When I was appointed to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (LASC) in 1995, my first assignment was a felony calendar court, a huge challenge for a lawyer whose legal practice had been “big firm” civil litigation. My reassignment to a courtroom hearing general jurisdiction civil cases a few years later was more familiar terrain. But it also put me in daily contact with colleagues in the same courthouse whose dockets confronted them with a new set of challenges gripping state courts nationwide: a rising tide of self-represented litigants (SRLs) with a profound need for the justice and protection only a court can provide but with few tools with which to navigate a complex system built by and for lawyers.
Soon after my reassignment to our main civil courthouse, I met a judicial colleague who, before his appointment to the bench, had served on the city council of a small city within the jurisdiction of the LASC. Over lunch in the judges’ lunchroom one day, the former council member began describing his vision for the future of justice in Los Angeles. He imagined a court system in which every community in Los Angeles would have a court-staffed kiosk where people could go to get advice about how to interact with the court in order to file, prosecute, or defend a civil lawsuit.
My judicial colleague’s vision was striking for someone still relatively new to the judicial role. In my mind at that time, courts could only be purely neutral institutions deciding cases brought forward by adversaries. How could the advantages of the adversary system of justice be maintained if the court was providing guidance to one side in litigation?
It turns out that my colleague who envisioned accessible advice for litigants was well ahead of his time. Many judges in the late 1990s took the view that, when pro per litigants (as they were then called) appeared before a judge or sought assistance from court staff, the only proper response was “I am not allowed to give you legal advice; I must treat both sides in a case the same way.”Footnote 1 But fast forward two decades, a window that includes my term as Presiding Judge of the LASC, and it is clear that American courts have undergone a tectonic shift, even a transformation, in their approach to court-provided guidance and assistance to unrepresented parties. What historically was a pat statement that “the court cannot provide legal advice” has, by necessity, morphed into a more useful but still limited set of resources for unrepresented parties often drowning in legal complexity.
This chapter offers both a history and an assessment of court-annexed assistance for litigants who try to access the court system without counsel and a perspective on whether these efforts, enhanced by a growing menu of digital tools, might plausibly narrow the justice gap by providing these litigants with necessary assistance. At once a history lesson and an in-the-trenches look at a couple of decades of court reforms, my aim is to show how anxieties about judicial and court neutrality have given way to an array of reform options that are producing concrete lessons as the American legal system considers alternatives to conventional, lawyer-centered forms of legal help in a legal system with massive amounts of unmet civil legal need.
Section 5.1 begins with a short, high-level review of efforts by courts around the nation to help SRLs adrift in an ocean of procedure and legalese, gradually abandoning the preexisting view that it was improper to assist SRLs. Section 5.2 offers a more detailed account of LASC’s efforts, providing a more focused case study of the institutional and ideological challenges of SRL-focused reforms. Some of LASC’s efforts to leverage human and technological resources to provide guidance and assistance to SRLs worked well, and others were surprisingly ineffective. Section 5.3, the final section, proposes some “lessons learned” from court efforts to design and oversee self-help services. Those services necessarily fall short of full legal representation. Nevertheless, courts’ experiences using supervised nonlawyer resources and technology interfaces to assist SRLs may suggest paths to more cost-effective, high-volume legal services and provide ideas for reformers considering how to enhance access to justice.
5.1 Navigating the Adversary System without Counsel and the Rise of Court Self-Help Services
As early as the 1990s, judges and court administrators across the nation could see a collision coming. On the one hand, the American legal system was as committed as any in the world to adversarialism, the idea that legal systems work best when the parties – and, more specifically, their lawyers – proofs in a structured, forensic setting to a neutral and passive decision maker who resolves the dispute.Footnote 2
On the other hand, a rising tide of high-stakes but small-scale cases was beginning to flood court dockets: debt collections, evictions, home foreclosures, and child support enforcement actions, among others. These cases were posing particular challenges for judges and court administrators because they tended to pit an institutional plaintiff (a bank, debt buyer, corporate or municipal landlord, the government), nearly always represented by a lawyer, against an individual defendant, nearly always self-represented. In addition, in cases where family members turned to the courts to settle disputes, establish legal relationships, or provide protection (divorce proceedings, guardianship and conservatorship petitions, name change petitions, applications for domestic violence restraining orders), litigants increasingly attempted to navigate the legal system without counsel.
When litigants bring their disputes to court without legal representation, it substantially burdens court operations. Think of a family law proceeding. An SRL who has no idea what to do to solve a custody dispute comes to the courtroom to ask the courtroom clerk for guidance. This interrupts the clerk’s efforts to try to organize the court’s calendar for the next day. Or a litigant may not understand how to serve her papers, a concept that is not intuitive for most litigants. When the motion is called for hearing, the judge has to explain service of process and continue the motion, further clogging future calendars. As the number of SRLs increases, these delays multiply.
By the late 1990s, it had become clear that complacency was not a sustainable approach to this challenge. Until then, the phenomenon of “pro se litigation” had mostly been the subject of isolated inquiry by individual jurisdictions. Then, in 1998, an important conference – a joint effort of the American Judicature Society, the State Justice Institute, the Open Society Institute, and the American Bar Association – brought together judges and court administrators from across the nation to think through the details and dimensions of the dilemma.Footnote 3 SRLs were growing fast: Even in the 1990s SRLs were filing a high proportion of family law cases in California.Footnote 4 By 2015 crowded court calendars with substantial SRLs were the norm in family law and some civil courtrooms. A 2015 national survey concluded that lawyers represented both sides in only 24 percent of civil cases and that even in general jurisdiction civil cases only 46 percent of defendants were represented.Footnote 5 As the Judicial Council of California observed in its 2019 Benchguide for Handling Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, “[t]he traditional passive role for judges works well when well-prepared attorneys represent both parties to a dispute. It doesn’t work as well when there is a full calendar of self-represented litigants who are unfamiliar with court rules, processes and evidence while trying to present their cases.”Footnote 6
Self-help resources for SRLs initially were thought of as a coping mechanism for courts with crowded civil and family law calendars struggling to move cases forward.Footnote 7 As court self-help efforts matured, and as the number of SRLs coming to court grew, courts came to realize the tragedy starkly articulated in the 2016 Civil Justice Initiative report to the Conference of Chief Justices: “The idealized picture of an adversarial system in which both parties are represented by competent attorneys who can assert all legitimate claims and defenses is, more often than not, an illusion.”Footnote 8
Slowly but surely, courts began to experiment, within the limits required for courts to maintain their role as a neutral adjudicator of disputes. Initially, that meant courts providing books, brochures, and forms and online educational tools.Footnote 9 Subsequently, it became clear that pamphlets and forms alone could not adequately communicate the complexity of court proceedings and substantive legal requirements. Courts began putting substantial resources into self-help centers where SRLs could meet face-to-face with court personnel to seek help.Footnote 10 In the ten years between the mid-90s and mid-00s, some 150 self-help centers were established nationwide.Footnote 11 While this required substantial investment of budget resources, scarce space in court facilities,Footnote 12 and considerable management oversight, self-help centers became an integral part of many courts’ operations.Footnote 13 By 2019, California’s self-help centers were servicing more than one million court users each year.Footnote 14
In some quarters, these court efforts were controversial. Representatives of the establishment bar even argued that the existence of court-annexed self-help services discouraged use of attorneys.Footnote 15 Self-help services provided by courts ordinarily include notifying litigants of pro bono or low-cost options for representation.Footnote 16 But some courts apparently thought the primary goal of court-provided self-help resources should be urging litigants to seek attorney representation.Footnote 17 Today, however, it is undeniable that existing resources in the legal community have not been able to meet the needs of the litigants who do appear in court – to say nothing of those who have legal needs but do not even attempt to access the courts, or those who are sued but fail to appear.Footnote 18
Concededly, self-help services can never be the equivalent of legal representation. The necessity that courts maintain neutrality ultimately means that courts cannot recommend a strategy, draft and propound discovery or, challenge the opposing party’s factual representations.Footnote 19 To state the obvious, a court cannot become an adversary to the party opposing an SRL. However, even careful adherence to that maxim leaves ample room for court-provided and court-hosted services. Courts can provide education about law and procedure, assist in filling out forms with information provided by SRLs, access court records of a litigant’s case, and provide options based on the state of the litigated matter. The next section of this chapter offers a closer-in look at how one court – the court where I have had the privilege of serving for nearly thirty years – has attempted to serve the needs of SRLs while hewing to the adversarial fundamentals of the American legal system.
5.2 Efforts to Assist Self-Represented Litigants at LASC
LASC is the largest trial court in the country, serving one of the country’s most diverse populations. Its prominence and its long experience in providing self-help services to SRLs make it an ideal case study in what has worked well and what has fallen short despite careful design. As reformers in the public and private sectors search for cost-effective, high-volume legal services models or alternative representation models, they should be aware of what courts have learned from their efforts to provide self-help services. The discussion that follows describes and appraises some of the self-help services LASC has implemented or attempted in an effort to leverage human and electronic resources to assist litigants, including efforts to ensure that SRLs have access regardless of the language they speak or their language literacy.
5.2.1 Leveraging Human Resources
5.2.1.1 Using an Educational Model to Enhance Service Delivery
In 2002 the Judicial Council of California gave grants to several local courts, including LASC, to encourage development of self-help models. Initially, self-help services were modeled on traditional one-on-one legal representation. A person would come to a courthouse for help and be served by court staff or legal services staff who spoke with the individual, discussed the person’s case or legal problem, and provided court forms. Court forms in California are complex, even though (or perhaps because) the forms organized legal topics and required factual responses in an iterative flow. Forms also change frequently, often in response to legislative changes. Because of the complexity of court forms, litigants served by the individualized self-help model typically needed to be guided through the process of filling out the forms.
Given the volume of civil and family law cases filed in Los Angeles County,Footnote 20 demand for self-help services could not be met using an individual-service delivery model. In subject areas where self-help demand was greatest, particularly in family law, LASC evolved into an educational service delivery model. In 2003, using a model self-help pilot grant, LASC self-help staff observed the types of SRL assistance being provided by several legal aid agencies, and then began experimenting with an SRL workshop model used by the Buhai Center for Family Law. LASC then worked to find ways to reduce the time required for workshops so as to fit into a morning or afternoon session the information needed to fully educate family law litigants about how to make informed decisions in representing themselves.Footnote 21
In family law cases, self-help services provided through an educational delivery model begin at an intake desk at which court staff greets the SRL and asks what they want to accomplish, whether they have a pending case, and what stage their case is at. Importantly, the intake staff person has access to the electronic court docket and can check the status of a litigant’s case, if a case already has been filed. Usually, it can be determined rather quickly what type of help the person needs. If there is an immediate need for action (e.g., need for a restraining order or emergency custody order), the SRL is referred to a staff person who can provide prompt individualized assistance.
If there is not an immediate need for action, the SRL is directed to an online or in-person introductory workshop. The introductory workshop for divorce covers topics including service of process, income and expense organization, community and separate property, spousal support, custody and visitation and child support.Footnote 22 The goal is to familiarize the SRL with the terminology and basic concepts involved in a divorce or dissolution matter. When conducted in person, the introductory workshop may take about three hours. After the introductory workshop, the family law litigant is required to complete a “homework packet” that tells the litigant what documents must be gathered (e.g., “your paystubs from the past two months”) and asks for information such as income for both spouses, monthly expenses, debts, information about children, and schedule of parenting time requested. The “homework packet” is not a form to be filed with the court; it is a guide to gathering factual information relevant to a divorce proceeding.Footnote 23
The SRL is told that family law self-help staff will require the “homework” to be turned in as a “ticket” to attending the next workshop. The divorce process is broken down into a total of three workshops. The second workshop provides step-by-step assistance with filling out court forms to begin or respond to a divorce. The third workshop assists litigants with filling out default judgment forms to complete their divorce if the respondent has not filed a response. Prior to the pandemic, all workshops were in-person. Now the first workshop is online in a format by which the SRL selects topics and moves through slides with written and oral explanations that are accessed at the litigant’s own pace. Subsequent workshops are scheduled Webex sessions that require a reservation. The participating SRL can use the share-screen function to ask individual questions about court forms, but the process is less efficient than an in-person workshop.
The educational service model for self-help allows far more litigants to be assisted. Individual assistance continues to be provided to help an SRL who needs specific direction or help with a particular answer on the “homework” or on a court form. But the goal is to communicate information online or in a group setting to the extent litigants are able to comprehend and assist themselves. Notably, the educational model allows both sides in litigation to be assisted: Occasionally court staff even instruct both parties to a divorce proceeding in the same workshop. In other subject areas, such as evictions, self-help assistance is provided by the court to both self-represented landlords and tenants, but different types of assistance are provided.Footnote 24
LASC links family law self-help services to the needs of the litigant in the courtroom. When an SRL appears in court in a family law proceeding and the judge concludes that the litigant has not met a legal requirement (such as service of a motion or filing a required document), the judge can check a box on a standard form, give the form to the litigant, and send the litigant to the self-help center (or to the court website) for assistance with the issue the court has identified.Footnote 25 Linking court proceedings to specific self-help services in this way is of great assistance to family law judges in handling their heavy calendars.
LASC has had great success with the educational model. SRLs can move relatively seamlessly between group education and individualized assistance when needed. The court offered a total of 2,126 workshops on eviction, probate, and family law topics from June 2020 through July 2021. Follow-up workshops are well-attended. Over a period in which 680 initial divorce workshops were offered, there were 333 second workshops (assistance with court documents in the divorce process) and 116 third workshops (obtaining a default judgment).Footnote 26
5.2.1.2 Using Student Interns to Assist with Self-Help Services
In 2004 LASC created a JusticeCorps program to bolster self-help resources. The JusticeCorps program is affiliated with the federal AmeriCorps program, which provides benefits to people who agree to participate in approved community programs, such as disaster services and education.Footnote 27 JusticeCorps recruits college students and recent college graduates to help provide individualized assistance to SRLs in self-help centers. JusticeCorps college students work part-time during the school year or full-time during the summer. Graduates who had a JusticeCorps internship or other volunteer service experience while in college can apply for a one-year full-time fellowship.
JusticeCorps students and graduate fellows are carefully trained by court staff and legal aid partner staff for the subject area in which they will be working, and they work under the supervision and direction of court staff and legal aid staff.Footnote 28 “JusticeCorps members answer questions, help litigants complete court paperwork, and assist in workshops that address the requirements of the various stages of family law, evictions, probate and some civil cases – providing in-depth and individualized services to the litigants.”Footnote 29
The JusticeCorps program at LASC has been extraordinarily successful and has significantly extended the resources of the court’s self-help services. JusticeCorps also creates opportunities for young people to learn about the law and the judicial system and prepares them for careers in the legal field. JusticeCorps at LASC has more than 2,000 alumni.
An important part of the success of the JusticeCorps program is the high standard of service and professionalism to which participants are held. JusticeCorps members wear uniforms and badges. After their training, students officially become part of JusticeCorps by taking an oath administered by a judge of the court during a ceremony to which their families and friends are invited. They promise to “bring Americans together to strengthen our communities,” to take action in the face of apathy, to persevere in the face of adversity, and to “get things done” in commitment to “the ideal of equal access to justice for all.”Footnote 30
5.2.1.3 Addressing Language Access
LASC provides interpreter services to litigants in over 255 languages.Footnote 31 Providing interpreters during court proceedings is not enough. Language access is important for users of the court website, for SRLs using self-help services, and for litigants seeking assistance from the clerk’s office or other court staff.
The JusticeCorps program, described above, recruits students who speak another language in their homes. These young people provide a language lifeline for SRLs in the court’s self-help program. The court also provides a supplementary salary stipend for court staff with language skills sufficient to allow them to answer the questions of litigants who speak a language other than English. More recently, the court put in place remote telephonic interpreter assistance. Court users identify their spoken language on “I Speak” cards, and they are connected to an interpreter from an outside organization who interprets live through the telephone. This service is provided in self-help center intake counters and clerks’ walk-up counters and over the phone through call centers.Footnote 32
5.2.2 Leveraging Electronic Resources
5.2.2.1 Electronic Resources Adjacent to Self-Help Services
Prior to 2020, most self-help services were provided in person. Over time, the information and assistance provided on the LASC website grew, but the court primarily focused on in-person services for SRLs. Although court forms were available online, and the court’s self-help centers had computers available for litigants to use to fill out forms while in the self-help facility, most SRLs chose to fill out paper forms. Court staff and legal aid partners who assisted with self-help services generally did not encourage SRLs to use the computers provided (even when completed forms could be filed electronically). As stated by the LASC Managing Self-Help Attorney, who has served in that position since 2002, most staff and legal aid professionals “would not accept that poor people could use computers.”Footnote 33
COVID-19 changed this complacency. During the pandemic, most services had to be delivered by remote video or by telephone. If SRLs could use a computer, they were able to have their work checked or ask a question about a specific form by sharing their document electronically with the person assisting them. Staff learned that many SRLs had or could develop computer literacy. Now staff and legal aid professionals working to assist SRLs in person are trained to try to encourage use of the computers provided in the self-help center. Their experience is that most people can use them.
Use of computers by SRLs streamlines the self-help process. If SRLs can use a computer, they can use the court’s online resources, either instructional material on the court website or live educational training modules delivered remotely. These resources do not require a trip to a courthouse. Moreover, computer use by SRLs attending in-person training allows for easier review of forms by court staff, correction of forms by the SRL based on the comments of the reviewer, and ultimately filing with the court.
Of course, an SRL may not have access to a computer outside of a courthouse self-help center. The City and LASC public library systems have stepped up to meet that need, and directions for access to library services are featured on the court website. The City of Los Angeles’ Public Library Tech2go program allows an adult with a library card to borrow a Google Chromebook and internet hotspot from the library for up to six months. All Los Angeles County public libraries have computer workstations for public use and allow adults with a library card in good standing to borrow a Laptop and Hotspot Kit for three weeks with an option to renew.
5.2.2.2 Website Innovation: “Gina” the Traffic Avatar
In 2016 LASC pioneered providing online services for traffic court litigants using an avatar we named Gina. Gina is an animated cartoon of a woman who serves as a virtual clerk. She greets users and offers assistance in five languages.
First, she helps users locate information printed on their traffic citation. Her instructions are both verbal and transcribed. Once the litigant inputs the unique number of their traffic citation, the court’s computer system locates the ticket. Then Gina offers specific options for the litigant. Persons who are eligible for traffic school are told about this option and how to comply with and document the traffic school requirements. An opportunity to set up a payment plan is offered to those who have not previously defaulted on a payment plan. Litigants are told they have an option to continue their hearing date and that they can respond by filing a statement in opposition to the citation in lieu of appearing in court. In each instance, options are clearly explained verbally and in writing simultaneously, and users type the letter or number of the option to indicate their choice. Further instructions follow based on a user’s choices.
Gina has been successful, providing assistance that SRLs can and do use and consequently reducing the burdens of in-person appearances, both for SRLs and for the court. She has helped as many as 4,000 people per week. By allowing online payment plans to be established without judicial involvement and by creating the traffic avatar function on the court website, wait times for traffic litigants seeking in-person advice were reduced from hours to an average of twelve minutes. This was hugely significant for litigants. Previously, traffic court litigants had to miss work on one or more days to accomplish a fairly simple traffic court transaction.
5.2.2.3 Online Dispute Resolution
LASC, together with Los Angeles County, has built a seemingly well-designed online dispute resolution (ODR) resource for low-dollar amount cases.Footnote 34 The ODR architecture allows parties to begin a negotiation by chat between or among themselves, provides helpful prompts to assist parties in thinking about what to say in making an offer or demand and allows documents to be uploaded and displayed to the opposing party. Importantly, parties are given an option to request that a live mediator, appearing remotely, assist in the negotiation. The participation of a neutral, when requested, helps ensure an even playing field in the negotiation even when one party is more sophisticated than the other.
Use of ODR is not mandatory for LASC small claims cases.Footnote 35 The ODR platform was used by litigants in 1,400 small claims cases in the period February 2021 through July 2022.Footnote 36 To those outside the LASC system, this may seem like a large number. But in fiscal year 2021–22 there were over 22,000 small claims cases filed in Los Angeles County.Footnote 37 Thus, only 5 percent of small claims litigants even tried to use the ODR platform. And only 2 percent of small claims cases were settled using the ODR platform.Footnote 38
One problem for use of ODR in the context of small claims cases is the difficulty of notifying parties of the availability of ODR. The court is able to email small claims plaintiffs and encourage them to reach out to the defendant to obtain an agreement to use ODR. But the court does not have access to the Defendant’s email. Therefore, it is up to the plaintiff to decide to participate in ODR and then to contact the defendant to explain the ODR resource and encourage the defendant to use it.
Another likely difficulty is the inability of the court to design ODR prompts that address the facts relevant to a particular small claims case. Small claims can involve almost any area of civil law, from real estate to construction defect to the Uniform Commercial Code to tort to contract.Footnote 39 Unless a mediator becomes involved, it is likely to be difficult for the parties to evaluate what damages are recoverable and what facts are needed to prove a claim.
The problem of low usage of ODR for small claims cases may have a more fundamental explanation. LASC also developed an ODR platform specifically designed to allow parents in divorce proceedings to negotiate the terms of their parenting plan without having to meet face-to-face. No mediator services are annexed to this ODR tool, but if the parents agree to a plan, the program generates a parenting plan agreement that can be filed for approval by the court. Even where both sides agreed to participate in the negotiation through ODR, a settlement was achieved in only 15 percent of cases.Footnote 40
5.2.2.4 Electronic Guidance for Completion of Court Forms
“Guide and File” was created by Tyler Technologies to help SRLs complete court forms. The user answers specific questions and the answers are used by the computer program to populate a form that can be electronically filed with the court. The great advantage of the design is that the end product is a document that complies with all court filing requirements.
In fiscal year 2020–21, 980 Guide and File interviews for filing an initial request for divorce were completed by Los Angeles County litigants.Footnote 41 But in that fiscal year there were over 29,000 filings for marital dissolution in Los Angeles.Footnote 42 In 2020–21, litigants completed 860 requests for domestic violence restraining orders using Guide and File,Footnote 43 but over 14,000 such requests were filed.Footnote 44
Customer satisfaction surveys show that most users who complete a Guide and File interview process have a high degree of satisfaction.Footnote 45 However, only about one-third of Guide and File interviews that are started by LASC litigants are actually completed.Footnote 46 Guide and File interviews can take an hour or two to complete.
5.2.2.5 Addressing Language Access in the Electronic Environment
The court obtained grants to be able to translate portions of the court website into the top five non-English languages used in Los Angeles County – Spanish, Mandarin, Armenian, Korean, and Vietnamese. But information the court provides to SRLs in written form, whether in English or in another language spoken in Los Angeles County, may not be understandable to many people who need court assistance if they have a low level of written language literacy in their native language.
As described above, Gina, the traffic avatar, provides both written and verbal guidance for traffic matters. The court believes that one of the reasons for Gina’s success is that she addresses both language and language literacy. The court’s self-help educational modules delivered online now also provide information simultaneously in writing and verbally. In addition, the court incorporates icons as nonverbal communication signals, an innovation supported by the research of the National Center for State Courts (NCSCs).Footnote 47
5.3 Lessons Learned from LASC’s Self-Help Experience that May Be Transferable to Low-Cost Legal Representation
This section elaborates on what LASC has learned about leveraging resources to assist SRLs, how to address language access and language literacy, the central importance of early fact-gathering to legal assistance, and the possibility that procedural and substantive law reform can help to close the access-to-justice gap. These insights may be useful to reformers seeking to improve delivery of cost-effective representation to low-income litigants.
5.3.1 Leveraging Human Resources by Involving Nonlawyers
Legal representation might achieve economies by incorporating an educational service model similar to that used by LASC early in representation (after initial intake) or at later stages of the representation process, particularly if the educational service model is supplemented with supervised resources similar to JusticeCorps. The parameters governing the assistance nonlawyers are allowed to provide in a court-annexed self-help setting may or may not be appropriate when legal representation is provided, and the author expresses no view on that issue. However, it may be useful to explain the accepted boundaries for provision of court self-help services.
Guidelines for court employees or contract workers providing court-annexed self-help services are derivative of the ethical restrictions that guide how a judicial officer may advise litigants. Neutrality is critical. A judge may not provide assistance to one side in litigation that the judge would withhold from the other side. Judicial ethics rules in California provide: “To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded. … It is not a violation of this Rule, however, for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”Footnote 48
Translated into the self-help context, the neutrality requirement necessitates that, if LASC provides self-help services in a particular subject area, it must provide assistance to both plaintiffs and defendants. For example, LASC provides self-help services for both self-represented landlords and self-represented tenants in eviction cases. Further, individual guidance should be provided in a manner that maintains the appearance of court neutrality. As stated in the California Administrative Office of the Courts’ Guidelines for the Operation of Self-Help Centers in California Trial Courts:
Services are standardized in that self-help center staff should give the same answer to a question regardless of who asks the question. For example, they can tell a litigant that a declaration needs to be completed and may provide guidance on what kinds of facts a court would need in order to decide the issues. The staff may ask appropriate questions to assist in clarifying the facts, and otherwise promote a focus on facts relevant to the court. But the declaration is in the litigant’s own words.Footnote 49
In addition to neutrality, competence is essential. A court must provide accurate information when it provides guidance to litigants. If self-help staff advises a litigant that they do not need to complete a particular section on a court-approved form, other court staff should not reject the form as incomplete and the judge should not withhold the relief requested by the litigant on the ground that the form was incomplete. Of course, the point is not that self-help staff can bind a judicial officer. Rather, self-help staff must be adequately trained so that they only provide assistance that is supported by law, court rules, and any local judicial practice.
California guidelines for self-help services require that a self-help attorney oversee the work of nonattorney staff and that a “managing attorney should be responsible for the oversight of all the legal assistance and education provided to the public.”Footnote 50 The guidelines encourage the use of experienced nonattorney staff so long as they are trained and have access to an attorney:
Deployment of experienced nonattorney staff to multiple court locations to provide direct services to the public is an excellent way to leverage personnel as long as they are properly qualified and can communicate with at least one attorney working concurrently at one of the court’s other self-help center locations who is available for timely consultation.Footnote 51
Training and experience requirements specified in the California guidelines include, inter alia: five years’ relevant experience for the self-help managing attorney;Footnote 52 two years’ relevant experience for staff attorneys;Footnote 53 for nonattorneys, a high school diploma and two years’ experience working with a licensed attorney or three years working for a California court plus a minimum of twenty hours additional training in the relevant area of the law where assistance is provided.Footnote 54 Courts are allowed to substitute equivalent experience and training in “appropriate situations.”Footnote 55
JusticeCorps volunteers in LASC self-help centers are supervised by LASC staff attorneys or by self-help attorneys provided by legal aid partners. Full-time JusticeCorps Graduate Fellows, who will serve a minimum of 1,700 hours over the course of a year, initially receive two full weeks of training. Then new fellows shadow returning fellows and receive on-the-job training while continuing additional training on five Friday afternoons. Additional trainings are added as needed or for enrichment throughout the year. Undergraduate student JusticeCorps members receive most of their training on weekends because they are all full-time college students. They are trained over weekends in September and October with additional weekend follow-up training in January. After at least three full days of training, they begin shadowing staff and being coached onsite while weekend training sessions continue.Footnote 56
LASC has seventy-six full-time court employees who provide self-help services. Of these, twenty-four are attorneys. In addition, self-help services are provided by forty legal aid partner employees working in nine courthouses. In addition, thirty-two full-time JusticeCorps fellows and about seventy part-time JusticeCorps students work under the supervision of LASC employees and legal aid partner employees.Footnote 57
California self-help guidelines provide that “when a litigant cannot be effectively assisted in the court self-help center, prompt referral to appropriate legal assistance should be made whenever possible.”Footnote 58
LASC would gladly refer self-help clients to lawyers, publicly funded or otherwise, if those resources were available. Court self-help services are a stop-gap measure, and courts would gratefully redeploy self-help resources to court adjudicatory functions if no-cost or low-cost attorney representation made SRLs vanish. But as circumstances now present themselves, LASC has experimented to make self-help assistance efficient and accessible. Perhaps our innovations can be adapted to make attorney representation more economical.
5.3.2 Recognizing that Electronic Resources Can Assist Socioeconomically Disadvantaged Individuals
Experience during the pandemic taught LASC that traditional assumptions about the computer literacy of low-income clients and the availability of computer resources may no longer pose as significant a barrier to reliance on electronic resources as once thought. For attorneys, review of documents or forms shared by a client electronically is likely to be less time-consuming than one-on-one in-person review sessions (both for the legal adviser and for the client).
However, electronic tools must be developed to accommodate individuals with limited language literacy. The principal motivating factor for LASC’s creation of Gina, the traffic avatar, was to attempt to assist persons with limited language literacy. Depending on the community served, those seeking to provide low-cost legal assistance may have to address providing service in multiple languages. But all low-cost legal services providers are likely to encounter persons with limited language literacy. Use of interactive avatars, verbal as well as written communication, and guidance through nonverbal cues such as icons are tools that legal services providers should consider in their client communications.
What can be learned from LASC’s efforts to help SRLs that resulted in tools that are underutilized, such as LASC’s ODR and the Guide and File programs? On the front-end, it is important to involve the intended audience in the development and testing of tools for SRLs.Footnote 59 On the back-end, empirical research can provide insights into what does and does not work and why. Unfortunately, courts’ priorities are and must be managing their daily operations. There is not a great deal of bandwidth for conducting focus groups or empirical studies.
The NCSC and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) have wonderful advice for courts seeking to improve access to justice.Footnote 60 But the substantive and procedural laws of each state are different. Each state is required to translate the factual and legal requirements expressed in laws written for (and mostly by) lawyers into tools that are understandable to a nonlawyer. The questions posed by Guide and File in California were written by lawyers. So were the standard California Judicial Council forms. Even with the good advice of NCSC and IAALS, this translation process does not always succeed in its mission.
5.3.3 The Importance of Early Identification and Assembly of Relevant Facts
A large part of the success of Gina, the traffic avatar, is that she can provide options specific to the factual and legal circumstances of a particular person and a specific traffic citation. The first thing Gina does after determining which language the user needs is to prompt the traffic litigant to enter the unique identifying number of the citation they received. With this information and the name of the person to whom the ticket was issued, the court’s computer can access data concerning the nature of the citation. This central, basic fact allows the court to advise a litigant of the specific options available to them. Is the person who received the citation eligible for traffic school? Can they be offered a payment plan (or have they previously defaulted)? Are they eligible to ask for an automatic deferred payment (or have they previously deferred)? Can they be offered a continued hearing date (how many times have they previously asked for continuance)? What future hearing dates are available? The decision tree is not complicated, but when the computer has access to the underlying facts that determine the legal options for a particular individual, that person can be given clear-cut choices, not just general information.
The court’s first version of the traffic avatar provided only general information about possible options for addressing a traffic ticket – not information specific to the particular individual’s available options for resolving their traffic ticket. This first version of Gina did not ask for the unique identifying number of the citation or access stored data about the nature of the traffic citation and the individual cited. In order for LASC to have information about a particular traffic citation, it had to invest in technology that created an electronic record of each traffic ticket entered by the police department that issued the citation. To achieve this technology improvement, the court had to coordinate with each of the more than forty-five police departments and other law enforcement entities (such as the California Highway Patrol) that operate within Los Angeles County.
The early, more general approach to assisting traffic litigants was much less successful, even though online options for continuing a hearing date, seeking a payment plan, or resolving the ticket through traffic school were available. When LASC was able to move from an educational model (what do I do if I get a ticket) to a transactional model (I got a ticket, what do I do), utilization of Gina more than tripled.Footnote 61 Without the basic facts that shaped the litigant’s legal options, online self-help assistance, even when provided by an avatar, fell short of serving the needs of SRLs.
An important component of the success of the education model of self-help used in family law cases is assigning “homework” to the SRL. The “homework” requires the self-represented family law litigant to organize and compile the core documents and information relevant to the legal issues in a particular person’s divorce proceeding. The process helps focus the litigant on the issues that will be important to the divorce proceeding rather than points of animosity about the causes of the divorce. As a matter of policy, court staff requires that the “homework” be completed before allowing an SRL to attend the second-level divorce education module. Self-help staff’s guidance to a particular SRL (e.g., what forms are essential) is shaped by knowing the issues that will need to be addressed in the divorce proceeding.
Conversely, lack of information about an SRL’s particular circumstance has undermined other efforts to provide effective self-help services. Court administrators for family law services very much wanted to create a “chatbot” to assist litigants. The goal was for the chatbot to be able to answer open-text questions typed in by the user. However, without some level of organized information about a particular SRL’s circumstances, the inputs were just too complicated for a chatbot to handle. Despite repeated efforts, court administrators only achieved 60 percent accuracy – meaning the chatbot was wrong about 40 percent of the time.Footnote 62 The chances of providing erroneous advice simply were too great to allow implementation of a chatbot in this context.Footnote 63
It should not be surprising that gathering the facts relevant to a legal dispute is a critical element of providing appropriate options to a litigant. After all, in most substantial civil litigation, discovery is the most expensive part of the pretrial litigation process.Footnote 64 The author of this chapter has argued elsewhere that in categories of simple, repetitive litigation, mandatory, automatic disclosure of specified documents and information should be required at the outset of litigation.Footnote 65 Especially in simple, repetitive litigation in which the plaintiff ordinarily controls all information necessary to prove the claim presented (e.g., collections, eviction, and judicial foreclosure cases), there is no reason to require a self-represented defendant to use the adversarial processes of discovery to obtain relevant information about the case.Footnote 66
LASC’s experience in assisting SRLs demonstrates that effective guidance is optimized when the core facts on which the outcome of the case will turn are available to the person or technology tool providing assistance early in the litigation. It seems logical that the costs of providing effective legal representation to a low-income individual likewise will be lower if counsel (or any person providing legal guidance) can develop means to obtain core facts at the front-end of the representation.
Applying this principle to simple, repetitive litigation in which the plaintiff ordinarily controls all information necessary to prove the claim, it makes sense to explore policies that would require plaintiffs to make disclosures when they file a complaint or, perhaps, to attach relevant documents to the complaint. California and Oregon have moved in that direction.Footnote 67
5.3.4 Reducing Legal Complexity
As discussed above, ODR and Guide and File have had limited utilization in LASC’s experience. Courts have made efforts to assist SRLs by providing plain language forms but have found that there is an irreducible complexity in substantive and procedural law that makes straightforward forms difficult to achieve.
Consider that the first issue faced by a person in California seeking a court’s protection from violent acts of another is which of four different types of restraining orders can provide the legal protection the person needs. The four types of restraining orders – (1) elder or dependent adult abuse protective order, (2) domestic violence restraining order, (3) civil harassment restraining order, and (4) workplace violence restraining order – fall under the jurisdiction of the probate courts, the family law courts and the civil courts, respectively (with workplace violence restraining orders considered a civil court matter). Each type of restraining order has procedures that allow a temporary restraining order to be issued ex parte – a necessary but complex process in and of itself. Some of the distinctions between the types of available relief are so fine that SRLs in LASC sometimes have been sent from the civil filing window to the family law filing window and back again.Footnote 68 On the California Judicial Council website, the forms for these types of relief are organized separately: fifty-seven forms for “Domestic Violence Protection,” thirty-three forms for “Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse,” and thirty-five forms for “Civil Harassment Protection.”Footnote 69
Of course, there are relevant distinctions in the circumstances that may give rise to the need for legal protections provided by a restraining order. But are all the fine legal distinctions that have evolved by looking at these remedies separately worth the cost of making the remedies less accessible? I do not pretend to know the answer, but it seems to be a question worthy of study.
Perhaps instead of struggling to simplify complex laws by translating them for use by nonlawyers, we should consider simplifying the law to make remedies and defenses more accessible to SRLs and to reduce costs of providing representation. As suggested above, procedural reform specific to some remedies such as debt collection and eviction (e.g., requiring plaintiffs to provide evidence to prove specific elements of the case at the time the case is filed), may be a path to less complex and costly access to justice. Substantive law in these high-volume cases should be examined as well.
5.4 Conclusion
Court-provided self-help resources are by no means a panacea. But those interested in regulatory reform of the legal profession and those interested in cost-effective representation of litigants in areas of high-volume litigation may find the courts’ self-help experiences instructive.
Courts have learned to leverage resources to assist SRLs in a variety of ways. Rather than assigning one staff person to work with one SRL, LASC utilizes an effective education model. With this model, groups of litigants on both sides of certain case types can be helped simultaneously. The court also utilized AmeriCorps funding to create a JusticeCorps cadre of undergraduates and recent college graduates who supplement court self-help services. The pandemic provided a push to leverage the use of computers to assist SRLs who formerly were assumed to be unwilling or unable to use such technology.
Courts also recognize that language access requires more than just relying on Google Translate. LASC invested in a language line to serve court users at self-help and public counter locations. Nevertheless, written language translations may fail to provide for the needs of those who have limited literacy in their native language. Verbal guidance by an avatar or a voice-over provides for greater comprehension than written instructions alone, especially when unfamiliar concepts need to be explained. Use of visual symbols such as icons also provides more effective wayfinding through multilayered material.
LASC has had greater success interacting with SRLs when it can provide answers based on facts specific to the particular litigant’s circumstances rather than advice about a general area of law. Early assembly of facts relevant to a litigant’s legal problem is critical to more effective guidance and early case evaluation.
Not all seemingly well-designed self-help tools have worked. When courts or others develop tools to interact with individuals seeking help with a legal problem, it is important to involve prospective users in the design. Empirical evaluation of what works and what doesn’t is key to determining how to make a better tool to assist litigants.
Finally, it may be time to think differently about the interface between the law and the human experience of individuals. Instead of struggling to translate complex legal principles into concepts that nonlawyers can understand, and instead of acquiescing in the current expense of litigation, perhaps efforts should be directed to simplifying substantive law and tailoring procedure to the fair presentation and adjudication of less complex cases.
Civil access-to-justice reform pursued through a financially focused, stakeholder-informed approach can drive transformational change. We present a framework and set of techniques, which together we dub “civil justice engineering,” for developing effective, scalable policy and procedure for the expansion of civil access to justice informed by qualitative and quantitative data, financial analysis, program evaluation, and stakeholder engagement.
Our framework has been shaped by our work at Stout Risius Ross, LLC (Stout), a global, advisory firm specializing in corporate finance, accounting and transaction advisory, valuation, financial disputes, claims, and investigations. We serve a range of clients, from public corporations to privately held companies in numerous industries. Stout’s Transformative Change Consulting practice is a recognized leader in the civil legal aid community and has completed projects involving:
▪ Strategy consulting for issues relating to access to justice;
▪ Organizing/facilitating stakeholder listening sessions and focus groups;
▪ Managing transformative change projects and workflows;
▪ Operational consulting related to data systems and processes, organizational culture, and employee relations;
▪ Economic impact assessments and research for civil legal services initiatives;
▪ Nonprofit budget development, review, and recommendations;
▪ Cost–benefit and impact analyses for nonprofit initiatives and activities;
▪ Data-driven program evaluation and implementation; and
▪ Dispute consulting and damages analyses for low-income individuals and nonprofit organizations.
Stout has provided consulting services to more than forty jurisdictions across the country related to programs assisting people experiencing civil legal issues. In each of these jurisdictions, Stout seeks to understand the local civil justice system, how residents interact with it, and the spectrum of information, assistance, and civil legal resources available for residents – ranging from online legal information, guided interviews and forms, supervised nonlawyers, mediation, community dispute resolution centers, advice and counsel, extensive legal services, and other forms of assistance.
Stout is currently retained as the Independent Evaluator for eviction right to counsel (or access to counsel) programs in Cleveland, Connecticut, Maryland, and Milwaukee. It has conducted eviction right to counsel fiscal return on investment or cost analyses and independent expert reports for advocates, coalitions, bar associations, or government agencies in Baltimore, Broward County, Chattanooga, Delaware, Detroit, Los Angeles County and City, Miami-Dade County, Newark, New York City, New York (outside of New York City), Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and South Carolina. Many of these engagements have contributed to landmark legislation being passed.
Following the release of Stout’s reports in Baltimore, New York City, Philadelphia, Delaware, and Detroit, eviction right to counsel legislation was enacted. In these engagements, Stout worked closely with funders/potential funders, legal services organizations, rental property owners, academics studying housing and eviction, government agencies and the continuum of care, nonprofits serving low-income residents, community organizers, and impacted residents.
Core to our approach is the idea that creating opportunity for change is as much about the analyses and engagement method as it is about the quantitative evaluation of a particular result. By engaging a broad range of local stakeholders, collecting and integrating quantitative and qualitative information, and seeking regular feedback as analyses are developed, civil justice engineering can be used to develop cost–benefit analyses and evaluation techniques that form the basis for collaboration and consensus, both prerequisites for meaningful and durable reforms that expand access to civil justice.
This chapter introduces the civil justice engineering framework and shows how it can further a wide range of access to civil justice initiatives, such as civil right to counsel, court efforts to assist self-represented litigants, an expanded role for nonlawyers or limited-license legal practitioners, effective utilization of brief services and advice programs, and justice initiatives to address racial inequity.
6.1 Situating Civil Justice Engineering
6.1.1 Policy-Based Access-to-Justice Reform in the United States: A Brief Overview
The United States has faced significant challenges in enacting broad, policy-based access to civil justice reform. These challenges arise from a confluence of institutional, political, fiscal, and cultural factors that can impede the development of comprehensive, sustainable reforms. In our experience, obstacles to scalable, sustainable, transformative policy reform have included but are not limited to:
▪ A propensity for the development of reactive interventions intended to respond to crises rather than a systemic assessment of causes;
▪ A failure to appreciate the costs of responding to crises when individuals attempt to navigate civil justice issues unassisted;
▪ An overemphasis on doctrinaire approaches to systemic challenges that require complex solutions;
▪ A lack of appreciation for the diverse demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds of those seeking assistance in civil justice matters;
▪ Political divisiveness and entrenched advocacy that impede achieving consensus on broad, scalable, sustainable policy reform;
▪ Prioritizing short-term results in lieu of investing in long-term, preventative policy change;
▪ Paralysis arising from the perceived daunting scale of systemic challenges;
▪ Anxiety and fear arising from the uncertainties of reform; and
▪ Failure to implement incremental, iterative policy change, instead searching for an immediate, universal solution.
In our experience, the judicial branch specifically can also experience unique obstacles to developing broad reform designed to sustainably improve civil access to justice, such as:
▪ Concern and frustration stemming from previous attempts to share data with various stakeholders, often related to misuse and misinterpretation of court data;
▪ Concerns surrounding data quality and data integrity that may reflect poorly on the court or its staff and may compromise any analysis of the data; and
▪ Apprehension that access-to-justice reforms might slow down case processing and disrupt court operations.
These barriers to change can be overcome. We have observed transformative change when there is an emphasis on incremental progress, acknowledging that no singular policy can comprehensively address all aspects of complex social and justice issues.
6.1.2 An Introductory Example: The Eviction Right to Counsel Movement in the United States
One recent example of sustained, scaled, transformative change in civil access to justice in the United States has come from the eviction right to counsel movement, particularly over the last ten years.
In 2015, eviction defendants across America lacked the right to legal representation even after decades of advocacy by tenant organizers, advocates, and other stakeholders. In 2017, New York City passed historic eviction right to counsel legislation.Footnote 1 This legislation offered full, extended representation for all eligible tenants (individuals with an annual gross household income not over 200 percent of the federal poverty level).Footnote 2
The reform’s impact was profound, made evident through New York City’s Office of Civil Justice report in 2021, which found that 84 percent of represented tenants were able to stay in their homes.Footnote 3 Additionally, during implementation, areas with an eviction-focused right to counsel experienced a reduction in eviction filings of over 30 percent.Footnote 4
The New York City eviction right to counsel legislation sparked a movement that has resulted in legislation being passed in seventeen cities, four states, and one county, where tenants now have a right to counsel or are guaranteed access to counsel for eviction proceedings.Footnote 5 The initial results in those jurisdictions demonstrate the impact of this significant expansion of access to civil justice. Based on available data from several jurisdictions, when clients are seeking to avoid an eviction judgment, 76 percent to 79 percent of clients receiving extensive servicesFootnote 6 have been successful in that aim.Footnote 7 Of those clients seeking to stay in their homes, 70 percent to 79 percent of clients receiving extensive services have been successful.Footnote 8 Of those clients seeking to secure time to find other housing, 42 percent to 88 percent of clients receiving extensive services have been successful.Footnote 9
This expansion in access to civil justice has emerged in jurisdictions with strong tenant organizing movements as well as those with little or no organizing around tenant rights. Change has occurred in the largest of cities as well as smaller cities across various regions (East Coast, West Coast, Midwest, and Mountain Regions). So too has it occurred in places with significant social safety net responses to housing instability and homelessness, as well as in places with a lack of such supportive services.Footnote 10
As in New York City, the eviction right to counsel movement and reforms in other areas of civil access to justice have been a decades-long endeavor. Organizers, community-based organizations, civil legal services organizations, bar associations, courts, and countless local stakeholders continue to be the backbone of transformative change and local eviction reform in many communities.
Evaluative reports in these jurisdictions, several completed by the authors, have demonstrated the importance and impact of tenants having representation,Footnote 11 but they have also demonstrated the need for iterative implementation techniques, data collection, stakeholder engagement, and the development of a spectrum of resources to assist tenants and rental property owners navigating rental housing disputes.
In this chapter, we discuss how our work has contributed to the efforts of local stakeholders. This should not take away from the extraordinary work of so many local stakeholders who work together to pursue ecosystem change in their communities. To the contrary, as we describe, it is only from the participation, leadership, and engagement of these stakeholders that such change becomes possible. Nor should the pages that follow be taken to suggest that the only means of achieving change is through the methods we describe, or that cost or benefit analyses should be emphasized to the exclusion of equity considerations. Rather, there are many ways in which reform has been, and will be, achieved. We simply and humbly offer our experience as a contribution to, and consideration for, further efforts surrounding local reforms related to access to civil justice.
6.2 An Overview of the Civil Justice Engineering Framework: Complementing Advocacy and Stakeholder Engagement with Financial Analysis
For many jurisdictions, the development of a comprehensive, independent cost–benefit study has informed policymakers and other stakeholders about the potential costs and savings of providing the eviction right to counsel. The development of such studies utilized an innovative combination of academic scholarship and community and stakeholder feedback with the application of quantitative and financial analysis with qualitative context.
6.2.1 Social Return on Investment and Cost–Benefit Analysis
A core concept in our civil justice engineering framework is social return on investment (SROI). SROI is a framework used to measure the social and economic value that may be created by an organization or initiative. It aims to assess and quantify the positive impact that an activity generates in relation to the resources invested, going beyond traditional financial measures by incorporating social outcomes into the evaluation.Footnote 12
Closely related to but distinct from SROI is cost–benefit analysis (CBA). CBA is a method employed to assess the potential economic impact and benefits of policy reforms or programs. It involves evaluating the costs associated with implementing the policy and comparing them to the expected benefits for the entities funding the program.Footnote 13
CBA is typically only one aspect of a larger strategy for policy reform regarding access to civil justice. In our experience, reform is not typically based solely on whether it is fiscally prudent, but fiscal impacts (both costs and potential benefits) are relevant considerations and can serve as a critical foundation for further dialogue and collaboration.
CBA is not uncontroversial in policymaking and law. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling provide an important critique of CBA, particularly when used as the sole justification for policy reform, arguing that “human life, health, and nature cannot be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless.”Footnote 14 In keeping with that critique, Richard L. Revesz and Michael L. Livermore suggest an approach to policy reform that blends the use of CBAs with a compassionate, ethical view of the issues being addressed. They write, “[b]ecause of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible … [but we] must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships.”Footnote 15
In our civil justice work, we use CBA differently. We do not intend to justify reforms with a CBA but rather to inform the dialogue surrounding reform with quantifiable insight and feedback from local stakeholders. A CBA can allow for informed decision-making, efficient resource allocation, transparency in the decision-making process, advocacy potential, and the ability to iteratively evaluate policy impact and foster accountability. But in isolation, a CBA does not account for the ethical arguments for access to justice. For this reason, discussed below, we recommend that a CBA be utilized within a comprehensive and integrated local approach to access to civil justice reform.
CBAs prior to the passage of such reforms (or the evaluation of the implementation of such reforms after passage, and related potential fiscal impact) have been effective, in part, because of both the comprehensive nature of the related reports and analyses as well as the breadth of contribution from local stakeholders. It is as much about how such work is conducted as it is about the quantitative result. By engaging a range of local stakeholders, listening to their perspectives, leveraging and reconciling academic scholarship, collecting and integrating quantitative and qualitative information, and seeking regular feedback as analyses and observations are developed, CBAs form the basis for collaboration that can lead to issue convergence in support of expansion of access to civil justice.
6.2.2 Leveraging Cost–Benefit Analysis Using an Integrated Approach to Access-to-Justice Reform
Using this framework, we have assisted jurisdictions across the United States in developing estimates of the fiscal impact of reform related to access to civil justice. This approach incorporates quantitative and qualitative components and often begins well before a reform related to access to civil justice is designed or implemented. Key elements of this approach include, but are not limited to:
▪ Leveraging the importance of localization by learning from local stakeholders regarding their interest in a particular civil justice reform and developing an understanding of the local civil justice ecosystem;
▪ Assessing the circumstances parties face through engagement with stakeholders, examining their needs and the role a particular reform has in meeting certain needs and addressing certain circumstances;
▪ Appreciating that person-centered data is imperfect, thus centering the inquiry on the development of reasonable estimates and transparency regarding preliminary measurement techniques and the need for ongoing assessment;
▪ Identifying and evaluating quantitative elements for analysis of program costs and potential fiscal impact as well as other impacts;
▪ Integrating supplemental research and observations;
▪ Developing estimates of program costs;
▪ Using prior academic scholarship and stakeholder data, developing estimates of reasonably quantifiable fiscal impacts, and identifying qualitative assessments of other impacts that cannot currently be quantified;
▪ Assessing opportunities for issue convergence; and
▪ Identifying opportunities for continued, iterative assessment, evaluation, and refinement, as well as identification of complementary reforms.
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate how applying this framework can amplify and inform the work of pursuing sustainable, scaled access to civil justice initiatives. We do so by identifying and explaining nine core elements of the approach.
6.3 The Elements of Civil Justice Engineering
Element #1: Leveraging the importance of localization by learning from local stakeholders regarding their interest in a particular civil justice reform and developing an understanding of the local civil justice ecosystem.
In our experience, local community stakeholders are typically highly aware of injustices and systemic barriers in their community. Instead of developing recommendations based on our impressions of what should be important to the community, we are guided by feedback from local stakeholders.
For example, in Oklahoma City, Legal Aid knew there were transportation barriers to access to justice, particularly for tenants in eviction proceedings. Public transit could be unreliable, and the bus schedules did not always align with the docket calls at court. Tenants would default in eviction cases because of transportation challenges. Legal aid developed data evaluation elements to measure the frequency of transportation issues shared by clients and are planning to use that data to advocate for changes to docket call times and bus schedules.Footnote 16
Consequently, the work of understanding program costs and potential fiscal impacts often starts at early stages of advocacy. At such stages, the comprehensive, inclusive, and intentional approach described below can inform many elements of advocacy beyond the cost of the proposed reform. It can serve to inform program design based on feedback from multiple stakeholders and can assist in developing coalition, collaboration, and opportunities for issue convergence.
Localization has been critical to propel policy reforms involving civil access to justice. While national trends or generalizable findings furnish insights, a variety of local perceptions, practices, procedures, and stakeholders often require that we uniquely consider the circumstances of each jurisdiction.
Localization also can increase local advocacy and prioritization, fostering accountability and investment within the community. With knowledge of their jurisdiction’s peculiarities, local policymakers and stakeholders are better equipped to advocate for and invest in policies that effectively cater to the needs of their constituents.
Detractors may posit that localization leads to excessive temporal and resource burdens; however, in our experience the opposite has been the case. National studies often fail to resonate with local communities and policymakers, leading to tepid support, dialogue, and development. Conversely, localized efforts serve as formidable catalysts for broader movements, effectively inspiring other communities to consider similar reforms.
This work needs to be informed by the views and perspectives of many stakeholders and will be inherently imperfect in measurement techniques – measurement techniques that will be centered on the development of reasonable, reliable, credible metrics but that will necessarily rely on a constellation of imperfect data, research, and qualitative feedback. Independence is an important factor, as findings and observations of this work are not motivated by a particular advocacy position. This can be an important consideration for policymakers interested in understanding the civil justice ecosystem and potential costs and fiscal impact of certain reforms.
Our efforts are to inform local efforts to pursue reform in an independentFootnote 17 manner. We rely on local communities to identify priorities for reform, and we seek to independently advise regarding the costs of implementation and the potential fiscal impacts of those reforms.
As we begin our work, we first, and continually, seek to understand the civil justice ecosystem impacted by the proposed reform. Civil legal issues, whether perceived by the individuals involved as “legal” or not, arise locally. They arise for an individual, a household, and a business owner. They arise in a local neighborhood, local community, city, and county, and with local stakeholders, local courts, and local support services. We are mindful that while our unique experience and expertise working with stakeholders in jurisdictions around the country may inform our work and our dialogue, we must begin our work listening to local stakeholders to understand the local ecosystem – both its history and its present.
Residents, business owners (such as rental property owners or lenders), legal services organizations, community organizers and advocates, attorneys, academic institutions, the courts, policymakers, and other community stakeholders are operating in an intricate, intertwined, and interdependent ecosystem.
We observe this interdependence and interconnectedness throughout our work and uniquely in each jurisdiction. For example, if we consider the eviction ecosystem, we must learn how rental property owners (and their counsel), tenants, courts, civil legal aid organizations, emergency rental assistance administrators, community-based organizations, and other public systems (e.g., emergency shelter, foster care, public schools, healthcare, transportation, police) interact with and upon one another, at what cost (financial and otherwise) and to which party.
We appreciate that we will never fully understand each local ecosystem we work in and certainly not to the extent of the local stakeholders we work with. For this reason, throughout our work, we remain open to continually learning about the ecosystem and ensuring, to the extent possible, that those insights and observations are intentionally incorporated in our quantitative and qualitative work. To achieve this, we utilize an immersive stakeholder engagement technique.
Element #2: Assessing the circumstances parties face through engagement with stakeholders, examining their needs and the role a particular reform has in meeting certain needs and addressing certain circumstances.
This approach does not necessarily require us to be subject matter experts in eviction, consumer debt, immigration, guardianship, family law, or other matters of civil access to justice. Instead, we approach our work with curiosity and genuine intrigue about the local justice ecosystem and stakeholders – their history, roles, responsibilities, perceptions, experiences, challenges, current resource constraints; the fiscal impacts and constraints that change can have on them; and the overall capacity for change within a resource-constrained environment.
Intentional, inclusive stakeholder engagement creates the opportunity to continually learn about the ecosystem and to create a collaborative environment that establishes or renews connections among stakeholders. As our work progresses, the stakeholders with whom relationships have been built are continuously re-engaged to discuss emerging issues, review progress, and assess new opportunities and challenges.
Our engagement with stakeholders has included but is not limited to:
▪ Courts;
▪ Legal services providers;
▪ Rental property owners;
▪ Public housing authorities;
▪ Rental assistance providers;
▪ 2-1-1 and other community action call centers;
▪ Coordinated intake service organizations;
▪ Legal technology hosts and providers;
▪ Public libraries;
▪ Community organizers;
▪ Continuums of Care (CoC);
▪ Social benefit administrators;
▪ Employers;
▪ City, county, and state government agencies;
▪ Public education and higher education providers;
▪ Faith communities;
▪ Community-based organizations;
▪ Transportation providers;
▪ Hospitals and healthcare providers; and
▪ Homelessness service providers.
In focus groups or interviews, participants share their perspectives and lived experiences regarding the subject matter (e.g., clients or constituents facing eviction or housing instability), potential fiscal and personal impacts, identifying common themes across lived experiences, and considering how we may be able to quantify the costs and benefits of regulatory reform.
When considering with whom to engage, inclusivity and diversity is critical. Engaging with stakeholder groups that have varying experiences, roles, power, perspectives, and perceptions informs the understanding of potential fiscal impacts.
For example, civil legal aid organizations are able to share data and experiences regarding the experiences of their clients, their interactions with the courts and counterparties; and the personnel costs of delivering services (e.g., salaries and benefits). Government and social services agencies are often able to share how they are spending public dollars to respond to certain crises experienced by community members that could be reduced if certain reforms related to access to civil justice were implemented. For example, we have engaged with emergency shelter providers and Continuums of CareFootnote 18 throughout the country. In every jurisdiction with which we have engaged, these housing social safety net providers share that a portion of people experiencing homelessness and living in shelters have likely experienced eviction in the past and that the eviction contributed to their need for emergency shelter or other services. This draws a connection between eviction and expensive publicly funded social services, and the link is reinforced by research conducted across the country.Footnote 19
Stakeholders who may not support certain reforms should also be engaged to ensure a comprehensive understanding of potential fiscal impacts. We hear from rental property owners about the challenges they face in providing safe and stable housing, the difficulties accessing rental assistance programs as well as the courts, frustrations with the legal process, and the costs they incur from delays arising from disputes with tenants. We also hear about challenging relationships with their tenants and the rental property owner’s efforts to assist in reaching resolutions prior to eviction.
The breadth of this stakeholder engagement helps to prevent bias and demonstrates a commitment to an independent assessment of both opportunities and challenges. In addition, it often uncovers and illuminates new findings that can lead to more informed policy decisions and continued stakeholder collaboration.
For instance, it is not uncommon for there to be concerns among rental property owners and their lawyers regarding the impact that expanded access to lawyers for tenants may have. However, lawyers representing rental property owners also consistently indicate that they always prefer to work with a represented tenant rather than an unrepresented tenant and that when lawyers are involved on both sides it is more likely that effective outcomes for both parties can be reached, and often more expeditiously than with an unrepresented tenant, particularly in more complex cases. In some jurisdictions, rental property owners have been vocal supporters of eviction right to counsel programs, particularly when appreciating the complexity of the circumstances tenants are encountering, the ways in which lawyers for tenants are able to effectively resolve these matters, and openness to feedback and recommendations from the rental property owner community – but also seek complementary resources such as sustainable, efficient, and effective emergency rental assistance.
Further, the degree to which tenants facing eviction are experiencing substandard housing conditions is often underappreciated by policymakers but well-understood by courts, legal aid attorneys, and property owners/managers. This information asymmetry typically arises because of a previous lack of structured data collection regarding the presence of these substandard housing conditions. The importance of addressing this information asymmetry arose from initial stakeholder engagement, and its prevalence was understood after implementing revised data collection based on that feedback. As a result, we have found that 60 percent to 80 percent of eviction right to counsel clients in jurisdictions around the country report that they are experiencing at least one (and often many) defective conditions in their home.Footnote 20 Figure 6.1’s data visualizations are examples of how structured data collection and analysis can inform policymakers and other stakeholders regarding complex circumstances clients can be experiencing and the impact legal representation can have when substantive legal issues are present.Footnote 21

Figure 6.1 Exemplar visualization of defective housing conditions.
Figure 6.1Long description
The bar chart at the top shows that 59.2 percent of tenants, that is, 452 tenants, reported the presence of a defective condition in their housing, while 40.8 percent of tenants, that is 312 tenants, reported no defective condition. Below this, another horizontal bar chart titled, Number of Defective Conditions Per Client, indicates the distribution of the number of defective conditions reported by tenants ranging from one to nine. The most frequent number of defective conditions reported was one, at 30.3 percent, or 105 tenants. A third horizontal bar chart on the right, titled, Landlord Repair of Defective Conditions, shows that 56.1 percent of landlords did not fix the defective conditions, while 40.1 percent fixed some conditions, and 3.8 percent fixed all conditions to the tenant's satisfaction.
Moreover, in many jurisdictions with an eviction right to counsel, a minority of tenants facing eviction seek legal assistance – however, of those that do, 85 percent to 90 percent are involved in complex disputes with the rental property owner, face severe consequences, are at the lowest income levels,Footnote 22 and are likely to need social services if they are not able to achieve their housing goals.Footnote 23 This finding has emphasized the importance of eviction right to counsel legislation to serve the most vulnerable but also has emphasized the need for additional forms of assistance and intervention to serve both rental property owners and tenants in other circumstances.
Policymakers and others often believe that the purpose of legal representation for tenants is to keep people in their homes. However, property owners, legal aid organizations, and community-based organizations often indicated that their tenants did not always want to stay in their homes. Rather, tenants sought legal assistance because their relationship with the rental property owner had often deteriorated beyond repair and the conditions of the homes were often unsafe. Based on this feedback, supplemental data was collected for clients of legal aid organizations to understand what the client’s goals were. This data revealed that 30 percent to 45 percent of clients (those facing eviction who sought legal assistance) did not want to stay in their homes.Footnote 24 Figure 6.2 provides examples of visualizations showing whether the client wants to stay in their home, and the intersection of whether they want to stay and the presence of defective conditions.

Figure 6.2 Exemplar visualization of client preferences regarding housing options.
Figure 6.2Long description
The leftmost chart shows that 55.7% of tenants wanted to stay in their homes, while 43.4% did not, and 0.9% had already vacated. The subsequent grouped bar charts are organized by year, from 2021 to 2023, and further segmented by the presence of defective conditions labeled, No Defective Conditions and Yes, Defective Conditions. Within each year and condition category, there are two bars representing whether tenants wanted to stay in their rental unit, indicated as Yes, or No. In 2021, among cases with no defective conditions, 79% wanted to stay and 21% did not. Conversely, among cases with defective conditions in 2021, 54% did not want to stay and 46% did. In 2022, for homes without defective conditions, 78% wanted to stay and 22% did not, while for those with defective conditions, 49% did not want to stay and 51% did. Finally, in 2023, among homes with no defective conditions, 81% wanted to stay and 19% did not, and for homes with defective conditions, 43% did not want to stay and 57% did. A legend at the bottom clarifies that the lighter bars represent, Yes, for wanting to stay, and the darker bars represent, No.
Eviction right to counsel programs and legislation can be critical elements of an ecosystem ensuring justice in rental housing disputes resulting in eviction filings. As we engage stakeholders, we consistently receive feedback about how eviction right to counsel programs provide an essential foundation for housing justice but that they should also be supplemented with other interventions. Many of those interventions are preventative in nature and could decrease the need for more costly interventions downstream. These should be considered complements to or integrated components of an eviction right to counsel. Interventions include sustained emergency rental assistance, mediation, prefiling connection to other social services, relocation assistance, improvements in the substantive landlord/tenant law (such as longer notice periods and just cause eviction protections), transportation assistance, and childcare assistance for in-person court appearances.
Understanding who is likely to access the services and for whom the services may be particularly impactful is important. People with civil legal needs are often experiencing a variety of circumstances and may need a range of services. In eviction right to counsel jurisdictions, we observe common characteristics of eviction right to counsel clients. Our evaluations of the eviction right to counsel programs in three jurisdictions found that tenants seeking representation often do so because they need assistance with the substantive legal issues of their case or potential defenses, or there are challenges within the household exacerbating the trauma of the eviction process. Tenants seeking legal representation in eviction right to counsel jurisdictions are also likely to disproportionately identify as female and African American or black compared to the jurisdiction’s overall population.Footnote 25 Figure 6.3 shows comparative metrics for the gender and race of eviction right to counsel clients in Cleveland relative to Cleveland’s overall population.

Figure 6.3 Comparative demographic metrics for Cleveland right to counsel clients versus Cleveland’s overall population.
Figure 6.3Long description
The top chart focuses on gender, depicting the percentage of female and male individuals in both R T C-C clients and the general Cleveland population. For R T C-C clients, the percentage of females appears significantly higher than males. The Cleveland population demographics depict a slightly higher percentage of females compared to males. The bottom chart presents a comparison of race, including Black, White, and Other categories, across four groups, R T C-C clients, all Cleveland residents, renter households in the Cleveland-Elyria Metro area, and renter households in the Cleveland-Elyria Metro area below 100% of the federal poverty level. Among R T C-C clients, the percentage of individuals identifying as Black is notably higher, followed by White, with a small percentage identifying as Other. For all Cleveland residents, the percentage of Black individuals is the highest, followed by White, and then Other. Renter households in the Cleveland-Elyria Metro area depict a slightly higher percentage of White individuals followed by black, and other. Finally, renter households in the Cleveland-Elyria Metro area below 100% F P L indicate a slightly higher percentage of White compared to Black individuals, with a small percentage identifying as Other.
In several right to counsel jurisdictions where we have worked, attorneys representing tenants in eviction matters told us of instances in which they were assisting a tenant where the only issue (a relatively simple one) was the nonpayment of rent. In those attorneys’ opinions, the tenant would have been able to navigate the process with other forms of assistance. This does not take away from the impact and importance of an eviction right to counsel in these places but rather reinforces the importance of continued study and evaluation centered on the experiences of the parties involved and the circumstances they face.
Segmenting potential client populations based on circumstances and case characteristics provides insights into the effectiveness and fiscal sustainability of programs, interventions, and service levels. An impactful and informative finding from case and client segmentation analysis would be, for example, that 80 percent of clients who had case or personal circumstances indicating that brief legal services (legal information, advice, assistance connecting with another social service, or assistance negotiating a settlement) would be the form of effective assistance necessary for clients to achieve the goals for their case. This is significantly more meaningful than a broader, less nuanced, and contextualized finding than, for example, that 30 percent of all clients achieved their goals through the receipt of brief services.
Element #3: Appreciating that person-centered data is imperfect, this should center us on the development of reasonable estimates, transparency regarding preliminary measurement techniques, and the need for ongoing assessment.
The variety of unique circumstances people face results in uncertainties regarding the potential impact of service delivery – uncertainties regarding necessary services for a given situation, the cost and longevity of those services, and the short- and long-term fiscal impact. Precise calculations and quantifications for these situations may not always be feasible. Person-centered data is often inherently imperfect, but reasonable estimates can often be developed, particularly when accompanied with transparency regarding the sources of information, limitations of such estimates, and the methods of calculation.
For example, when analyzing the potential fiscal impact of housing instability, we often attempt to estimate the cost savings or redirection of public dollars that could be recognized if fewer people were to experience homelessness (sheltered or unsheltered) because of access to legal representation. There is a significant body of academic research indicating that a portion of people who are evicted will likely experience homelessness and that a subset of the people who experience homelessness will likely enter emergency shelter or require a different housing social safety net response (e.g., rapid rehousing, transitional housing, permanent supportive housing).Footnote 26 In addition, local homelessness response providers may also publish reports or provide data demonstrating the intersection between eviction and shelter entry or other social service responses. We collect, review, and synthesize the data presented in academic studies, as well as local information, and compare it to data civil legal aid providers are collecting regarding where clients would go if they were evicted.
In our experience, the findings from academic studies are often consistent with the civil legal aid provider data and feedback from local social service providers. We leverage these sources of information to develop a quantitative estimate as to the percentage of people who would experience homelessness and likely require a housing social safety net response. We then seek feedback from local stakeholders to ensure the estimates we develop are consistent with their experiences. Once we have an estimate as to the percentage of people who would have likely experienced homelessness but-for legal representation, we review academic studies and local data regarding the annual cost of providing housing social safety net responses. When combined, the incremental number of people who likely avoided needing a housing social safety net response and the annual cost of the housing social safety net response can be used to develop a reasonable, quantitative estimate (informed by qualitative stakeholder feedback) of potential cost savings or opportunities for the redirection of public dollars.
Element #4: Identifying and evaluating quantitative elements for analysis of program costs and potential fiscal impact as well as other impacts.
Through stakeholder engagement, we learn about the availability of quantitative data and prior research that can contribute to analysis of implementation costs, as well as potential fiscal and other impacts.
Stakeholders can often share data they collect through the course of serving their constituents, can identify prior research or publications to inform further analysis, and can identify other stakeholders that may be able to assist in providing quantitative data elements. These same stakeholders then become essential in ensuring a reasonable interpretation and analysis of the data.
In our experience, data collected by local stakeholders often requires significant guidance to appropriately interpret. Examples of data we have received and reviewed include but are not limited to:
▪ Civil case filing and disposition data;
▪ Legal services provider de-identified case information;
▪ Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) data;
▪ 2-1-1 data;
▪ US Census data;
▪ Homelessness response data;
▪ Foster care entry and exit data;
▪ Student homelessness and enrollment data; and
▪ Legal services provider budget and financial data.
This engagement and review of data can also assist in identifying opportunities for expanded data collection and analysis. For example, Figure 6.4 presents data findings that assisted policymakers in understanding the volume of annual eviction filings in Cleveland, the defendant representation rate trend, and defendant representation rates by zip code.Footnote 27 This type of visualized data assists in understanding how policy change can impact the total number of filings a jurisdiction is experiencing and identifying whether more residents are being represented through the eviction right to counsel program over time.

Figure 6.4 Eviction data visualizations.
Figure 6.4Long description
The first chart, a column chart, shows the number of eviction cases filed annually from 2011 to 2023, excluding 2015. The trend indicates a general decrease in filings until 2021, with values dropping from 10,976 to 4274, then rising to 6352 in 2023. The second chart plots eviction filings with defendant representations by month. This chart shows a steep rise in the percentage of cases with represented defendants from January 2019 to April 2020, with values vacillating until they precipitously dropped from 16.4% in March 2023 to 9.0% in April 2023. The third chart is a horizontal bar chart that plots eviction filings by 20 zip-codes for eviction cases filed and for eviction cases where the defendant was represented, showing differences in representation rates between zip codes, with the highest rate at 18.0% and the lowest at 8.4%.
Element #5: Integrating supplemental research and observations.
Complex ecosystems simply cannot be defined or fully understood by quantitative data and analysis alone. Further, many stakeholders will not have or will not be able to share quantitative data or data that could be used in robust quantitative analysis. However, many stakeholders can provide a wide range of qualitative feedback, insight, or materials that can be used to provide important history, context, and support for quantitative analysis. This information is essential to demonstrate a more fulsome appreciation for the local civil justice ecosystem. In addition, it provides the ability for stakeholders to contribute to the work, further enabling the development of coalition and the potential for issue convergence. Examples of information used in qualitative assessment and observation include but are not limited to:
▪ Social program budgets;
▪ Academic or other research previously conducted about the relevant civil justice ecosystem or matter type;
▪ Prior program evaluations relevant to the local civil justice ecosystem;
▪ Articles and investigative reporting about the relevant civil justice ecosystem; and
▪ Feedback provided in interviews and stakeholder focus groups or listening sessions.
Locally prepared research and the feedback from local stakeholders are complemented by relevant research from other jurisdictions to provide further support for local feedback and create pathways for further engagement.
The most prominent question we hear when working on projects related to civil access to justice reform is “What will it cost?”
As such, developing a reasonable, credible, and independent assessment of the expected costs of implementation is an essential element of our work. It is important to ensure such estimates reflect a sustainable model of service delivery consistent with the capacity necessary to provide the services, and the quality necessary to achieve the expected results. This often represents a paradigm shift for those providing the services in severely resource-constrained environments, where such services are necessarily extremely limited.
We have assisted jurisdictions with developing detailed program budgets for a variety of service delivery models. The budgeting exercise includes calculations for the expected number of clients served, estimated caseloads, sustainable personnel expenses (e.g., salaries and benefits for attorneys, paralegals, case managers, intake staff, navigators, and social workers), and program infrastructure (e.g., rent and utilities, office expenses, technology, furniture and equipment, licenses, and dues). The estimated implementation cost of the reform not only informs program and service delivery design but also how the reform may be implemented. Depending on the scale and scope of the reform, it may be appropriate to consider a phased-implementation timeline.
The cost of sustainable implementation provides an important foundation for the assessment of total funding needed but also provides the ability to assess how the potential fiscal and other impacts compare to the costs and availability of sustainable funding. Such measures are not fixed and static. Rather, the costs (and fiscal impacts) can vary if the program design changes. In some instances, program design can be optimized to minimize costs, maximize impact, and maintain the quality of service necessary to achieve programmatic expectations. In other instances, particularly when implementing transformative measures not previously implemented, it may be reasonable to expect cost efficiencies over time as the ecosystem adapts to a new or expanded model of service delivery.
Element #7: Using prior academic scholarship and stakeholder data, developing estimates of reasonably quantifiable fiscal impacts, and identifying qualitative assessment of other impacts not quantified.
The stakeholder engagement process will often reveal significant potential fiscal benefits to states, cities, counties, and municipalities from civil access to justice reform. This is further reinforced by a growing body of academic scholarship that has demonstrated the connections between housing instability or eviction, as well as other forms of trauma, that can give rise to social services responses.Footnote 28 Civil access-to-justice reform can have wide-ranging impacts on the lives of individuals, families, neighborhoods, and communities. In our work, we will recognize, research, and discuss these potential impacts, but our quantitative analysis will primarily focus on the potential fiscal impacts that would accrue to the jurisdiction providing the funding for the program. In certain instances, we are mindful that fiscal benefits may accrue to the county or state (e.g., when we are analyzing the fiscal impact to a city) based on the nature of funding for certain social services.
For example, in several jurisdictions, such as Cleveland, we have observed that emergency response to homelessness (including the emergency shelter system), child welfare response, and the primary education system were all funded through the county. While policymakers in the city were interested in allocating funding for an eviction right to counsel and appreciated the holistic benefits that its residents would receive as well as importance of access to the justice system, the financial justification for it was more challenging because it was not providing the funding for social responses that would likely be most impacted.
These fiscal impacts can be considered on a continuum of confidence based on the availability of data, research, feedback, and system characteristics. In our experience, certain fiscal impacts can be reasonably and credibly calculated based on academic scholarship, publicly available data and metrics, and data that is often (or could be) collected by civil legal services organizations or other local stakeholders. Other fiscal impacts cannot be reliably or credibly measured with the data and research available, although feedback from stakeholders and individuals with lived experiences indicates the impacts clearly exist.
As an example, the fiscal impacts associated with residents who experience homelessness and the direct costs of homelessness response and emergency shelter are often more easily quantified using local data and information. However, the impact to property values for neighborhoods experiencing high rates of eviction, or the long-term impacts to health and education for children who experience eviction and persistent housing instability, can be very difficult to measure due to the lack of research and information currently available (both locally and generally on such topics).
The unquantifiable impacts stakeholders describe should also be considered and recognized. The reality of fiscal impacts that cannot be credibly converted to a monetary scale should not be viewed as a limitation. Rather, they are a pathway for continued research and data collection. We have observed firsthand the value of robust, structured data collection in jurisdictions throughout the country that are endeavoring to demonstrate the costs and benefits of regulatory reform related to access to civil justice.
Element #8: Assessing opportunities for issue convergence.
We often observe comprehensive cost–benefit analyses and potential fiscal impact quantifications contributing to the development of local issue convergence.Footnote 29 Assessing issue convergence requires authentic engagement with a range of local community stakeholders. This engagement should also consider information requests, research, criticism, and questioning. An effective dialogue will require assessments of bias that may arise from the unique perspective and experience of stakeholders and a willingness to respectfully explore the potential for bias and how to interpret, understand, and apply the insights from stakeholder engagement. Through the course of developing this dialogue, we seek to identify common and aligned interests, experiences, and aspirations for change or innovation. We also identify areas of disagreement and concern. These are also valuable contributors to the dialogue and present opportunities to share such concerns from an independent perspective, creating a shared appreciation for the views of other stakeholders, including those who have traditionally been considered adversaries.
In certain instances, we have experienced providers of social services or legal assistance who are informed by their daily experiences but may not appreciate that those daily experiences are largely limited to serving those experiencing the most traumatic and destructive versions of certain civil legal issues or circumstances. In such circumstances, it can often be helpful to broaden the conversation and learn about the experience of system-impacted persons who experience the system differently and do not interact with certain social service or legal service programs. The engagement can then broaden the stakeholders involved and more widely inform the dialogue – with both, the opportunities for issue convergence can increase.
In other instances, for instance, rental property owners may initially oppose contemplated legislation that would expand access to legal representation for tenants. We have talked to dozens of rental property owners and their counsel across the country, and they often express concern that expanded access to legal representation may lead to expected delays in the eviction process due to the presence of a tenant’s attorney. They frequently describe these expected delays as potentially contributing to increases in rental arrears and lost rental income.
Rental property owners and their counsel are often accustomed to fast-moving eviction proceedings where tenants fail to appear at the eviction hearing. If they do appear, they are unlikely to be represented, and unlikely to have the necessary specialized knowledge of landlord–tenant law to represent themselves effectively.Footnote 30 There are often similar concerns from the courts, which are also accustomed to expeditious eviction proceedings that do not require significant human or financial resources to adjudicate. Rental property owners also often expect that every tenant will seek legal assistance – regardless of the circumstances the client may be facing, the quality of housing, and the efforts by the landlord to try to provide time or assistance for the tenant.
However, our experience indicates an increased likelihood that cases can be resolved out of court and before the first hearing when both parties are represented, resulting in more efficient and effective case resolutions that has financial benefits for both parties (and the courts). Rental property owners’ counsel have shared that they prefer to negotiate and interact with another attorney rather than an unrepresented tenant because it serves their interest: securing an efficient and effective case resolution that often includes emergency rental assistance to pay the rental property owner the back rent owed or creating repayment plans that tenants can reasonably adhere to, thereby increasing the likelihood of a rental property owner being paid the amount of back rent owed.
Rental property owners have also shared with us that the financial cost of identifying, screening, and securing a new tenant is significant, as is the financial cost of preparing a property for re-rental, and vacancies before a new tenant is secured. Because of those costs, their preference is generally to keep a current tenant.
In addition, the ways that tenants respond to delinquency and the receipt of an eviction notice can vary significantly. Not every tenant seeks legal representation. Data collected from eviction right to counsel jurisdictions indicates that those who do seek legal representation are often experiencing a variety of complex issues – such as substandard housing conditions, substantive disputes with the rental property owner, verbal lease agreements, and may be facing severe consequences that could arise from an involuntary displacement.Footnote 31 It is possible that many of those who are not seeking legal representation or assistance perceive their circumstances to be largely economic (not legal) and may seek nonlegal forms of assistance. This can inform both communication strategies (to assist tenants in understanding the legal issues associated with eviction cases) as well as complementary services (such as mediation and rental assistance) that may assist with effectively resolving eviction cases when tenants do not seek legal assistance.
Policymakers are also a stakeholder group with financial interest in regulatory reform related to access to civil justice and therefore can be a party to issue convergence. In certain instances, a primary factor for some policymakers when considering a reform is the economics of the reform: what are the costs and benefits, what is the expected return on investment, and is this a fiscally responsible use of taxpayer dollars? We have developed robust cost–benefit analyses of enacted and contemplated eviction right to counsel legislation across the country to inform policymaker decision-making.
Even as issue convergence emerges as a possibility, we continue to embrace an iterative approach to the development of cost–benefit concepts, program design, and implementation considerations. Issue convergence requires continual efforts of genuine and authentic listening and engagement, and there are also often a significant number of unknowns in complex social ecosystems that require ongoing evaluation, assessment, and investigation. Iterative processes of engagement, design, development, implementation, and assessment (repeating) can ensure that an active dialogue is maintained, new insights and challenges are brought forward, and collaboration can continue to foster innovation.
Element #9: Identifying opportunities for continued, iterative assessment, evaluation, and refinement as well as identification of complementary reforms.
Reform will often involve the development and implementation of programs and services not previously provided in a jurisdiction, and certainly not recently. As such, predicting how the civil justice ecosystem will respond and adapt will not be done with perfect precision.
While reasonable estimates can be developed, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this work and identify the additional data collection, research, and collaboration that will enable the ecosystem to continually evaluate the impact of the reform and identify the complementary services that can further enhance the ecosystem in a financially viable and sustainable manner.
Elements of iterative assessment that can be particularly valuable and impactful include but are not limited to:
▪ Expanded data collection, analysis, and visualization;
▪ Integration of data sets from additional data sources;
▪ Advisory councils to continue to be informed by people with lived experiences;
▪ Stakeholder engagement and stakeholder working groups;
▪ Data-informed outreach using local, trusted messengers;
▪ Focus groups and surveys of people with lived experiences; and
▪ Consideration of the development of complementary or adjacent resources, programs, policies, or legislation.
A commitment to such iterative assessment, development, and implementation techniques can foster ecosystem collaboration and enhance the likelihood of sustained commitment to innovation by local stakeholders.
6.4 Conclusion
The development of a comprehensive, independent cost–benefit study intended to inform policymakers and other stakeholders about the potential costs of providing services intended to expand civil access to justice, as well as the fiscal impact and potential costs savings that could accrue through the passage and effective implementation of such reform, can be a transformative contribution to the dialogue and support necessary to enact and sustain such reform.
However, this work is as much about how such analyses are conducted as it is about the quantitative result. By leveraging academic scholarship, engaging a broad range of local stakeholders, genuinely and authentically listening to their perspectives, collecting and integrating both quantitative and qualitative information, and seeking regular feedback as analyses and observations are developed, such cost–benefit analyses form the basis for collaboration and consensus that can lead to issue convergence in support of expansion of access to civil justice.
This approach can inform the work of pursuing sustainable, scaled reform related to many efforts to improve access to civil justice, such as civil right to counsel initiatives, court efforts to assist self-represented litigants, expanding the role of nonlawyers or limited-license legal practitioners, effectively utilizing brief services and advice programs, or developing justice initiatives to address racial inequity. It is also important to acknowledge that other theories of change that are more narrowly constructed may also be successful at achieving discrete change and an improvement in access to civil justice.
In our experience, reform related to access to civil justice that is pursued through a financially focused, stakeholder-informed, research-supported approach can result in significant, transformational, and groundbreaking change in civil access to justice.
In the United States, access to legal representation in civil courts is constrained and inequitable. Most people who have justiciable civil legal problems cannot or do not obtain legal assistance.Footnote 1 Americans living in and near poverty are disproportionately in need of civil legal protections. In 2022, 74 percent of low-income households experienced at least one civil legal problem, and 39 percent experienced five or more problems – including challenges with health care, housing, disability access, public benefits, domestic violence, and more.Footnote 2 Despite grappling with such an extensive range of legal problems, low-income Americans lacked adequate help for 92 percent of them.Footnote 3
The “justice gap” – this rift between legal needs and legal assistance – is driven by both supply and demand. Concerns about the former have understandably dominated approaches to addressing civil legal inequality. Underfunding at the federal, state, and local levels restricts the supply of lawyers available to meet the needs of people facing civil legal problems. For example, legal organizations funded by the Legal Services Corporation – a core institution undergirding the US civil legal infrastructure – are unable to provide enough legal help for 71 percent of the legal problems brought to their doors.Footnote 4 Notwithstanding this underfunding, delivering access to legal advice or representation for low-income Americans has long been upheld as a crucial imperative. In 1970, Senator Walter Mondale dubbed legal services, “the most effective poverty program, dollar for dollar.”Footnote 5 Contemporary evidence supports Mondale’s contention. Access to civil legal representation can narrow health disparities, improve communication between public institutions and impoverished communities, and increase property values and wealth in black communities.Footnote 6
Recognizing these and other benefits, governments have invested in broadening access to legal services. Though the methods for achieving this end have been varied, most have emphasized the supply side of the justice gap: providing lawyers, legal information, and legal help.Footnote 7 This chapter begins with a discussion of such supply-side interventions, including (1) right to counsel, (2) legal technologies, and (3) the use of nonlawyers. Each of these has shown promise and attracted public resources. Each also confronts limitations that underscore the imperative of attending to the demand side of the justice gap.
After outlining the limits of supply-side approaches, this chapter turns to the drivers of demand. Most fundamentally, civil legal needs are a product of political processes. Demand for legal help is propelled by a politics of scarcity, inequality, and welfare state retrenchment.Footnote 8 Addressing the demand side of the “justice gap” therefore requires the redistribution and reconfiguration of power in American political life. Supply-side approaches to civil legal inequality do not sufficiently account for power. Bringing power to the foreground complements and usefully balances the prevailing preoccupation with increasing the supply of legal resources.
Moving beyond a supply-side emphasis on civil legal systems and toward a demand-side attentiveness to power dynamics within political systems opens a broader horizon of possibilities for change. A demand-side approach posits that when legal interventions lay the groundwork for collective action and facilitate the exercise of power, they can mitigate the demands that necessitate access to justice in the first place. By drawing on in-depth interviews with organized tenants and key examples of legal interventions that catalyze political action, this chapter makes the case that power should be a core concern for anyone seeking to redress civil legal inequality.
7.1 Supply-Side Approaches: Right to Counsel
To motivate the case for a demand-side focus on power, it’s worth considering some of the most salient supply-side approaches. Right to counsel (RTC) is foremost among them. In cities as wide ranging as New York, San Francisco, Boulder, Minneapolis, Kansas City, and Philadelphia, legislators, judges, community organizations, and denizens have fought for, and won, increased funds for free or low-cost legal counsel in civil proceedings.Footnote 9
These RTC policies take numerous forms. Some are means-tested, and others universal. Some pertain specifically to legal representation in eviction proceedings; a few are broader.Footnote 10 Some RTC policies come to fruition through legislative action, others via judicial decisions, still others by executive action.Footnote 11 The common thread that runs through all RTC efforts is a mandate to increase the supply of lawyers available to represent or advise people with civil legal needs.
RTC policies can be very effective. In 2017, New York City enacted “Intro 214-B,” a pathbreaking expansion of civil legal access.Footnote 12 Intro 214-B was intended to provide legal counsel for low-income tenants facing eviction. Prior to the passage of this legislation, roughly 1 percent of New York City tenants were represented by an attorney in eviction cases.Footnote 13 Within five years (by the fourth quarter of 2022), 63 percent of tenants in eviction court received legal assistance.Footnote 14 Among that group, 78 percent were able to remain in their homes.Footnote 15
Intro 214-B is just one example of the profound benefits of legal representation for low-income Americans. Nevertheless, even this pivotal RTC legislation has proven insufficient to meet the demand for legal services.Footnote 16 Sharp increases in eviction filings in the aftermath of the pandemic were met with a floundering civil legal infrastructure that could not meet the bar set by Intro 214-B. Legal services providers in New York City estimate that they would need roughly $461 million dollars per year to fairly execute current contracts for legal services as well as cover anticipated cases.Footnote 17 At present, New York City provides $110 million in funding, falling far short of the target.Footnote 18 Despite having a historic RTC law on the books, New York City Mayor Eric Adams has hesitated to bridge this gap.Footnote 19
Funding deficits are only one challenge facing RTC. As widely touted as Intro 2014-B has been, beneficiaries of the law sometimes do not know that they have access to free legal representation, do not understand how to obtain such representation, or are alienated from the legal system altogether. Even proponents and implementers of RTC acknowledge its complexity, difficulty, and cost. Adriene Holder, chief attorney for civil practice at the New York Legal Aid Society, aptly admitted to a NYC reporter that “Right to Counsel is in its infancy stages. … [E]veryone wants us to run and twirl but we’re barely out of the crawling stage. So, people need to understand that we’re going to need to continue to refine how this work is done, but we need resources to do it.”Footnote 20
As an attorney, Holder articulates the problem as one of resources, accentuating the supply side of the justice gap. However, it’s clear that many people at the racial and economic margins of society face problems that are technically “legal” but cannot ultimately be resolved through legal processes. For example, there were 69,440 residential eviction petitions filed in NYC between July 1, 2021, and June 30, 2022.Footnote 21 Among those eviction filings, 54,806 (about 79 percent) were for nonpayment of rent.Footnote 22 Though there are legitimate legal issues that prompt nonpayment of rent (e.g., withholding rent due to substandard conditions), a common reason for doing so is not having the money to pay. This holds true for a broad spectrum of civil legal problems that are fundamentally rooted in economic and political systems that do not provide denizens with sufficient material resources to meet basic needs.Footnote 23 Legal services providers are inundated by cases because they deal with the fallout from such structural deficits. Colleen Shanahan and colleagues make this point as follows.
The litigants in housing court do not end up behind that door by coincidence. Rather, this is a foreseeable consequence of the absence of affordable and adequate housing, health care, childcare, and education, the absence of fair and equal wages, and the presence of mass incarceration in our society. State civil cases involving debt, family relationships, and children have different names on the courtroom door but similar stories behind those doors.Footnote 24
Economic and political structures engender, maintain, and deepen the deluge of inequalities that are flooding civil legal institutions.Footnote 25 Public policies enable housing insecurity, low and stagnating wages, predatory consumer practices, constrained access to public benefits, wage theft, and many other processes that induce precarity.Footnote 26 The civil legal system shoulders the resulting burdens, despite not being designed to do so. Colleen Shanahan and her coauthors trenchantly capture this dilemma:
The work of state civil courts is a daily manifestation of the failure of the executive and legislative branches to disrupt structural inequality or invest in systems of care to mitigate it. These courts operate in the breach to address social needs because they cannot decline the cases presented to them. Thus, the social needs people bring to court are framed as disputes in order to access social provision. … This leaves state civil courts attempting to address – within the constraints of their dispute resolution design – the social needs of litigants.Footnote 27
In such a context, demand for legal services soars. Right to counsel expansions are meant to mitigate this, and they are an indispensable tool for doing so. However, when deployed solely as a supply-side instrument, RTC has little bearing on larger political-economic conditions. It helps people to (perhaps) survive the “brutal needs” that emerge from structural inequality but does not disrupt or transform that inequality.Footnote 28 This is a basic limitation of supply-side solutions.
7.2 Supply-Side Limits: Legal Technologies
RTC is only one of numerous supply-side approaches. Legal technologies have also been hailed as a route to democratizing access to legal resources.Footnote 29 Rapid developments in machine learning and web-based capacities have engendered optimism around the hope that the justice gap can be bridged via low-cost, highly accessible technology-assisted legal service delivery.Footnote 30 More than a decade ago, the Legal Services Corporation declared technology “a powerful tool in narrowing the justice gap” and offered recommendations for technological pathways to facilitating access to justice.Footnote 31 Some legal scholars have viewed the “great disruption” sparked by swiftly emerging artificial or machine intelligence as a process that will undermine the monopoly of lawyers and “provide benefit to society and clients as legal services become more transparent and affordable to consumers, and access to justice thereby becomes more widely available.”Footnote 32
Notwithstanding such confident predictions, there are reasons to be skeptical about the equalizing effects of technological innovations.Footnote 33 Successfully leveraging technology to bridge civil legal gaps will be contingent on whether people with legal needs can access the internet, have adequate digital literacy, or have the capacity to adequately articulate their needs when required.Footnote 34
Even further, legal technology cannot circumvent economic and social inequalities. Under some conditions, technology even has the potential to exacerbate disparities, for example, by creating a “two-tiered system” where low-income communities are “stuck with inferior AI-driven assistance.”Footnote 35 All things considered, technology holds both promise and peril for civil legal inequality. This makes overreliance on expanding access via supply-side technological innovation an insufficient response to the justice gap.
7.3 Supply-Side Limits: The Use of Nonlawyers
The use of nonlawyers is another supply-side approach to addressing unmet legal need. Historically, the legal profession in the United States has had relatively high barriers to entry and widespread modes of “self-regulation” that limit who can legally practice law and under what conditions.Footnote 36 Lawyers must graduate from an accredited law school, pass the bar exam (in most states), obtain a (state specific) license to practice law, and more.Footnote 37 These and other regulations are meant to ensure the integrity of legal practice. But they also limit the supply of lawyers and increase their cost. In the context of high demand, this system creates a challenging context for those seeking access to civil legal resources.Footnote 38
One solution is to increase the supply of practitioners who can address civil legal problems by allowing nonlawyers to practice law in some capacity.Footnote 39 For example, in 2014 New York City piloted several programs aimed at leveraging nonlawyer legal expertise to meet civil legal needs. One such program deployed legal navigators to assist self-represented litigants in housing court.Footnote 40 These navigators were permitted to perform a wide range of tasks, including substantive responsibilities like answering judges’ questions regarding the facts of the case.Footnote 41
Similar efforts have gone even further. In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court passed a rule paving the way for a new category of legal practitioner: Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs). Washington thus ushered in “the profession’s first paraprofessional licensing scheme that allows nonlawyers to provide legal advice without the supervision of a lawyer.”Footnote 42 These and other models for expanding the scope of who can provide legal services are encouraging but difficult to sustain. The Washington state program, for example, was sunset in 2023, with no new LLLT licenses being issued thereafter.Footnote 43 Though that program gained national recognition and the (fleeting) endorsement of the Washington State Bar Association, it floundered when the composition of bar’s board and the state court changed.Footnote 44 Even more broadly, unauthorized practice of law (UPL) regulations across the country prohibit nonlawyers in varied and substantial ways.Footnote 45
Though RTC, legal technologies, and nonlawyer assistance are innovative and important means of tackling civil legal inequality, an exclusive focus on supply-side solutions places a ceiling on the possibilities for transforming the justice landscape. A turn to the demand side – through an emphasis on political power – opens a different horizon of prospects.
7.4 Why Power Is Pivotal
Power is a complex notion that has been widely theorized in terms of its various faces, forms, and dimensions. For the purposes of this chapter, I define power broadly as the capacity to influence the conditions that shape one’s life and community.Footnote 46 Political power is specifically the capacity to wield influence through the state and other critical political actors (e.g., employers, landlords) as a means of changing the conditions that shape one’s life and community.Footnote 47 The people and communities with the most inadequate access to civil legal resources – those who are economically and racially marginalized, struggling to survive onslaughts of deprivation and predation in their daily lives – are the very people who often lack political power. Such a dearth of power enables the circumstances that create civil legal problems. So long as power imbalances facilitate material inequities (as is the norm), legal needs (demand) will likely outpace the ability to meet them (supply).
To make concrete the relationships between power and legal need, consider Quiana, a young mother interviewed as a part of a larger research project.Footnote 48 After a local code enforcement officer found lead paint in Quiana’s home, she tested her four children for lead exposure. Quiana then found out that three of her children had borderline high levels of lead, while her fourth and youngest child – a three-year-old boy – had severely high levels. Despite urging from public health officials, Quiana could not afford to relocate. She was unemployed and far down a long waiting list of people eligible to receive section 8 vouchers. Moreover, there was a dearth of affordable rental units in her city. The local department of health fined Quiana’s landlord and ordered him to abate the lead, but he did not. When Quiana sought a lawyer to help her address the lead issue, she could not find one. Her local legal services organization focused mostly on eviction cases. They did not have the capacity to take on lead cases.
With her fear and frustration over the situation growing, Quiana stopped paying rent. Her landlord then promptly initiated eviction proceedings. She returned to legal services and only then was able to get an attorney to represent her in housing court. As a result, she was able to temporarily fend off eviction.
Despite receiving civil legal assistance for (some of) her legal problems, Quiana remains in a precarious, unsafe housing situation with an unaccountable landlord looking for a reason to kick her out. Given these circumstances, it would be unsurprising if additional legal problems emerged in her life. Quiana’s most fundamental problems, however, are not legal. The primary reasons for her predicament are political-economic: inadequate regulation of predatory landlords, insufficient availability of affordable housing, and an underfunded and ill-equipped housing voucher program. All these issues are the result of political choices that reflect (among other things) the inability of Quiana and people in communities like hers to influence policy to their benefit.
Quiana recognized the problem of power at the core of her dilemma. Facing the double dangers of poisoning and displacement she confessed,
When it comes to the judges and even code enforcement, I feel like they should be doing more. Because I’m quite sure this is not the only house that’s going through situations. So, for [the landlord] to still be out here collecting his rent and half-ass doing his job, I feel like that’s where the higher ups should come in … but it doesn’t seem like they’re doing anything about it really, and what can we do? Like me, for example, I’m trying. I been trying to contact these people and that people, and it’s like, I’m not getting nowhere … tenants like me, we need a voice, because we’re not being heard.
Though Quiana lived in a city experiencing an enduringly severe crisis of lead poisoning within impoverished communities of color, she was not part of any concerted effort to pressure public officials to address the lead issue or to build safe, affordable housing. By her own account, Quiana lacked the power to change the circumstances that produced her legal problems. Though she did not live in a city with a “right to counsel” in eviction court, it’s unlikely that the outcome of her situation would have been different if she had (given that she did have representation in her eviction case). It’s similarly implausible to suppose that having access to current advanced legal technology or a nonlawyer legal practitioner would have fundamentally altered Quiana’s circumstances. And even if one of these supply-side interventions would have proved effective in Quiana’s case, they would do little to change the (similar) conditions faced by many of her neighbors.
On the other hand, when tenants like Quiana organize collectively to exercise power in the face of the inequities that structure their lives, possibilities for more fundamental change emerge.Footnote 49 When lawyers and legal institutions go beyond providing access to legal services and toward facilitating collective organizing, people like Quiana are enabled to build power that can alter the conditions that profoundly constrain their life chances.
7.5 How Power Can Mitigate Legal Need
To make the case for critically assessing supply-side legal interventions through the lens of power, we must clarify precisely why power is so vital for mitigating legal need. This chapter describes three ways that political organizing to build power can change the conditions that lead to legal problems:
(1) Organizing can help to avoid problems that could have generated legal needs.
(2) Organizing can address problems (through nonlegal means) that generate legal needs.
(3) Organizing can affect policy change to alter conditions underlying legal problems.
Below, I give examples from in-depth qualitative interviews with sixty-seven tenants who organized collectively, each of which illustrates how these mechanisms work to mitigate legal needs.
7.5.1 Preemptive Organizing to Avoid Problems that Generate Legal Needs
Some tenant organizations pursued preemptive strategies to help avoid practices that might lead to heightened legal needs. Take, for instance, collective bargaining with landlords: Using the threat of rent strikes or other direct action as leverage, tenant organizations engaged in collective bargaining bring property owners to the table to establish terms that ensure enduringly livable, healthy housing conditions. Tom, an organizer from a large tenant organization in Massachusetts, described the model as follows:
[W]e were really emphasizing this idea of collective bargaining. … You organize a tenant association, and you ask for negotiations with the landlord to secure a long-term contract that ha[s] limited rent increases and addresse[s] conditions. Just like a labor contract, you would try to sign a three-year contract that addresse[s] wages and working conditions. And we were successful in doing that. We were getting a lot of buildings under contract. … [A] number of landlords decided that it was in their interest financially to work with us, or negotiate with us, rather than trying to evict us, because we could mobilize some pretty serious resources to block evictions. So, we’ve got a lot of buildings under contract and that really was a qualitative step forward in terms of collective bargaining.
While Tom’s union was especially successful, it was not peculiar. Collective bargaining of this sort happens around the country and can act as a mechanism to proactively tackle the conditions that otherwise generate legal needs.
7.5.2 Responsive Organizing to Address Problems that Generate Legal Needs
When tenants operate as individuals, they do not have much leverage to hold landlords accountable. Alternatively, when they work collectively, they can use direct pressure tactics like protests and rent strikes to push landlords to meet the very material needs that transform into legal needs when unaddressed. Carlos, a member of a tenant union in Texas, detailed his organizations’ “tactics to pressure landlords or management companies to do the right thing”:
We helped organize tenants. … [T]hey’d already had one negotiation with this management company that didn’t go so well. … They had no water in the building. … They’ve been going without water for quite a while, and they finally got it turned back on after the protest and the rent strike. They finally got the water turned back on. [Now] there are still all kinds of other issues – mold in the apartments, other apartments have leaks … [The property management company] don’t seem concerned about it. So, that’s why rent strikes can continue at least for the foreseeable future … a good number [of tenants] are determined to [keep going].
Carlos and fellow members of his tenant union target specific actors to address harmful housing conditions that might otherwise lead to legal action. If only one or two tenants acted individually by withholding rent (as Quiana did when her landlord would not abate the lead), they could easily end up in housing court facing eviction, and they would likely need a lawyer to prevent displacement. But in the context of collective action, tenants create opportunities to negotiate. And the outcome of those negotiations can circumvent the processes that would have generated legal need.
7.5.3 Organizing to Affect Policy Change
A third way that organizing can mitigate legal need is via policy change. From good cause eviction to rent control to affordable housing – tenants around the country build power to address the structural conditions at the root of many legal problems. Successful policy campaigns can have far-reaching reverberations in the lives of tenants. Consider Joe and Jocelyn, who started a tenant union in a Midwestern city. Soon after launching the union, Joe and Jocelyn discovered the main policy priority of the tenants in their organization: expelling a notorious property management company with a large footprint in the city. As Joe elaborated:
They wanted them gone, and for good reason, there was a lot of illegal really, really brutal [stuff] going on. So that’s the campaign we launched, to get that contract canceled. … Nobody gave us any chance in hell of winning that campaign … we had [city] council people saying this will never happen … we were getting our asses kicked in this campaign. We were not winning. They hired maintenance staff to intimidate us. … I got regular death threats against my daughter. Throughout this campaign every leader that spoke out was retaliated against from breaking windshields to evictions. But we just kept base building. We just kept knocking on doors. We just kept building relationships and we had meetings with the housing authority director.
Having identified an important cause of the problems facing tenants in their city, Joe and Jocelyn’s union focused on weakening the “power structure” represented by people like the city housing director to achieve their policy goal of driving out a major property management company. To this end, they engaged in strategic institutional negotiation.Footnote 50 Though they identified the housing director as a primary roadblock, she was highly respected and behaved differently in closed-door conversations with tenant union members than she did publicly. So, their strategy was to push her “to treat our residents in public the way she treats them in private meetings.” Joe believed that “what grows in the dark dies in the light of exposure” and anticipated that making a public spectacle of the housing director would create productive political pressure. This is precisely what happened. Joe describes it this way:
We were able to get a committee hearing with [city] council and a resolution saying that the council supported cancelling this contract. We showed up really powerful that day. We filled up half the room. Our members told really powerful stories about the most egregious shit happening, and then [the housing director] literally got up there and did everything short of calling them liars. And [the city contract with the management company] was canceled four days later.
Jocelyn and Joe worked with hundreds of tenants in their city, most of whom were black women, to achieve a policy change that directly addressed the very housing conditions that often landed tenants in court. Indeed, they initially wanted a RTC campaign to be their first policy effort. But most members of the union preferred that they begin the union’s work with ousting the management company that had long plagued the city. Following the lead of the tenants by letting their needs determine the policy agenda of the union, Joe and Jocelyn developed a winning strategy and overcame the odds that seemed stacked against them at first. By building political power instead of legal capacity, they met the very needs that might have morphed into legal problems if left unaddressed. By doing so, they built their power further, creating a positive feedback cycle:
[T]hat was our first campaign, and we built a really solid base out of that … If you’re in [this city] and you lived in public housing in the last ten years, chances are you’ve experienced this management group. Chances are your family experienced abuse by them. So, we built a lot of credibility on that. It’s like, okay, this isn’t just another nonprofit. … These folks can actually deliver material demands, can actually make promises to working class people and deliver on them.
Joe, Jocelyn, and the tenants they organized took direct political action to drive policy change in their city. Their efforts centered on changes that would be meaningful in the lives of race-class marginalized tenants, altering the processes that create legal needs in the first place.
7.6 Demand-Side Legal Interventions
Given the limits of the supply-side provision of legal services and the promise of building power through political organizing, it is tempting to underestimate the continued importance of civil legal infrastructure and resources. However, eschewing legal interventions in the current political economy risks doing great harm because many people would suffer more acute deprivation in the absence of legal protections. Further still, spurning legal tactics misses a potentially imperative opportunity to use the law as a means of forging countervailing power.Footnote 51 In this view, a strategic and complementary mix of supply and demand approaches is optimal.
What do demand-side legal interventions look like? All the attention given to supply has obscured the prospects for moving beyond accessing justice and toward wielding power.Footnote 52 Though an exhaustive accounting of those prospects is beyond the scope of this chapter, the remaining sections surface two examples that point in the direction of this fundamentally important shift: (1) using supply-side policies like RTC and use of nonlawyers as a path to power and (2) leveraging legal protections to support political organizing.
7.6.1 From Supply to Demand: RTC as a Springboard
Supply-side policies can complement and enhance efforts to build power in the marginalized communities that face the most debilitating legal problems. In some ways, this can happen inadvertently through policy feedback processes. For example, my coauthor Mallory SoRelle and I have found that people with civil legal problems who have legal representation have higher levels of political efficacy and are more likely to participate in politics.Footnote 53 In this way, policies that expand access to civil legal representation can “feedback” into the political system and boost the participation of people within racially and economically marginalized communities.Footnote 54
There are also strategic and intentional ways of translating supply-side policies into demand-side gains. One example is Intro 1529 – a recently enacted law in NYC known as “The Power to Organize” bill. Intro 1529 amends the administrative code of the city of New York to require the Office of the Civil Justice (OCJ) coordinator to collaborate with community groups in engaging tenants around their civil legal rights and creating community infrastructure to enable tenants to protect those rights.Footnote 55 Such infrastructure can include holding tenant workshops and trainings, supporting the formation of tenant associations, and referring tenants to community organizations.
Like Intro 2014-B, Intro 1529 was developed and advanced by community organizers in collaboration with city council members and lawyers.Footnote 56 Media reports referred to the bill as promoting “tenants’ right to organize.”Footnote 57 In local meetings, tenant organizers explicitly talked about the limits of RTC/Intro 214-B and the necessity to both reinforce RTC through organizing efforts and use RTC as a springboard for funding organizing to build more power.Footnote 58 In this way, Intro 214-B together with Intro 1529 offer a model for addressing both the supply and the demand side of civil justice by pushing for both access to legal resources and increased organizing power. The complementary logic of these bills exemplifies how providing people with civil legal representation can be an entry point into cultivating political power.
7.6.2 Abating Demand: Using Law to Sustain Organizing
Leveraging civil law as a tool to buttress community organizing against the actors that provoke demand for legal services is also an important and direct means of abating such demand.Footnote 59 For example, landlords that rent unsafe properties or perpetrate unethical practices are one driver of legal need.Footnote 60 As discussed in the previous section, providing legal support for organized groups of tenants that fight against such landlords – as opposed to only providing legal representation to each individual tenant – is an example of a demand-side, power-centered approach. This is not a new idea. Community lawyering and movement lawyering are longstanding and continued forms of resistance to structural inequalities.Footnote 61 Nevertheless, there is a disconnect between legal practitioners who prioritize increasing access to justice and those who seek to build power within the communities that are most bereft of such justice. John Whitlow, director of CUNY School of Law Community and Economic Development Clinic, incisively articulates the contours of this disconnect:
[R]ight to counsel should be viewed as a limited intervention that operates when eviction is imminent, i.e. after the structural sources of displacement have done their work. Failure to recognize the limits of the RTC – and of access to justice paradigms more generally – naturalizes those structural sources and legitimates as normal the widening inequalities produced by our current political-economic and social order. Challenging inequality and displacement in a deep and lasting way requires moving beyond access to justice.Footnote 62
One means of “challenging inequality and displacement in a deep and lasting way” is by offering legal support to tenant organizations as they marshal such challenges. For instance, consider the circumstances of tenants in Crest Hill Apartments, a privately owned recently renovated eighty-unit building.Footnote 63 Because Crest Hill has rent-stabilized apartments, it is one of the only affordable options for low-income tenants in the Northeastern community where the building is located. For this reason, many Crest Hill tenants welcomed the opportunity to rent in an affordably priced recently renovated building.
However, when a small child in the complex fell ill and a local pediatrician identified lead poisoning as the underlying problem, Crest Hill tenants discovered that they were living in conditions that were perilous for their health. Per state law, the lead poisoning diagnosis triggered automatic reporting to the local Department of Health, which then involved the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA was legally mandated to test every unit in the building where children younger than six years old lived. Testing revealed that some units had nearly 50,000 micrograms of lead dust per square foot, relative to the EPA limit of 10 micrograms.
Tenants were infuriated. Many of the children in the building had been experiencing respiratory and other health issues. Melissa, a young mother in the building with some experience in political organizing, learned about the threat of lead toxicity and jumped right into action:
[I]t was such an egregious revelation that … I was like, we have to have a meeting – a tenants meeting. There’s just no option. We have to deal with this. And if we do it individually, there’s just too many units for it to get mishandled by management … it was obvious … I literally have to do this. So I put up fliers around the building.
Melissa spread the word and Crest Hill tenants quickly had an initial meeting. Soon, the tenants in the building formed a tenant union to collectively confront the lead hazard that was sickening their families:
So that first meeting, we had thirty people or so. It was a really good first meeting. And we just talked about the lead issue and how we were going to address it. And it was mostly giving people information on how to schedule their inspections, things like that … [T]he second meeting I broached the subject of a tenant union … it’s so egregious that … we just have to proceed as quickly as possible … to move swiftly in order to protect kids in this building, let alone everyone else. And so, we got a majority support verbally at that meeting. And then me and a handful of other people brought the union petition around the buildings.
Within a month, three-quarters of the units in the building signed the petition. But the building owner was completely indifferent to tenant demands. Crest Hill was one of many buildings they owned, and paltry state fines did not outweigh the significant cost of lead abatement.
Crest Hill tenants pursued multiple strategies for holding the owner accountable. One strategy involved seeking legal help:
[I]t came to light that not only is there a chronic, a systematic lead issue. There’s also severe water damage and leaking … [and] fuzzy mold growth … our spore counts in here are very high … [so] it escalated pretty quickly in terms of our actions … [we] had to hire a civil attorney. With children involved, obviously, affecting their health … [I]t’s for our own protection … [So]there’s a housing court case. The first family filed with the housing court in January. Five more families, including us, joined for February. So now, we’re paying rent into an escrow account. Ten more people are joining the rent strike for March.
Though the housing court case was a means of redress in its own right, it was also a mechanism to support organizing. The most obvious leverage that Crest Hill tenants had against their delinquent owner was the money they paid for rent. But tenants feared that withholding rent would risk eviction. Even though the building was hazardous, it was the only option for many tenants, especially short of any settlement or support to facilitate their move. So, if Crest Hill tenants wanted to organize a rent strike against the building owner, they needed protection from eviction while doing so. The civil proceeding afforded such protection by allowing tenants to pay their rent into an escrow that could be withheld from the landlord while the case was pending. This cleared the way for tenants to pursue more risky strategies, including direct action (protests, rallies, press conferences) in combination with a coordinated rent strike. In the absence of assurances from a civil attorney, many tenants would not have participated in these activities.
Crest Hill tenants navigated the boundaries between legal strategies and building grassroots power with a keen understanding of the relationship between the two, which Melissa articulated this way:
[I]t can be really important to separate out the legal from the power building because Americans especially will go straight to the legal system as their only avenue. So, initially, everyone was going straight to that: “We got to hire the lawyer and sue [the owner]…” But even at the first meeting, I was saying, “if we are only going through the legal system, we will quickly become extremely frustrated and stop any kind of actual struggle against ownership and management because there are so many gaps.”
And a good lesson for the tenants was the Department of Health finished their legal mandate to only inspect units with kids under six, and tenants were like, “how can that be possible? How can they not be in charge of inspecting the rest of the units?” People were saying, “that can’t be what the law is because that’s not sufficient.” And it’s like, I hear you that it’s not how it should be, but that is the reality … the law is not made for tenants. It is not directed at tenants. It is to protect landlords and property ownership, to encourage property ownership. And what you’re hearing is true, but we can’t just get frustrated. We have to just take that information, find out what the gap is between where regulation stops and where we want it to be, and that gap is where we have to organize until we get the living conditions that we want to get.
At the core of these observations is an acknowledgment of the distinct but symbiotic relationship between legal and organizing approaches. The explicit use of lawyers in support of community organizing efforts goes beyond the case-based approach implicit in many access-to-justice efforts, and toward collective action that can help larger groups of people face more fundamental problems. In this view, policies seeking to advance access to justice through supply-side approaches like RTC, legal technology, and the use of nonlawyers are necessary, but not sufficient. It is pivotal to complement such policies with demand-side statutes that protect people from retaliation for organizing, strengthen collective bargaining rights, provide funding for lawyers to support community organizations, and more.
A puzzle hangs over legal tech: Why isn’t there more of it, particularly the sort that helps ordinary people?
Conditions have long seemed ripe for a legal tech renaissance. While there remains debate about where to assign blame for the justice gap, its magnitude is undeniable. A parade of “legal needs” surveys in recent decades shows that a hundred million or more Americans experience one or more civil justice problems each year yet receive no help in resolving them.Footnote 1 Take this decades-long crisis of immense, unmet civil legal need and add in rapid advances in technology, especially artificial intelligence (AI), and one would expect a robust “direct-to-consumer” (DTC) legal tech sector that provides affordable, tech-enabled solutions to fill the justice gap.
And yet, investment in DTC legal tech – just one measure of an industry’s health and potential – has languished compared to lawyer-driven software applications, such as Harvey or Casetext. Beyond LegalZoom and RocketLawyer, DTC legal tech is a footnote in a market dominated by law firms and corporate buyers.Footnote 2 And investment in DTC legal tech is a pittance compared to “fintech.” Think here of Robinhood, a commission-free stock trading tool that has received a hefty $6 billion in funding,Footnote 3 more than ten times even LegalZoom.Footnote 4 Becky Sandefur, the dean of access-to-justice scholars,Footnote 5 concluded in a 2019 report that legal tech tools serving “non-lawyers” are “restricted and limited” in functionality and “only partly match the types of justice problems most commonly reported by Americans.”Footnote 6 A more recent report from Duke University reached the same conclusion: “justice tech”Footnote 7 has struggled to overcome “system barriers.”Footnote 8 As one “justice tech” founder recounted, “I had a big dream and I knew it would be hard, but I had no idea.”Footnote 9
So why hasn’t a robust DTC legal tech market emerged? At least three explanations have so far dominated the debate. The first (and most common) blames restrictive rules that say that only lawyers can practice law (i.e., prohibitions on “unauthorized practice of law,” or UPL) or own law firms (i.e., Rule 5.4’s bar on fee-sharing).Footnote 10 The former limits functionality, consigning DTC legal tech tools to form-filling and “document assembly,” thus providing only limited help to those in need. The latter bar DTC providers that are not fully lawyer-owned – like LegalZoom – from employing lawyers to supplement their tech-based services. A second prominent theory is insufficiently potent technology: Automated tools, even sophisticated AI-based ones, cannot perform the all-important translational work – cutting through legalese and explaining options and outcomes in plain language – that is necessary when serving unsophisticated lay clients.Footnote 11 While not a problem for legal tech directed at lawyers, it’s a major hurdle for tools that aim to serve people who need actionable advice in clear, understandable, and bite-sized forms. A third explanation focuses on courts’ technology systems: Looking across some 14,000 court jurisdictions in the United States, one sees a checkerboard of technology and data infrastructures. The resulting technological Babel makes impossible the scale necessary to induce tech providers to invest time and capital in developing and then maintaining robust, user-friendly systems that serve customers with very limited ability to pay.
This chapter argues that undergirding each of these explanations is a deeper and potentially intractable problem. Though barriers such as restrictive rules, weak tech, or the court technology checkerboard are commonly invoked, they fail to account for the limited scale and longevity of most DTC legal tech. The better explanation for anemic legal tech – or at least a core component of a complete one – is the uniquely challenging market economics of providing low- and medium-income Americans with legal services. Facing already narrow margins, DTC legal tech is locked in an unwinnable race to attract and retain customers who only need their services once – and, worse, may not realize they need them at all. Lowering other barriers – say, by lifting the lawyer’s monopoly, or leveraging newly potent forms of generative AI – might give DTC legal tech room to breathe, but doing so cannot alone solve the underlying problem: To build sustainable models, DTC legal tech needs passive income streams and enterprise-level customers.
That conclusion, withering as it is, is crucial to thinking about the future of legal services and access to justice. For instance, it is possible that “regulatory reform” advocates have it wrong, at least as to technology-based legal services. If liberalized legal services rules are unlikely to yield a flowering of DTC legal tech anytime soon, then perhaps the access-to-justice movement should be investing its limited capital, both political and real, in efforts to build out human-centered models of legal services delivery, such as the community justice worker movement.Footnote 12 By extension, perhaps legal tech entrepreneurs should focus on devising tools that extend the reach of the human providers, beleaguered and overwhelmed, that already dot the civil justice landscape. Even more bracing, perhaps legal tech developers should be creating tools that serve courts, not self-represented litigants.
As we note below, courts in the coming years will face a “make or buy” choice. “Make” means court-connected, court-hosted systems, including court portals, remote hearings, online dispute resolution (ODR), digital self-help, or e-filing, whereas “buy” means courts structuring themselves, particularly their technology and data systems, to be more accessible to intermediaries, especially DTC legal tech providers, who serve self-represented litigants. Make and buy require very different infrastructures, and it’s not at all obvious that courts, perennially underfunded, have the money to do even one, let alone both. But if DTC legal tech is doomed, and budget-constrained courts must choose, then “make” – taxpayer-financed, “public option” legal tech – may be the wiser investment.
We develop these ideas using a mix of theory and evidence. The first section below reviews the “usual suspects” – three common explanations for anemic DTC legal tech. The next section sets forth our market- and business-centered theory, thus building a fuller account of the challenges facing DTC legal tech. A third section reports our research, including interviews, with six DTC legal tech providers, chosen to reflect a cross-section of the current market landscape, and then maps them to the full set of “barrier” theories. A final section considers the implications of a DTC legal tech sector that may never get fully off the ground.
A few orienting notes on scope: First, our inquiry focuses on DTC legal tech providers: client-facing providers that use technology to deliver legal services. We thus bracket legal tech tools that instead automate law practice via a “technology assist”Footnote 13 to lawyers and legal workers.Footnote 14 Moreover, we focus on legal tech providers that offer actual legal services, defined broadly as “help with a justiciable issue.”Footnote 15 As such, we exclude story-telling tools, reminder tools, and digital signature tools which, while client-facing, do not provide a legal service; we also exclude “legal marketplaces,” which merely connect consumers to an (often traditional) legal services provider.Footnote 16 Finally, we include DTC legal tech providers whose end users are individuals and/or small businesses, but not lawyers or large corporations. In so doing, we employ a broader definition of “consumer” than previous studies.Footnote 17 By defining consumers to include small businesses in addition to individuals, we focus on tools within the so-called PeopleLaw segment of the legal services industry, as distinct from corporate-facing BigLaw or legal aid.Footnote 18 In serving ordinary individuals and not organizational clients, PeopleLaw sits at the cusp of the justice gap: individuals and businesses who do not qualify for legal aid but who also cannot afford traditional legal services.
8.1 The Usual Suspects: “Barrier” Theories
Three explanations have dominated the debate about anemic “justice tech.” Each, however, raises hard questions about where the real problem lies. This section reviews each explanation to set the stage for our own market- and business-focused account of why DTC legal tech has languished.
8.1.1 Restrictive Rules and Regulatory Reform
The most common explanation for anemic legal tech is regulatory constraints on law practice. In the US context, two types of restrictions are most salient. The first is the prohibition on UPL. The second is Rule 5.4’s bar on fee-sharing, which limits investment in law firms to lawyers and prevents investors who are not lawyers and organizations that are not law firms to own, invest in, and profit from the sale of legal services. Notably, numerous states have relaxed, or are considering relaxing, these regulations.Footnote 19 But as it stands, these rules continue to constrain the services that legal tech providers can offer.Footnote 20
However, whether liberalizing reforms can unleash new entity- and technology-based modes of legal services delivery remains unproven. In the United Kingdom, where UPL was already more relaxed, loosening fee-sharing rules to permit nonlawyer investment in legal services providers has had an underwhelming impact on innovation. While the majority of such providers in the United Kingdom serve individual consumers or small businesses,Footnote 21 a comparative study of nonlawyer ownership in Canada, Australia, England, and Wales concluded that outside investment’s impacts on access to justice remain limited outside of certain practice areas, such as personal injury.Footnote 22 Moreover, it’s unclear whether the benefits of these economies of scale are consistently passed on to consumers. While greater nonlawyer investment generally has promoted technological innovation and the development of new legal services,Footnote 23 evidence is mixed on whether reforms have moved the needle on price.Footnote 24
8.1.2 Weak AI
A second common explanation for anemic DTC legal tech is that AI is simply not potent enough to productize PeopleLaw. One theory is that, unlike legal tech for BigLaw, legal tech for PeopleLaw must interface directly with individuals and small business owners who require lay translation of legal concepts,Footnote 25 something natural language processing (NLP) technology, powerful as it is, has struggled to do.Footnote 26
The “weak AI” explanation for languishing legal tech is an important one, but it is hardly decisive. After an “AI winter” of relative stasis, AI is once more undergoing staggering leaps in potency with the arrival of powerful “large language models,” or LLMs – a branch of “generative AI” that is capable of producing clear, plain language text. Champions see a two-fold promise. First, new AI systems are plainly better than earlier generations of NLP at translating plain language into legalese and vice versa.Footnote 27 As already noted, lay-to-legal translation is essential if you want to build usable tools. Second, increased translational capacities might mean that new generative AI systems can take lay narratives – an individual’s plain language explanation of a problem – and then map them to legal ontologies, pathways, and even likely outcomes.Footnote 28 For the first time, AI might be potent enough to plausibly offer actionable advice to self-represented litigants on options and outcomes.
Current prognostications, however, may miss some important points. For starters, generative AI may not move the needle as much as some think. Much of existing DTC legal tech does not rely on cutting-edge technologies: Document assembly, for instance, is relatively low-tech, using simple automation engines to help self-represented litigants answer complaints and avoid default judgments.Footnote 29 The value-add of sophisticated generative AI systems may not be as robust as some assume.
Moreover, to be both reliable and cost-effective, AI must adapt to an ever-shifting constellation of substantive and procedural rules across jurisdictions. Direct-to-consumer legal tech providers have to this point relied solely on human lawyers to manually update their tools as laws change or new rules and regulations are issued. Here, too, questions remain about how soon, or even whether, newly potent forms of AI can handle subtly and ever-changing laws and regulations without human intervention.
Time will tell whether continuing AI advances can make meaningful progress on these problems. But, for the moment, weak AI does not offer anything approaching a fully satisfactory theory for the current state of DTC legal tech. For some applications, current tech capabilities seem more than ample. For others, continued AI advances may hold the key.
8.1.3 The Court Technology Checkerboard
A third common explanation for anemic DTC legal tech extends from American federalism. In a nutshell, most PeopleLaw clients have a limited ability to pay. So for providers, scale is king. However, in addition to the variations in substantive and procedural law just noted, a checkerboard of technology systems, particularly e-filing systems, and data infrastructures across thousands of local court jurisdictions make scaling services nearly impossible.
More specifically, DTC legal tech is limited by two types of jurisdictional complexity.Footnote 30 First, patchwork systems create jurisdictional differences in what forms litigants need to e-file, what requirements they need to meet, and what system – both front-end and back-end – litigants e-file through. Filing requirements are a key pain point that increases the complexity of delivering clients filing-ready documents; DTC legal tech often requires full-time lawyers to manually track and update requirements across the jurisdictions they serve.Footnote 31 Second, even if technologists find a way to track and code around jurisdictional differences, self-represented litigants cannot e-file at all in many statesFootnote 32 and, even where they can, they can only do so in limited case types. Filing fees – and e-filing can often introduce additional fees – pose an additional burden; there are no consistent digital payment systems, so some jurisdictions require litigants to pay in person.Footnote 33
As with the other commonly invoked barriers to robust DTC legal tech, the state and local checkerboard of technology systems and data infrastructures might improve, and efforts are underway to develop common, jurisdiction-spanning data standards.Footnote 34 Unless automated approaches can replace brute-force monitoring and updating, the checkerboard problem – complex, incongruous, and confusing requirements that vary state to state and even courthouse to courthouse – will remain a threat to low-cost delivery models. At the same time, the technology checkerboard plainly has less to say about federal-level innovation, not to mention large states with relatively unified court systems. As with the other explanations, the checkerboard is, at best, a partial explanation for anemic legal tech.
* * *
In short, even if rules were liberalized, AI continued to vault ahead, and the checkerboard made more uniform, DTC legal tech still faces substantial barriers. The next section begins to sketch them.
8.2 A New Take: Market Barriers to Robust DTC Legal Tech
What else might explain anemic legal tech? This section develops an alternative, market-based theory focused on legal tech providers as businesses – and, very often, startups – and the shape of the markets they seek to serve. To flesh out its particulars, it draws on theory and industry analogues to propose a three-step, market-based explanation: Legal tech lacks a sustainable customer base because (i) limited customer demand and (ii) high customer-acquisition costs produce (iii) an acute “lifetime value trap.” The rest of this section elaborates on each of these challenges.
PeopleLaw – the market that DTC legal tech is best positioned to serve – has been flooded with lawyers for decades,Footnote 35 yet it remains notorious for its lack of profitability.Footnote 36 The vast majority of PeopleLaw is bespoke and labor-intensive, and there isn’t much room to lower prices when the average solo practitioner already earns less than $60,000 (and may be facing significant law school debt).Footnote 37 And while legal tech has often served those priced out of traditional PeopleLaw, that market likely cannot sustain the scale necessary for a tech startup to grow, particularly where legal tech providers typically face stiff competition to attract individual customers.Footnote 38
With the ever-increasing cost of digital marketing, including the rising ticket price of search engine optimization (SEO), legal tech must dramatically increase the dollar value of each client to break even, let alone turn a profit. While this problem may be addressed by building a steady base of loyal, returning customers, demand in PeopleLaw is hardly consistent: Customers are less likely to need another divorce than they are a replacement pair of their favorite brand-named sneakers. To solve this problem, other consumer services segments – health tech and platform tech – have redefined the customer: Instead of individual users, they serve enterprises that come with big-ticket contracts and reliable revenue. But there is no clear enterprise customer, at least not yet, for legal tech to tap into.
8.2.1 Limited Customer Demand
In general, legal markets are hindered by informational asymmetries that artificially curb demand: People do not understand their true legal needs, and do not seek appropriate representation. One way to combat low demand is to target services to specific markets: Think here of personal injury lawyers’ billboards, which make the nature of their services crystal clear. But when providers tailor their offerings to a legal services niche particularized enough to passively attract customers – such as sole business proprietors or divorcees – that niche often has too few clients to justify the expense of serving it.
8.2.2 High Customer-Acquisition Costs
Even if a legal tech provider can crack the demand problem and generate interest in their services within their target demographic, founders note that “it still [takes] a lot of work to convert that interest into a paying customer.”Footnote 39 This is because customer-acquisition costs (CAC) are incredibly high. Traditional, low-tech methods don’t seem to work in the legal tech space: Finding consumers by word of mouth can be “challenging” and take “more time than they originally planned.”Footnote 40 In general, overcrowding in DTC markets has driven up the price of digital advertising,Footnote 41 eliminated any arbitrage, and made the customer-acquisition math much more challenging.Footnote 42 For legal tech, even in markets where users understand their specific legal need, intense competition between providers can render legal services financially inaccessible. Take immigration, for example: Provider overcrowding has made SEO on immigration-related terms so expensive that many for-profit providers charge fees in the thousands to recoup advertising costs.Footnote 43
8.2.3 The Lifetime Value Trap
A DTC brand’s success hinges on how much headroom there is between customer lifetime value (LTV) and CAC.Footnote 44 Now that CAC has skyrocketed, it is “widely accepted” that firms should direct more effort into retaining existing customers than attracting new ones.Footnote 45 Yet there are only two ways to boost LTV: repeat customers, or customer cross-sell. DTC legal tech is set up for failure on both.
Where consumer demand is steady – for example, in consumer goods – the key to repeat customers is loyalty: getting your customer to stick with you over your competitors. Customer-centric, interaction-based marketing models are the current gold standard for increasing customer loyalty and, thus, LTV.Footnote 46 Consistent touchpoints allow companies to gather nuanced customer data that can predict and even generate demand. Allbirds, a DTC shoe brand, can use the data of existing customers to estimate how often a particular customer will need to replace their shoes, and to build customer profiles that allow it to maximize each dollar spent on CAC. The same relatively straightforward calculation is possible for razors, laundry detergent, and all manner of consumer goods that are used up and regularly repurchased. And in consumer goods, cross-sell opportunities are often obvious: A company can easily expand into selling shaving cream alongside razors.
A common strategy among DTC companies is to build customer loyalty by expanding beyond their initial product offerings to create a complementary ecosystem of products and services. Peloton, for instance, initially offered big-ticket exercise bikes but quickly expanded to offer digital exercise class subscriptions, exercise apparel, and wellness programming.Footnote 47 It thus transformed from a bike retailer to a holistic exercise company with the ability to collect and use customer data to drive growth.
Direct-to-consumer companies that provide services, not goods, also leverage consumer data to drive LTV.Footnote 48 By interfacing directly with consumers, DTC brands can generate huge troves of data about usage preferences. TurboTax, for example, sells customer data to generate advertisementsFootnote 49 and targets users with “offers”Footnote 50 – that is, upsells them.Footnote 51 And perhaps most important of all, the relentlessness of annual taxes means that TurboTax enjoys repeat customers – and, even better, customers with increasingly complex needs over a lifetime – with little investment required on their part.
Where building loyalty among individual customers is impracticable, DTC service providers often turn to enterprise-level customers: companies, not individuals, who purchase big-ticket and renewable contracts. Subscriptions sold to enterprises, not individuals, are also generally more profitable: While Amazon’s marketplace generates more revenue, its cloud solutions – sold only to enterprises – account for the lion’s share of Amazon’s profits.Footnote 52 Similarly, many health tech players have made insurers and employers their core customers.Footnote 53 More complex healthcare services use a B2B subscription model: Livongo, a diabetes management platform, is free to the individual user but paid for by employers, health plans, or health providers.Footnote 54
Most importantly, enterprise-level contracts serve as vital cash infusions that give startups with limited equity – like most legal tech – the capital they need to scale and grow.Footnote 55 Biotechnology startups often get early “revenues” from contracts with large pharmaceutical companies, providing both cash flow and visibility into on-hand capital for longer-term investments.Footnote 56 This ability to forecast is particularly important in maturing startups looking to scale.Footnote 57 Major cash infusions are especially vital for legal services startups that, because of Rule 5.4, cannot raise outside investment using asset-backed guarantees and do not have outside equity to pad their cash flows.
Structural forces prevent legal tech from implementing each of these traditional strategies. First and foremost, legal tech cannot rely on predictable demand to increase LTV. Unlike shoes, people do not always need legal services. And the more specialized the legal service is, the rarer the potential repeat customers or cross-sell opportunities become. This creates a tension between increasing specialization of legal tech – the very unbundling of legal services that some view as a necessary precursor to lower-cost legal servicesFootnote 58 – and a DTC legal tech provider’s ability to generate sustainable LTV.
Second, traditional enterprise customers do not exist for legal services, likely due in part to the lack of legal insurance. In the United States, there is little legal insurance outside of medical malpractice for doctors.Footnote 59 Employers, reliable enterprise customers, are unlikely to offer legal insurance on a large scale: Unlike healthcare, where both employer and employee have a vested interest in the employee’s health, employees often have legal needs that are actually adverse to their employers – for instance, issues around benefits or even claims against the employer itself.
Third, enterprises unique to legal services are poorly positioned to support and scale DTC legal tech. BigLaw seems the obvious choice: Because firms can invest in DTC legal tech without running afoul of UPL or Rule 5.4, they can give small startups the credibility needed to win customer trust. But the economics of BigLaw are not designed to withstand the major up-front investment required to stand up a legal tech startup. A new DTC legal tech provider must spend at least six months to a year fine-tuning SEO to hit the right searches and convert leads to revenueFootnote 60 – an expensive process even without the years required to create the document assembly tool in the first place.Footnote 61 Cash-strapped courts could, in theory, be a promising enterprise customer for established providers, supplying them with a steady stream of litigant-clients, but they face high hurdles in supporting startups.
Finally, the nature of legal services creates barriers to legal tech companies building holistic product suites for which customers have ongoing needs. For instance, Hello Divorce – a DTC legal tech company described in more detail below – followed the “Peleton-model” and introduced nonlegal services that extend the lifetime of its divorce clients. But the introduction of those services required careful, resource-intensive navigation around strict UPL and Rule 5.4 prohibitions. Even then, the lack of perpetual demand for legal services creates issues. While Peloton customers will likely only buy one bike – just as Hello Divorce customers will likely only get one divorce – exercise and wellness are ongoing needs; divorce counseling is not. Direct-to-consumer legal tech must not only stave off competition; it must also contend with a more existential question: If I solve my client’s legal problem, will they ever need me again?
8.3 The Barriers in Operation: Case Studies in Legal Tech
This section puts data on what, to this point, has been mostly open-ended theorizing about the workings of the legal tech marketplace. We do so by running the various theories – both the “usual suspects” and our new, market-based way of thinking – through a select set of legal tech providers, as summarized in Table 8.1.Footnote 62 These legal tech offerings represent a rough cross-section of the nascent DTC industry in terms of each entity’s services type (from online software wizards that generate ready-to-file legal documents to legal advice from humans), the subject-matter area of those services, the entity’s organizational structure, its fee structure (including its for-profit or nonprofit status and its sources of revenue), and its geographic scope. Taken together, these companies offer an ideal workbench to explore how the different possible explanations for the industry’s anemic status operate and intersect across different segments of the market. They also make plain our central thesis, as summarized in Figure 8.1. While conventional explanations for anemic DTC legal tech – restrictive lawyer rules, weak AI, and the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction technology checkerboard – might explain languishing legal tech as to some subset of DTC providers, only our market-based theory can fully explain lagging legal tech across the board.

Table 8.1Long description
The table summarizes the work of 6 case study subjects in column 1, followed by the scope, structure, 3 legal services namely, document assembly, legal advice, and attorney-client matching, and 4 fee structures namely, one-time customer transaction, ongoing customer subscription, attorney referral fees, and grants or individual donations, from left to right in order.
The work summary for the 6 case study subjects are as follows.
Hello Divorce. Generates and files divorce documents for clients and connects clients with lawyers at its sister firm, Levine Law.
Atticus. A legal marketplace that performs client intake and connects users with vetted outside lawyers, focused on social security and disability.
Tenant Power Toolkit. Generates and files documents for tenants facing eviction in California with a focus on the L A courts.
Legal Zoom offers document production, filing, and legal advice for small business owners and solo proprietors.
Upsolve generates but does not file Chapter 7 bankruptcy documents.
SixFifty is a SaaS company that offers employers platform-level employment and privacy solutions with one-off document assembly available on their website.
The data for the 3 legal services and 4 fee structures are represented in tick marks signifying that a particular column is checked for a legal tech provider. The following are the data for the scope, structure, the 3 legal services, and the 4 fee structures in order, from left to right for the 6 legal tech providers.
Hello Divorce, multi state, dual entity, all columns checked except for one-time customer transaction fees and grand or individual donation.
Atticus, national, dual entity, only attorney-client matching and attorney referral fees are checked.
Tenant Power Toolkit, C A, stand-alone, only document-assembly and grant or individual donation are checked.
Legal Zoom, national, stand-alone, all except attorney-client matching and grand or individual donations are checked.
Upsolve, national, stand-alone, only documents assembly, attorney referral fees, and grants or individual donation are checked.
SixFifty, national, wholly owned subsidiary of Wilson Sonsini, all except attorney referral fees and grant or individual donation are checked.

Figure 8.1 Impact: degree to which a barrier restricts scale.
Figure 8.1Long description
The table compares the degree to which 4 different barriers namely,Restrictive Rules, Weak A I, The Checkerboard Problem, and the Lifetime Value Trap, impact 6 legal tech companies’ ability to scale. There are 3 impact degrees. A black circle indicates that the barrier has a significant and negative effect on the provider such that lifting the barrier would enable the provider to scale, grow, or otherwise offer better services to their clients; a gray circle indicates that the barrier limits scalability or profitability in minor ways; a white circle indicates that the barrier has no or minimal impact.
For Hello Divorce, restrictive Rules, The Checkerboard Problem, and the Lifetime Value Trap, are black circles, and Weak A I is a white circle.
For Atticus, Weak A I and the Checkerboard Problem are white circles; Restrictive Rules is a grey circle, and the lifetime value trap is a black circle
For the Tenant Power Toolkit, Restrictive Rules is a white circle, weak A I and the Lifetime Value Trap are grey circles, and the checkerboard problem is a black circle.
For Legal Zoom, restrictive rules and the lifetime value trap are black circles, Weak A I is a white circle, the checkerboard problem is a grey circle.
For Upsolve, Weak A I, the Checkerboard Problem, and the Lifetime Trap are grey circles, and restrictive rules is a white circle.
For SixFifty, the Lifetime Value Trap is a black circle, and Restrictive Rules, Weak A I, and the Checkerboard Problem are white circles.
8.3.1 Restrictive Rules: Why Hello Divorce Struggles When Atticus Does Not
Restrictive rules have shaped what services American legal tech can offer and how their businesses are structured. But just how much explanatory power do they carry, and how, exactly, do rule restrictions limit available business models when trained on particular providers?
Key to answering those questions is to see the combined effects of UPL and Rule 5.4, not one or the other operating alone. For instance, LegalZoom’s core business focuses on document assembly, which is not affected by UPL rules or changes to them. Rule 5.4’s constraint on nonlawyer ownership, however, adds a further layer of complexity by limiting provision of legal advice even by full-fledged lawyers. In the United States, LegalZoom’s nonlawyer ownership means it cannot hire attorneys to provide direct legal advice to its customers – a major disadvantage when competing against traditional law firms. But in the UK and Arizona, which permit nonlawyer ownership in some circumstances, LegalZoom employs licensed attorneys to provide permitted legal services. And it makes a mint in doing so – those legal services are a major profit driver, increasing transaction volume and allowing LegalZoom to charge a premium over its tech-only services.Footnote 63
But workarounds of Rule 5.4 in the United States are few. New ventures must either forego outside funding or adopt convoluted dual-entity structures to allow the tech side to receive funding while the law firm itself does not. Hello Divorce, for instance, operates both Hello Divorce, a technology company, and the Levine Family Law Group, a full-service law firm, as separate entities through a complicated “dual-entity” model in order to skirt both UPL and Rule 5.4 restrictions. And doing so is costly.
To see why, consider first that Hello Divorce provides digital DIY divorce products across document assembly, e-filing, credit repair, and other financial services.Footnote 64 Its online platform also offers access to expert help from in-house mediators and lawyers at Levine Law.Footnote 65 Users pay a monthly subscription fee of $99 to access the DIY web-based tool and additional fees for financial coaching or legal services.Footnote 66 The Levine Family Law Group, a long-standing family law practice, provides those legal services,Footnote 67 which are used by approximately 50 percent of Hello Divorce’s clients.Footnote 68 Those clients sign a fee agreement with Levine Law, not Hello Divorce.Footnote 69 But in order to provide legal services through the Hello Divorce app – which hosts all scheduling, correspondence, and documents – Levine Law pays Hello Divorce a monthly administrative fee of $4,750.Footnote 70
These crisscrossing contracts are a direct product of restrictive regulation. Lest it violate UPL, Hello Divorce the tech company cannot hire lawyers to provide legal services; its technology cannot provide legal services, nor can its paralegals offer legal advice.Footnote 71 But under Rule 5.4, Levine Law cannot split legal fees with Hello Divorce. And since Rule 5.4 bans nonlawyer investment, Hello Divorce cannot collect legal fees directly from customers or own an in-house law firm. Nor can Levine Law support Hello Divorce as a wholly owned subsidiary: It is unlikely any law firm outside of resource-rich BigLaw can afford to shoulder the costs of scaling a startup, especially since Rule 5.4 cuts off access to loans and outside capital.
This convoluted structure, while end-running UPL and Rule 5.4, brings substantial operational complexity, making the business more expensive, harder to run, and less attractive to investors. For starters, Hello Divorce cannot enjoy basic economies of scale such as shared software subscriptions, malpractice insurance, workers comp, and cybersecurity.Footnote 72
The dual-entity workaround also restricts the flow of capital between Levine Law and Hello Divorce. Venture capital and private equity can only be directed to Hello Divorce,Footnote 73 while legal services revenue must flow into Levine Law. Thus, venture funding cannot be used to pay attorney salaries – Levine Law’s biggest cost bucket.Footnote 74 The dual-entity structure’s mismatched cash flows also split value between the two companies, making Hello Divorce appear less profitable – and less attractive to investors – on paper.Footnote 75
In stark contrast to Hello Divorce, AtticusFootnote 76 – an “attorney-client matching” service – has set up a dual-entity model that works simply because there is no UPL risk to mitigate. Atticus does not provide direct legal services, or anything approaching legal services, and no money exchanges hands between Atticus and individual users. Atticus’ “front-facing” entity, a law firm licensed in California, acquires clients, screens them, and matches them 1:1 with a vetted attorney in the Atticus network.Footnote 77 Those network providers then pay Atticus a referral fee in compliance with Rule 1.5e and applicable state-level regulations. While Hello Divorce’s “front facing” entity is its technology platform,Footnote 78 Atticus’ “tech” entity serves as its back-office: a venture capital-backed Delaware C corporation that owns the tech platform and manages spending across both entities.Footnote 79 Thus, Atticus is subject to far less regulatory scrutiny,Footnote 80 especially because its services do not compete directly with attorneys.Footnote 81 Atticus actually makes the existing legal monopoly work better by solving a mismatch between demand and supply. Rather than competing over the same client pool, Atticus helps existing PeopleLaw attorneys scale their services by finding them clients – including clients who may not otherwise pursue legal help at all.
In short, restrictive rules have plenty of explanatory value when it comes to key segments of the legal tech industry. Just ask Levine Law and Hello Divorce. But, as Atticus’ success shows, they hardly explain anemic legal tech across the board.
8.3.2 Weak AI: The Upside of Generative AI for the Tenant Power Toolkit
Consider another “usual suspect:” that underpowered AI has prevented DTC legal tech from building the tools necessary to scale PeopleLaw solutions. But even “full-powered” AI is not positioned to address DTC legal tech’s – and particularly, DTC document assembly tools’, most pressing issues. As noted previously, much document assembly is technologically simple: Providers plug complicated legal expertise into a technologically basic software wizard. Instead, the most labor- and capital-intensive phase is hiring lawyers to (1) create a plain language logic tree and (2) track ever-changing procedural and substantive requirements.Footnote 82
While these pain points constrain scale, generative AI is hardly a panacea. AI may never be capable of replacing lawyer translations, especially in more complex areas of the law. Plain language translations require precision and difficult judgment calls: Translating law into plain language is uniquely challenging because it carries inherent risks of over- or under-specification, creating a trade-off between making legal language understandable and retaining its original meaning.Footnote 83 Given this complexity, it may be some time before NLP can take the reins. And as discussed in Section 8.3.3, so long as technology cannot itself brute-force through the court technology checkerboard, scaling across jurisdiction remains prohibitively costly. In short, while some blame “weak” AI for “weak” DTC legal tech, “stronger” AI is unlikely to have the capabilities necessary to meaningfully jumpstart more effective DTC document assembly tools.
Still, as highlighted by the Tenant Power Toolkit, some providers may nonetheless benefit from next-generation AI. Currently, the toolkit asks a series of plain language questions to gauge eligibility and generate legal documents – such as fee waivers, proof of service, or even answers – for California tenants who have been served eviction papers.Footnote 84 While the toolkit can e-serve and e-file documents via One Legal, it can do so only in California.Footnote 85 Its scale and scope is limited by the pace at which human lawyers can design new plain language logic trees or translate existing ones, and the number of jurisdictions it can actually file in. Could generative AI enable the toolkit to reach more users by translating and simplifying its existing services?
Perhaps. First, generative AI can help providers like the Tenant Power Toolkit serve non-English speaking clients by instantly translating existing document assembly tools into languages beyond English. Often, the people Tenant Power Toolkit seeks to serve require a tool in their native language.Footnote 86 This time-consuming translation work is currently done by humans. As AI improves, even if it cannot create the logic trees themselves, it may offer a reliable and lower-cost solution to extending the reach of human-created tools.Footnote 87
Second, generative AI can make existing tools more accessible by reducing the number of questions users must answer. Branching logic trees are time-consuming. The Tenant Power Toolkit finds that users often do not complete the process, having underestimated how long and complex the tool is.Footnote 88 Upsolve, another tool catered toward low-income folks, has cited similar issues.Footnote 89 Here too, generative AI may present a novel solution: Users could type in a plain language problem that AI would then map onto legal questions and outcomes with no need for elaborate Q&A-like branching.
Even so, while AI could simplify logic trees – asking fewer questions and instead using technology trained on lawyer-made datasets to sift through the information the client provides – for most DTC legal tech providers, this is a nice-to-have and not a need-to-have: Document assembly tools have worked effectively as they are.
8.3.3 The Court Technology Checkerboard: A Problem LegalZoom Monetizes and Upsolve Avoids
Turning to the last of the conventional explanations, to what extent does the state- and local-level checkerboard of laws and court technology systems affect Table 8.1’s menu of legal tech providers? For many, the combined complexity of state laws and filing requirements makes expanding to new geographies expensive and labor-intensive. Return, briefly, to Hello Divorce. Each day, several of its clients’ forms are rejected not because they are incorrect but because the filing requirements have changed since the online tool prepared their documents.Footnote 90 Hello Divorce must employ a full-time lawyer to track and update filing requirements down to the county level, as courthouses often change their requirements with little or no notice.Footnote 91 Because the cost of filing alone makes serving additional states highly expensive,Footnote 92 the court technology checkerboard directly limits geographic scalability: Solutions built for one jurisdiction often cannot solve the same problem for clients in a different location.Footnote 93
Two strategies have been successful in overcoming the checkerboard problem: (1) finding an area where the law is uniform, but filing is not, as LegalZoom has or (2) limiting services to document preparation only, like Upsolve.
LegalZoom operates across 50 states and more than 3,000 counties in the United States; its core business is generating and then filing documents for small businesses.Footnote 94 LegalZoom has achieved such scale by monetizing the checkerboard problem. While LLC formation implicates different laws and regulations at the local, state, and even federal levels,Footnote 95 the basic steps for setting up an LLC are consistent across all states.Footnote 96 By choosing a relatively uniform area of the law, LegalZoom was instead able to focus its resources on tracking and coding the different filing requirements of each jurisdiction.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, because its solution actually solves filing complexity, simplification of state-by-state systems poses a major risk: LegalZoom’s investor materials highlight that “if U.S. state agencies increase their offerings for free and easy-to-use business formation services such as … filing portals to the public, it could have a significant adverse effect on our business.”Footnote 97
But for Upsolve – which, as a reminder, assembles but does not file chapter 7 bankruptcy forms – such filing portals would make its services more accessible and effective. An estimated 40 percent of Upsolve users drop off at filing because courts are inconsistent in their treatment of self-represented litigants.Footnote 98 Generally, e-filing remains too complex for Upsolve’s online tool to integrate, especially as requirements continue to change.Footnote 99 Despite expanding its scope in other ways – offering information and referrals to help customers with other types of bankruptcy, piloting consumer debt relief advocates in New York City, and building a new online tool for immigration – Upsolve’s technology-enabled services remain narrow: They assemble, but do not file, legal forms.
Here again, the checkerboard argument is complicated. Refraction through a more market-based model suggests that inter-jurisdictional variation is at once a threat and an important source of value.
8.3.4 The Lifetime Value Trap: A Challenge for All For-Profit Providers
Turn, now, to our market-based theory of anemic legal tech, which proceeds from the premise that low demand and high advertising costs have made customer acquisition expensive, so DTC legal tech providers must find a way to make each customer, once acquired, more profitable. As reflected in Figure 8.1, for-profit providers universally struggle to escape the LTV trap. Only for nonprofit providers – Upsolve and the Tenant Power Toolkit – do the economics of customer acquisition and retention have only minor impacts.
8.3.4.1 Customer Acquisition
At first blush, one obvious solution to the LTV trap is for legal tech to partner with law firms, allowing them to tap into an established client base. Our case studies, however, demonstrate that referral rates are low. SixFifty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Silicon Valley law firm Wilson Sonsini that provides platform solutions that customers, usually small businesses, use as part of their daily operations.Footnote 100 These solutions focus on streamlining common document assembly processes, not just fulfilling one-off document needs, and are marketed as legal automation software.Footnote 101 One of the very few legal tech players with direct ties to a BigLaw law firm, SixFifty nonetheless maintains a careful distance from Wilson Sonsini, using standard UPL disclaimers despite relaxed regulations in its home state of Utah.
While SixFifty and Wilson Sonsini do cross-refer customers – SixFifty even offers Wilson Sonsini clients a “friends and family” discount – those referrals almost never result in new business for either entity.Footnote 102 Poor referral rates are largely attributable to low customer overlap: Customers go to SixFifty and Wilson Sonsini for entirely different needs.Footnote 103 We see similar mismatch between customers of Hello Divorce and Levine Law.Footnote 104 Law firms make “chandeliers” – they handle multimillion-dollar deals and disputes – while document assembly tools standardize “lightbulb” solutions for simpler problems.
Instead of relying on referrals, most DTC legal tech providers turn to digital advertising to attract new clients. For some, it’s an easier task. People in need of a divorce, for instance, know they have a legal need and often make predictable searches, making it easy for Hello Divorce to target potential clients.Footnote 105 In other areas – particularly in large and diffuse markets – SEO is expensive and imprecise. LegalZoom, for example, generally targets small business owners; sales and marketing is their largest operating expense, amounting to nearly one-third of total revenue.Footnote 106 But even if a company has resources to spend on SEO, it may not be an effective distribution channel. In immigration, for instance, the high volume of both general and specific searches (e.g., “immigration help” or Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) application”) and providers’ need to target outreach based on their sub-specialty (e.g., Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) work permits) makes the SEO strategy impracticable.Footnote 107
8.3.4.2 Customer Retention
To increase LTV, many providers prioritize cross-sell. As previously noted, because no one plans to get divorced more than once, Hello Divorce has shifted its focus to more holistic lawyer-alternatives such as financial counseling and marriage mediators to extend the lifetime of each client.Footnote 108 LegalZoom also focuses on driving additional purchases and cross-sell for its customers,Footnote 109 including by upselling its customers to higher margin solutions.Footnote 110 For example, LegalZoom plans to expand credentialled-professional-assisted offeringsFootnote 111 similar to those offered by HelloDivorce.
Another way to boost customer retention is through subscriptions.Footnote 112 Despite being a key component of LegalZoom’s strategy to enhance LTV – in fact, its “business depends substantially on [] subscribers renewing their subscriptions”Footnote 113 – growth in one-time transactions continues to outpace growth in subscriptions.Footnote 114 And an all-in subscription strategy comes with a major pitfall: Deferred revenue as a result of subscription units can make cash flows dependent on the size, timing, and terms of subscription agreements.Footnote 115
SixFifty, for its part, has successfully combined cross-sell and subscriptions by building a suite of complementary products that allows it to naturally sell existing customers additional products (e.g., selling an employee handbook customer a subscription to its severance paperwork tool). This is partially attributable to the substantive legal areas it serves: Every business enterprise that interfaces with consumers must remain compliant with ever-changing privacy and employment regulations. Bundling multiple types of compliance under one vendor simplifies the process for small HR and legal departments; for example, they only need to be trained on and use one platform solution. SixFifty also occupies a niche where legal need is ongoing: Year after year, employers will need to hire, onboard, and let go of employees.
8.3.4.3 Escaping the Lifetime Value Trap
The LTV-to-CAC ratio, which compares the value of a customer over their lifetime to the cost of acquiring them, is the primary measure of DTC profitability.Footnote 116 For ecommerce, a ratio greater than 3:1 is considered “good.”Footnote 117 In SaaS,Footnote 118 industry benchmarks place the average LTV-to-CAC ratio at 3:1 for business services and 6:1 for financial services.Footnote 119 DTC legal tech, which straddles ecommerce and SaaS, likely sees much lower – and thus unsustainable – LTV-to-CAC ratios.
LegalZoom, for its part, “aims to achieve” a ratio of 3:1 within twenty-five months.Footnote 120 Because LegalZoom does not publish (and in fact claims not to know)Footnote 121 its customer churn rate, it’s difficult to calculate its exact LTV-to-CAC ratio based on publicly available data. That its goal is a ratio of 3:1 suggests that LegalZoom’s actual ratio is lower, and thus, below industry benchmarks.
By contrast, SixFifty achieves a 3:1 LTV-to-CAC ratio,Footnote 122 putting it on par with other business services but below analogous financial services. But SixFifty is likely unique among its legal tech peers; its primary customers are businesses with large annual contracts and thus higher average LTV.Footnote 123 By contrast, LegalZoom must retain a subscription customer for ninety days to recoup acquisition costs.Footnote 124 Despite enjoying higher LTV, SixFifty’s CAC is likely to remain high because it uses a traditional sales motion reliant on SEO. Even this legal tech success story is doomed to chase LTV through cross-selling or by retaining subscription customers for as long as possible.
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More so than the “usual suspects,” market-based barriers to growth explain anemic legal tech. Through these case studies, we can trace the universal profitability struggle to a single, relatively simple culprit: the customer. Scholars envision DTC legal tech serving individuals in need of unbundled, specialized legal services.Footnote 125 But demand for such services is uniquely fickle: Customers rarely understand their own legal need and, unlike annual check-ups or taxes, specialized legal need is rarely ongoing. By serving their clients, providers often render themselves moot. And given high CAC costs, one-off clients cannot sustain DTC legal tech. If we want to move the needle on access to justice, we need to accept the reality that leaving legal tech growth up to the “market” might mean that effective, scalable legal tech for ordinary people remains out of reach.
8.4 Implications
To this point, we have identified and tested an alternative, market-based theory for lagging DTC legal tech that provides a fuller, industry-spanning explanation than the standard arguments around restrictive rules, weak AI, or the court technology checkerboard. This section builds out some of the implications of our findings for the future of legal services and access to justice. Two loom largest. First, the structural challenges facing DTC legal tech hold important lessons for current “regulatory reform” efforts, and they may even tip the scales away from liberalization strategies that aim to foster a robust, competitive legal tech marketplace. Second, market-based barriers to a robust DTC legal tech ecosystem may have fundamental implications for how courts should see their role, and build out their own technology and data infrastuctures, as the civil justice system enters its next chapter.
8.4.1 Is Regulatory Reform a Wrong Turn?
Our market-based theory offers a cautionary note, perhaps even waves bright red flags, for theories of regulatory reform that aim to foster, or otherwise depend upon, a robust DTC legal tech market as a way to serve the millions who currently face civil justice problems without meaningful legal help.
Regulatory reform, while a complex amalgam of reform impulses, can be distilled into three basic flavors. Entity-level reform efforts aim to relax UPL, Rule 5.4, or both in order to permit entities – from already-existing ones, such as law firms or LegalZoom, to new tech startups – to devise new, entity-level legal services delivery models. Direct-to-consumer legal tech finds its footing in this entity-level flavor. Role-based reforms call for new, top-down licensure schemes to mint new classes of legal professionals – think physician assistants or nurse practitioners for law – with entry requirements, ongoing educational and reporting requirements, and regulatory oversight patterned after current regulation of the legal profession.Footnote 126 But a third flavor, “community justice workers,” is gaining steam.Footnote 127 Drawing from both entity – and role-based approaches, this new reform model calls for deputizing certain trusted legal services providers – for instance, legal aid groups – to hire, train, and oversee new types of nonlawyer service providers, rather than top-down licensure, in order to extend their reach. This trio of reform flavors is currently jockeying for position across dozens of states as access-to-justice concerns move more squarely onto legal and political radars.
The deep, market-based challenges facing DTC legal tech plainly present a significant challenge to the first, entity-level approach – and may even tip the scales in favor of the other models. Indeed, if one-to-many legal services are unlikely to flourish, and if sandbox reforms, as in Utah, or ABS systems, as in Arizona, cannot yield a robust, competitive marketplace of DTC legal tech providers, then perhaps reformers should put their eggs in other baskets. Seeking political change is not costless. Reformers must be careful to spend their limited real and political capital wisely, and in ways that will achieve movement ends, rather than seeking change for change’s sake.
To be sure, this chapter’s anatomy of the market-based challenges facing DTC legal tech does not perform a full-dress analysis of the relative economic viability of all three reform models. Role-based reforms suffer from economic challenges of their own: The quality of services and the fees charged by newly minted paraprofessionals will almost certainly be directly proportional to entry and training costs and the stringency of regulatory oversight. And even a significant discount off the fees charged by lawyers – currently averaging $300 per hour – will still price most Americans out of the market. The community justice worker approach has problems of its own, as it depends on legal aid and other providers who are perennially funding-strapped and may not be inclined to take on significant new oversight duties in support of a model that, in effect, cannibalizes their own service provision.
Here, then, lies a more bracing possibility: Perhaps regulatory reform is itself a wrong turn – a market-based move that cannot solve the core market failure that is fueling reform calls in the first place. Perhaps, in other words, we should be seeking other ways to narrow the justice gap and serve the millions who must navigate a complex civil justice system with little or no help. That leads directly to a second implication: the role of courts, and the technology choices they make, as they prepare for the next chapter of the civil justice system.
8.4.2 Courts’ Make-or-Buy Choice
A second, and related, implication of our findings goes to how courts can best leverage potent new legal technologies, particularly with the advent of generative AI, for self-represented court users.
In the current court tech landscape, we see the challenge facing courts as a version of “make or buy.” Courts can “make” new legal services by creating virtual self-help centers, from simple chatbots to a full-scale, end-to-end digital courthouse front door where court users can come, input a plain language description of a problem, and get back actionable information and advice, be routed to other appropriate forms of legal help, or access needed form-filing and e-filing tools. Courts can also offer court-hosted online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms. The first ODR platforms at eBay and PayPal were simple gathering places where disputants could gather, usually asynchronously, and bargain their way to a settlement.Footnote 128 But with generative AI, we can glimpse more advanced versions – call it ODR 2.0 – that primes the disputants with information, including, perhaps, a prediction as to how the case would come out if litigated to a judgment in court.Footnote 129
Alternatively, courts can “buy” assistance for self-represented litigants by improving accessibility and inter-connectivity – for instance, through application programming interfaces (APIs), or by adopting common data standards – and by taking other measures, such as lowering e-filing barriers, to make it easier for legal tech providers to provide fully integrated services to self-represented litigants.Footnote 130
Neither “make” nor “buy” is without deep challenges. As already noted at length, “buy” depends on a robust legal tech marketplace that may not materialize even with substantial relaxation of regulatory constraints on legal services and more standardized, less checkerboard-like court technology and data infrastructures. The uniquely challenging market economics of serving moderate and low-income Americans may simply be too much to support a truly robust marketplace of legal services providers.
“Make” can seem no less daunting. Above all, it requires significant technical capacity that few courts currently have. Indeed, courts are woefully lacking in IT expertise, never mind AI. And, even if they partner with one of the purveyors of foundational, open-source LLMs in order to harness the newest and most potent forms of generative AI, significant in-house work will need to be done to customize and improve the accuracy of the models. As a result, partnering may be necessary in the age of generative AI, but partnering only partially solves the problem of limited court technical capacity.
Still, a reasonable conclusion is that “make” may be the better course, particularly if budget-strapped courts can only choose one. More bracingly, it’s possible that “make” is the only plausible path forward, particularly in the parts of the civil justice system where access concerns are most acute – the parade of debt collection actions, evictions, and family law matters that now dominate state court dockets. In that part of the civil justice system, as the average litigant’s ability to pay moves toward zero and profit margins thin, the market-based critique advanced in this chapter, and the uniquely challenging market economics of serving low- and even medium-income Americans, gains even greater purchase, leaving courts and policymakers with few other levers. Indeed, if a truly robust DTC legal tech marketplace is doomed from the start, then court-hosted, taxpayer-financed, “public option” legal tech – not selective, privately offered services serving the relatively better off – may be the wiser and fairer use of limited public funds.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has squarely asked the question that has long hung over legal tech: Why has DTC legal tech that serves individuals and small businesses directly not risen up amidst massive unmet civil legal needs? Our answer is a disheartening one: Inclusive legal tech may never materialize, at least not at a scale that can more than dent the problem of access to justice, because of the uniquely challenging market economics of serving ordinary people. But there is power in that recognition, for it can push us to consider what other measures might be necessary to make the civil justice system more open and fairer for all.