Rawls’s primary aim was to show that his two principles are superior to utilitarianism. Utilitarianism does not take individuals seriously, treating them as mere “container persons” in the “calculus of social interests.” Rawls emphasized that the original position was one of uncertainty, not mere risk. Harsanyi had earlier derived the utilitarian principle from an original position much like Rawls’s. The difference was that Rawls applied the maximin principle of choice under uncertainty, which picks the option having the least bad worst outcome. Harsanyi instead assumed the equiprobability of all outcomes and maximized expected utility. Rawls recognized that maximin is not a good choice strategy in general use, but argued that special features of the original position favored it over the equiprobability assumption. Chief among these are those that he argued establish the lexical priority of the equal basic liberties. In the 1999 revision of A Theory of Justice, Rawls recast the argument by appealing to two moral powers – a capacity to share a sense of justice and a capacity to choose and revise one’s life plan – and a highest-order interest in setting one’s own aims and in shaping the social world in which they must be pursued.