This chapter analyzes Kant’s moral law, which interpellates the subject as would an other, as a form of address. When we think of Kant’s categorical imperative with the prevailing understanding of autonomy in mind, we may overlook the fact that the autonomous subject is not the one who makes a decision, is not the one who choses, but rather the one who is addressed and enjoined. In fact, what Kant calls “spirit” (the law’s ability to affect and motivate the subject) lies, this chapter argues through close reading, on the law’s letter, that is, on its structure of address. Unconditionality and address are two inseparable ways in which the law exerts its impact on subjectivity . And indeed, unconditionality is present in this chapter as the question of the origin of voice. This poetic question, which is at the core of the enigma of autonomy, becomes more explicit when we turn to Levinas, himself a deeply Kantian critic of Kant. Doing full justice to Kant, Levinas explains autonomy as being inspired in the most literal sense of the word: finding in myself something that was not in me before (something I have received, an order that addresses me), believing I am its author, and saying it “by my own voice.” Kant’s autonomy, the chapter concludes, consists in standing for the origin of what has no origin, in standing for a beginning that is always preceded.