Introduction

It is no exaggeration to say that Japanese policy towards Middle Eastern countries has been reactionary for a long period of time. It is well known that relations between Japan and the Middle East have rested primarily on the import and export of crude oil and natural gas (LNG), which is a source of life, not only for industry, but also for many other energydependent activities in Japan.

Following the first “Oil Shock” in 1974, those relations showed a marked change. Japan was the most dependent country on Arab oil in the 1970s, where 71% of its imported oil came from the Middle East. To encourage the Japanese government to change its “noninvolvement policy”, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments declared Japan a “non-friendly country” at the onset of the Oil Crisis in November 1973 – after the October 6th War or, as it is called in Japan, “the Fourth Middle East War”. As a result, Japan received a 5% production cut in December of that year, causing panic in different sectors of the Japanese economy.

It was the first time in Japan’s contemporary history that Japanese citizens waited in long queues at supermarkets, department stores and closed gas stations, to obtain sundry household items or a few liters of petrol. This event threw the daily life of the Japanese people into chaos, and threatened to drastically curtail the country’s expected growth rate (ActionForex, 2004).

On November 22nd, Japan issued a statement advocating for Palestinian selfdetermination, asserting that Israel should withdraw from all of the 1967 territories. Additionally, Japan threatened to reconsider its policy towards Israel if the latter refused to accept these conditions. By December 25th 1967, Japan was considered an Arab-friendly state (Sirkhabi, 2015:92-96).

In response to the oil crisis, Japan embarked on a new policy towards the Arab countries, one that not only involved oil-based relations, but also a knowledge-based exchange. The implementation of Japan’s knowledge-based policy in the Middle East has been intermittent over the last 40 years, with its success being dependent upon economic conditions and energy supply problems during that period.

Moreover, wars in the Gulf Area, and unstable conditions in the Middle East and Arab World, have always affected the Japanese approach to the Gulf. Japanese initiatives to develop human capital and foster knowledge-generative networks began with Egypt and were later extended to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. With the potential to expand to a variety of cultural, diplomatic, and economic sectors these initiatives are principally designed to strengthen and ensure the longevity of Japan-Gulf relations.