In Chapters 2–4, we considered three approaches to understanding deindustrialization. The first of these was that the phenomenon did not necessarily matter because jobs lost in manufacturing would be replaced by jobs in the service economy. We noted two problems with this approach, namely that the new (and existing non- manufacturing) jobs often had worse conditions than what had previous existed and wage growth was often lower than in the past, and that deindustrialization was also taking place in much of the Global South. The second approach argued that deindustrialization in the North was caused – at least partly – by competition from the rise of manufacturing in the South, through cheap goods, low labour costs, relocation of production (through foreign investment or subcontracting within value chains) and undervalued currencies. We suggested that while this might be the case in some sectors, it could not explain longer term trends of deindustrialization and again it failed to properly take account of deindustrialization in much of the South. The third position suggested that most deindustrialization in the Global North (and beyond) was caused by productivity increases and technological innovation, including automation. While this approach had its merits, it did not sufficiently explain why this also meant worse “replacement jobs” (as in the first perspective), nor the falls in growth rates in productivity and output in recent years. This led to a consideration of trends beyond deindustrialization per se, as discussed in Chapter 5, and specifically the idea that global capitalism has in effect stagnated for a long period of time. While the data on productivity and output were significant, the argument about stagnation over the past 50 years was rejected as it failed to account for the continued dynamism of capitalism, even with lower growth rates. The argument made was that rentiership has indeed increased in the neoliberal era, but this was less a reflection of capitalist stagnation, and more one of new and intensified sources of expansion, including in finance and global value chains. It was also noted how this led to the boom of the long 1990s, which took place from around 1992 to 2007. However, the chapter also suggested that the global financial crisis of 2007– 08 had been managed but not satisfactorily overcome, and it was here that we could identify a crisis, of which recent deindustrialization in the US for example (the China shock) was but one manifestation.