This article examines the central-local relation between China's unitary and socialist state and its capitalist Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong, and considers that, notwithstanding the centralised system underpinning the relationship, Chinese central decision-making in respect of Hong Kong could raise issues of legitimacy. This article focuses on the decision-making of China's National People's Congress and its Standing Committee between 2016 and 2021, purportedly pursuant to the Chinese Constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law (the instruments providing for Hong Kong's different systems). Upon examination, this article argues that legitimacy-based inhibition, restriction, and resistance arises in relation to the legal control exercised by the Chinese central authorities over Hong Kong. This is made possible by the ‘conditionality’ of the Basic Law, framed as the implementation of China's policies for the return of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, and by the nurturing of the perceived pluralistic premise of the policy of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ by Hong Kong's common law judges and lawyers in their interpretation and application of the ‘imposed constitution’ of the Basic Law.

Pursuant to Article 63 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a state may require other treaty parties to disclose their intellectual property case law ‘of general application’. While most domestic judgments in common law are indeed of general application, civil law systems theoretically employ judgments as reference only. Nevertheless, to value consistency and predictability, the hybridisation of civil law jurisdictions is increasingly leading them to devise special lists of judgments that acquire formal or factual binding status on lower-ranked courts. This trend is particularly evident in China, whose Supreme People's Court's ‘Guiding Cases’ join other specific categories of holdings within ‘Judicial Interpretations’ and further guideline documents that are factually binding domestically. When the United States and the European Union requested, through the World Trade Organization, that China disclose the full range of its case law of general application, China responded that civil law jurisdictions do not issue judgments that are binding beyond the parties. This article examines the limitations and merits of the Chinese stance.

‘Anxious scrutiny’ has become one of the most used terms within the lexicon of judicial review throughout the common law world, including Hong Kong, yet surprisingly remains understudied in the scholarly literature. In contrast to the considerable body of literature on substantive review of discretion in relation to proportionality and Wednesbury unreasonableness as rival standards of review, there is still much to explore in relation to the foundation, purpose, and techniques of anxious scrutiny review, including how the concept may have come to depart from its English roots in other common law jurisdictions. Using Hong Kong as a case study, this article examines how anxious scrutiny has been received in an Asian common law jurisdiction, considering both the scope of application and the techniques used by judges under this standard. Through a detailed examination of the case law, it traces the origins and evolution of the standard and its future role within the sliding scale of substantive review within Hong Kong's system of public law.

Democracies today do not collapse all at once, in an extreme and illegal manner, but erode gradually, through a series of subtle and seemingly legal measures. This challenges traditional theories of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, which are designed to address revolutionary changes that negate core features of the constitutional order. How should courts respond when a constitutional amendment comes at the early stages of a process of democratic erosion, when the ‘first brick’ is falling from the fortress of democracy, or when would-be autocrats slice the first piece from the ‘salami’ that is the democratic constitutional order? Against the backdrop of Israel's recent judicial overhaul, we argue that in countries experiencing incremental democratic erosion, courts must take a broad and contextual view and, when there is evidence that further anti-democratic moves are being planned, prevent that ‘first brick’ from falling. This is crucial to protect other democratic institutions, such as significant gatekeepers or constitutional courts.

In Thailand, the concept of corporate criminal liability is commonly identified with significant theoretical and practical uncertainties. Only limited attention, however, has been devoted to the notion's historical roots in English legal transfers. This article examines the relevant legislation, court cases, academic literature, and other records. It carves out the continuous English influence on Thai corporate crime doctrine and highlights the legal irritation that occurred along the way. It argues that irritation was not automatic but driven by the Supreme Court, whose choices were shaped by decades of English impact on Thai legal education and practice. The article thereby highlights the dynamics between legal transfers and local drivers of legal development. It expands the growing research on the continued relevance of English law in Thailand and concludes with an outlook on the future of Thai corporate crime doctrine.

Ouster clauses have perennially borne the mantle of a ‘litigation minefield’, where clashes between legislative and judicial powers unfold in open fora. Recent jurisprudential advancements in the United Kingdom and Singapore demonstrate how judicial approaches to ouster clauses can evolve in the face of constitutional developments. Hong Kong has, however, remained muted while these jurisprudential advancements bear fruit in other parts of the common law world, notwithstanding the fact that its constitutional framework, umpired by the Basic Law, has been in existence for over twenty-five years. This article argues for the need to reconceptualise approaches to ouster clauses in Hong Kong, grounded firmly in its post-1997 constitutional framework. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence, it presents a spectrum of approaches, animated by the dynamic interplay between various ‘macrocontextual’ and ‘microcontextual’ factors, ranging from a localised version of Anisminic, remedial interpretation, and invalidation of ouster clauses on the grounds that they impermissibly affront the constitutional right of access to courts, allocation of judicial power, and constitutional supremacy.

The rise and proliferation of International Commercial Courts has become a perceptible trend across the European and Asian continents over the past two decades. One such dispute resolution hub exists within the Astana International Financial Centre, a special jurisdiction within the Republic of Kazakhstan that operates on the basis of common law principles. The Astana International Financial Centre and its Court were modelled on the international financial centres of Dubai and Qatar; however, there are substantial differences between the legal systems of the Gulf States and that of the Republic of Kazakhstan. As a result, the creation of a new court has led to considerable criticism within the local legal community, raising serious doubts as to whether the Kazakh state should be maintaining and financing a ‘caviar-court’ instead of using resources to reform and develop the national judicial system. Nevertheless, despite the scepticism surrounding the financial centre, there is potential for the Astana International Financial Centre and its Court to become a regional dispute resolution hub for post-Soviet countries and the Central Asian region, following the example of Singapore and Dubai.