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10 - Central Bank Digital Currencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2025

Ignazio Angeloni
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Daniel Gros
Affiliation:
Centre for European Policy Studies
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Summary

This chapter deals with “digital cash.” A central bank digital currency (CBDC) is a liability of the central bank toward a nonbank holder – an individual or a company. The technology, a web of interconnected computer terminals, is widely available. Central banks already host deposits from banks, so technically the CBDC would only be an extension. From an economic and financial standpoint, however, there is major difference, because the opening of the central bank balance sheet to the public would tend to lead to bank disintermediation. Banks extend the credit to households and firms; bank disintermediation therefore has a contractionary effect on credit and economy growth. This effect is stronger in financial crises, in which deposit holders tend to shift massively toward “safe assets.” A CBDC risks constituting a channel of deposit runs. Some central banks, therefore, plan to apply strict quantitative limits. There is a trade-off here: The stricter the limits, the lower the significance and usefulness of the CBDC. By and large, global central banks are still grappling with these problems, and research is ongoing. The limited experience of countries that have already launched a CBDC (China, Nigeria, Bahamas) is not positive. There has been very little demand for CBDCs because they provide very little value added over existing private means of payment. The jury is still out as to whether the most important central banks (Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, etc.) will actually go ahead and issue CBDCs.

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Chapter
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Money In Crisis
The Return of Instability and the Myth of Digital Cash
, pp. 257 - 288
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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