I argue that alienation objections to housing markets face a dilemma. Either they purport to explain distributive injustices, or they hold that markets are objectionable on intrinsic grounds. The first disjunct is empirically dubious. The second undermines the motivation for objecting to housing markets, and overgeneralizes: if markets are objectionable due to alienation, so is all large-scale social cooperation.

We present a model that locates the source of vagueness as the speaker’s inability to perfectly perceive the world. We show that the agents will communicate clearly about the world as the sender perceives it. However, the implied meaning about the actual world will be vague. Vagueness is characterized by probability distributions that describe the degree to which a statement is likely to be true. Hence, we provide micro-foundations for truth-degree functions as an equilibrium consequence of the sender’s perception technology and his optimal, non-vague communication in the perceived world – connecting the epistemic and truth-degree approaches to vagueness.

Insurers draw on sophisticated models for the probability distributions over losses associated with catastrophic events that are required to price insurance policies. But prevailing pricing methods don’t factor in the ambiguity around model-based projections that derive from the relative paucity of data about extreme events. I argue however that most current theories of decision making under ambiguity only partially support a solution to the challenge that insurance decision makers face and propose an alternative approach that allows for decision making that is responsive to both the evidential situation of the insurance decision maker and their attitude to ambiguity.

Nozick’s ‘utility monster’ is often regarded as impossible, because one life cannot be better than a large number of other lives. Against that view, I propose a purely marginalist account of utility monster defining the monster by a higher sensitivity of well-being to resources (instead of a larger total well-being), and I introduce the concept of collective utility monster to account for resource predation by a group. Since longevity strengthens the sensitivity of well-being to resources, large groups of long-lived persons may, if their longevity advantage is sufficiently strong, fall under the concept of collective utility monster, against moral intuition.

We study original position arguments in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general formal framework for such arguments. Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social choice rules that can be supported by original position arguments. We illustrate this characterization in terms of various well-known social choice rules, some of which do and some of which do not satisfy the axioms in question. Depending on the perspective one takes, our results can be used to argue against certain rules, against Rawlsian theories of procedural fairness, or in support of richer, multidimensional models of individual choice.

Lara Buchak defends a Weight-Ranked Utilitarianism (WRU) that she says avoids the critique of Rawls’s that is sometimes thought fatal: utilitarianism unjustifiably blurs the distinction between persons. Buchak’s defence depends upon (i) a version of Harsanyi’s assumption that parties to a social contract should reason as if they have an equal chance of being anyone and (ii) a hypothesis she explores in a recent article. I argue that her assumption and hypothesis are untenable. WRU fails of the generality to which Buchak aspires because it fails for one of her most important cases: the distributive question posed by Rawls.

In a recent article in this journal, James Christensen, Tom Parr and David Axelsen argue that millionaire salaries are unjust and women have no grounds of fairness to unjust salaries in parity with men. They accept that disrespect is expressed toward women when they are paid less than men because of their gender. Their argument largely replicates a similar argument developed earlier by Anca Gheaus. By drawing on the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, we argue that Christensen et al. and Gheaus hold women to unacceptably high standards of justice and arguably higher standards than men are held to.

Fausto Corvino has recently argued in this journal that, given present people’s reasonable expectation of future people’s economic activity, present and future people stand in the relation required by both of the two main camps of justice as reciprocity: justice as self-interested reciprocity and justice as fair reciprocity. In reply, I argue that on neither view is the relation Corvino identifies the relation the view requires and that neither view endorses his principle of intergenerational distributive justice, Transgenerational Sufficiency, in a contract between generations. I show that these concerns generalize to any view of synchronic direct intergenerational reciprocity.

It has been shown that the Mere Addition Paradox occurs in a choice-functional approach with Path Independence (Stewart R.T., 2021, Path independence and a persistent paradox of population ethics, Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming). The present study is a three-part response to this finding. First, I show that Path Independence is not an essential property leading to this paradox and that logically weaker properties can get the same result. Second, I present a rationalizable choice function that does not yield the paradox. And third, I argue that menu-dependent relations are nicely examined if Path Independence is relaxed to Property $\alpha $ (or equivalently, Contraction Consistency).

What follows is a sketch of three of the main claims of How to Pool Risks across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions (Otsuka 2023) with which my symposium commentators critically engage: namely, that (1) by efficiently pooling risks across as well as within generations, (2) collective pensions can realize a form of Rawlsian reciprocity involving fair terms of cooperation for mutual advantage, (3) through the voluntary binding agreements of individuals to join a mutual association that provides social insurance. I respond to their challenges to these claims in my replies that follow their contributions.

A response to pressures on pension finance caused by population ageing and economic turbulence has been a substantial move from traditional defined-benefit plans in which, at least in principle, all risk falls on the contributions side, to defined-contribution plans in which risk during accumulation all falls on the benefits side. This paper argues that both designs are ‘corner solutions’ and hence generally suboptimal, and goes on to set out a range of designs that offer different ways of sharing risk among workers, employers, future pensioners and current pensioners.

This contribution discusses the central thesis in Michael Otsuka’s book that collective pensions can be organized on a voluntary basis from the recent experience with pension reform in the Netherlands. Despite a long tradition of collective-funded pensions organized in a decentralized way by social partners, basis reform was necessary as population ageing made it increasingly harder to maintain the intergenerational solidarity implicit in these pensions. Although it is well-established that risk sharing between generations can be beneficial and welfare improving to all, it is far from certain that new generations will enter existing pension arrangements on a voluntary basis. First, there is a considerable ‘discontinuity risk’ if deficits in pension funding – caused by bad shocks – deter younger generations from entering the scheme. Second, even if it is to their own interest most people do not voluntarily engage in pension schemes due to several kinds of behavioural and psychological barriers.

This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Michael Otsuka’s book, How to Pool Risk Across Generations. Following Otsuka, one may distinguish three distinct systems of cooperation within a standard pension arrangement: the retirement system, the longevity risk pool and the investment risk pool. It is important to observe, however, that only the retirement system constitutes a genuine system of intergenerational cooperation, the other two are essentially intragenerational, in that they pool risks among members of a cohort. Otsuka is faulted for being occasionally less than clear on these distinctions.

Michael Otsuka argues that collective pension schemes are forms of social cooperation on equal terms for mutual advantage and thus, matters of social justice. In this way Otsuka wants to understand collectively funded pensions in Rawlsian terms. I argue that not all forms of social cooperation are the same and that the specific kind of social cooperation Rawls has in mind is, in at least three central respects, different from the kind of social cooperation involved in the collective pension schemes Otsuka describes.

I agree that a good pensions system should embody some form of collective risk pooling and that this would be to the advantage of everyone. There are some difficult issues of adverse selection to be solved, however. Moreover, egalitarian concerns are of crucial importance in most countries and they require to go further than collective risk pooling and to take into account that society is more than a system of self-interested monetary transfers between and within cohorts.