16 July 2025.

48 Annex V AA.

49 See, for example, Case C-438/23 Protéines France, 4 October 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:826, para. 86; Joined Cases C-795/21 P and C-796/21 P WEPA; Hygieneprodukte GmbH, 26 September 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:807, paras. 66–77. The Court also uses a historical method, which relies on using the preparatory works of the EU legislature to clarify legislative intent, to be taken into account in the teleological and contextual interpretations, see, e.g., Joined Cases C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P Illumina, 3 September 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677, para. 129.

50 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, “To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice,” Academy of European Law, AEL Working Paper 2013/9; Sorina Doroga and Alexandra Mercescu, “A Call to Impossibility: The Methodology of Interpretation at the European Court of Justice and the PSPP Ruling” (2021) 13 European Journal of Legal Studies 87–120, 97–8; Karl Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung” in Karl Riesenhuber (ed), Europäische Methodenlehre – Handbuch für Ausbildung und Praxis, 3rd edition (De Gruyter 2015) pp. 199–224.

51 Cambridge Dictionary, “Information,” dictionary.cambridge-org.demo.remotlog.com, accessed 16 July 2025.

52 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (n 48), 14; Douglas Walton, Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Sartor, Statutory Interpretation: Pragmatics and Argumentation (Cambridge University Press 2021), para. 1.6.

53 For example, Case C-438/23 Protéines France, 4 October 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:826, paras. 86–9 (“ingredient”).

54 See references to “informatie” in the Dutch version, “información” in the Spanish version, and “Informationen” in the German version.

55 Art. 3.3 AA.

56 Example: in the case of a credit agreement, the service is the provision of credit in return for remuneration, the lender’s disbursement obligations are generally set out in a credit agreement (and general terms), and the lender must meet the disclosure rules of the Consumer Credit Directive.

57 Martijn van der Brink, Legislative Authority and Interpretation in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2024), 141–42; Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (n 48) 14; Walton, Macagno and Sartor (n 50), para. 1.6.

58 European Union, Joint practical guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation, version 2016-07-08, op.europa.eu accessed 16 July 2025, paras. 10.5-10.6.

59 The CJEU has used the specific acts of the European Parliament in the legislative history to evaluate the teleological interpretation, see, e.g., Case C-236/24, 8 May 2025, Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen and Sogent v KG and WA, para. 21–36.

60 European Commission, COM(2015) 615 final, 2015/0278(COD), 2 December 2015, Section VI.

61 European Parliament, P8_TA(2017)0347, Amendments adopted on the proposal for the AA (COM(2015)0615 – C8-0387/2015 – 2015/0278(COD)), Amendments 205, 295 and 304.

62 Council of the European Union, General Approach, 15586/17, 2015/0278(COD), recital (20h) (new).

63 European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2019 on the proposal for the AA (COM(2015)0615 – C8-0387/2015 – 2015/0278(COD).

64 European Parliament, Report (COM(2015)0615 – C8-0387/2015 – 2015/0278(COD)), A8-0188/2017, 8 May 2017, 113.

65 See, e.g., Gunnar Nilson et al., Case C-162/97, 19 November 1998, ECR 1998 I-07477, para. 54.

66 See for an example, Case C-244/95, Moskof v Kapnou, 20 November 1997, ECR 1997, I-06441. See also Tadas Klimas and Jurate Vaiciukaite, “The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation” (2008) 15 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Section V; Case C-280/13, Barclays Bank SA.

67 For example, case C-17/24, CeramTec GmbH v Coorstek Bioceramics LLC, 19 June 2025, paras. 33–51.

68 See, e.g., Case C-76/23, Cobult, 21 March 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:253, para. 25; Case C-623/22, Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers, 29 July 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:639, paras. 39–41; Case C-508/12 Vapenik, 5 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:790, paras. 24–5.

69 Directive (EU) 2016/2102.

70 Recital 37 WAD. The discussion below is based on version 2.2 of the WCAG.

71 Art. 15 AA and Commission implementing decision of 14 September 2022 C(2022) 6456 final, in which they are listed.

72 International Business Machines (IBM), “Agentic AI in financial services: Opportunities, Risks and Responsible Implementation,” May 2025, 7–8, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/documents/gb-en/12f5a71117cdc329 accessed 16 July 2025. This position is supported by the European Disability Forum, “101 million reasons to build better artificial Intelligence,” 26 May 2025, edf-feph.org, accessed 16 July 2025, and the United Nations, “Leaving no one behind: using artificial intelligence as a tool for supporting inclusivity to strengthen the participation of persons with disabilities,” background note for round-table discussions, Conference of States Parties to the UN CRPD, 26 March 2025, CRPD/CSP/2025/3, Section III.

73 Joasia Luzak and Mia Junuzovic, “Blurred Lines: Between Formal and Substantive Transparency in Consumer Credit Contracts” 8 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 97–107, Sections 1 and 2.

74 Marco Loos, “Double Dutch – On the role of the transparency requirement with regard to the language in which standard contract terms for B2C-contracts must be drafted” 6 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 54–9, 54–5; Benedikt Schmitz and Charlotte Pavillon, “Measuring Transparency in Consumer Contracts: The Usefulness of Readability Formulas Empirically Assessed” 9 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 191–200, 200.

75 For brevity, this section provides a high-level overview of relevant standards. Note that where it gives examples of specific rules, it is not implied that every Directive contains the same rule – they are discussed collectively.

76 Recital 33 CCD2; Recitals 38 and 40 MCD; Recital 54 PSD2.

77 See Arts. 10 MCD, 7 CCD2 and 24.3 MiFID II.

78 Arts. 11 MCD and 8 CCD2.

79 Recital 32 CCD2; recital 7 UCPD.

80 CJEU C-646/22 Compass Banca SpA, 14 November 2024, para. 59, in respect of the UCPD.

81 Recitals 36 and 38 CCD2; recital 27 of the proposed Directive as regards Union retail investor protection rules (COM(2023) 279 final, 24 May 2025).

82 Arts. 5.1 and 10.1 CCD2 and 14 MCD.

83 Art. 24.5 MiFID II.

84 Art. 44.1 PSD2.

85 Arts. 13.1 MCD and 9.1 CCD2.

86 Arts. 13 and 18.8.a CCD2.

87 Case C-677/23, 23 January 2025, para. 58.

88 Recital 59 CCD2.

89 Art 21.1 CCD2.

90 Art 44.1 PSD2.

91 Art 5 UCTD; Case C-39/24 Justa v Banco Bilbao, 30 April 2025, para. 38.

92 See re UCTD and CCD1, Mia Junuzovic, “Transparency of (pre-)contractual information in consumer credit agreements: is consistency the missing key?” 14 Croation Yearbook of European Law & Policy 69–98, 75–6.

93 Case C-677/23, 23 January 2025, para. 30–2.

94 Case C-139/22, 21 September 2023, para. 61.

95 See, e.g., Case C-199/03 Ireland v Commission [2005] ECR I-8027, para. 69; H. Hofmann, “General Principles of EU Law and EU Administrative Law” in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014) pp. 212–41, Section 3; Patricia Popelier, “Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making” (2000) 2 European Journal of Law Reform 321–42, 325 et seq.

96 Patricia Popelier, op. cit.

97 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council [1997] ECR II-39, para. 125; Hoffmann (n 95), Section 3.

98 Neil Maccormick, “Coherence in Law and Legal Justification” in A. Peczenik, L. Lindahl, B. van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science, Dordrecht (Reidel 1984); J. Dickson, ‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/legal-reas-interpret/>.

99 European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines,” SWD(2021)305 final, 3 November 2021, 5; European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox, July 2023, accessed 16 July 2025.

100 See more generally, Art. 12 UN CRPD and European Commission, “Union of Equality – Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030,” COM(2021) 101 final, 3 March 2021, 5.2.

101 European Commission, “Savings and Investments Union,” COM(2025) 124 final, 19 March 2025.

102 V. Mak, “The Consumer in European Regulatory Private Law” in D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law, Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2016) pp. 381–400. See for a discussion in the e-commerce context, Felix Pflücke, Compliance with European Consumer Law: The Case of E-Commerce, Oxford University Press 2024, chapter 4.

103 Note that this protection paradigm co-exists with more interventionist paradigms, such as restrictions on business models and product design, which are beyond the scope of this article.