Little will be remembered in the future—with perhaps the exceptions of intense Nay Pyi Taw political manoeuvring in January and the ramping up of deliberate mass attacks on civilians around the year—about the first ten months of 2023 in Myanmar. Instead, beginning on 27 October 2023, a shockingly successful anti-military operation launched by three much underestimated ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in northern Myanmar led immediately to the fall of some of the most economically strategic towns, and over the next few weeks, the EAOs overran dozens of military commands, outposts and garrisons. Called “1027”, the unforeseen weakness of Myanmar's Defence Services breathed life into hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cells of resistance fighters across the country. By 31 December 2023, thirty-four towns (mostly not townships) were emptied of officials associated with the State Administrative Council (SAC) and the military. On social media and even in junta-backed mainstream media, unprecedented expressions of humiliation and anger were aired by formerly pro-SAC channels on Telegram and other fora, but also from well-known retired military officers who have supported military rule since 2021. Indeed, for the first time in seventy years, the never-questioned idea held by members of the armed forces that the military was the only national institution that could hold the country together—an idea not shared by the opposition or much of the population anymore—came into question with exactly the constituency of military officers past and present who had never doubted it. Although the military is not on the verge of implosion, its “perpetual” institutional and political power is no longer a given among the officer corps.

When Bad News Got to the “King”

In January 2023, there was considerable speculation among diplomats and some activists in the lead-up to the expiration of two years of emergency rule (as constitutionally stipulated) that the military junta would begin the process of establishing an interim authority to take power and hold elections in the coming year or in 2024. On 9 January, the Ministry of Immigration and Population kicked off a “census”, in which it claimed it would send enumerators door to door nationwide to update the voter list and ensure the list used for its election is based on “correct data” (in the words of the SAC leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing). It is unclear why the SAC called a voter list update a “census” except that the information being collected goes beyond what the 2015 and 2020 voter lists contained. Questions included Citizenship Scrutiny Card (CSC) status, which is consistent with Min Aung Hlaing's position that the CSC is necessary to be a legal voter, although there is no constitutional or legal requirement as yet for CSCs. Resistance and ethnic armed groups had already come out against a SAC election, and the National Unity Government (NUG), on 5 January, specifically urged the public not to cooperate with the data collection process. In many village tracts and wards, the SAC-appointed administrators could not convince any social groups to take the forms house to house. Instead, the initiative spurred widespread local resistance, with many of the SAC administrative offices in the countryside that had survived 2021–22 burned to the ground or blown up. Those authorities who did not abandon their posts were assassinated by underground groups. By the last week of January, the entire operation was called off (with a “census” eventually postponed to October 2024).