The keju (科举) system, or the imperial examination system, was one of the crucial institutional genes of the entire Chinese imperial institution. It ensured the imperial institution remained unchallenged ideologically and prevented the rise of de facto nobles or local lords through its control of the personnel system. The keju system incorporated the ideological principles of “Confucianism,”1 and also regulated the selection and placement of bureaucrats through the imperial examination system. This institutional gene instilled a deep-rooted concept of hierarchy in people’s minds, fostered a population that obeyed authority unconditionally, and suppressed aspiration to pursue individual rights. It aligns closely with the institutional genes required to establish a totalitarian system. Conversely, it is diametrically opposed to the institutional genes necessary for forming a constitutional system.
Keju, which began in 124 bce and ended in 1905, “lasted for two thousand years, concurrent with the dynastic empire itself” (Yu, Reference Yu2005). As the content of the keju,
Confucianism in China … has a notable feature, that is, the high degree of integration between politics and religion – they are inseparable and unified. The emperor also serves as the pope, or vice versa. Divine authority and political power are intertwined. The doctrines of Confucianism are delivered in the form of governmental decrees. The imperial “imperial edict” is a sacred decree, equivalent to the papal bull. In medieval Europe, a king’s coronation required the Pope’s anointing, which was considered as receiving God’s approval. In contrast, when a Chinese emperor ascended to the throne, all he needed to do was to issue a proclamation to the world. The proclamation always began with, “By the Mandate of Heaven, the Emperor decrees,” making the emperor’s decree carry the authority of a papal directive.
In contrast, the Church is a comparably crucial institutional gene in Western countries (including Russia), encompassing both Christianity as a religion and ideology and the Church as a social organization of a government-like structure. From the time Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire until the nineteenth century, the Church and secular power in Europe (including the area of modern Russia) were closely intertwined. However, they never completely merged into one. The Church and secular power maintained their status as separate entities.
This chapter discusses the keju system and the Church as institutional genes, considering their basic characteristics, origins, evolution, and their impacts on institutional evolution as social organizations and governments. It is important to clarify that from a social science analytical perspective, we focus on the keju system as an institutional gene of the Chinese imperial system, not on Confucianism per se, or its authenticity, specific schools, philosophy, or religious aspects. From an institutional research viewpoint, we are interested in aspects that have played significant roles in shaping institutions and history.
5.1 Confucianism and the Keju System versus Christianity and the Church
5.1.1 Confucianism and the Keju as an Institutional Gene of the Chinese Imperial System
The keju system was initially established to support imperial rule by altering personnel selections of the imperial bureaucracy and reinforcing legitimacy through the propagation of Confucianism. However, through centuries of evolution, it became an integral component of the Chinese imperial system and evolved into institutional genes. During the reign of Emperor Wudi of Han (r. 141–187 bce), less than a century after Emperor Qin Shi Huang first established the empire, the prototype of the imperial examination system, directly operated by the emperor and the court, was created to consolidate imperial rule. Nearly 400 years later, by the end of the Eastern Han dynasty, Confucianism evolved into a structured system under the emperor’s direct cultivation. The main purpose of implementing an imperial examination system and using Confucianism as an ideology was to legitimize imperial rule and to weaken the political power base of the social elite by making it difficult for the descendants of high officials and nobility to hold office without passing an examination.
However, the partially institutionalized keju system could not prevent the disintegration of the empire at the end of the Han dynasty. It took nearly 360 years before the empire was reunified under the Sui dynasty (581–618). Learning from the collapse of the empire at the end of the Han dynasty, the rulers of the Sui dynasty formalized the examination system, ending the hereditary posts of the nobility and systematically limiting the opportunities for the offspring of prominent families to attain prestigious positions. In this way, they curtailed the potential challenges these families could pose to imperial power.
The keju system, once it reached maturity, became the basis of the imperial personnel system, dictating the entry and often the future career trajectory of the majority of imperial bureaucrats. This system, formally initiated during the Sui dynasty and later refined during the Song dynasty, guided China in developing a comprehensive, merit-based bureaucratic structure. This structure effectively suppressed the emergence of an aristocracy, thus ensuring that the empire remained unchallenged and undivided from within until the dawn of the twentieth century.
The cornerstone of Confucianism, the content of the keju examination, was loyalty – towards the emperor, imperial authority, and the empire itself. The Confucian classics that were used for the keju exams were carefully collected and interpreted by imperial scholars and then approved by the emperor. Candidates, who were prospective bureaucrats, had to memorize these classics and only after passing the exams could they secure positions in the imperial bureaucracy. For the highest tier of these exams, the palace examination, the emperor himself acted as the chief examiner. He personally presided over the examination held in the palace and successful candidates were automatically considered his disciples. Moreover, from its organizational methods to its budget support, the keju system was a fundamental part of the empire’s politics and finances.
For two millennia, the Chinese Empire channeled intellectuals into the examination system, effectively indoctrinating unwavering loyalty towards both the emperor and the empire. The allure of the imperial examinations, combined with the stringent prohibition of any organized intellectual pursuits outside the exam’s scope, effectively nullified the existence of organized, independent intellectual entities capable of challenging imperial dominion. Consequently, the examination system evolved into an institutional gene that solidified and perpetuated the imperial order in China, persisting for two millennia. Individuals with different beliefs or ideologies were forced to adapt in order to conform to official Confucianism. Even Jesuits sent by the Vatican had to disguise themselves as Confucian scholars to maintain their presence in China and any visible signs of missionary activity were threatened with prohibition or expulsion.
In stark contrast, despite significant bureaucratic institutions of the West, particularly those pertaining to civil service examinations which were imported from China by the Jesuits during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Landry-Deron, [1735] 2002), there was no direct link between the Church and the secular processes for civil appointments. Moreover, the contents of the civil service examination in the West focused more on intellectual merit and less on brainwashing.
5.1.2 Separation of Church and State as an Institutional Gene of Western Europe
Christianity, the state religion of Europe’s feudal monarchies (except in regions under Ottoman rule), saw its monarchs crowned by the Pope. Some monarchs successfully exerted control over the Church within their borders, yet the demand for separation of Church and state persisted. Conventionally, the Church and the state bureaucracy maintained their distinct identities and any attempt to subordinate the former under the king’s control would have contravened this norm. The independent coexistence of these two institutions developed into a fundamental, albeit contentious, institution within feudal Europe. The monarch’s inability to control the Church is completely inconceivable from the perspective of the Chinese imperial system. However, the question is how this institutional gene, which separates religious and secular authorities, came into existence.
From the very beginning, even before the formal establishment of the Christian Church, Christian communities were independent of secular power. Christianity faced brutal oppression by the Roman Empire in its early years. The Gospels express a notable aversion to autocracy and even direct opposition to the Roman Empire. For example, Paul the Apostle, who perished in prison in the Roman Empire in 64 ce, portrayed the reign of Christ as antagonistic to the prevailing authorities of an evil age (Yang, Reference Yang2010). He characterized the rulers and authorities of the Roman Empire of his day as the embodiment of that evil age, manifested as a “fallen” form of power. As recorded later in Galatians of the New Testament, Paul urged resistance to the Roman Empire. Rulers, he said, oppressed the people out of fear, and their reliance on violence only further emphasized this fear. Plenty of such content in the Bible formed an important part of the institutional genes that later led to the Reformation. Even before Martin Luther, Erasmus posed a theological challenge to Roman Catholic doctrine based on his reinterpretation of St. Paul’s writings.
Only when the Christian Church had matured as an institutional gene and Christianity had become an irresistible force did the Roman Empire recognize its legitimacy. The escalating influence of the Church eventually led the emperor to establish Christianity as the state religion. Given that the Bible had been widely disseminated and the Church had emerged as a well-established formidable entity with extensive congregations, the independence of Christianity and its Church was hardly shaken by Roman or any other secular authorities. Unlike the Qin Empire, facing the institutional gene of Christianity, the Roman Empire lacked the ability to execute a mass book-burning, nor could it instigate a new religion like the Han dynasty, let alone rewrite the Bible.
For centuries, this institutional gene, promoting the separation of Church and state, found fertile ground in Europe throughout various pivotal eras such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, and in England from the Magna Carta to the Glorious Revolution. Figures like Martin Luther embedded this separation at the core of the Reformation. His “Two Kingdoms” doctrine, also known as the “Doctrine of the Two Governments,” posed a direct challenge to the Pope’s interference in secular affairs.
In contrast, Confucianism, which originated from the so-called Five Teachings associated with the ancient saintly kings of China, although worshipped as a theological system (to be elaborated upon in the later part of this chapter), was simply a creation of monarchs. Subsequent monarchs followed the practices of King Wen and King Wu of the Zhou dynasty for the sake of their rule. Confucius extended those courtly practices of the Zhou to a wider society and his teachings were further refined by his followers through the generations into what is known as the Five Classics of Confucianism. Confucianism has the Son of Heaven (i.e., the emperor) as its religious leader, Confucius as its forefather, and the Yijing (Book of Changes) as its source of divine wisdom. In essence, the Confucian imperial examination system constituted an entirely artificial system of beliefs and institutions created by secular authorities to support imperial rule and to serve the emperor. Everything about Confucianism, from the classics to the rituals, was under the complete control of the emperor to strengthen his power.
After becoming the state religion, Christianity received financial and military support from the Roman Empire. The state Church gradually monopolized the spiritual discourse and its teachings became orthodox, stifling other interpretations of Christianity, with no mention of other beliefs. At the time, illiteracy was widespread among the commoners, so the Bible was mainly accessed by the clergy, who represented the papacy, while the faithful relied on their interpretations. As the state religion of the Roman Empire under the patronage of the emperor, the Church tended to interpret the parts of the Bible that were most favorable or compatible with the imperial rule, which gradually became dogma.
The Church used orthodoxy to indoctrinate Europeans in a manner similar to the way the Chinese Empire used Confucianism to brainwash Chinese. But the difference is that the Roman emperor could not directly dictate the Church’s teachings or its interpretation of the Bible. The Church was an independent bureaucracy, led by the Pope, with its operations determined by the clergy themselves. Neither the Roman emperors nor the medieval monarchs had the power to alter the Bible, dictate how it should be interpreted, or directly manipulate the Church’s operations. Yet, the close relationship between imperial institutions and the Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire sets it apart from the institutional genes of the Roman Catholic regions. We will delve into the crucial role of the Orthodox Church and the Byzantine Empire in the origins of Tsarism in Chapter 7.
Because of the relative institutional independence of the Christian Church and the secular polity, both the Roman Empire and the medieval monarchies were subject to certain constraints imposed by the Christian Church. Even in cases where religious authority and secular rule were intertwined, with one dominating the other, they still maintained separate identities and a degree of mutual restraint existed. This stands in contrast to the consolidated imperial system in China.
The medieval Catholic Church, with its ideology, provided the fundamental legitimacy for secular power and its highly organized bureaucracy surpassed that of the secular kingdoms. As a result, it was challenging for national monarchs to exert control or manipulate the Church. Secular incursions into ecclesiastical power primarily concerned the appointment of bishops, while in the reverse direction, the Church frequently infringed upon royal authority. In either instance, breaching the sanctified separation of Church and state invariably elicited fervent resistance. The Investiture Controversy, a protracted conflict between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor over the appointment of bishops in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, exemplifies the extent to which Europe’s spiritual and secular authorities were held in mutual check.
On the basis of the originally established institutional genealogy which ensured mutual restraint between theocracy and secular power, the Reformation emerged, creating numerous Protestant sects and challenging the Catholic monopoly on theocracy. This movement further spurred the separation of Church and state, solidifying it into a more robust institutional gene. Initially, Protestants were labeled heretical by the Catholic Church and faced persecution and execution in many countries. This hostility and animosity between the Catholic and Protestant Churches ignited decades of religious warfare. To safeguard freedom of belief and expression, the separation of Church and state was institutionalized during the Glorious Revolution and became a pivotal factor in establishing constitutional government in England.
In contrast, the keju Confucianism system was an inseparable part of secular authority from its inception. There was never a separation of keju and state in Chinese history, nor any demand for such a separation. The sole function of the keju system was to serve and uphold imperial authority. Notably, even for prominent pro-constitution reformers of the Late Qing period, such issues were never up for debate or deliberation.
Finally, let me conclude this section by emphasizing that even where the Church fell under royal influence, it preserved its separate identity. This distinction is clear because the divine right of kings had to be ratified by the Church. When the Church ordained a monarch, it communicated to its subjects that it was acting as the executor of God’s will and judgment. This stands in contrast with the Chinese model, where the emperor was inherently divine and regarded as the Son of Heaven. Confucianism and the keju system formed a conglomerate of beliefs and institutions, carefully crafted by imperial scholars to reinforce imperial rule. Everything linked with Confucianism, from religious doctrine to rituals, fell under the emperor’s control.
5.1.3 Independent Scholarship: The Church versus the Keju System
Under the tradition of relative separation of Church and state, a prominent characteristic of higher education and scientific research systems in medieval Europe was the relative autonomy of Church-run educational and academic institutions from secular governments. Given that Christianity was the state religion, secular authorities had to acknowledge that God reigned over both government and monarchy, thus they could not exercise full control over how the clergy and their congregations explored God and the Bible. Consequently, believers could pursue an understanding of the Creator’s wisdom independently of the secular regime and were allowed to assemble, publish, and preach within the boundaries sanctioned by the papacy. As history turns out, the independent scholarship facilitated by the separation of Church and state is fundamental to the nurturing of constitutionalist thought and pivotal for scientific progress.
While the medieval monarchy was autocratic, the Church, being relatively independent of royal authority, was able to systematically and institutionally cultivate intellectuals who dedicated their entire lives to understanding God and His created world. Such an understanding could indirectly challenge secular authority. This is because when the divine right of kings is invoked, any suggestion that the king is misguided about God presents a fundamental challenge to the secular order. Consequently, it was not just the Church but also the medieval monarchies that were highly stringent about banning and suppressing heretics. A divergent interpretation of God could fundamentally undermine the foundations of secular power and its perceived “legitimacy.”
These independent explorations in theology and social issues drove the Reformation, catalyzed the Enlightenment, and systematically laid the groundwork for concepts of human rights. These thinkers postulated that, since God is superior to the monarch, any monarch or man-made institution must defer to the will of the Creator. Consequently, all humans, being creations of God, should inherently possess inalienable basic rights. In this respect, our modern understanding of human rights, the rule of law, and the institutional and ideological constraints imposed on monarchs are all intrinsically linked to the fundamental concepts of Christianity. This forms the origin of the foundational ideas regarding human rights and equality as articulated by Locke prior to the Glorious Revolution.
Another crucial aspect pertains to the incentives offered by the contrasting institutions. In Europe, the separation of secular and divine power meant that the Church, barring corruption, had no secular or material incentives. Clergy and believers focused solely on God, viewing the promise of reward in the afterlife as the only incentive rather than seeking power and wealth in their earthly lives. The doctrine of original sin stipulated that anyone seeking entry into heaven had to atone for their sins during their lifetime. As this atonement could not be quantified, the promised reward was of a spiritual, not worldly, nature.
However, Christianity (along with its precursor, Judaism and the deist and pantheist beliefs which evolved from Christianity following the Enlightenment) offered powerful spiritual incentives to believers. Redemption, coupled with the curiosity and passion to comprehend God’s world, inspired selfless pursuits among the faithful, including a deep quest for spiritual and scientific truth, sometimes extending to the brink of martyrdom.
This spiritual incentive was in stark contrast to the one provided by the keju system, where participants were primarily driven by the goal of securing governmental positions. Pursuing an understanding of God and the principles of Creation, scholars affiliated with the Church committed themselves to meticulous reasoning and the systematic observation of the cosmos and the living world. They postulated that since all things were created by God and adhered to God’s laws, the only way to truly know God was to understand the natural world and the rules it followed. Consequently, contrary to the Chinese keju system, which functioned as an extension of state power, the Christian Church established and nurtured educational institutions independent of secular authority. This, in turn, facilitated the emergence of an educated class that was independent of the government.
Conversely, within the Chinese Empire, advanced education and the keju system were simply extensions of the imperial court. Alongside the development of a nascent examination system, the Han dynasty established the Grand Academy (taixue 太学) in the capital, Chang’an. This academy was tasked with serving the empire and it was supported by affiliated academies at all local levels throughout the country. From this point forward, the empire’s education system evolved in lockstep with the examination system. During the Sui-Tang period, the Grand Academy was renamed the Imperial University (guozi jian 国子监), a designation it retained until the keju was abolished in the late Qing dynasty.
As the cultivation of court personnel was the raison d’être of China’s educational institutions, learning and politics were invariably intertwined. Therefore, in Chinese history there never was a system of learning independent of the imperial court, nor were there ever any calls for such a system. Even during vigorous scholars’ movements, when reformists debated on how to reform the empire, the notion of independent scholarship was never brought to the forefront.
Confucianism, the cornerstone of the keju system, espouses the hierarchical principles of obedience to bureaucracy, with the sovereign at the apex, analogous to the obedience of a son to his father. The Grand Academy was tasked with training students with the express purpose of serving the emperor, the Son of Heaven, fostering in them unwavering loyalty to his rule and instilling in them the principle of never challenging the imperial court on matters concerning the rights of the people. The boldest Confucian scholars documented in Chinese history only ever broached policy issues intending to promote the longevity of the empire and enhance the merits of the emperor. Moreover, a typical Confucian scholar in Imperial China displayed little to no interest in natural phenomena or technology and, consequently, would neither engage in independent academic pursuits nor express a desire for academic autonomy.
Institutionally speaking, as the backbone of the empire’s personnel and education systems and the primary promoter of Confucianism, the keju system offered potent, tangible material incentives to scholars across society. Within the imperial system and its educational structure, the singular opportunity for a scholar’s personal advancement was to secure a government position, the only pathway to which lay through the examinations. Anyone who succeeded in these examinations had the chance to rise above their station in society. This was encapsulated in a common saying: “A farm lad at dawn; a court official by dusk.” A scholar’s accomplishments, social status, and rewards were all determined by his exam results.
The following report vividly illustrates the intense motivation among Chinese students to participate in the keju system towards the end of the nineteenth century. After the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform, there was a period when modern educational institutions and the traditional imperial examinations coexisted in certain regions. Yet, students attending modern institutions, even those who were chosen for study abroad programs, were eager to participate in the keju examinations at any given opportunity, even to the point of risking expulsion from their schools. “The allure of the keju exams was irresistible for school pupils, resulting in many lacking the motivation to further pursue their studies [after the abolition of the keju system]” (Guan, Reference Guan2017, p. 132).
Faith and science are unrelated to the keju exams. They were neither tested nor encouraged. The emperor, regarded as the Son of Heaven, was believed to be the only legitimate interpreter of Heaven’s will. Confucian temples were not equivalent to “churches”; they held no authority in interpreting Confucianism, which was the central content of the exams. The examination system was purely a tool for the emperor to maintain control over the state personnel and ideology. The elements of Confucianism to be tested on the keju exam were compiled and revised by imperial scholars.
For the majority of candidates, delving beyond the content of the keju exam to seek deeper insights into Confucianism or to contemplate what constitutes credible historical evidence was unnecessary, as their primary concern was meeting the examiners’ expectations. For them, not only was there no deity superior to the emperor but there was also no ambition beyond securing an official position in the imperial bureaucracy. Their world was confined within the parameters set by the emperor and the keju system reinforced this mindset, leaving little room for free intellectual exploration and it fostered a culture that largely ignored faith and science.
Motivated by the prospect of attaining an official position, generations of talented scholars throughout Chinese history devoted themselves to the pursuit of government careers, fixating on the imperial court and bureaucracy as they secured roles and engaged in power struggles. Generally, these individuals exhibited no interest in exploring the world beyond their official duties. They did not typically seek spiritual fulfillment and had even less curiosity about the natural world or science. The potent incentives provided by the combination of examinations and official evaluations left China with a weak foundation for the development of faith and science. By “science,” in this context, I refer to the pursuit of truth, akin to faith in its own right, rather than merely a collection of techniques or skills.
The keju examinations of the Tang and Song dynasties once included mathematics, astronomy, and calendrics, which were of great value for observing celestial phenomena, compiling almanacs, and guiding agriculture. But for nearly 700 years, from the restoration of the keju in the Yuan (1315) to its abolition (1905), mathematics and science were completely excluded from the imperial examination. This was because if the proliferation of skills in these disciplines led to predictions and the compilation of almanacs from unofficial sources that contradicted those of the state astronomy offices, it would have undermined the legitimacy of the imperial court. Thus, generations of scholars who devoted themselves to the imperial examinations after the Yuan dynasty did not study mathematics and science. Even traditional Chinese medicine, providing significant practical value for the emperor and the court, never featured as a topic on the examinations. Those who studied Chinese medicine were often scholars who had failed the examinations. For example, the eminent doctor Li Shizhen was forced to study Chinese medicine after failing the advanced keju examinations several times, although he passed the bottom-level examination.
The keju had a profound impact on morality in China. Generally, the essence of morality consists of the principles or beliefs that individuals adhere to for self-discipline in situations that cannot be assessed or monitored. However, moral instruction in the keju version of Confucianism was designed to legitimize and maintain the ruling order and it was constructed with testing in mind. Generations of scholars, enticed by the prospect of success on the examinations and securing an official position, prioritized the version of Confucian morality that was being tested in exchange for official roles and material incentives. As a result, the focus of the social elite was shifted towards material gain, leaving faith and morality in the shadows. The notion that “all things are inferior; only learning is superior” has influenced Chinese society for generations, whereas in this context, “learning” refers to excelling on examinations and climbing the rungs of the imperial bureaucracy.
Dai Zhen of the Qing dynasty sharply criticized Zhu Xi’s hypocrisy (later in this chapter I will explain Zhu Xi’s contribution to Confucianism) in his moral teachings – “Cultivate the principles of Heaven, extinguish the desires of Man,” noting that “Cruel officials kill by laws while Neo-Confucians kill by their preaching.” Lu Xun of the early twentieth century was more direct, saying that although “every page of Chinese history has the words ‘benevolence, righteousness, and morality’ written on it,” the actual meaning was “cannibalism” (Diary of a Madman). In line with the criticisms levied by Dai Zhen and Lu Xun, there exists an old Chinese adage lamenting hypocrites who “bear virtue and morality on their tongues but harbor greed and lust in their bellies.”
5.2 The Emergence and Evolution of Official Confucianism and the Keju System
Confucianism and the keju in China, along with Christianity and the Christian Church in the West, have had profound impacts on Chinese and Western societies from both institutional and cultural perspectives throughout two millennia. They serve as the “institutional genes” that guide institutional evolution in both East and West. In this section, I will investigate and compare the emergence and evolution of these two systems. I will begin by examining the topics of religious and institutional monism and pluralism in both China and the West.
Religious monism and pluralism arose in significantly different historical contexts in China and the West. Christianity was predominantly monolithic prior to the Reformation. The Church was intolerant not only of other religions but also of heterodox interpretations of the Bible and God by various Christian sects. The Reformation ignited a protracted series of wars between Catholics and Protestants. Only after the Western countries gradually established constitutional governments, which safeguarded freedom of belief and expression, did religious pluralism become the standard norm.
In contrast, under China’s imperial rule, where everything was tailored to serve the secular power, the empire was relatively tolerant towards religions and ideologies, as long as they obeyed the authority, notwithstanding fluctuations over time. On the religious side, there was a degree of tolerance and pluralism at certain times in the empire’s history, provided they pledged to obey the emperor’s orders. Consequently, the official version of the Confucian classics was adjusted to include elements of Taoism, Buddhism, and other beliefs. However, on the secular front, there was never any tolerance for pluralistic ideas that challenged the imperial authority, and religions were compelled to submit to imperial rule.
Contrary to the coexistence of divine and secular dual institutions in Europe, the Chinese imperial system was a monopolistic institution. No other system was permitted to exist outside the control of the imperial power and the keju system served as the backbone of this monolithic imperial order. Functionally and by design, it was an exclusive system, allowing no room for competition. As for the apparent “inclusiveness” of the official interpretation of Confucianism, such assimilation was entirely intended to serve the monarchical rule of the emperor.
All imperial systems shared a common characteristic: the utilization of violence to suppress and eradicate any ideology or religion that threatened their dominance (for the concept of a imperial system, see Section 1.2). This is evident in both the nascent unified Chinese Empire, which witnessed book-burning and live burials of Confucian scholars, and the Roman Empire, which fiercely suppressed the emerging Christianity. Strikingly, these same empires, in later years, would elevate the ideologies they once sought to extinguish, promoting them to the status of a state religion or the guiding philosophy of state institutions.
After consolidating his empire, Qin Shi Huang took dramatic measures to dismantle the residual aristocratic power of the Zhou dynasty’s feudal system. He abolished the enfeoffment of nobles and converted their ancestral lands into possessions of the emperor. The so-called junxian system (referenced in Chapter 4), which was widely established at the time, ensured that each region within this vast unified empire was governed by officials appointed by the central government. There were no hereditary noblemen with local power; only the emperor held hereditary authority.
Legalist governance (also detailed in Chapter 4) was particularly rigorous with its system of punishments and rewards, reinforcing the principle that, “those who obeyed would prosper and those who disobeyed would perish.” Despite these measures and the establishment of a unified imperial system, the empire continually faced challenges from remnants of the feudal aristocracy, Confucian scholars, and their affiliated literature.
5.2.1 Emergence of the Examination System and the Creation of the Confucian Classics
Institutions are inextricably linked to public consensus. The Qin Empire established two institutional genes of China’s imperial system: the junxian system and the imperial land system. However, tyranny, established solely on the basis of violence and expropriation, confronted serious challenges to its legitimacy of rule.
Qin Shi Huang’s transition from feudalism to the imperial junxian system disrupted noble interests and sparked fierce opposition. In 213 bce, the official, Chunyu Yue, demanded a return to the practice of feudalism, citing the Confucian classics and arguing that ignoring historical practices would lead to administrative failure. On the contrary, Chancellor Li Si, a Legalist, criticized Confucians for dwelling on the past at the expense of the present and proposed banning Confucianism. Qin Shi Huang adopted Li’s advice, burned all the Confucian classics, including the Book of Songs and the Collection of Ancient Texts, and executed those found discussing those works by burying them alive.
Using the Legalist approach of book-burning and live burials of Confucian scholars, without an ideology to lend legitimacy to its rule, the Qin Empire was short-lived. The succeeding Han Empire sought to legitimize its reign by endorsing the official version of Confucianism as the sole ideology and suppressing all other schools of thought. Simultaneously, it introduced an early form of the imperial examination system to select government officials, thereby strengthening the imperial bureaucracy.
From the Han dynasty’s endorsement of official Confucianism to the establishment of the formal keju system in the Sui dynasty and its subsequent refinement throughout the Song dynasty and beyond, the official Confucianism, which formed the essence of the keju, consistently evolved in tandem with the evolution of the imperial system. The reason I use the term official “Confucianism” is to remind readers that much of what is recognized as a Confucian classic was not actually written by the founding sages Confucius and Mencius. As Kang Youwei discovered through textual research, The Ancient Classics, which had been the core of the imperial examinations since the Eastern Han, were in fact forged by Liu Xin at the end of the Western Han dynasty (206 bce to 24 ce). According to Liang Qichao, this work by Kang “has shaken the very foundation of the orthodox school of Qing Confucian learning, and all ancient books must be re-examined and revalued.”2
Once Confucianism was securely entrenched as the “state religion,” the book-burning and live burial of scholars became taboo in the Chinese imperial tradition, reviled and cursed by officials and literati throughout the ages. Yet, the burning-burial atrocities lingered in the institutional genes of the imperial system, intrinsically linked to autocracy, and the legacy eventually manifested itself in the form of totalitarianism. Mao Zedong, the CCP chairman, proudly portrayed the campaigns against counterrevolutionaries and “rightists” and the Cultural Revolution as a continuation of Qin’s burnings and burials (Chapters 11 and 12). On May 8, 1958, at the 2nd Session of the CCP’s 8th National Congress, Mao depicted Qin Shi Huang as a master strategist, who prioritized the present over the past, and he declared:
Qin Shi Huang? He’s nothing. He merely buried 460 Confucian scholars; we’ve buried 46,000! In our campaign against counterrevolutionaries, haven’t we exterminated some counterrevolutionary intellectuals? I’ve debated with democrats. You label us as Qin Shi Huang, but no, we surpass him a hundredfold. You berate us as dictators, likening us to Qin Shi Huang, and we admit to all of it. The pity is you don’t say it enough, and often we have to add to it.
The Han Empire, succeeding the brief rule of the Qin, inherited the latter’s institutions. Its four-century-long reign and substantial territorial expansion were inextricably linked to its efforts to complement the exercise of violence with the establishment of legitimacy. The Han Empire molded the Confucian teachings into state-sanctioned classics to legitimize the ruling order and the emperor’s authority, which it promoted extensively. Gradually, the Chinese imperial system evolved into a comprehensive control mechanism that combined Confucianism with the severity of Legalism. The official interpretation of Confucianism emphasized the emperor as the Son of Heaven and the sole legitimate ruler. Only officials appointed by the emperor held legitimacy, thus excluding the hereditary landed aristocrats from the system. This underlying logic paralleled the Roman Empire’s decision to accept Christianity, which it had once persecuted, as the state religion.
After its violent establishment, the Han Empire sought to offer incentives to significant figures within the emperor’s alliance. Emperor Han Gao Zu ennobled over a hundred of his political and military allies, leading to a hybrid system of centrally governed districts and enfeoffed principalities. This action partially relinquished the junxian system and reintroduced a form of feudal order. Throughout the empire, lands were granted to the emperor’s siblings and most accomplished ministers, while areas surrounding the capital remained under direct imperial rule.
This arrangement bore resemblances to the Warring States period (475–221 bce), when rulers of self-governing royal houses aimed to attract “roving advisors” – the most intellectually distinguished individuals – to their service. “In the early years of the Han, feudal lords and princes managed their own people and sought wise counsel. The Prince of Wu, for instance, recruited roving advisors from all directions.”3
Institutional genes inherited from the old Zhou regime were further reinstated following the death of Emperor Han Gao Zu. As regional lords began vying for power and defying the central imperial authority, Emperors Wen and Jing sought to regain control, leading to the Rebellion of the Seven States in 154 bce. In response to rising feudal powers, Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 bce) issued the renowned “Grace Decree” (Tui-en Ling 推恩令).
The decree allowed vassal descendants to inherit fiefs, alleviating resentment. However, it also mandated the division of fiefs among all sons of the vassals, thereby systematically diluting and limiting their power. This ruling, while aimed at curbing and eventually eliminating the influence of the vassals, cleverly aligned with the self-interest of most vassal descendants.
From that point on, all Chinese imperial rulers adopted this strategy, which proved conducive to their objectives. Consequently, the primogeniture system was officially abolished in the Chinese Empire, making the rejection of primogeniture an integral element in the institutional genes of the imperial land system. This shift fundamentally weakened the power of the local lords and eradicated the base of the landed aristocracy.
Nevertheless, local lords continued to resist integration into the unified empire’s territory, recruiting scholars to aid their cause.4 In competition with these vassals, to draw these advisors towards serving the unified imperial governance, Emperor Wu of Han established the Grand Academy system in 136 bce. Located in the capital, this Academy was pivotal in training government officials. Meanwhile, provincial and prefectural authorities were tasked with assessing and nominating suitable candidates, subject to quotas, for government positions (Yu, Reference Yu2005).
In a bid to legitimize the unified imperial system that centralized power and aligned the itinerant advisors with a shared ideology, Emperor Wu adopted scholar-official Dong Zhongshu’s proposal to, “Dismiss other schools of thought and revere only the Six Confucian Classics.”5 Dong’s Confucian teachings, like the “mutual correspondence between Heaven and man” and the “Grand Unity” of the universal empire, were adopted as the official doctrine. Consequently, Confucianism became the dominant philosophy in the Han Empire,6 and an examination system was established to select intellectuals who conformed to Confucianism as candidates for the imperial bureaucracy.7
By the second half of the first century bce, the Grand Academy enrolled up to 3,000 students and approximately 100 individuals passed the official examinations each year, earning positions in various government departments. This marked the early form of the keju system. As a result, the Confucian principles regarding protocol and rituals were officially codified into law. However, it is worth noting that the official version of Confucianism deviated from and even contradicted certain aspects of the original Confucian teachings.
The book-burnings during the Qin dynasty resulted in a scarcity of resources for Confucian scholars during the early Western Han (the Western Han was the first part of the Han dynasty) period. This scarcity, coupled with the significance of Confucian texts, created an opportunity for fabrication. Towards the end of the Western Han period and during the short-lived Xin dynasty (9–23) that followed, the scholar-official Liu Xin (刘歆) claimed to have discovered a vast collection of pre-Qin Confucian texts, which had a transformative impact on Confucianism. Due to his close relationship with the throne, particularly with the Xin dynasty’s founder Wang Mang (seen as a temporary usurper from the Han perspective), Liu Xin’s “old texts” became the new classics of Confucianism. These texts subsequently became the central material for the imperial examinations and continued to hold that position until the abolition of the keju system in the twentieth century. However, since Sima Guang in the eleventh century, many scholars have argued, providing evidence, that Liu Xin falsified these classics to gain favor with the emperor.
During the later part of the Han Empire, the Eastern Han dynasty, Confucianism underwent extensive standardization, promoted by several generations of emperors and imperial courts. Emperor Zhang of the Eastern Han dynasty convened the Bai Hu Tang Meeting in 79 ce, building upon earlier imperial symposia on Confucianism. The discussions and outcomes of this meeting were compiled into a document known as the Baihu tongyi (白虎通义) (Comprehensive Understandings from White Tiger Hall). This document outlined the core principles and regulations of Confucianism and served as a governance code during the Eastern Han period (Li, Reference Courtois, Werth, Panné J.-L., Paczkowski, Bartošek, Margolin and Kramer1999, vol. 1, p. 506).
The Baihu tongyi systematically transformed the official Confucian teachings into official Confucianism, asserting that the sovereign possesses divine status. Simultaneously, it reaffirmed the doctrine of the Three Principles and Five Virtues (Sangang Wuchang), the foremost principle of which stipulates that “ministers are subject to the orders of the Sovereign” (jun wei chen gang). In Confucianism, the Son of Heaven serves as both the head of state and the ultimate religious authority. Hence the statement: “To no one but the Son of Heaven does it belong to order ceremonies, to fix the measures, and to determine the written characters.”8
In this context, “ceremonies” refer to religious protocol and rituals. “Measures” denote the bureaucratic system, other political and economic systems, and the system of weights and measures. “Written characters” symbolize a unified written script, a consistent system for textual verification, and a unified national ideology based on a singular collection of writings.
In summary, official Confucianism was shaped by the emperors and their advisors, who deliberately assembled and selected from the corpus of the Confucian classics. The deities and canon of Confucianism were forged through official processes, even though they were presented as ancient classics to bolster their authority when needed. This differs significantly from the evolution of Christianity, where the divinity of Christ and the establishment of the Bible as the Christian canon were firmly in place long before Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, Christianity evolved from Judaism, an already mature religion, providing it with a well-established theological foundation.
But even among the Confucian scholars who had to adhere to the prescribed norms, some early doubters questioned the authenticity of the official Confucian scriptures. Song dynasty scholars such as Sima Guang and Hong Mai expressed skepticism about the Confucian classic Zhou li (Rites of the Zhou), suggesting it was a forgery by Liu Xin (Yu, Reference Yu1991). More detailed scrutiny was undertaken by Qing scholars, including Liu Fenglu, Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, Shao Yichen, and Liao Ping in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their work confirmed that Liu Xin had fabricated and misconstrued the ancient scriptures.
Building on the research of Liao Ping and others, Kang Youwei published his magnum opus, Xinxue weijing kao （新学伪经考） (A Study of Forged Classics from the Xin Dynasty), in 1891. This work played a pivotal role in advocating for the Hundred Days’ Reform movement, of which Kang was a key proponent.
In his summary of the evidence from prior studies, Kang concluded that several so-called “ancient” classics such as the Zhou li, Yi li (逸礼) (Etiquette and Rites), Guwen shangshu (Old-Text Book of Documents), Zuo zhuan (Zuo’s Commentary), and Mao shi (毛诗) (Book of Songs, Mao Version) were in reality “pseudo-classics” fabricated by Liu Xin during the late Western Han dynasty to assist Wang Mang in usurping power.
Kang opined, “Liu Xin falsified the classics, distorting the teachings of the sages; and Zheng Xuan propagated the forgeries, leading Confucian learning astray.” Kang further pointed out that the forged classics used in the keju exams were designed to aid the emperor and reinforce the existing imperial order.
Historian Qian Mu challenged the claims of Liao Ping and Kang Youwei. However, independent research by scholars such as Qian Xuantong, Gu Jiegang, Guo Moruo, and others confirmed that Liu Xin’s “discovery” of the ancient texts was indeed fraudulent. For instance, Feng Youlan argued that Liu Xin had fabricated the Zuo zhuan by extracting content from the Guoyu (Discourses of the States) (Feng, Reference Feng1985).
Because of the resistance of the old institutional genes, for the new institutional genes to emerge and attain dominance, it often requires many iterations. Although the Han dynasty created Confucianism and the imperial exam system, this nascent system failed to be universally implemented. In the late Eastern Han dynasty, leading lineage families dominated politics, creating a de facto aristocracy that rendered the imperial government impotent. The Grand Academy and the keju examination system went into decline and the dynasty eventually dissolved.
5.2.2 The Establishment of a Full-Fledged Keju System
For over 360 years following the Han dynasty, the unified empire ceased to exist, except for a brief period of unification during part of the Western Jin dynasty (265–316 ce). This period constituted the longest stretch of disunity in the more than two-thousand-year history of Imperial China. In 581 ce, Emperor Wen of Sui reunified the empire by force.
Learning from the experience of the Han dynasty, the Sui emperors institutionalized the imperial examinations to solidify the unified imperial system and prevent the accumulation of power within the nobility. In terms of its contribution to the creation of a long-lasting imperial system, the establishment of the keju system in the Sui dynasty was as pivotal as the establishment of the junxian system (prefecture and county system), and the imperial land system in the Qin dynasty.
Emperor Wen’s initial move was to abolish the inherited nine-grade ranking system in the bureaucracy, thereby ending the appointment of officials based on lineage ranking. At the central level, the government was restructured into Five Departments and Six Ministries. Local authorities were reorganized into prefectures and counties. To weaken the power of the nobility, Emperor Wen emphasized that regional governors must be appointed by the imperial court and could not be representatives from the local clans.
Addressing the fundamental issue of identifying capable bureaucrats and managing ideology, the emperor expanded the institutions inherited from the preceding dynasty, the Grand Academy and the National University (guozi xue), which was the predecessor of the Imperial University (guozi jian) under Emperor Yang, promoted Confucianism, encouraged the practice of rituals, and elevated Confucianism to the status of an indispensable part of governing the empire.9 He also mandated localities to select and recommend candidates regularly to the central government, where their suitability for official positions would be determined through examinations on Confucianism. Consequently, schools proliferated across the regions, leading to a flourishing of Confucianism.10
The second emperor of the Sui dynasty was the official creator of the keju system. Upon his ascension to the throne in 604, an imperial edict was issued to establish Confucianism as the sole doctrine, excluding all other teachings. At the same time, the Imperial University and the Grand Academy were re-established and prefecture-and-county-level colleges were created.
In the second year of his reign, he instituted the jinshi degree, which was directly assessed by the imperial court, thereby laying the foundation for the keju system. Two years later, the emperor issued further edicts concerning various aspects of the examination system, including the introduction of ten examination subjects (Du, Reference Du1988). From then on, the keju system became the foundational system for controlling state personnel and ideology in the empire.
The initial keju system was divided into the xiucai (秀才) and jinshi (进士) sections. The relatively junior xiucai section was responsible for selecting official support staff, while the more senior jinshi section was in charge of selecting officials. The Ministry of Rites was tasked with assessing both the students of the Imperial University and those recommended by local authorities. The jinshi examination eventually became the principal gateway to a career in officialdom. Candidates who were successful on the jinshi examinations would then sit for a special examination conducted by the Ministry of Personnel before they were assigned official posts.
In the early years of the keju system, senior officials still maintained the privilege of bypassing the examinations to place their sons and protégés into government posts. However, this privilege was eventually eliminated. Initially, students from the Imperial University were primarily descendants of the nobility, as only the wealthy could afford to study and take examinations over several years. Most of the sages recommended by the local authorities also came from privileged backgrounds. However, these advantages diminished over time, systematically reducing the opportunities for the elites to form forces that could challenge imperial power.
Building on the foundations of the Sui, the keju was further stabilized and institutionalized during the Tang dynasty (618–907). Emperor Taizong of the Tang (r. 626–649) expanded access to education, enlarging schools and increasing student numbers. Empress Wu Zetian (r. 690–705) initiated what became the palace examinations when she began personally assessing nominees on policy and administration in the imperial palace. During the reign of Emperor Xuanzong (r. 713–756), eight court examinations were conducted by specially appointed senior officials, a practice that became standard. From Empress Wu onwards, the keju system included examinations in literacy and martial arts but never in science or technology – a situation that continued until the abolition of the keju in the early twentieth century.
Despite the keju system being consolidated and expanded during the Tang dynasty, it was still not sufficiently institutionalized. The enduring influence of traditionally powerful families facilitated some local high officials to evolve into de facto aristocrats, becoming local warlords whose power could be passed down through generations. Consequently, feudal warlords re-emerged in some regions during the mid-to-late Tang period.
In this context, General An Lushan leveraged his high-ranking righteous father and ultimately instigated the rebellion known as the An-Shi Rebellion, which precipitated the terminal decline of the Tang dynasty. In the process of suppressing the rebellion, the Tang court was compelled to bestow territories on rebel generals to secure their support, further fortifying the power of these lineages. In turn, these same families made efforts to undermine Confucianism and the keju system, seeking to maintain their dominance and challenge the imperial authority.
After the An-Shi Rebellion, some Confucian scholars sought to convince the emperor to re-establish the keju system and restore Confucianism in order to save the empire from further decline. They claimed that the root cause of the societal unrest was the decline of and general disregard for Confucianism. They emphasized that the essential Confucian principles of reverence for family and political hierarchy, along with loyalty to a wise sovereign, could have prevented the An-Shi Rebellion and halted the disconnection of local governors from central authority (Li, Reference Courtois, Werth, Panné J.-L., Paczkowski, Bartošek, Margolin and Kramer2000, vol. 2, p. 9).
Nonetheless, the nobility had grown powerful by then and resistance against the keju was robust. After the Huang Chao Uprising (878–884), more territories fell under the control of local warlords and the regional nobility emerged stronger than ever before. The Tang Empire collapsed under the pressures exerted by this rising aristocracy, leading to the disintegration of the united empire once again.
5.3 The Confucian Keju System Becomes a Mature Institutional Gene
The Confucian keju system, established by the imperial court since the Han, Sui, and Tang dynasties, was aimed at creating an ideological framework that legitimized imperial rule and at strengthening the imperial bureaucracy that weakened, and even aimed to eradicate, the nobility. But the Confucian keju system was not fully institutionalized in that period. It suffered a decline towards the end of the Han and Tang dynasties, paving the way for the emergence of a de facto aristocracy, territorial fragmentation, and the eventual collapse of the unified empire.
Nevertheless, the Confucian keju system, which had been evolving for centuries, emerged as an institutional gene, although it was far from mature at the end of the Tang dynasty. Adhering to the institutional heritage of the Tang, the monarchs of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, the rulers of the fragmented Chinese Empire, each incorporated Confucianism to lend legitimacy to their rule and utilized the keju system to maintain a hold on their bureaucracies. The behavior of the founder of the short-lived Liang dynasty (907–923) illustrates this point. Despite his notoriety for being untrustworthy, he claimed that his regime was divinely ordained. Throughout his reign, he venerated Confucius and revived and expanded the keju system.11 It is noteworthy that during this period, in conjunction with the expansion of the keju system, the Confucian classics were first produced using woodblock printing (Li, Reference Courtois, Werth, Panné J.-L., Paczkowski, Bartošek, Margolin and Kramer2000, vol. 2, pp. 86–107), a development that occurred more than four centuries before the Bible was printed.
Upon re-establishing a unified empire and with the institutional genes of the Confucian keju system substantially developed, the Song dynasty fully institutionalized the Confucian keju system. This resulted in a stable and unified structure of the imperial system in China from the Song dynasty onwards. Subsequently, no aristocratic force capable of challenging the imperial power ever surfaced again.
Emperor Taizu of the Song dynasty (960–1279), who ascended to the throne by a military coup, was aware of the lessons of the decline of Confucianism in the late Han and Tang dynasties and of the urgent need to establish the legitimacy of his rule. At the beginning of his reign, he began to restore and construct Confucian temples, build new schools, and facilitate the mass printing of the Confucian classics for circulation. Thereafter, throughout the Song dynasty, expanding Confucianism and improving the keju system remained a priority for the court, further enhancing this integral part of the institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system.
During the Song dynasty, two major reforms to the Confucian keju system were undertaken, each leaving a profound imprint on the functioning of the system in subsequent dynasties. The first was initiated by Wang Anshi, who sought to restore the original interpretations of the Confucian classics and update the examination topics accordingly. Wang contended that the original teachings of Confucianism had been lost in the wake of the Qin dynasty’s book-burnings and live burials, resulting in the proliferation of heterodox teachings facilitated by fabricated content in the classics that had been handed down ever since.12 In 1072, Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) gave his approval to Wang Anshi’s proposal and appointed him to lead a new bureau tasked with reinterpreting the classical texts of Confucianism. Wang Anshi’s reinterpreted versions of these classics became the foundation for the keju exams. Editions of these reinterpreted classics were distributed to the imperial family, the Grand Academy, and prefectural colleges all across the country.
Wang Anshi utilized reinterpreting the classics as a theoretical instrument for advocating his reforms. While on the surface he appeared to be reviving the Confucian canon, in reality, he was extrapolating from these texts his own perspectives on contemporary governance. This approach was known in antiquity as “invoking ancient precedents to promote reform.” In essence, he tried to influence and unify the thinking of all keju candidates by abridging, interpreting, and annotating classical sources, and thereby to justify and promote reform. As a result, the Neo-Confucianism of the Song dynasty replaced the classicist Confucianism of the Han and Tang dynasties, both on the keju and in society at large. Nine centuries later, Wang Anshi’s strategy was replicated by Kang Youwei, whose critiques of the Confucian content of the keju examinations sparked the Hundred Days’ Reform movement.
An important part of Wang’s keju reform was to establish his work, The Three Classics, as a classic in its own right and alter the form and content of the keju. Old rules for recruiting officials, based on poetry and prose skills, familiarity with excerpts from the classics, and textual exegesis, were discarded. A new jinshi examination was introduced, with standard answers drawn from the Three Classics.
Subsequently, generations of Chinese scholars studied this version of the ancient classic in preparation for the keju exams. The Three Classics had a profound influence on Neo-Confucianism during the Song dynasty, prompting a shift from the dissemination of exegesis of Han and Tang Confucianism to a pursuit of righteousness. The key point here is that although Confucian schools and the content of the imperial examinations could differ, their ultimate goals were all the same. They were designed for the sake of secular emperorship, not for divine authority. Essentially, what Wang Anshi did for Emperor Shenzong mirrored what Liu Xin had undertaken for Emperor Wang Mang of the Xin dynasty – interpreting the classics to facilitate political rule.
The philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200), from the late Southern Song dynasty, had an even greater influence on the development of the Confucian classics and the keju system than Wang Anshi. Zhu Xi served the court under four Song emperors, moving up and down the ranks of the bureaucracy. Having a thorough knowledge of the classics and court politics, he was acutely aware of what was most useful for the keju exams and knew how to adapt the Confucian classics to serve political needs.
Zhu Xi’s method of standardizing and popularizing the Confucian classics held immense value for the empire, hence his work was canonized by emperors succeeding the Song dynasty. His most enduring legacy was the distillation of the essence of Confucianism into a framework of the Three Principles and Five Virtues (Sangang Wuchang 三纲五常), which provided moral guidance for individuals and also served as the ideological foundation for the imperial societal order. The first principle emphasized that the ruled, as subjects of the sovereign, were obligated to obey and could not challenge the emperor in any manner. This framework, he claimed, constituted the universal principle of imperial rule, which would endure regardless of which dynasty was in power or who was the ruler. He declared:
There is only one principle in the universe. The heavens obtain it and become the heavens, the earth obtains it and becomes the earth, and all living beings born between heaven and earth obtain it and follow their nature. Its extension is manifested in the Three Principles, and its order is established in the Five Virtues. This principle flows everywhere, there is nowhere it does not reach.13
Zhu selected what became the Four Classic Books from the Confucian classics, in order to unify the concepts of the Three Principles and Five Virtues. The Three Principles stated that: “When a subject serves his ruler, a child serves his father, and a wife serves her husband, the three relationships are in harmony, and the world is in order. If the three relationships are contrary, the world is in chaos.”14 Zhu’s distillation of these notions was so effectively instilled into society that everyone was brainwashed even before they could read.
In addition to the Confucian classics, Zhu Xi promoted the ancestral shrine system to further extend Confucianism to every corner of society in an institutionalized manner, far beyond the scope of the imperial examinations. In the time of Confucius and Mencius, during the Zhou dynasty, rulers worshipped their ancestors in local clan temples. After Qin established the unified empire, local bureaucrats replaced regional princes and nobles. Even the most influential officials were deprived of their land-based powers and were not allowed to build clan temples in the areas they were sent to. These imperialist practices undermined the foundations of Confucianism. The Confucian texts destroyed by the burning of books could be recreated by collecting the old and fabricating the new. But after the destruction of the social tradition on which Confucianism rested, Confucianism would find it difficult to become the state religion in society, if there were no corresponding new traditions being created in society. It is from this aspect Zhu Xi’s contribution was profound. He proposed that leading clans should construct ancestral shrines in their hometowns. The ancestors of the outgoing officials had family members to worship in their hometowns. According to the classics, only Grand Masters and above could maintain an ancestral shrine, but the practice gradually spread through society. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, it became common for ordinary families to construct their own clan temples. This widespread ancestral worship reinforced a Confucian mindset, which emphasized the emulation of ancestral models, contributing to the empire’s social stability. Additionally, ancestral shrines served a secular function by preserving a moral framework built upon clan rules. Thus, while politics and religion merged within the structures of Confucianism at the imperial level, a similar union occurred within the Confucian micro-kingdoms of the ancestral shrines at the community level (Li, Reference Courtois, Werth, Panné J.-L., Paczkowski, Bartošek, Margolin and Kramer2000, vol. 2, pp. 590–592).
In terms of the keju system, the Song keju started by following the Tang tradition. However, it later underwent several far-reaching reforms. Most notably, Emperor Taizu instituted the palace examination. All who passed the palace examination were designated as “disciples of the Son of Heaven,” effectively students of the emperor, which furthered the imperial control of ideology and personnel.
Additionally, the Song dynasty also introduced a three-tier system of examinations, comprising prefectural, provincial, and palace examinations. Successful candidates from the prefectural examination were sent to the imperial capital as juren for the provincial examination, which lasted for three days. The final examination, the palace examination, took place in the imperial palace. The emperor himself presided and decided on the final ranking of the successful candidates. From the time of Emperor Taizu onwards, those who acquired a jinshi degree on the palace examination were directly appointed as officials, bypassing the need for further evaluation by the Personnel Ministry. The three-tier examination system was maintained in this way for over a millennium.
The Song dynasty raised the quota for award of the degree of jinshi to 70 or 80 per examination cycle, up from 20 or 30 in the Tang dynasty. The best graduates were divided into three grades: jinshi with distinction (first class), jinshi with merit (second class), and associate jinshi (third class). During the 320 years of the Northern and Southern Song era, the imperial examinations were held 118 times and over 20,000 graduates were accepted as officials.
The Southern Song was conquered by the Mongol-ruled Yuan Empire (1271–1368) shortly after Zhu Xi’s time. The Mongol emperors recognized the importance of the Confucian keju system for asserting ruling legitimacy and establishing a bureaucracy. So, they swiftly adopted the corresponding institutional elements. Even before assuming the throne, the Yuan founder, Kublai Khan, engaged Liu Bingzhong and other Confucian scholars to devise a governance plan based on Confucian principles.15 Kublai not only embraced the title “Great Master of Confucianism” (Rossabi, Reference Rossabi1994) but also, on Liu Bingzhong’s advice, named the empire Great Yuan (meaning “primordial force”), drawing this term from the Confucian classic, the Yijing.
The Mongol emperor, Renzong (仁宗) of the Yuan dynasty revived the keju in the second year after he acceded to the throne after the complete annihilation of the Southern Song dynasty (1313 ce). He decreed that scholar-officials would hereafter be assessed based on Zhu Xi’s work, marking the first time in history that Zhu Xi’s work had been elevated to such a stature. Renzong utilized Confucianism as a tool for governance, compelling Mongols and others of Central Asian ethnicity within the empire to study Zhenguan zhengyao (The Essentials of Governance of Emperor Taizong’s Reign), Zizhi tongjian (Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance), Daxue yanyi (Expanded Interpretation of the Great Learning), and related works. He mandated that candidates for official posts be examined based on Zhu Xi’s Sishi jizhu (Collected Commentaries on the Four Books), instituting Zhu’s Neo-Confucianist teachings as the basic syllabus for the keju examinations. During the Yuan dynasty, there were over 400 academies of classical learning and the number of prefectural and county schools reached a peak of over 24,400. What is even more significant is that the examination system remained in its form from 1313 until 1905, when the keju system was abolished.
In 1370, shortly after establishing the Ming dynasty, Emperor Taizu declared: “All Chinese and foreign civil servants must be selected by the keju, and no one would be allowed to obtain an official position without passing the examination.” Moreover, examinations would be grounded in the classic commentaries of Zhu Xi and his fellow thinkers. Emperor Chengzu (also known as Emperor Yongle) later officially made the keju the state’s main channel for recruiting officials, thus opening the route for landlords and even commoners to enter the official-gentry class (Guo, Reference Guo2017, p. 2). Interestingly, despite Taizu’s violent seizure of power and his brutal suppression of challengers to the regime, he strived for stability. He bestowed vassal kingships of various regions to his twenty-five sons but he also explicitly maintained the emperor’s power to curtail these regional rulers (Wang and Gao, Reference Wang and Gao2017, pp. 20–45). He actively promoted the keju as the decisive system for state appointments. Ultimately, it was the keju system that secured the stability and unity of the Ming dynasty.
Ever since the Han emperors fostered Confucianism and established the keju, rulers of every dynasty have sustained and enhanced these in order to retain power. History not only perpetuates systems that work but also tends to repeat many of the specific operations involved, such as manipulating the Confucian classics for the purpose of ruling. In addition to the abridgements and amendments of the Confucian classics by the imperial scholars in the Eastern Han period, the Ming emperors also tampered with the Confucian classics to meet their needs. By comparing the Ming and pre-Ming editions of the Confucian classic Mencius, contemporary scholars discovered nearly a hundred deletions. Numerous passages dealing with the ruler’s self-constraint and respect for the people should allow people to criticize the ruler and oppose harsh taxes, the due benevolence of the ruler and the responsibility of the monarch for any social decay have been removed (Shao, Reference Shao2007; Rong, Reference Rong1947).
After the mid-Ming dynasty, almost all important posts within the imperial bureaucracy were occupied by keju graduates with a jinshi (进士) degree, as reflected by the saying, “No one could join the Hanlin Academy without a jinshi degree, and no one could join the cabinet unless he was a Hanlin.”16 Furthermore, rankings in the imperial bureaucracy aligned closely with examination grades. A Ming minister Wang Lun praised his government’s exemplary management of the keju system, extolling its “orderly selection procedure and graded appointment system” (Guo, Reference Guo2017, p. 9).
Based on that under the Song and Yuan, the keju under the Ming became more mature and more universal and institutionalized. It made admission to a school a prerequisite to participate in the keju. Excellent students selected from prefectural and county schools would be permitted to enroll directly at the Imperial University. Provincial school officials held two levels of examinations and the candidates were divided into six classes according to their performance. Those ranked first and second class progressed to the provincial examination and were classed as xiucai.
The Ming dynasty keju was organized into three tiers: provincial, metropolitan, and palace examinations (乡试、会试、殿试). Provincial examinations were held every three years in each provincial capital. Candidates who passed the provincial examinations earned a juren (举人) degree. The metropolitan examination, in turn, was a national examination conducted by the Ministry of Rites in the year following the provincial examinations. Juren from across the nation would journey to the national capital for the metropolitan examination, administered by a chief imperial examiner. Candidates who succeeded on the metropolitan examination were called gongshi (贡士) and subsequently progressed to the palace examination, held later that same year. The palace examination was presided over by the emperor, who personally determined the final ranking of the examinees. No candidate was eliminated at this level, with the top three examinees gaining “first class” status and the top candidate being granted the title of Zhuangyuan (状元), a distinction which often precipitated rapid promotion.
In the Ming dynasty, the “eight-legged” essay, known as the baguwen (八股文), was the first assessment in the provincial and metropolitan examinations, a format carried over to the examinations of the Qing dynasty. The baguwen, a distinctive writing style, evolved from the Song dynasty’s interpretations of the classics, primarily based on the annotations of Zhu Xi. Passages from the Four Books and Five Classics were chosen as examination topics in the baguwen. Candidates were mandated to use words representing the teachings of the sages, to adhere to a specific essay structure, to limit the number of words, and to maintain paired syntax. Over time, this mechanistic writing style became increasingly rigid. The late Ming reformist, Gu Yanwu, suggested that the emphasis on the baguwen led examiners to overlook the essence of the Confucian classics. He criticized that “while the baguwen flourished, the canonical texts of Confucianism were neglected; while the 18 offices [of examiners] thrived, the histories were forgotten,” adding, in his view, that, “the harm done by the baguwen is worse than the burning of books [by Qin Shi Huang].”
What repressed the scholars more than the baguwen was the prohibition on freedom of speech. From the outset of large-scale education in the Ming dynasty, explicit decrees banned students from expressing opinions on political, social, and judicial matters. During the reign of Emperor Taizu of the Ming dynasty, all schools were required to house a slab stele in their study hall, engraved with this prohibition.17 Violators faced severe punishment. This restriction on freedom of speech was entirely inherited by the Qing dynasty. Shunzhi, the first Qing emperor, implemented the scholar-official examination system, simultaneously mandating the text to be inscribed on Confucian study hall steles throughout the country, prohibiting scholars from expressing heretical views.
In the first year after the Manchus overthrew the Ming Empire (1644) and established the Qing dynasty, the first Qing emperor, while violently suppressing the Han revolt, issued an edict stating that the Confucian keju would be continued in order to enlist and stabilize the people. In the following year, the Qing court promulgated the Keju Provisions, which followed the procedures and contents of the Ming system. Provincial examinations were held in six provinces that year. From then on, large numbers of scholars were lured to take the examinations and in essence defected to the Manchu. Using a combination of soft power and military force, the Qing successfully subjugated the Ming Empire.
For 200 years, the Qing dynasty essentially maintained the keju system similar to that of the Ming dynasty, although some operational changes were made. These included expanding the examination disciplines, thereby providing more opportunities for entrance into officialdom. The metropolitan examinations adopted a selection process on a province-by-province basis, ensuring a certain level of regional equality in the intake of officials. A budgeting system for the examination was also institutionalized. As a fundamental part of the bureaucratic system, like in the Ming dynasty, the keju was the primary pathway to officialdom in the Qing dynasty. Those who gained entry into officialdom through other routes were not only fewer in number but also held less prestige and had fewer promotion opportunities compared to those who went through the keju (Hu and Li, Reference Hu and Li2017, pp. 1–3).
Over centuries of evolution, the Confucian keju system, since the Song dynasty, became an indispensable institutional gene for maintaining a high degree of stability within the imperial system. This was further refined in the Ming and Qing dynasties. By creating official Confucianism, the long-standing empire established a uniform ideology that supported imperial rule and social order. Almost all imperial officials ascended through the ranks by passing the keju examination, becoming deeply versed in standardized Confucian content encompassing ethics, morality, loyalty, filial piety, and etiquette. The keju system, with its high-powered incentives to study and ascend into officialdom, held formidable allure. The purpose of studying was not rooted in faith, curiosity, or the pursuit of truth but in realizing the dream of transitioning from “a farm lad at daybreak to a court official by dusk.” This was how the system enticed scholars to remain loyal to the regime, warning people never to challenge the legitimacy or authority of the rule. However, by the end of the imperial era, the Confucian keju system confronted unprecedented challenges. Despite both the imperial system and the keju officially ceasing to exist after 1911, the institutional genes they left behind continue to influence society significantly, manifesting in various transformed forms.
