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10 - The Drama of Vaccine Politics: Covid-19 InoculationDistribution in Thailand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2025

Hwok Aun Lee
Affiliation:
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
Siwage Dharma Negara
Affiliation:
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
Jayant Menon
Affiliation:
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

In early 2020, Thailand was remarkably successful in containing the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, controlling the number of total cases and deaths more effectively than other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Poum 2021). The Centre for Covid-19 Situation Administration (CCSA), a new unit set up by the government to manage the pandemic, started out well but performed inconsistently over time, with critical roles in deliberation, expert consultation and decision-making undermined by vested interests. In mid-2020, Thailand had only one domestically transmitted case, averting a second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021, however, the administration of General Prayut Chan-ocha failed to effectively manage the country's third Covid-19 outbreak, the Delta variant, which hit severely in April 2021 (BBC News 2020). The third wave originated at entertainment venues in Bangkok and then spread rapidly across the country when people travelled during the Songkran festival. In May 2021, new infections lingered at around 2,000 to 3,000 cases daily, with no improvement until September (Worldometer 2023). Thousands of people died from the Delta variant. This triggered public concern about whether the country would have adequate access to the Covid-19 vaccines, which would allow a return to normal life.

Governments arguably bear the responsibility for vaccinating all residents. The Thai government, however, mismanaged the beginning of the vaccine roll-out in early 2021 (Punchada 2021a). This was primarily a result of infighting among the government organizations responsible for managing Thailand's pandemic response and power struggles between coalition parties who wanted to control vaccine procurement and distribution. The coalition parties believed controlling vaccine procurement and distribution would secure their political fortunes ahead of the next general election, which was eventually held in May 2023. Conflicts within government organs and between coalition parties not only led to the initial failure of vaccine delivery, but also caused the release of confusing public information at both central and local levels of administration.

Thailand began its vaccine roll-out—approximately 1.7 million doses—in June 2021 (BBC Thai 2021). AstraZeneca and Sinovac were the two major inoculations in use during the initial period of the campaign. The government secured approximately 117,000 imported AstraZeneca shots from the United Kingdom, with another 61 million doses locally produced by royal-owned company Siam BioScience.1 The country also imported 6 million doses of Sinovac— also known as CoronaVac—from China, including 500,000 jabs donated by the Chinese government. Sinovac then became the key to Thailand's nationwide vaccination operation. The Thai government distributed more than 30 million Sinovac jabs from February 2021 through to the end of the year, beginning with two doses allocated to each frontline healthcare worker, to each resident of areas with severe disease clusters and to each resident of Phuket, the famous holiday island that the government hoped to reopen for tourists in July 2021. Later in 2021, the government also permitted further vaccines to be distributed: Johnson & Johnson, Moderna and Pfizer.

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Type
Chapter
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Learning from Covid-19 in Southeast Asia
Restriction, Relief, Recovery
, pp. 354 - 384
Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
Print publication year: 2025

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