The modern idea of purebred dogs has come under increasing critical scrutiny over recent decades. In light of this critical focus and other developments in society, some new trends in how companion dogs are bred and acquired have emerged. This means a diminishing influence from traditional kennel clubs with more dogs being sold without a pedigree, stricter legal restrictions on dog breeding, growing popularity of deliberate crosses of established breeds (i.e. so-called designer breeds) and growing hype around the benefits of mixed-breed dogs. We give an overview of these trends and discuss to what extent they will serve to promote dogs that are innately healthy, have good welfare and function well in their various roles in today’s world. We argue that newly invented designer breeds and mixed breeds also have worrying health and behavioural problems, and that the predictability of purebred dogs with respect to body size, basic behaviours, known need for grooming, disorder profiles and other attributes may well offer some benefits for a satisfying human-dog relationship seen from both sides. The optimal future seems to lie in the middle ground, where the future organised dog world (i.e. kennel and breed clubs or their successor organisations) will need to re-open the breed registries, remove wording from breed standards that currently promotes extreme conformation, support selection against disease-predisposing genotypes and phenotypes and refocus dog showing and breeding to promote health and appropriate behaviour.

The global Insects as Food and Feed (IAFF) industry currently farms over a trillion individual insects a year and is growing rapidly. Intensive animal production systems are known to cause a range of negative affective states in livestock; given the potential scale of the IAFF industry, it is urgent to consider the welfare of the industry’s insect livestock. The majority of the literature on farmed insect welfare has focused on: (i) establishing that insect welfare ought to be of concern; or (ii) extending vertebrate welfare frameworks to insects. However, there are many overlooked challenges to studying insect welfare and applying that knowledge in IAFF industry contexts. Here, we briefly review five of these challenges. We end with practical recommendations for the future study of insect welfare.

Based on experiences from stakeholders, this paper describes and discusses Danish emergency procedures when animal transport vehicles overturn, from a One Welfare perspective. Twenty qualitative interviews were conducted with selected stakeholders involved in emergency responses and their co-ordination. Results from interviews were extracted and are presented as a description of the Danish emergency management procedures in situations where pig transport vehicles overturn in a traffic accident. The description is followed by a discussion of six identified themes related to animal welfare and One Welfare in such situations: (1) Standard operating procedures; (2) Balancing animal welfare and work safety; (3) Roles, education and experience; (4) Communication, time and access to animals; (5) Debriefing; and (6) Killing of animals. Overall, the analyses of the interviews showed that the emergency response at an overturned pig transport vehicle involves different professional groups, requires technical knowledge regarding animal transport vehicles as well as knowledge of the species involved and how to handle the animals. The results are discussed from a One Welfare perspective, suggesting that these emergency responses include an inherent societal prioritisation dilemma involving the balancing of, for example, training, preparation and debriefing of different professional groups. Further research is needed to address ethical considerations, share best practices, and enhance emergency protocols.

Animals under human care are exposed to a potentially large range of both familiar and unfamiliar humans. Human-animal interactions vary across settings, and individuals, with the nature of the interaction being affected by a suite of different intrinsic and extrinsic factors. These interactions can be described as positive, negative or neutral. Across some industries, there has been a move towards the development of technologies to support or replace human interactions with animals. Whilst this has many benefits, there can also be challenges associated with increased technology use. A day-long Animal Welfare Research Network workshop was hosted at Harper Adams University, UK, with the aim of bringing together stakeholders and researchers (n = 38) from the companion, farm and zoo animal fields, to discuss benefits, challenges and limitations of human-animal interactions and machine-animal interactions for animals under human care and create a list of future research priorities. The workshop consisted of four talks from experts within these areas, followed by break-out room discussions. This work is the outcome of that workshop. The key recommendations are that approaches to advancing the scientific discipline of machine-animal interactions in animals under human care should focus on: (1) interdisciplinary collaboration; (2) development of validated methods; (3) incorporation of an animal-centred perspective; (4) a focus on promotion of positive animal welfare states (not just avoidance of negative states); and (5) an exploration of ways that machines can support a reduction in the exposure of animals to negative human-animal interactions to reduce negative, and increase positive, experiences for animals.

It is widely accepted that we ought to avoid taking excessive risks of causing gratuitous suffering. The practical implications of this truism, however, depend on how we understand what counts as an excessive risk. Precautionary frameworks help us decide when a risk exceeds the threshold for action, with the recent Birch et al. (2021) framework for assessing invertebrate sentience being one such example. The Birch et al. framework uses four neurobiological and four behavioural criteria to provide an evidence-based standard that can be used in determining when precautionary action to promote invertebrate welfare may be warranted. Our aim in this discussion paper is to provide a new motivation for the threshold approach that the Birch et al. framework represents while simultaneously identifying some possible revisions to the framework that can reduce false positives without abandoning the framework’s precautionary objectives.

To qualify and quantify animal welfare, novel assessment tools have been and are being developed, while existing assessment tools are being modified so that they can be applied to multiple species living under different housing and management conditions. The results of such assessments should be reliable, consistent and reproducible. We review the steps that should ideally be taken to develop, validate and apply animal welfare assessment tools. The first step should be to find a definition of animal welfare that the various stakeholders can agree upon. The second step should be to formulate and agree upon a framework for the evaluation of animal welfare. Both theoretical/conceptual frameworks, which provide a structure for research and suggest which facets are considered important, and ethical frameworks, which explicate the underlying moral position, should be considered. Finally, animal welfare assessment tools should be developed and validated based on both the adopted welfare definition and the welfare evaluation framework(s). However, this three-step approach has not always been followed in the development of welfare assessment tools currently in use. We expect that transparency and clarity regarding the underlying definitions and frameworks will increase the likelihood that the resulting welfare assessment tools will give similar weight to the aspects considered relevant to animal welfare, as it helps to specify the aspects that are considered to be key elements of animal welfare. This approach should lead to convergent assessment results and higher correlation of welfare indicators between assessment tools.

Russell and Burch’s 1959 original definitions of the 3Rs (replacement, reduction and refinement) are widely used today as standards for the ethical use of non-human animals in research, although they have a number of limitations. Authors and institutions around the world have addressed some of these, coming up in certain cases with more accurate, functional, and up-to-date definitions. However, not only do there still remain limitations needing to be addressed, but some that have been addressed resulted in discrepancies, contradictions, and general confusion as to how best apply the 3Rs in practice. In order to clarify the meaning of the 3Rs and enable more optimal implementation of these principles in animal experimentation, this article provides a theoretical discussion for revised definitions of the original 3Rs via examination of some of their main limitations and inconsistencies. First, we offer up the original definitions as presented in the context of Russell and Burch’s book The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Then, we examine the main limitations and present clear specifications and requirements for such revised definitions. After presenting our revised definitions, we conclude with various implications for animal welfare within the context of experimentation.

A wide range of animal taxa, including vertebrates and invertebrates, are controlled or kept by humans. They may be used as pets, for recreation, sport and hobbies, as working animals, as producers of animal-derived (food) products or as biomedical models in research. There is a need for clear guidance on the treatment of animals, regardless of their phylogenetic distance from humans. Current animal welfare concepts, which emphasise animal sentience and the ability of animals to experience negative or positive mental states, are limited in scope to a small proportion of the animal kingdom, as the vast majority of species are (currently) thought to lack sentience. We discuss four options for addressing the question of which basic concept(s) could be used to derive guidelines for the treatment of animal species, sentient or non-sentient: (1) alternative concepts tailored to specific groups of species; (2) ‘welfare’ concepts not presupposing sentience; (3) the precautionary principle; or (4) the concept of animal integrity. Since questions regarding the appropriate treatment of animals, including species with a large phylogenetic distance from humans, have an ethical/moral dimension, we also address who counts morally and how much, and how animals should be treated given their moral status. We suggest that the concept of animal integrity, possibly complemented and extended by the concept of habitat/ecosystem integrity, is suitable for application to all species. However, a current concept of animal welfare should serve as the primary basis for guidance on how to treat species that are sentient and capable of experiencing emotions.

According to the Bayesian brain hypothesis, the brain can be viewed as a predictive machine, such that predictions (or expectations) affect how sensory inputs are integrated. This means that in many cases, affective responses may depend more on the subject’s perception of the experience (driven by expectations built on past experiences) rather than on the situation itself. Little research to date has applied this concept to affective states in animals. The aim of this paper is to explore how the Bayesian brain hypothesis can be used to understand the affective experiences of animals and to develop a basis for novel predictions regarding animal welfare. Drawing from the literature illustrating how predictive processes are important to human well-being, and are often impaired in affective disorders, we explore whether the Bayesian brain theories may help understanding animals’ affective responses and whether deficits in predictive processes may lead to previously unconsidered welfare consequences. We conclude that considering animals as predictive entities can improve our understanding of their affective responses, with implications for basic research and for how to provide animals a better life.

Decapod crustaceans, commonly utilised for pure or applied scientific research and commercial food production, have generally remained outside ethical debate. However, in the last decade many parts of the world have seen an increase in public interest in the welfare of decapod crustaceans and statutory legal protection has been introduced in several countries. Although still limited to a small number of countries and remaining relatively unharmonised, relevant legislation could be increasingly broadened to include decapods in further jurisdictions. Much existing legislation, originally intended for protecting terrestrial vertebrates during scientific study, might be unsuitable for aquatic invertebrates such as decapods. Indeed, precedence with many fish species and cephalopods suggests detail is lacking with respect to fundamental guidance. Therefore, similar inclusion of decapods into such legislation could make welfare or scientific goals more challenging to achieve unless relevant guidance is available, particularly to animal care practitioners. This horizon paper aims to summarise existing decapod legislation, and the considerations required should decapods be included in current conceptual frameworks and scientific legislation.

The Five Domains model is influential in contemporary studies of animal welfare. It was originally presented as a conceptual model to understand the types of impact that procedures may impose on experimental animals. Its application has since broadened to cover a wide range of animal species and forms of animal use. However, it has also increasingly been applied as an animal welfare assessment tool, which is the focus of this paper. Several critical limitations associated with this approach have not been widely acknowledged, including that: (1) it relies upon expert or stakeholder opinion, with little transparency around the selection of these individuals; (2) quantitative scoring is typically attempted despite the absence of clear principles for aggregation of welfare measures and few attempts to account for uncertainty; (3) there have been few efforts to measure the repeatability of findings; and (4) it does not consider indirect and unintentional impacts such as those imposed on non-target animals. These deficiencies lead to concerns surrounding testability, repeatability and the potential for manipulation. We provide suggestions for refinement of how the Five Domains model is applied to partially address these limitations. We argue that the Five Domains model is useful for systematic consideration of all sources of possible welfare compromise and enhancement, but is not, in its current state, fit-for-purpose as an assessment tool. We argue for wider acknowledgment of the operational limits of using the model as an assessment tool, prioritisation of the studies needed for its validation, and encourage improvements to this approach.

Over the last several decades an alternative to current methods of stunning cattle has been developed. This system, DTS: Diathermic Syncope®, has been suggested to the Jewish and Muslim communities as a means to achieve pre-cut stunning in conformity with both religious and EU regulations without a need to resort to a derogation that permits an exemption from the EU requirement to pre-stun all animals undergoing slaughter. The developer’s contention is that the system induces fainting, and thus should be acceptable to all groups, including the kosher (Jewish) and Halal (Muslim) consumer. A review of the system based on publications and reports from the developer itself suggests that in reality the system selectively heats the brain, leading to an epileptic-type seizure with tonic-clonic phases and unconsciousness lasting several minutes. It does not induce a (benign) faint, and use of the system might cause structural brain damage. Thus, this system is unlikely to be acceptable under Jewish religious law and its animal welfare value can be questioned.