Myanmar has always had mixed feelings about its membership of ASEAN. Indeed, all international organisations are viewed with suspicion, particularly if cooperation is seen to be at Myanmar's expense. If it was felt that the Association had turned against Myanmar, because of the February 2021 coup, then it would not take much for the junta to decide that membership was more trouble than it was worth, and threaten to withdraw. If pushed far enough, it might even do so.

The decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations not to invite Myanmar's military leader to two related summits in Brunei on 26–28 October raises an intriguing question: if pushed far enough, would the junta in Naypyidaw take Myanmar out of the regional grouping?

Myanmar's military rulers thought long and hard before joining ASEAN in 1997. To do so was seen as a break with the country's long-held and deeply-felt attachment to independence and strict neutrality in foreign affairs. ASEAN was not allied with any major power bloc, and undertook not to interfere in its members’ internal affairs, but even so membership would compromise Myanmar's traditional stance.

At the time, a conservative faction of the ruling military council believed that ASEAN membership offered nothing of significant value, and would expose Myanmar to foreign pressures. However, a more progressive faction successfully argued that ASEAN could provide a buffer between the regime and its foreign critics. It would also help Myanmar to balance its problematical relationship with China.

For its part, ASEAN was under pressure from its US and European dialogue partners not to expand, but it felt that Myanmar's membership would strengthen the grouping's influence. It was also keen to woo Myanmar away from China's embrace, which had been strengthened by Western sanctions. Besides, Myanmar was relatively undeveloped, was rich in natural resources and offered a potential market for technology and consumer goods.