From 1973 until 1976, General Krit Sivara was the most powerful person in Thailand—politically, militarily and economically. From en¬tering Cadet School in 1931, he—like Roman emperor Claudius—had, in the background, outlasted all other military strongmen before him: Phraya Phahon, Phibun, Phin, Sarit, Thanom and Praphas. Indeed, Krit was more powerful than Thanom and Praphas because they had depended upon each other. Krit had come from a military family (see Figure 6.1).

In 1973, Krit was also more powerful than the king; though Krit declared his loyalty to King Bhumipol, he controlled the monopoly on state violence and the king's guards, and he was wealthier than the palace. Though the legitimacy of monarchical endorsement was important for Krit, he possessed a competing ideology, given his stature as the saviour of Thai democratization and the king alike. Thus, despite swearing allegiance to the monarchy, early on Krit already appeared to be a potential danger to the king. Other senior military officers at the time had either been tarnished through their association with Thanom, Praphas or Narong (e.g., General Aat Sasiprapha), were junior to Krit (General Bunchai Bamrungpong and General Prasert Thammasiri), had retired (Thanom, Praphas, General Prasert Rujirawong and General Kruan Sutaninot), had not served in the all-important army (e.g., ACM Thawee Chulasap and Admiral Sangad Chaloryu) or were dead (General Kriengkrai Attanand).

According to some, Krit saw himself merely as the “peace-keeper” successor to Thanom and Praphas, viewing 14 October 1973 “as an opportunity” to be used as an “advantage”. In fact, from 1973 until his death in 1976, rumour-mongers constantly speculated that Krit was planning the “reinstatement of dictatorship through a second coup”. As post-1973 events transpired, however, Krit turned out to be that rare military strongman who sought to preserve elected governance. With Thanom's departure, Krit immediately proved himself to be an adept military commander. To prevent potential coups from below, he kept his forces under control through a policy of division. As one observer put it, “the army is too divided to think about a coup”. Thus, military unity depended upon Krit alone. Nevertheless, with such a policy, should Krit die suddenly, it would exacerbate military division in Thailand, which is precisely what happened in 1976.