It is difficult to argue with Diana Zoelle's claim that liberaldemocracy, as conceived and developed in the United States,is a problematic model in globalizing concern for women'shuman rights. Moreover, when she suggests that U.S. ratifi-cation of the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),although not a panacea for the attainment of full equality,would constitute an important step toward alleviating wom-en's oppression, she is probably correct. Finally, although herclaim that the potential currently exists to accord humanrights to all people in a world community that is less tornapart by bipolar enmity, less subverted by ideological ten-sions, and less compromised by the economic priorities ofmultinational corporations is probably not correct, one can-not help wishing that it were.

Little is known about the political determinants of subjective well-being across nations. The dominant theoretical approaches, comparison and trait theory, suggest that cross-national differences will be either nonexistent or largely independent of political conditions. I argue instead that although culture does appear to play a significant role, the results of democratic competition have even more dramatic effects upon national levels of life satisfaction. Specifically, I demonstrate that subjective appreciation of life is positively affected by the ideological complexion of governments and by qualitative features of the welfare state. The implications for social policy, electoral politics, and our theoretical understanding of life satisfaction are discussed.

Aggregate party identification (macropartisanship) has exhibited substantial movement in the U.S. electorate over the last half century. We contend that a major key to that movement is a rare, massive, and enduring shift of the electoral equilibrium commonly known as a partisan realignment. The research, which is based on time-series data that employ the classic measurement of party identification, shows that the 1980 election triggered a systematic growth of Republican identification that cut deeply into the overwhelming Democratic lead dating back to the New Deal realignment. Although short-term fluctuations in macropartisanship are responsive to the elements of everyday politics, neither presidential approval nor consumer sentiment is found responsible for the 1980 shift.