Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2025
On 8 November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy won a stunning victory at the national elections, which by most accounts was reasonably free and fair. For the first time in almost half a century, Myanmar faced the prospect of a genuinely representative civilian government, albeit in partnership with the armed forces. Analyses of the likely future of democracy in Myanmar ranged from the overly optimistic to the darkly pessimistic. In this debate, the harsh realities of power in Myanmar were sometimes overlooked.
Over the past few months, articles and op-eds by experts and others on Myanmar's general elections have covered almost every conceivable aspect of the subject. Also, it seems a shame to dampen down the wave of euphoria that has swept around the world since the National League for Democracy's (NLD) stunning victory on 8 November, which promises a new beginning for a country and people that have suffered for decades.
In considering where recent developments might lead, however, it is important to take a broad view and keep the election outcome in perspective. As Nicholas Farrelly wrote in the Myanmar Times on 9 November, this is just the beginning of a very long and difficult process. The harsh realities of power in Myanmar—at least as far as they have been seen until now— demand a fair degree of caution.
It might be helpful to list a few basic facts of life in Myanmar, just to set the scene:
First, the armed forces (Tatmadaw) have long been and arguably remain the most powerful political institution in Myanmar. As Robert Taylor has written, “Only the army can end its own role in Myanmar's politics, and that decision is dependent on its perception of the civilian political elite's ability to manage the future”. He might have added, “and protect the Tatmadaw as a national institution”.
Second, it is also important to bear in mind that the elections were relatively free and fair, and produced a reasonably accurate result, only because the leaders of the armed forces permitted them to occur and did not interfere. It may not have been easy, but they could have intervened at any stage of the process and ensured that the elections were cancelled, postponed, or manipulated to give a different outcome.
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