In 1888, George Eastman introduced Kodak, one of the first affordable, user-friendly photographic film cameras. The camera’s success planted seeds for a global market for amateur photography that the Eastman Kodak Company would dominate for over a century. Leveraging substantial profits from photographic film, Kodak invested heavily in research and development, continuously innovating in amateur photography and pioneering new technological domains. From the 1970s onward, as growth in its core business began to slow and new imaging technologies emerged, Kodak embarked on significant strategic renewal initiatives. These efforts included diversifying into industries such as plain paper copiers and pharmaceuticals and developing digital products for photography applications. Despite considerable investments in innovation and growing new businesses over several decades, Kodak ultimately failed to find a viable path to sustaining its success; it filed for bankruptcy in 2012. The company’s decline illustrates the inherent challenges of sustaining a successful enterprise in evolving markets and technologies. Furthermore, it raises critical questions about the effectiveness of strategic renewal efforts, particularly when high-performance expectations are set within an environment of significant uncertainty.

This research reconstructs the business dynamics behind the evolution of the European mutual fund industry, which led Luxembourg to become its main international gateway since the 1960s. We analyze this local industry to understand how political and financial élites influence the economic specialization of small states. We argue that a closely-knit community of local professionals and politicians, well-versed in corporate and European legislation, leveraged the Grand Duchy’s small state status within the nascent European Community to become a financial hub specializing in mutual funds within an emerging network of international financial centers. This position was achieved through bifurcation of sovereignty strategies on the basis of two main premises. First, on the systematic acceptance of conflicts of interest within local financial and political leadership, comprising overlapping roles, revolving-doors, and familial ties in business relationships. Second, on regulatory engineering practices, such as the dynamic interpretation of laws, and the strategic planning of directive assimilation to advance Luxembourg’s interests as opposed to its EU counterparts. The analysis uses archival material from nine archival collections and oral history interviews.

The automotive lobby’s voluntary commitment to reducing CO2 emissions in 1998 was widely perceived as evidence of the influence of multinationals on European decision-making. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) denounced the lack of transparency. Interviewing negotiators or quoting published reports, scholars focused on the disappointing effects of this agreement. Pending the opening of the public archives, this study is based on primary industry archives, which shed light on the highly confidential negotiation phase. Exchanges within the industry and meetings with the European Commission reveal the limits of the automotive lobby’s power, which had to face internal divisions and seemed to suffer more than choose the agreement. It was the result of Directorate-General (DG) III’s maneuvering. The companies “voluntarily” accepted it as the lesser evil, as it was more advantageous than a directive. The idea of standards being co-constructed by public and private stakeholders needs to be qualified: the balance of power was unbalanced. With these soft regulations, it was above all the Commission that strengthened its position in the decision-making process, to the detriment of other stakeholders such as the European Parliament.

Just before World War I, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) geographically expanded its trade in the Canadian Arctic to derive profits from Arctic fox fur and secure its position in a global value chain (GVC) delivering fur to metropolitan consumers. The “problem of nature” challenged the company’s business venture. Furthermore, “nature” was made and remade by the HBC’s own capital investments. The fox trade itself changed human ecology. Technology transfers to Inuit modified their hunting regimes to increase the company’s returns of polar bear skins. Though these skins had high potential market value, modes of production introduced by the HBC to the Arctic precluded the company from sending high-quality products to metropolitan dressers. Within a changing Arctic human ecology, the HBC produced one highly valued commodity for the market while producing another from which it could derive only modest profit. The HBC’s fox and polar bear trade at the onset of the last century suggests ways that business empires can set off complex and unanticipated changes in human ecologies and, therefore, the dynamics of nature and business at their very peripheries.

This article explores the development of a group of free-standing companies in Colombia in the first decades of the twentieth century. The article illustrates how the British investor Shirley Jenks, who closely matches the description of the “gentlemanly capitalist” social class, leveraged “free-standing companies” as an investment vehicle to construct interconnected strategic business interests. The article illustrates the versatility offered by “free-standing companies” and how, in combination with “collaborating elites,” the mechanisms of the London capital market could be used to construct and administer a significant business empire in the periphery with little local presence or direct influence.