Myanmar's generals have no popular mandate to rule the country. They rely almost entirely on the state's coercive apparatus (mainly the armed forces, but also the national police force, intelligence agencies and various militias) to stay in power. It is of critical importance to the junta's survival, therefore, that the armed forces remain loyal and cohesive. Yet, more than any other development in Myanmar's modern history, the 2021 coup has thrown this into doubt.

The military coup in Myanmar has again led observers to speak in sweeping terms of large groups, on the assumption that they all think and act alike. Hence references in the news media to “the armed forces”, “the police” and “the demonstrators”. In the circumstances, this is understandable, but it can lead to misconceptions and a misreading of events.

For example, Myanmar's armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) is a large organisation (no one knows quite how large, but most Myanmar watchers accept a number around 350,000) made up mostly of ethnic Burman (Bamar) Buddhists. They have all experienced similar training regimes and been exposed to the same propaganda about the need for stability and the Tatmadaw's special role in Myanmar's national affairs.

Similarly, the members of the national police force, numbering around 80,000 (another rough estimate) have undergone the same process of indoctrination, sometimes at the same schools. Policemen and women have been developing their own professional ethos, but they are still subject to the same kind of discipline as members of the armed forces. Indeed, many of them, particularly those in the paramilitary security battalions (or “riot police”), are former soldiers.

The state's intelligence services, made up of four main agencies and a number of smaller units, consist of personnel chosen as much for their commitment to the military leadership and willingness to obey orders, as they are for their individual skills and experience. (The gangs of “vigilantes” occasionally employed by the authorities during times of civil unrest cannot be considered real members of the security forces).

In normal circumstances, the members of Myanmar's security forces are likely to maintain discipline and obey the orders issued to them by their senior officers and, ultimately, the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief.