If 2022 marked the path away from the Covid-19 pandemic, then 2023 provided a glimpse of the contours of a more contentious and uncertain world marked by major power competition. Southeast Asia's integration with the world economy and its location along key access routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans provided distinct advantages at moments when major power interests converged around a commitment to economic liberalization. Much of the region's economic growth and prosperity over the past three decades lay in accessing capital and technology from North America, Europe and Japan to produce components for export to China or assemble parts from China for the world market. With a focus on economic gains from globalization, territorial disputes could recede into the background while a robust forward US military presence in Asia could coexist with an expanding and modernizing People's Liberation Army (PLA). But given the intensifying friction among major powers and their rethinking of globalization, Southeast Asia's position in the global value chains and the mutual accommodation among major powers in the region are under stress.

Southeast Asia very much felt on edge over the course of 2023. Much of the pressure comes from the fact that the region is a locus of competition between the United States and China, given both geography and its embeddedness in the global supply chains. Persistent pursuit of “internal circulation” by China on the one hand and “on-shoring” and “friend-shoring” among the United States, its allies and close friends on the other meant that plugging into key production chains may become more challenging for much of Southeast Asia. This is despite some Southeast Asian states benefitting somewhat from a general diversification away from China among developed economies. Beijing's increasing resolve in establishing a veto over access to maritime East Asia and the desire by the United States, its allies and close friends to prevent such a situation places Southeast Asia in the crosshairs and further complicates the region's fraught politics.

That Southeast Asian states collectively and individually appear generally under-prepared to deal with a more contested and uncertain environment throws a shadow over the region. Claims about “ASEAN centrality” and its supposed importance ring hollow when the grouping and most of its members seem unable to propose a clear plan for navigating the more difficult waters churned up by rising major power competition and global as well as regional instability. The continuing civil war in Myanmar perpetuates a humanitarian crisis and criminality, whereas Russian aggression in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East and contestation over the maritime space in East Asia potentially place global supply chains at risk. Such conditions exemplify the world to which Southeast Asia must now adapt and where declarations about “not choosing sides” no longer appear to be adequate. Without a clearer sense of direction, Southeast Asia is more dependent on the vagaries of Beijing and Washington's ability and willingness to manage tensions and avoid escalation between them.