Introduction

In Indonesia, some Islamic groups continue to struggle for the revival of the Jakarta Charter of 1945, “that sought to implement shariah laws” (Endang Saifuddin 1979; Ahmad Syafii 2001). In 2002, some Muslim political parties lobbied to amend Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution to include the Jakarta Charter provisions (Nadirsyah 2007). Although the formalization of shariah through political and constitutional means has not materialized, some factions in Indonesia continue to have this aspiration through other means. The failure of the Islamist push in 2002 means that Indonesia is unlikely to become an Islamic state in its traditional and legalist form. However, this does not nullify the shariahtization (the inclusion of shariah into state laws) agenda of those who argue that shariah can be implanted and embedded in the Pancasila doctrine. Islamist groups such as the former members of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) were not the only organizations championing this course; Islamic organizations such as Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—considered moderate and apolitical movements—are also on the same page. Muhammadiyah and NU members often proclaim their openness and inclusivity, but the two organizations never outrightly reject the implementation of shariah in the public sphere. They only express clear opposition to shariahtization in the realm of politics and law—such as in the case of establishing a shariah state and the legislation of hudud law—but refrain from commenting on the so-called shariah lifestyles that have garnered the interest of many Indonesian Muslims.

This chapter argues that shariahtization in Indonesia implemented through Islamic political conduits is garnering less followership when compared to it being championed through fatwa-making, especially on matters dealing with the Islamic way of life (i.e., lifestyle). Groups aspiring for political Islam are decreasing in numbers and influence, while those who champion a shariah-compliant lifestyle are gaining traction (Burhanuddin, Hui, and Negara 2023). Indonesian Muslims generally approve halal food and beverage regulations, shariah-compliant lifestyles, and Islamic economic practices. By contrast, most Indonesians do not support forming an Islamic state. This project, which I term “shariahtization through lifestyle”, centres on the role of MUI as the primary driver of shariahtization (Syafiq 2022).