Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2025
As the civil war in Myanmar ground on, a critical question that arose was whether any foreign government would formally recognise the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), and provide more than humanitarian aid. There was a wide consensus that lethal aid to the NUG's armed wing, the People's Defence Force, and to allied ethnic armed organisations, could tip the strategic balance in Myanmar and give the resistance forces a much better chance of winning the war against the junta.
Over the past year, governments and international organisations have imposed sanctions against Myanmar's military regime and taken various other steps to support the country's embattled opposition movement. Most of these measures have been largely symbolic, however, and none have had a direct impact on the balance of forces inside the country. The junta has continued its repressive policies, in what has become a nationwide civil war.
Requests by the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) for direct military intervention, under the UN's Responsibility to Protect principles, have fallen on deaf ears. More recent calls by members of the People's Defence Force (PDF), for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Myanmar, have been equally unsuccessful. Expatriate groups and private donors have provided a trickle of funds and weapons, but to date no lethal aid has been forthcoming.
Despite intensive lobbying in the US and elsewhere, the NUG has been unable to persuade any foreign government to recognise its credentials, or to assist the armed groups fighting the junta in its name. This lack of official response seems to reflect a combination of international conventions, geostrategic circumstances and perceived national interests.
One argument heard is that governments usually recognise states, not other governments, so the question of formally disavowing the military regime and acknowledging the NUG does not arise. After all, Myanmar already exists. This approach permits governments to avoid taking any positions that might harm their tenuous communications links with the junta, upset China or complicate relations with international organisations like ASEAN.
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