Suárez’s Nominalism
from Part II - Being, Its Properties, and Ancillary Notions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: aN Invalid Date NaN
Suárez holds that a predicated universal is an ens rationis, something properly regarded as an extrinsic denomination grounded in the intrinsic individual formal unities of mind- and language-independent res; he is thus a nominalist rather than a realist, where nominalism, although this term is variously understood in his period of philosophizing, denies the existence of anything beyond individuals. This conclusion has, however, been disputed, not least because Suárez’s approach is careful and highly nuanced. The main chore of this chapter is twofold: first, to show that he is indeed a nominalist and then, second, to explicate and assess the character of his nominalism, which will also perforce involve us, albeit only briefly, in reflecting on his reservations about accepting the existence of anything which is not an individual, which is to say, then, his motivations for rejecting realism about universals.
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