¹ Peterson, MJ, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815–1995 (Ipswich: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997)10.1057/9780230375895CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Talmon, Stefan, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Roth, Brad R, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

² Talmon, supra note 1 at 6, 7.

³ Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 156.

⁴ Stefan Talmon, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council” (2022) 15:16 ASIL Insights n.p., online: <www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recognition-libyan-national-transitional-council>.

⁵ Federica Paddeu & Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, “Recognition of Governments: Legitimacy and Control Six Months after Guaidó,” Opinio Juris (18 July 2019), online: <opiniojuris.org/2019/07/18/recognition-of-governments-legitimacy-and-control-six-months-after-guaido/>; Ralph Janik, “European Recognition Practice on Venezuela: The Devil in the Details,” Opinio Juris (8 February 2019), <opiniojuris.org/2019/02/08/european-recognition-practice-on-venezuela-the-devil-in-the-details/>.

⁶ Pavlopoulos, Niko, The Identity of Governments in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024) at 93 10.1093/9780191991509.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Talmon, Stefan, “The Duty Not to ‘Recognize as Lawful’ a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation without Real Substance?” in Tomuschat, Christian & Thouvenin, Jean-Marc, eds, The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Leiden / Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 119 Google Scholar.

⁹ Talmon, Stefan, ‘Who Is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law’ in Goodwin-Gill, Guy & Talmon, Stefan, eds, The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 532 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 83–84, 85–86, 137.

¹¹ Ibid at 95.

¹² Ibid at 85.

¹³ The last chapter (Chapter 5) examines the question of government representation in international organizations.

¹⁴ Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 88.

¹⁵ Ibid at 89.

¹⁶ Ibid at 92.

¹⁷ Ibid at 94ff.

¹⁸ Ibid at 97; Aguilar- Amory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Great Britain v Costa Rica), (1923) 1 UNRIAA 375 at 381 [Tinoco case].

¹⁹ Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 97.

²⁰ Ibid at 106ff.

²¹ For a details analysis, see Roth, supra note 1 at 366–87, 405–10.

²² Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 128 (also referring to other examples, including Cote d’Ivoire (2010), Honduras (2009), and Gambia (2016).

²³ Sean D Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments” (1999) 48:3 ICLQ 545 at 578.

²⁴ Erika de Wet, “The Role of Democratic Legitimacy in the Recognition of Governments in Africa since the End of the Cold War” (2019) 17:2 Intl J Constitutional L 470 at 478 (“democratic legitimacy has not yet developed into a precondition for governmental recognition on the continent”).

²⁵ Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 95.

²⁶ Ibid at 96.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid at 140.

²⁹ Ibid at 107.

³⁰ Ibid at 107ff.

³¹ Ibid at 95.

³² Ibid at 118.

³³ Ibid at 95.

³⁴ Ibid at 112ff.

³⁵ Ibid at 95, 111, 113. See also Federica Paddeu & Niko Pavlopoulos, “Between Legitimacy and Control: The Taliban’s Pursuit of Governmental Status,” Just Security (7 September 2021) (“not all States accepted the constitutionality of Juan Guaidó’s claim as president of Venezuela, which involved a plausible, but novel, interpretation of Article 233 of Venezuela’s constitution. Furthermore, it is perhaps due to uncertainty over the constitutionality of either claim to power that neither the military junta nor the National Unity Government have obtained widespread recognition as the government of Myanmar”).

³⁶ Pavlopoulos, supra note 6 at 123.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Paddeu & Pavlopoulos, supra note 35 (examining the rather “uncertain” validity of the constitutional claim to power by the ousted government).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Peterson, supra note 1 at 195 (indicating that the institution of recognition is “more discredited today than it would otherwise have been because of the political uses in the interwar and early Cold War eras so vividly exposed the contradiction between the international function of assessing whether a particular regime can serve as the international agent of its state and individual states’ foreign policy goals”).

⁴¹ Talmon, supra note 1 at 155.

⁴² Paddeu & Pavlopoulos, supra note 35 [emphasis in original].

⁴³ See Haroun Rahimi & Mahir Hazim, “International Law and the Taliban’s Legal Status: Emerging Recognition Criteria?” (2023) 32:3 Washington Intl LJ 228 at 234ff; Filomena Medea Tulli, “States and Other International Entities: The Non-Recognition of the Taliban Government of Afghanistan” (2022) 31:1 Italian YB Intl L 494.

⁴⁴ Seyfullah Hasar, ‘Recognition of Governments and the Case of the Taliban” (2024) 23:1 Chinese J Intl L 73 at 97 (“[t]he Taliban case also shows that, in a particular case, the effects of recognition could be minimised, if not diminished altogether, to the extent that, with no substantial legal or practical consequences tied to it, non-recognition may remain only in name, or political realm. That is, it is possible that, in a given case, nothing may be left in the residual meaning of recognition to mark the difference between recognition and non-recognition”).