Six months out from the coup in Myanmar, there had been countless articles, op-eds and other opinion pieces published in the international news media and online. Most were optimistic, to a greater or lesser degree, reflecting the hopes and dreams of their authors. However, even allowing for the difficulty of making predictions about Myanmar, a careful analysis of the country's likely future painted a much bleaker picture.

Predicting Myanmar's future has always been a risky business. It opened up to academics, journalists and others after the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising, but there is still much about its politics, economy and society that remain little known and poorly understood. For example, despite being the most powerful institution in the country for over half a century, its armed forces (or Tatmadaw) still defy detailed analysis.

In these circumstances, only a very bold or foolhardy observer would claim to be able to see where the country is heading, beyond the short term. Even so, it is important that some effort is made to identify emerging trends and to make cautious assessments about the likely course of events. For, without such a picture in mind, it is difficult to understand the significance of current developments and to formulate realistic policies aimed at tackling specific problems.

Before attempting a description of what Myanmar could look like over the next year or two, it might be helpful to lay down a framework for analysis, and state some basic assumptions.

First, Myanmar's security forces are larger, stronger and better resourced than any of the country's ethnic armed organisations (EAO), either taken individually or considered as part of an anti-junta coalition. The opposition's “new age rebels”, such as the self-proclaimed People's Defence Force (PDF) and sundry armed resistance groups, including local militias and urban guerrilla cells, are uncoordinated, poorly trained and ill-equipped.

Second, the “young officers’ coup” postulated by some activists is a remote prospect. Nor is Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing likely to be ousted by army “soft-liners” willing to negotiate a deal with the prodemocracy movement. The “defection” of hundreds of soldiers and police personnel will not make any real impact. They are useful in propaganda terms, and can pass on some practical skills, but they will not change the overall balance of forces.