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12 - Money in the Global Power Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2025

Ignazio Angeloni
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Daniel Gros
Affiliation:
Centre for European Policy Studies
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Summary

This chapter is devoted to global competition for monetary dominance. Correspondent banking, the backbone of international transactions, largely uses Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the main messaging system for cross-border payments. Correspondent banks play a role akin to a “central bank” in international transactions. They are trusted intermediaries of transactions on behalf of others. One problem is that correspondent banking leads to dominant positions of some banks in that essential service. There are economies of scale and network externalities here, hence the tendency for concentration and monopoly of power. Can digitalization help solve these problems? In principle, a network of interoperable central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could be the solution. This would be a very different CBDC from the “retail version” described earlier. Its design would be different, along with the risks involved. We then discuss the geopolitics of money and the advantages and drawbacks of having an international currency that serves as reserve asset or invoicing instrument. At present, the dominance of the US dollar is unchallenged; neither the euro nor the Chinese yuan are plausible contenders. CBDCs are unlikely to change this status quo: The international role of currencies is determined by other factors, such as economic size, the stability of the currency itself, and the breadth of the underlying financial markets.

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Chapter
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Money In Crisis
The Return of Instability and the Myth of Digital Cash
, pp. 304 - 334
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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