The establishment of the Chinese Communist Party as the cornerstone of a communist totalitarian system in China could not have been accomplished without the missionary activities, financial support, and direct recruitment and organizational efforts of the Comintern in China. The Chinese were unaware of Marxist-Leninist ideology until the October Revolution, let alone capable of organizing a Leninist party independently. Comintern agents infiltrated China during a time of intensifying nationalism and a surge in anti-Western and anti-Japanese sentiment, which were stoked by the May Fourth Movement. The immediate catalyst for this movement was the Versailles Treaty at the end of the First World War in April 1919. This treaty ceded sovereignty over Shandong, a Chinese province, from Germany (a defeated nation in the war) to Japan (a victorious nation), even though China had also been on the winning side.
The anti-West frenzy in China provided an excellent opportunity for the Comintern. In 1920, it established its China branch, the CCP, which recruited fifty members nationwide in its first year, thereby sowing the seeds of totalitarianism in China. This was the Comintern’s most significant accomplishment in its global communist revolution endeavors. Just over a decade later, by 1931, the CCP had rapidly grown, leading to the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. By 1949, the CCP took control of the whole country after defeating all forces advocating or sympathizing with constitutionalism.
As discussed in Chapter 9, there was a significant gap between China’s institutional genes and those required to establish constitutionalism, resulting in the failure of both the constitutional reforms of the late Qing era and the subsequent Republican Revolution. But communism, like constitutionalism, was an imported concept and was even less understood by the Chinese until the 1950s. Why, then, had Bolshevism’s fate in China been diametrically opposed to that of constitutionalism? This chapter explains why and how Bolshevism was able to take root in China by analyzing its institutional genes.
The communist totalitarian system established by the Bolsheviks was based upon three basic institutional genes from Tsarist Russia: Tsarist autocracy, secret political organizations, and the Orthodox Church. While communist ideology originates from Christianity, several distinguishing aspects of communist totalitarianism – first realized by Bolshevism – are rooted in Russian Orthodoxy. These include its penetration into all corners of society, the use of propaganda, traditions of confession and a personality cult, a spirit of martyrdom, and a secular governance system of caesaropapism.
Without Russian Orthodoxy as a critical institutional gene, it would have been impossible for China to develop an indigenous communist ideology or a communist totalitarian system centered around this ideology. Indeed, Marxism was only introduced to China in the early twentieth century by a handful of students studying in Japan. Their understanding of Marxism was at best superficial and had much less influence among intellectuals than anarchism did (Xu and Wang, Reference Xu and Wang2015). This small group of Chinese who had a superficial understanding of a few Marxist-Leninist pamphlets could not have made a significant impact on society, let alone established a party like the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the work of the Comintern was indispensable in setting up a totalitarian party in China.
However, simply attributing the success of the CCP in China to the Comintern does not provide a fully convincing explanation, as the Comintern’s efforts to export revolution largely failed elsewhere in the world. For instance, in Germany, it was unable to persuade the Social Democratic Party (SDP) or other significant revolutionary leaders to adopt their stance. It also encountered substantial hurdles in other countries. Why was the Comintern able to make a significant impact in China? There must have been other elements, beyond the efforts of the Comintern alone, that facilitated the eventual triumph of communist totalitarianism in China. The most crucial of these factors is the similarity between certain institutional genes in China, primarily those associated with imperial rule and secret societies, and those of Bolshevism.
Compared to Tsarism, China’s imperial system was more centralized, sophisticated, and deeply rooted in history. In both China and Russia, the imperial tradition served as one of the foundational institutional genes for establishing a modern totalitarian system. Public support for imperial autocracy was even stronger and more widespread in China than in Russia. For the majority of Chinese, particularly intellectuals, the imperial order was the only structure they recognize. Their support for autocratic rule of an imperial nature was often a subconscious response. This remains somewhat true even in today’s China.
Additionally, another institutional gene essential for a totalitarian party is the history of secret insurgent groups in China, a tradition that dates back to the Song dynasty. This parallels the custom of clandestine political organizations in Tsarist Russia. As previously discussed in Chapter 9, the Tongmenghui-KMT was inextricably linked with traditional secret societies like the Hong Fraternity from the early days of the Republican Revolution. Intriguingly, the institutional gene of secret political organizations was indeed an essential and basic ingredient in the establishment and development of the CCP. More interestingly, the CCP deliberately used secret political organizations in the revolution under direct instructions from the Comintern.
To comprehend why Soviet Russia and the Comintern had such a special appeal to some radical Chinese intellectuals, one should consider their positions and demands. As shown in Chapter 9, the great majority of constitutionalist intellectuals (including their leaders and whether they championed a constitutional monarchy or a republican revolution), were primarily concerned with national salvation rather than the basic rights of the people or limiting the power of the monarch or government. Of all the ideologies introduced to China from the West and Japan, Social Darwinism had the most significant influence as it aligned with the ethos of Chinese scholars who believed in the principle that, “Every man bears responsibility for the nation’s rise and fall” (guojia xingwang, pifu youze). This ethos is referred to as “nationalism” in this book for simplicity, though space constraints prevent elaboration of whether this spirit is precisely nationalistic.
After the failure of the “Second Revolution” and Yuan Shikai’s claim to the throne, the government of the ROC in Beijing, known as the Beiyang government, not only controlled merely a portion of China’s territory but also became the target of radical intellectuals. The radicalism of those intellectuals was not rooted in constitutionalism but rather in passionate nationalism, criticizing the government for “selling out the country.” Even moderates were interested in what was known as the New Culture Movement rather than constitutionalism.
In early 1919, China, as a victor of the First World War, participated in the Paris Peace Conference. By the end of April, the world’s major powers voted to transfer the rights and interests of defeated Germany in Shandong Province to victorious Japan. This decision led to the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement, spreading from Beijing to major cities across the country. Ultimately, the government conceded, refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The significance of this movement lies in its profound influence on students and intellectuals. Nominally, the slogans of the Movement included “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science.” Yet the substance of democracy was largely absent from publications of the time; the inseparable connection between democracy and constitutionalism was not recognized; there were only abstract slogans that were open to interpretation (Xu and Wang, Reference Xu and Wang2015, chapter 5). Among the Chinese people, intellectuals in particular, the greatest impact of the May Fourth Movement was a surge in nationalistic and anti-imperialist sentiment.
Lenin astutely seized the momentum of rising nationalism and anti-imperial sentiment in China, making Bolshevism highly appealing to Chinese radical intellectuals. Resistance to imperialism and advocacy for nationalism became the primary conduits for Bolshevism to infiltrate China. The First Soviet Declaration on China (The Karakhan Manifesto), issued in July 1919, proclaimed the unconditional restoration of all rights and interests previously seized from China by the Tsarist regime. It denounced imperialism and exploitation and advocated for a classless society led by the proletariat. Such a strategy rapidly attracted Chinese intellectuals and politicians, already stirred by nationalistic fervor following the May Fourth Movement, towards the Bolsheviks. As stated in the Documents of the First National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth in 1922, “Marxism in China … has been present for only about three years … It was the international capitalist oppression and the Russian proletarian revolution that facilitated its spread” (CASS, 1980, vol. 1, pp. 26–45).
10.1 Communist “Jesuits”: The Comintern’s Infiltration into China
Prior to the Comintern’s arrival, the Chinese imperial system deliberately obstructed the systematic dissemination of any Western ideologies, including Christianity, in China. Although Christianity reached China as early as the Tang dynasty, without a concerted missionary effort, Christian doctrine and Western culture largely remained unknown in China until the Ming dynasty. The Jesuits were the first to attempt a systematic propagation of Western religion and the Church in China. However, from Matteo Ricci’s arrival in China in 1583 to the expulsion of the Jesuits by the Communist Party in 1952, Christianity’s impact in China remained limited. While both the Comintern and the Jesuits were missionary organizations, the former’s accomplishments were incomparable to those of the latter.
Similar to Christianity’s early days in China, only a few Chinese knew of Marxism as one of several varieties of socialism through Japanese literature before the October Revolution. Anarchism was by far the most popular among Chinese radicals at that time. In the initial stages of the October Revolution, the press and public opinion in China were highly skeptical of the Bolsheviks, seeing them as “greedy and aggressive” with a bloodthirsty appetite for power. Therefore, ways had to be found to “guard against” the Bolsheviks in China (quoted from Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, p. 5). After the October Revolution, a few Chinese intellectuals were exposed to the rudiments of Bolshevism in Japanese literature. Li Dazhao was among the earliest to hail the victory of Bolshevism at the end of 1918. However, what he cheered for was less the ideology of Bolshevism itself but rather its religious appeal. He observed that Bolshevism in Russia had “a sort of religious authority and became a mass movement. Not only Russia of today but the world of the twentieth century may not escape being dominated by this religious authority and swept up by this mass movement” (Li, Reference Li1979, vol. 1, pp. 163–165).
At that time, Chinese radical intellectuals embraced various forms of anarchism and socialism, including both Marxist and anti-Marxist ideologies. For instance, Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the CCP, still believed in anarchism until the end of 1919 (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4). Xu Xingzhi, another founder of the CCP, recollected that he, like many others post the May Fourth Movement, was heavily influenced by anarchism until 1922 when he encountered the pamphlet Historical Materialism translated by Li Da.1
As such, Li Dazhao was very much an exception even within the radical left. This peculiarity is part of the reason why Li was the first person the Comintern contacted to organize activities in China. Not surprisingly, Li Dazhao’s understanding of Bolshevism and influence on his fellow radical intellectuals were rather limited. Even his most accomplished follower, Zhang Guotao, recalled that before the Comintern’s delegates arrived in China, the Chinese had virtually no knowledge of Bolshevism, only a few knew about socialism – primarily anarchistic socialism (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, pp. 40–41).
The rapid spread of Bolshevism in China was largely attributable to the entry of the Bolshevik “Jesuits” – the Comintern. More proactive than Jesuit or other Christian missionaries, the Comintern went beyond simply promoting ideology. It took direct political and military actions, financed the establishment of a Leninist Revolutionary Party in China, and coordinated with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. The strategy that proved to be most effective was not promoting Marxism or even communism but rather exploiting the inflating nationalistic sentiment in China.
Following Soviet Russia’s Karakhan Manifesto, which announced that Tsarist-era agreements with China would be nullified and all property that Tsarist Russia had looted from China would be returned, it issued the Second Declaration in 1920. This promised to return the Chinese Eastern Railway and all leased mines and gold mines without compensation, renounced the Boxer Indemnity, and gave up all Russian privileges in China.2
This strategy of Soviet Russia resonated perfectly with the surge in nationalist sentiment that had been sweeping China since the May Fourth Movement. The press praised this Russian initiative as an “unprecedented step towards the betterment of all mankind in world history” and the KMT generally favored Soviet Russia (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, p. 9).
It was not until then that Chen Duxiu, the first leader of the CCP, began to embrace Bolshevism. In the New Year’s issue of Xin qingnian (La Jeunesse) in 1920, Chen hailed the “progressive Leninist government, declaring its intention to assist China.” Chen and Li Dazhao secretly met with Comintern representatives in February and Chen began to systematically promote Leninism after that. Subsequently, with the financial support of the Comintern, La Jeunesse translated and published theories on the dictatorship of the proletariat, causing his colleague Hu Shih to complain that La Jeunesse had become a journal for the translation of Soviet literature (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4).
However, the Bolsheviks, presenting themselves as anti-imperialist allies of China, received widespread acclaim from the Chinese press. Almost all Chinese intellectuals held an uncritical admiration for Soviet Russia. One minor incident illustrates this point clearly. The British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, visited China in 1920. When he shared his recent observations about Soviet Russia and his criticisms of the Bolshevik revolution, he was met with hostility from leading Chinese intellectuals who had previously admired him. Russell’s “anti-Soviet” stance was criticized by prominent intellectuals across the political spectrum, including Hu Shih, Lu Xun, Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Li Da, Chen Wangdao, Shao Lizi, and Cai Hesen, among others. The man who played the largest role in China’s Russell Fever was Zhang Shengfu, a co-founder of the CCP. He introduced Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Zhang Guotao to the party and was Mao’s boss in the Peking University library. Realizing the reactions to his speech, Russell stated in a letter to Zhang, “[I] was persuaded you hated me on account of my criticism of Bolshevism” (Schwarcz, Reference Schwarcz1992, p. 134).
In line with the propaganda efforts of the Karakhan Manifesto, Soviet Russia assigned a secret envoy, M. Popov, to investigate China in 1919 (Chapman, Reference Chapman1928), and secret contacts were held between N. G. Burtman, a covert member of the RCP, and future CCP founders Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, and others between 1919 and 1920. In early 1920, with news of the Karakhan Manifesto reaching China, the RCP dispatched Grigori Voitinsky and two assistants to carry out systematic propaganda, agitation, and organizational work in China based on the efforts of Popov, Burtman, and others, causing a great stir in political and intellectual circles (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 40). In fact, even before Voitinsky arrived in China, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu had met secretly with another Soviet emissary in Tianjin in February (Zhang et al., Reference Zhang1984, p. 98).
Voitinsky’s arrival laid the foundations for the establishment of the CCP in terms of ideology, organization, and funding. He subsequently became the Comintern representative in China (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 84). Among all of Voitinsky’s efforts, arguably, the most important was setting up the first Marxist study association, the first foundational organization of the CCP, in Li Dazhao’s office, as Zhang Guotao recalled (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, pp. 86–88). At Li’s recommendation, Voitinsky moved to Shanghai and made it the seat of the East Asian Bureau of the Comintern (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, pp. 93–96). In early 1920, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao founded the Socialist League in Beijing, a reading group composed of people with various forms of socialist ideas, mainly anarchists (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 157).
The first discussion about establishing a communist group or party in China took place during a talk between Voitinsky and Chen in Shanghai in early July 1920. The head of the East Asian Bureau of the Comintern, V. D. Vilensky, then made a special trip to Beijing in August to convene the first congress of the RCP members in China (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4). The most important topics at the congress were the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party, the convocation of a congress of Chinese communist organizations, and specific measures for propagating communism in China.3 The East Asia Bureau then convened a conference of Far Eastern Socialists in Shanghai, which Chen Duxiu attended as China’s delegate. The conference emphasized the task of establishing communist parties in countries such as China, Japan, and Korea.
In mid-August 1920, Voitinsky reported to the East Asian Bureau, the precursor of the Comintern Far Eastern Bureau, that he had established a Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau with Chen Duxiu, among others. He detailed his achievements in China, stating:
We have established a Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai comprising five people (four Chinese revolutionaries and myself), with three departments, namely Press, Propaganda, and Organization…. Our Organization Department will establish a Central Bureau of Trade Unions…. I have drafted resolutions that were discussed and adopted by the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau…. Our Press Department will launch the inaugural issue of a Chinese language newspaper Workers’ Voice … to be printed by our printing house. Our task now is to establish organizations like this in various industrial cities of China…. and it is hoped that a General Socialist Youth League can be established within this month.
Voitinsky acted as the Comintern representative to the Revolutionary Bureau, with Chen Duxiu as Secretary, Wang Yuanfang as the head of the Press Department, Li Da as the head of the Propaganda Department, and Zhang Guotao as the head of the Organization Department.4
Under Voitinsky’s direct guidance, from the mid-1920s onwards, communist groups were established throughout China under various names and various publications were launched to propagate Leninism and the “orthodox” Bolshevik Marxism and communism. In August, Chen Duxiu and Voitinsky established a preparatory group for the founding of the communist party. In November, the monthly magazine Gongchandang (The Communist Party) was launched.
In just a few years, under the leadership of the Comintern, communist groups across China effectively replaced various socialist ideas from Japan and the United States with Bolshevist ideologies. Notable among these groups was the Hunan New People’s Society, an organization of anarchists directed mainly by Mao Zedong (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4). Mao, who had initially leaned towards Hu Shih in the debate between Li Dazhao and Hu (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4), claimed that from the summer of 1920, he was influenced by Chen Duxiu and he had converted from an anarchist to a Marxist by reading Bolshevik literature translated by Chen’s organization (Snow, Reference Snow1979, p. 127). Historical documents record that Mao did not participate in the preparatory work to establish the party in 1920 (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 4). At the 1921 New Year’s meeting of the Hunan New People’s Society entitled “Transforming China and the World,” the participants voted on five policies proposed by Mao, which included Leninism and anarchism, with the majority favoring Leninism (the violent dictatorship of the proletariat).5
It is important to note that while the Comintern’s primary objective was to instigate a Bolshevik revolution, with Bolshevik ideology forming an integral part of this goal, China’s radical intellectuals had been more focused on “national salvation” since the late nineteenth century. And they were primarily concerned with theories or ideologies that served this particular purpose. As such, Social Darwinism was the first to gain popularity. Recognizing this, the Comintern strategically integrated China’s quest for national salvation into the broader goal of a world communist revolution. Through this approach, the Comintern persuaded and guided Chinese radical intellectuals to look to Soviet Russia as a model, adopting Bolshevism, forming a Communist Party under the Comintern’s leadership, seizing power through violent means, and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Bao Huiseng, who attended the CCP’s first congress, recalled, “Most of our comrades became Communists before they studied Marxism-Leninism.” Liu Renjing recollected that when the CCP was established, people generally only knew about the terminology or dogma. Liu, referred to as a nerd by Zhang Guotao, was one of the very few people in the party who had read Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program at that time (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 276).
10.2 The China Branch of the Comintern: The CCP
It took only two years from the Comintern’s initial infiltration into China in 1919, when the Chinese population knew almost nothing about Bolshevism, to the official founding of the CCP in 1921. The inception of the CCP was designed, decided upon, engineered, and implemented by the Comintern. Zhang Tailei, as the first delegate of the CCP to the Comintern, claimed in his report to the Third Congress of the Comintern in Moscow that the first communist groups in China had emerged in May 1920. Additionally, in his report of June 1921, he stated that “The work we have done is still preparatory,” implying that the CCP was still in its formation stage.6
Indeed, under the drive of the Comintern, the CCP had already begun to establish some foundational preparatory organizations by this time and these organizations clearly indicated their associations with the Russian Revolution and the Comintern. For instance, a section of the CCP’s Manifesto, released by the end of 1920, was dedicated to discussing Russia’s proletarian dictatorship, portraying it as the inaugural victory of the global revolution. Moreover, the First Resolution of the CCP in 1921 specified in its concluding section that “the Central Committee of the party is obligated to submit monthly reports to the Third International” (the term Third International refers to the Comintern).7
In addition to organization, the fledgling CCP was heavily reliant on the Comintern for its financial needs. This dependence was so acute that even a short interruption could have severe repercussions. After Voitinsky’s departure, there was a temporary lapse in Comintern representation in China and as a result, “the financial support for the interim central was interrupted, causing a disruption in all tasks and leading to the suspension of the monthly publication of The Communist Party for several months” (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 110). Later, the Socialist Youth League was also forced to disband. The problem was not resolved until June 1921 when the Comintern sent Voitinsky’s successor to Shanghai (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 245).
The preparations for the formal establishment of the CCP began in early 1921, initiated by the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. In March, the Bureau reported to its Executive Committee in Moscow that it was preparing an outline for the commencement of work in China, which would be deliberated “at the congress of Chinese communists in Shanghai in May under our guidance.” The representatives dispatched by the Far Eastern Bureau to this inaugural CCP congress were V. A. Neiman-Nikolsky and Maring (whose actual name was Henk Sneevliet). Neiman-Nikolsky represented the Comintern leadership, claiming that he must be a part of all the CCP’s leading body meetings. He was also entrusted with the task of funding the party. Neiman-Nikolsky’s assistant, Maring, who succeeded him as the Comintern’s representative in China after the former’s return to Russia, became a more influential figure later (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, pp. 246–247). The Dutch, British, and Austrian governments had long been concerned about Maring. In the six months before his arrival in China, embassies and courts of those governments had been sharing intelligence about his travels and sending notifications to the Chinese government.8
Orders and financial support from the Comintern directly dictated the operational matters for the first CCP congress. The Comintern provided each delegate with around 1,000 yuan for travel expenses, equivalent to the monthly salary of 100 workers in China at the time (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 254). As Chen Duxiu was in Guangzhou by then, execution of the Comintern’s instructions fell to Li Da, the temporary leader of the Shanghai Communist Party. Li later recalled, “In June, the Third International sent Maring and Neiman-Nikolsky to Shanghai. They instructed me to immediately convene a party congress, announcing the official establishment of the CCP. At that time, the party had seven local units. I sent out seven letters requiring them to select and send representatives to Shanghai” (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, p. 251). Mao Zedong was one of the representatives from outside Shanghai who received the letter from Li and attended the First Congress. Maring was the de facto chairman and main speaker at the First Congress.9
The decision by the Comintern to hastily establish the CCP in Shanghai in the summer of 1921 was not wholly welcomed by the first CCP leader, Chen Duxiu. Maring reported to the Comintern that Chen was reluctant to accept the Comintern’s “guardianship” over the CCP.10 Maring emphasized to Chen and all CCP leaders that “from its inception, the CCP has been part of the Third International, and it is a branch of the International,” thus subject to the leadership and financial assistance of the Comintern. Accordingly, “whether you acknowledge this or not is unimportant” (Bao, Reference Bao1983, p. 370). However, Chen insisted that “we must take responsibility for the Chinese revolution” (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, p. 159) and that “we should not ask for money from the Third International” (Bao, Reference Bao1983, p. 7). Maring complained to Zhang Guotao that Chen’s comments were “simply not those of a communist” and he could not “shoulder the responsibility of a secretary.” He urged Zhang to replace Chen as the leader of the CCP (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, p. 161). The disagreements between Maring and Chen were resolved later and then Chen announced that the CCP Central Committee embraced the Comintern and fully accepted its financial aid (Tang, Reference Tang2013, chapter 5). Under the direction and funding of the Comintern, the newly established CCP had to model itself after the Bolsheviks in Russia and its members were obliged to become Leninist revolutionaries. When Bao Huiseng, a founding member of the CCP, was sent to Wuhan as branch secretary there, he was told by Chen Duxiu that his “living expenses would be paid by the Secretariat of the Labor Association,” thus implying that he had become a Leninist “professional revolutionary” (Bao, Reference Bao1983, p. 8).
All substantive activities of the CCP, including the establishment of various communist groups, the cultivation of elites, organization, propaganda, personnel, strategies, and so on, transpired after the Comintern’s arrival in China, particularly following the convening of the First Congress of the CCP. After the First Congress, Chen Duxiu regularly reported to the Comintern details about the CCP’s execution of the Comintern’s orders. In his report to the Comintern on June 30, 1922, Chen noted that the number of CCP members had grown from just over 50 at the time of the First Congress to 195. Funding was primarily provided by the Comintern; they had received 16,655 yuan from the International, whilst only 1,000 yuan was raised by the CCP itself. The political propaganda carried out with the support of the Comintern was predominantly the printing of Lenin’s works and Russian communist propaganda. Reports were detailed down to the name and printing number of each propaganda item, the specifics of each local strike, and the creation of each workers’ school and club. Concerning the party’s development plan, the report stipulated “rigorous centralization is to be practiced.”11
In July 1922, the Second Congress of the CCP declared in its Resolution on the Admission of the Chinese Communist Party to the Third International that “the Chinese Communist Party is the Chinese branch of the International Communist Party.” The annex to the resolution, titled “Conditions of Admission,” stipulated that:
All parties of the International Communist Party must be built upon the principle of democratic centralism … must fully support the Soviet Republic in its fight against counterrevolution … must be named the Communist Party of a certain country – a branch of the Third International Communist Party … The central organs of the Communist Parties of various countries must publish all important official documents of the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party.12
Additionally, Article 3 of the CCP Constitution passed by the Second Congress stipulated that, “members of the Communist Parties of various countries recognized by the Third International can become members of this party.”13 The Comintern’s leadership role was fully evident in the Comintern’s instructions given to China and in its Resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International on “Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party.”14
10.2.1 The Comintern and the KMT
The Comintern sowed the seeds of Bolshevism in China by establishing its branch there. However, nurturing the growth of these seeds and strategizing how to seize power in China necessitated further tactical planning. One pivotal measure the Comintern adopted was the reorganization of the KMT. Historically, this move also aimed at dismantling the remaining constitutional structure of the Republic of China. Notably, this reorganization was largely conducted at the invitation of Sun Yat-sen. This fact alone underscores the critical role that China’s own institutional genes played in the transplantation of Bolshevism.
The Comintern’s purpose in reorganizing the KMT was to make it more closely resemble the Bolsheviks, or at the very least, to transform it into a type of Russian left-wing SR party, and to establish a united front with it. The initial instructions from the Comintern to the CCP followed its strategy of inciting revolutions around the globe, with a particular focus on exporting the Bolshevik model of revolution. This included spreading Leninism and initiating workers’ movements. The Leninist approach, which prioritized anti-imperialism as the spearhead of the international communist revolution, dovetailed perfectly with the surge of nationalism in China.
According to the Comintern’s evaluation, the KMT was the largest nationalist party in China and thus became the focal point of their work since the CCP was too feeble. In 1922, the Comintern’s representative in China reported back to the Far Eastern Bureau, stating that the CCP, along with the associated communist groups, was “insignificant in number … disconnected from the masses … with poor operational ability.” Moreover, they “had no connection with the Chinese national revolutionary movement … and were hardly capable of engaging in practical revolutionary work.”15 Therefore, the Comintern was striving hard to win over the KMT. In early 1920, A. S. Potapov, a senior Bolshevik intelligence officer, established contact with KMT leaders, including Sun Yat-sen, Chen Jiongming, and Dai Jitao. Potapov even forwarded a letter to Lenin on behalf of Chen Jiongming (Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa2006, pp. 73–79).
As previously mentioned, ever since the Karakhan Manifesto was issued by Russia, Bolshevism exerted a significant influence on KMT elites across the political spectrum. Some founding members of the KMT, such as Dai Jitao, were also among the founding members of the CCP. In this context, Chiang Kai-shek, who was then an unimportant figure, wrote in his diary as early as 1919, “I plan to learn Russian in preparation for an investigation trip to Russia.” In early 1920, he petitioned Sun Yat-sen, requesting to “take the Soviet … as a model” (Yang, Reference Yang2008, pp. 114–116). Sun had been communicating with Soviet Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin as early as 1921.
Following the First Congress of the CCP, Maring, with Zhang Tailei, immediately contacted Sun Yat-sen and other KMT leaders in Guangdong. In early 1922, the Comintern held the Far East Laborer’s Delegates’ Conference in Moscow. Not only did Lenin meet with the CCP delegate Zhang Guotao but he also met with KMT delegates such as Zhang Qiubai. During the event, Lenin’s sole meeting with the CCP representative was intended to promote cooperation between the KMT and the CCP. Both parties’ delegates expressed their willingness to accept his advice (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, p. 198). Sun Yat-sen and Chen Duxiu respectively supported Lenin’s suggestion in principle.16
After Maring’s meeting with Sun, Adolf Joffe, the Russian plenipotentiary in China (known as Yue Fei in Chinese documents), arrived in China in August 1922. Joffe corresponded extensively with Sun and sent representatives to meet with him. Sun requested that Joffe convey his thoughts to Lenin and Trotsky.17 Then, on January 26, 1923, the Sun-Joffe Manifesto was issued, announcing the alliance between the Soviet Union and the KMT and the reorganization of the KMT (Kurdyukov, Reference Kurdyukov1959, pp. 64–65). Thereafter, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP officially decided to provide the KMT with economic and military aid, establishing a committee headed by Trotsky to specifically guide Joffe’s correspondence with Sun and requesting that Sun centralize the leadership of the KMT as much as possible. Joffe informed Sun that the Soviet Union was to provide large-scale military aid to Sun in northern and western China. In late-July of 1923, Stalin, on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP, appointed Mikhail Borodin as Sun’s advisor (Kurdyukov, Reference Kurdyukov1959, pp. 173–175). Since then, Borodin became the most important representative of the RCP and the Comintern in China. Stalin requested that he “submit a work report to Moscow on a regular basis, if possible, once a month” (Kurdyukov, Reference Kurdyukov1959, p. 266).
In September1923, Sun sent General Chiang Kai-shek, then the Chief of Staff of the army, to lead a delegation to visit Moscow. The delegation included CCP members who had joined the KMT, including Shen Dingyi and Zhang Tailei. During the nearly three-month visit, they met with top RCP leaders such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Lunacharsky. Chiang Kai-shek told the Secretary of the RCP Central Committee Secretariat that “the KMT is very close to the RCP in spirit” and he agreed to send a permanent KMT representative to Moscow.
In a meeting with the Red Army Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, a detailed plan was agreed upon for the Soviet Union to reorganize and train the KMT army modeled on the Red Army, including the troop size, funding, operational bases, and more. Chiang was dissatisfied that the RCP was unable to provide full support for Sun’s request for large-scale military aid because the RCP and the Comintern were primarily focused on Germany rather than China due to significant changes in Germany at that time.
However, upon receiving a telegram from Sun informing him that Borodin had arrived in Guangzhou, Chiang was extremely grateful, stating, “It is now very clear who are our friends and who are our enemies.” In his communication with the RCP, he proposed that “some influential comrades” from the Comintern should be sent to China to “lead us.” At the Executive Committee meeting of the Comintern, Chiang reported on the KMT’s “vision of world revolution,” stating that “the main base of world revolution is in Russia.” Upon the victory of the revolution in Germany and China, an alliance of these three countries would be formed, after which “we could overthrow the capitalist system worldwide.” Finally, the Comintern entrusted Chiang with delivering its Executive Committee’s resolution regarding the KMT to Sun (Kurdyukov, Reference Kurdyukov1959, pp. 271–280). Two months later, all the basic elements in this resolution became the fundamental principles of the KMT.
In late January 1924, under significant influence from the Comintern, the KMT held its First National Congress, marking the beginning of a comprehensive reorganization. Sun Yat-sen announced at the meeting that the KMT would be restructured along the lines of the Bolshevik Party and that China’s revolution would “learn from the Russian model.” However, unbeknownst to the KMT, the Comintern’s long-term goal was for the KMT to lay the groundwork for the CCP’s development and, when opportune, to facilitate the CCP’s full seizure of power. Apart from Sun Yat-sen, every key leader within the KMT, including Chiang Kai-shek, Liao Zhongkai, and Chiang Ching-kuo, had visited or received extended training in Russia. The structure, protocols, and rules of the inaugural congress were modeled on those of the RCP, with the general stipulations of the party constitution being almost identical to those of the RCP counterpart. Furthermore, the manifesto approved at the congress interpreted Sun’s “Three Principles of the People” in a manner practically identical to Comintern resolutions. RCP representatives were astonished by the KMT’s official interpretation of the Three Principles, which was clearly “based on the resolutions of the Comintern” (Yang, Reference Yang2008, pp. 34–35).
In accordance with the Comintern’s directives, during the reorganization of the KMT, CCP members joined the KMT en masse. However, some elites within the KMT expressed skepticism about the inclusion of communists. They suggested that CCP members should renounce their communist affiliation to demonstrate their loyalty to the KMT and the Three Principles of the People. The CCP leader Li Dazhao responded by declaring that the CCP was an extension of the Comintern rather than an independent Chinese organization, making its dissolution implausible (Yang, Reference Yang2008, p. 37). CCP members came to occupy significant roles within the KMT. Mao Zedong became the Secretary of the Organization Department, while Yun Daiying became the Secretary of the Propaganda Department (Yang, Reference Yang2008, p. 40). An influx of CCP members into the KMT Central Committee resulted in traditional KMT elites, such as Chiang Kai-shek, being marginalized (Yang, Reference Yang2008, p. 120).
As momentous as the KMT’s reorganization was the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou in mid-1924, supported by the Comintern in every aspect. The academy was marked by its Soviet-style systems, staffing structures, and curricula. Military instructors were primarily Soviet Russians, and it had a party department reminiscent of that of the Soviet army. The academy’s commandant, Chiang Kai-shek, declared that: “what we want to emulate is the Soviet Russian revolutionary party.” The Comintern not only demanded the incorporation of a political department and party representation but also the strategic placement of CCP members within the academy, thereby tipping the balance of power in the CCP’s favor. Only two of the five executive and supervisory members of the first party committee were from the KMT (Chiang being one), while the remainder were from the CCP. In the second term, Chiang was the sole KMT member alongside six Communists (Yang, Reference Yang2008, p. 124). Following the abrupt death of Sun Yat-sen in late 1925, Wang Jingwei and Chiang emerged as the most influential leaders of the KMT, owing to Borodin’s endorsement and a series of calculated political maneuvers. Chiang acknowledged, “Without the reorganization of our party and the guidance of Soviet comrades … the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) would not have been formed by now. What we have achieved today is largely attributed to Soviet comrades … in helping the Chinese revolution.” He further stated that: “the interests of communism and the Three Principles of the People are the same” (Yang, Reference Yang2008, pp. 125–127).
With the aid and establishment provided by the Soviet Union and with the Whampoa Military Academy as the foundation, the NRA of the KMT, in alliance with the CCP, gradually came into being. Soviet advisors became the de facto leaders of nearly all the military departments within the KMT. This significantly bolstered the actual power and influence of the CCP within the KMT (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, pp. 27–31).
10.2.2 The First Full-Scale Armed Uprising by the CCP and the Breakup with the KMT
Thanks to the supportive environment fostered by China’s endogenous institutional genes, the Comintern was remarkably successful in dismantling the remaining constitutional order in China. While supporting the KMT and CCP in the south and preparing for war, the Soviet Union backed General Feng Yuxiang in the north, offering substantial military aid to engineer a coup and topple the Beijing-based government of the Republic of China, also known as the Beiyang government. After enduring a series of blows, from Sun Yat-sen’s “Second Revolution” to Yuan Shikai’s ascension to the throne, this military coup ended a republic that had ruled since the fall of the Empire. Consequently, China not only lost any remnants of its constitutional order but was also plunged into a full-blown civil war. Subsequently, Zhang Zuolin’s Northeast Army defeated Feng, seized control of Beijing, and established a military regime. In this context, in July 1926, the NRA, a collaborative force of the KMT and the CCP, launched the Northern Expedition.
The Northern Expedition was designed and facilitated by the Soviet Red Army, beginning with an operational plan put forward by Soviet military advisor Galen (the alias of V. K. Blyukher). Galen and his staff assumed overall command, with Soviet military advisors integrated into nearly all divisions to ensure implementation. Apart from supporting the KMT-CCP NRA, the Soviet Union maintained substantial military aid to Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun (Nationalist Army) as it targeted Beijing from the northwest. With the Soviet command and substantial military aid, the NRA made such impressive advances that Stalin and the Comintern misjudged the situation and prematurely concluded that the time was ripe for the CCP to seize power in China. By the end of the year, the Comintern Executive Committee issued a directive to the CCP calling to strive for the establishment of a “people’s democratic dictatorship … of the proletariat.” Upon receiving this mandate, the CCP declared in early 1927 that “the Chinese national revolution now has a solid foundation, and it is time for the proletariat to seize leadership.” Under Comintern directives, the CCP escalated preparations to instigate riots in several major cities in an attempt to seize power, including plans to take control of Shanghai (Shen, Reference Shen2009, pp. 27–31).
At the outset of the Northern Expedition, the CCP already held a third of the seats on the KMT’s Executive Supervisory Committee and 77 percent of leadership positions on the Central Committee of the KMT. Almost all political commissars across the various units of the NRA, along with party representatives of all divisions and a majority at the regimental level in the First Army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, were CCP members. Moreover, the CCP controlled 2,000 armed worker pickets and 6,000 peasant self-defense units in Guangdong, leading approximately 100,000 workers and 600,000 members of peasant associations (Shen, Reference Shen2009, pp. 27–31). As the Northern Expedition made swift progress, the CCP extended its leadership within the army, established trade unions and peasant associations, and effectively assumed control in numerous locations. However, before the CCP’s secret plan to seize power could be implemented, numerous conflicts had already erupted between the KMT and the CCP across various regions, which dramatically escalated calls within the KMT to purge the CCP (Chen, Reference Chen1981, p. 61).
As the CCP accelerated its efforts for an uprising, tensions flared between the KMT and the CCP, especially in Shanghai. In February, the CCP Central Committee initiated a general strike in Shanghai. On March 21, it instigated an armed insurrection involving 800,000 participants in the city. By the end of March, the CCP issued a manifesto entitled “A Call to the Working Class of China on the Shanghai Street Battles.”18
The exposure in early April of the Comintern’s plans to stage a coup in Beijing and orchestrate a CCP takeover from the KMT served as the final straw that turned the KMT into a staunch enemy of the Communists. Foreign embassies, primarily those of the signatories to the 1901 Boxer Protocol, along with the Beijing government, received intelligence suggesting that Soviet Russia was instructing the CCP to incite a riot with the intent to seize power in Beijing. Responding to this, the foreign diplomatic corps issued a search warrant to the Beijing Police Department, leading to an abrupt raid on the Soviet Embassy on April 6. This extensive search yielded a significant amount of evidence, resulting in the arrest of 22 Russians and 36 KMT-CCP members, including Li Dazhao, who were hiding in the embassy. This evidence, amounting to seven truckloads of documents, detailed the Comintern’s support for the KMT and the CCP, intelligence gathering activities, the construction of armed forces, and the instigation of revolutions and uprisings (Twitchett and Loewe, Reference Twitchett and Loewe1986, part 1, chapter 11). Those Soviet secret files clearly documented the Comintern’s plan to utilize the KMT to seize power for the CCP. A secret telegram from Moscow to Borodin was also discovered, indicating the objective was to use the Northern Expedition to distract imperialist nations and that the NRA was to therefore be prevented from unifying China (Zhang and Peking Police Compilation Commission, Reference Zhang1928).
Chiang Kai-shek was furious upon learning of these exposed secrets (Chen, Reference Chen1981, p. 54). On April 12, he launched a coup in Shanghai, openly instigating a comprehensive anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign (in KMT official language, this coup is called a “Qingdang” [Purge]). Stalin likened the comprehensive defeat suffered by the CCP and the Comintern to the setback experienced by the Bolsheviks in July 1917, predicting that the revolution could soon “return to the streets” (Lenin and Stalin, Reference Lenin and Stalin1950, p. 281). Guided by this misjudgment, Stalin and the Comintern dispatched Galen to instruct the CCP to launch the Nanchang Uprising on August 1.19 On August 7, the Comintern dispatched Vissarion Lominadze to Hankou to preside over an emergency meeting of the CCP’s Provisional Central Committee, known as the August 7th Meeting, at which Chen Duxiu was replaced as leader of the CCP by Qu Qiubai. Qu had joined the RCP in May 1921 and had previously held important positions in the Comintern and the RCP. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhang Guotao were appointed alternate members of the Central Committee which marked Mao’s first promotion to the central leadership.
The August 7th Meeting also decided to immediately launch a series of armed uprisings across various regions, with the RCP serving as the decision-maker and provider of military and financial assistance. From August 1927 to February 1928, in the name of Stalin and the RCP’s Politburo, over ten resolutions and telegrams were issued to direct the CCP’s uprisings.20
During a period of three months beginning in September, the CCP, under the guidance and support of the Soviet Union, orchestrated uprisings in parts of Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong. The intent was to seize political power swiftly via a comprehensive uprising. The first Soviet-style regime was established during the Guangzhou Uprising towards the end of 1927. Another Soviet regime was subsequently set up in Changsha (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, p. 41). While these attempts swiftly collapsed, their historical significance is clear: they represented the initial steps towards the establishment of a central Soviet regime by the CCP.
By March and April of 1928, under the leadership of Bukharin, the Comintern and the Soviet Army collaboratively developed a plan to establish multiple dispersed guerrilla bases in the rural areas of southern China. The Soviet Union provided both military and financial aid to support this endeavor.21 The Comintern believed that the comprehensive uprising they led for the CCP could quickly achieve victory.
To prepare for the seizure and consolidation of power, the Comintern, led by Bukharin, urgently convened the 6th Congress of the CCP in Moscow.22 During the congress, Bukharin made a report on behalf of the Comintern, while Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai presented important reports on the party’s military and political affairs. The preparations for the seizure of power were either directly based on the RCP’s model or modified based on the translation of its documents. Among them, the Resolution on Organizational Issues Concerning Soviet Political Power made comprehensive and detailed provisions for establishing Leninist Soviet power in China, including deciding its name, the relationship between the party and political power, and the organization and operation of the regime.23
10.3 Secret Societies: The Institutional Gene for Building the Party and Its Army
A communist totalitarian party is a tightly organized, violent, secret group based on Leninist ideology. One of the reasons the Comintern was able to swiftly see results in its party-building efforts in China was the training it provided to the Chinese revolutionaries in the 1920s. Over 2,000 members of the CCP (including the Youth League), as well as a large number of KMT members, received systematic training in the Soviet Union. This training primarily took place at Oriental University, established by the Comintern, which was later renamed Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in 1925. Bo Gu, a leading figure in the CCP, praised the program for its effectiveness in rapidly transforming the CCP into a “completely Bolshevized” entity within just a few years. Most senior leaders of the CCP, with a few exceptions like Mao Zedong, received training in the Soviet Union (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, p. 36).
However, in societies that are incompatible with a secretive Leninist party structure, for example, in advanced democracies, training party leaders alone would not be sufficient to bring about significant change. Thus, while the systematic and large-scale training provided by the Comintern was vital for the establishment and development of the CCP, it was not the most decisive factor. Instead, the presence of compatible institutional genes within a society, which can accommodate and foster the growth of a Leninist party, proved to be the determining factor.
A Leninist party is characterized by its top-down absolute rule and consists of professional revolutionaries. Prior to seizing power, the party functions as an organization that clandestinely plans and orchestrates armed takeovers. Once in power, it uses a highly secretive, top-down approach to make decisions, implementing policies and constructing institutions to control society. Even though the Bolshevik’s protocols were crafted by Lenin, their core attributes largely emerged from Russia’s inherent institutional genes and one of those was secret political organizations, as discussed in Chapter 8.
Similarly, the imperial system in China historically did not allow for the existence of organized, independent social forces that were open and separated from the court. Any groups perceived as threatening to government power were strictly prohibited. Throughout history, the only large-scale organizations that could transcend regional boundaries and survive independently of the court were secret societies. Parallel to the institutional genes of secret terrorist organizations in Tsarist Russia, China has carried the institutional genes of secret societies since ancient times. These include societies like the White Lotus, which emerged during the Song dynasty, and the extensive development of groups such as the Hong Fraternity, the Brotherhood Society, and the Red Spear Society since the Qing dynasty.
On the other hand, openly competitive political parties only briefly emerged among a small group of social elites in the early twentieth century. Most people in China, especially those who joined the CCP, were oblivious to the concept of open party competition. This provided an excellent social foundation for the establishment of a Leninist party. Moreover, these institutional genes laid the spiritual and organizational groundwork for all other Chinese revolutionary groups, like the Tongmenghui-KMT and the ultimately unsuccessful Chinese Revolutionary Party, as discussed in Chapter 9.
10.3.1 Comintern Instructions and the Starting Point
Indeed, the Comintern explicitly instructed the CCP to fully utilize China’s long-standing secret societies as its social foundation in the early days of the CCP’s establishment. Early CCP documents pointed out that “secret societies such as the Brotherhood Society (Gelaohui) were originally organizations of the oppressed class … they have a very strict organization … we should recruit the masses who have traditionally been under the guidance of old-style secret societies” (quoted in Shao, Reference Shao2010, p. 186).
In 1925 and 1926, CCP leader Li Dazhao noted that “the Brotherhood Society and Red Spear Society were originally organizations for the self-defense of farmers,” calling on intellectuals to “hurry up and join the Red Spear Society” in order to achieve “the goal of overthrowing the local tyrants.” He explicitly instructed that joining the Red Spear Society was in line with Leninism (Li, Reference Li1984, pp. 564–569).
CCP leaders such as Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai also instructed that the secret societies be integrated into the CCP’s peasant movement. The 3rd Plenary Session of the 4th Central Committee of the CCP passed the Resolution on the Red Spear Society Movement, asserting that the Red Spear Society be “an important force in breaking down the warlords in the national revolution.” It proposed a secret alliance with the Red Spear Society (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 166–171).
A Comintern report documented that the peasant movement in China was flourishing, and the peasant associations were developing rapidly because “secret societies have joined the peasant associations.”24 Among the large number of documents discovered in the Soviet embassy by Zhang Zuolin’s police in 1927, a significant portion was related to the Comintern’s interest in organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Zhang and Peking Police Compilation Commission, Reference Zhang1928).
As both the KMT and CCP had close ties to the secret societies, and given that integration with the secret societies was a policy of the Comintern, CCP members were allowed to openly and vigorously develop alliances with secret societies during the first KMT-CCP cooperation. Through this channel, the CCP achieved considerable growth in peasant associations and the armed forces.
In the early stages of party-building, as the majority of CCP members were from rural areas, gang-style initiation rituals were adopted in many CCP branches. These included ceremonies such as drinking chicken blood, beheading chickens, and burning incense as part of the oath-taking for joining the CCP. The oath proclaimed that betrayers would be punished by “merciless knifing and shooting.” Some regions also issued deadly disciplinary rules, stipulating that “those who violate discipline shall be killed” and “those who leak secrets shall be killed” (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 304–307).
Mao Zedong recognized the potential of secret societies such as the Triad Society, the Brotherhood Society, and the Green Gang. He estimated that these organizations collectively encompassed around 20 million individuals, many of whom were vagrants. Mao believed that “if guided properly, [they] could turn into a revolutionary force” (Mao, Reference Mao1952). He also suggested that peasant associations could supersede secret societies, arguing that “after the secret societies join the peasant associations, their members could openly and legally air their grievances and there [no longer would be] any need for various secret societies” (Mao, Reference Mao1949).
Between 1925 and 1926, in his role as the head of the National Peasant Movement Training Institute under the KMT’s Central Peasant Department, Mao organized specific courses discussing how to attract secret society members to the peasant movement. This strategy of recruiting many secret society members to join the peasant associations proved to be a significant driving force for the early development of these associations (Schram, Reference Schram1966; Chesneaux, Reference Chesneaux1972, p. 13). Mao once noted in 1927 that most of the revolutionary army were vagrants (Schram, Reference Schram1966).
Since the KMT launched a coup and openly opposed the CCP, the most critical aspects for the CCP’s development, and even survival, was the establishment of its armed forces and revolutionary bases. This could not have been achieved without relying on China’s long-standing secret societies and clandestine armed forces to build military power and develop peripheral organizations. Under the guidance of the Comintern and the Soviet Red Army, the CCP’s attempts to establish Soviet power through urban uprisings were repeatedly unsuccessful. Even though Bukharin had formulated plans to establish several bases in rural South China,25 this was a mission impossible for Bolshevik intellectuals, whether Russian or Chinese.
10.3.2 The First Chinese Soviet Regime and the Red Army
The Bolshevik Party did not emerge purely from the ideas of the Russian intelligentsia but rather it developed from the institutional genes of Russian secret political organizations. Similarly, the CCP, despite being sowed and nurtured by the Comintern, had to rely on more than just abstract strategic plans from the Bolsheviks when faced with practical challenges. The Bolsheviks were unable to design specific tactics for the CCP. After a series of failures, the CCP eventually managed to establish its first stable Central Soviet regime. However, this was not through independent growth but by co-opting the territory and military forces of a secret society. The base in the Jinggang Mountains area was initially established by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, leaders of the Hong Fraternity (Hongmen), and was subsequently integrated into the CCP. The establishment of the CCP’s second Central Soviet regime in Yan’an also heavily relied on the power and influence of secret societies such as the Brotherhood Society.
Yuan and Wang had controlled most of the Jinggang Mountains area with the Hong Fraternity troops since 1925 and, one year later, Yuan was persuaded to join the CCP (Shao, Reference Shao2010, p. 187). In 1927, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and others each led rebel forces to the Jinggang Mountains. There they merged with the forces of Yuan and Wang, transforming the Jinggang Mountains base into the first stronghold of the CCP. Mao assigned He Changgong as the political commissar for Wang’s forces (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 247–251). Yuan became the Chief of Staff for the Fourth Front Army, the strongest branch of the Red Army at that time (Wang, Reference Wang2012). Tan Zhenlin later recalled that without Yuan and Wang, it would have been impossible to establish the Jinggang Mountains base. It was from this base that the Chinese Soviet Republic, with Ruijin as its capital, was established in 1931 (to be discussed in Chapter 11). The CCP bases established on the foundations of the Hong Fraternity and the peasant rebel army consisted of over 80 percent of cadres originating from the peasantry.26 These cadres later formed the backbone of the CCP’s development. Their interests and influence determined much of the fundamental characteristics of the CCP and its army.
The establishment of the Jinggang Mountains base serves as a prime example of how the CCP effectively utilized secret societies to build military power and establish bases. However, it is crucial to note that this was not an exception but rather a representation of the general development pattern of the CCP. Chen Duxiu, a former CCP leader who was later expelled from the party and criticized as a Trotskyist, wrote in 1930, “The so-called Red Army was mostly composed of the proletariat class of vagrants (bandits and deserters).” He further noted that, “He Long’s Second Army, Brother He’s old forces are purely bandits … this Red Army has nothing to do with the party or peasant organizations” (Shao, Reference Shao2010, p. 315).
In fact, He Long, prior to joining the CCP, was a leader of the Brotherhood Society. After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, he returned to his hometown, and by leveraging his connections with the Brotherhood Society and other secret societies, he consolidated the forces of the Brotherhood Society, thereby establishing what later became known as the Second Red Army (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 261–269). Records indicate that He Long subsequently spent considerable effort addressing the challenges posed by the armed gangs within his army (Shao, Reference Shao2010, p. 307). Similarly, Zhu De had once been one of the key leaders of the Brotherhood Society (Smedley, Reference Smedley1956, p. 88), and Liu Bocheng was also a member of the Brotherhood (Mitani, Reference Mitani2002, pp. 19–20).
10.3.3 Yan’an: The Second Chinese Soviet Regime
The role of secret societies was equally significant in the establishment of the CCP’s second Central Soviet regime. After abandoning their base in the Jinggang Mountains, the CCP took Yan’an as the capital of their northern Shaanxi base, in 1937, following the Long March. Much like the Jinggang Mountains base, the northern Shaanxi base was also established by leveraging the power of the Brotherhood Society.27 In 1928, Liu Zhidan, a local CCP leader, was introduced to the Brotherhood Society by its local leader, Ma Xiwu. After joining the secret society, Liu was granted the title of “Master of Wisdom,” which made him the second highest ranking local leader. Subsequently, Ma Xiwu and six other Brotherhood Society leaders joined the CCP and more than twenty Brotherhood Society leaders became officers of the Red Army, at the regimental level or above. The commander of the 27th Red Army, He Jinye, was also a member of the Brotherhood before joining the Red Army (Shao, Reference Shao2010, p. 379).
In recognition of Ma Xiwu’s contributions to the CCP, he was appointed Chairman of the Soviet government of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia in 1936 and even became the Vice-President of the Supreme People’s Court in the early 1950s. It was the pervasive and far-reaching influence of the Brotherhood Society in the Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia regions that facilitated the CCP to establish bases there by leveraging the strength of the secret society. Chen Yun once recalled that “the Brotherhood was ubiquitous in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Suiyuan provinces in the northwest” and that “nine out of ten people in Heshui area and Huan County were Brotherhood members … and in Heshui and Baoan areas, even children and women had joined the Brotherhood.”28
After the Central Red Army arrived at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia base, it immediately used the pretext of resisting Japan to further exploit the Brotherhood Society to strengthen the Red Army. In the autumn of 1936, Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Central Government, issued a “Declaration to the Brotherhood Society.” The CCP Central Committee stated in the Directive on Winning over the Brotherhood that “the broad masses in secret societies across China sympathize with and support the Soviet regime, and fight for its victory” (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 390–391). The CCP even convened a Brotherhood Society National Congress and appointed many leaders of the Brotherhood as its commanders. The development of the armed forces in many of the Soviet areas was fueled by members of the Brotherhood, who held their own secret meetings within the Red Army units for a period of time. Some of them flaunted their privileges in the Soviet areas extravagantly. Brotherhood members in Zhidan County said, “Brothers can get opium from the Soviet government” (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 381–387).
10.3.4 Totalitarian Rule over the Secret Societies within the Party and Its Army
The CCP was built, both politically and militarily, by leveraging the institutional structures of the secret societies. Yet, such reliance on organizations like the Hong Fraternity, the Brotherhood Society, and the Red Spear Society also presented significant challenges. Given the totalitarian nature of the party, maintaining absolute control was imperative. To ensure unwavering control over the party and its military, party leaders were compelled to eliminate all dissident forces stemming from the secret societies, particularly those that had not fully submitted to totalitarian rule.
From the early stages of the CCP, the Comintern directed that the party should harness the strength of these secret societies during its growth. However, as the party gained momentum, it was crucial to establish firm control over these societies. The Resolution on the Organization of Soviet Political Power, which was adopted at the 6th CCP Congress held in Moscow in 1928, made specific provisions concerning the so-called “bandit problem” within the Red Army. It suggested forming “alliances with bandit-like groups or similar organizations” before an armed insurrection. It recommended a dual strategy: first, it was necessary to “covertly establish the core of political power, seize the masses from secret societies like the Red Spear Society” and “isolate their leaders.” Second, following the insurrection, it was required to “disarm them and suppress them harshly … treating their leaders as counterrevolutionaries … who should be completely annihilated.”29
Implementation of this strategy was articulated in the Resolution of the Gutian Congress held by the Fourth Red Army in 1929, which eventually facilitated the CCP’s complete control over its armed forces. At that time, the Fourth Red Army was the CCP’s most critical military force and many of its officers later rose to the highest ranks of the CCP’s military leadership. The principles established at the Congress solidified the fundamental system: the army was under the control of the party leadership through the party, not directly under the generals. The resolution also imposed numerous restrictions on secret society members and addressed what it referred to as “the problem with local thugs” (Mitani, Reference Mitani2002, p. 21).
This resolution was swiftly put into action and the principle was applied across the entire Central Soviet base area, resulting in devastating consequences. Tens of thousands of CCP cadres, Red Army officers, and soldiers lost their lives in the ensuing internal struggle (a topic to be discussed in the next section). Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, the founders of the Jinggang Mountains base, were labeled as bandits and traitors during the purge and were subsequently executed (Shao, Reference Shao2010, pp. 308–312; Mitani, Reference Mitani2002, p. 21).
10.4 Reign of Terror and the Emergence of a Totalitarian Leader
Any totalitarian system is preceded by a totalitarian political party. The operational mechanism of this party dictates the functioning of the society under its control. Extreme centralization of power and total control over the populace leaves no room for any option other than obedience or power ascendancy. Inevitably, this leads to severe power struggles, resulting in the simultaneous existence of personality cults and reigns of terror (also see Chapter 8).
When the Comintern helped establish and develop the CCP, the basic system and mechanisms of the Bolshevik Party that it had systematically developed were passed onto the CCP through its directives and deep involvement in decisions and operations. Once this basic system was established, many of the system’s details and mechanisms evolved autonomously.
When a highly centralized totalitarian system that controls everything and permits no space for competition or political diversity is established, everyone’s fate rests in the hands of the top leader. Leninist “democratic centralism” necessitates that individuals and organizations in subordinate positions must obey the orders of their superiors or face harsh penalties. Anyone attempting to challenge the leader or the power center must be ruthlessly eliminated. When a system compels people to choose between obedience and commanding obedience, it draws its members into power struggles. This results in an extraordinarily brutal struggle for control and leadership. It was true of both the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks. The newly established CCP, despite its initial struggles for survival, was no exception.
10.4.1 Initial Formation of Totalitarian Institutional Genes
From participating in the inaugural National Congress of the CCP, funded by the Comintern, to joining the KMT under Comintern directives, Mao gradually rose through the ranks to become a mid- and upper-level cadre of the CCP, bolstered by the recognition and support of the Comintern. Following significant setbacks for the Comintern and CCP in 1927, Mao consolidated the Fourth Red Army and established the Jinggang Mountains base, thus commanding the party’s most formidable regional forces of that time. In 1930, the CCP instituted the first Central Soviet Area in the Jinggang Mountains, further enhancing Mao’s standing within the Comintern. Consequently, the totalitarian machinery of the Red Regime soon began to take shape, reminiscent of the Jacobin and Bolshevik regimes, including the orchestration of the Red Terror and the emergence of an absolute leader.
The genesis of the Red Terror within the CCP emerged from seemingly minor differences of opinion on strategic and tactical matters, which might appear as minor or even random incidents to outsiders. However, the nature of these incidents was inherently totalitarian, as such dynamics can only occur and escalate in a totalitarian organization. As the incumbent Secretary of the General Front Committee of the Central Soviet Area, Mao saw these differences as a challenge to his authority. As a result, he initiated a purge within the party and military of the Central Soviet Area under the pretext of eliminating the KMT’s Anti-Bolshevik (AB) League known as the Anti-AB League campaign.30
In the early stages of the purge, the Comintern received reports alleging that 100,000 AB-Leaguers had infiltrated the ranks of 300,000 party members, while Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Peng Dehuai had purged 4,000 men from their armies.31 The CCP and Red Army cadres accused of being part of the AB League were subjected to brutal torture.32 The CCP’s official records document the appalling methods of torture employed: “beating hands with thunderbolts, burning bodies with incense, burning the vagina and cutting breasts with knives.”33 A Comintern document of the time recorded that:
Mao accused the Secretary of the provincial committee (Li Wenlin) of having connections with the AB League and proposed his dismissal. Mao appeared isolated during the vote, … Mao then began to accuse the entire provincial committee. Some of the Party Committee members were later rescued by the 20th Corps. In response, Mao ordered … the disarmament of the 20th Corps.34
After its generals were purged, the 20th Corps launched an anti-Mao rebellion, which was ultimately annihilated and thereafter disbanded from the Red Army.
Mao’s capacity to conduct such a sweeping purge, even while the CCP was still in its formative stages and focused on survival and establishing its power bases, was in part determined by the inherent nature of the CCP and Red Army. The party and army, which had their roots in secret societies and rebel peasant groups, carried the institutional genes of brutal secret societies. This made it exceedingly easy to provoke mass responses through incitement to violence.
Equally significant was the authority granted to Mao by the Comintern, legitimizing his use of violence to eliminate opponents. In the early 1930s, Mao first demonstrated his leadership over the Fourth Red Army and the Central Soviet Area through the establishment of the Jinggang Mountains base. Nonetheless, as a branch of the Comintern, the CCP was bound to carry out orders from the Comintern and Mao was not yet the leader of the CCP Central Committee. However, the continued support of the Comintern, even as Mao purged the ABs from the party and the army, emboldened him to initiate the Rectification Movement in the years to come.
At the CCP’s 6th National Congress in 1928, Mao was elected to the Central Committee for the first time. The Comintern also designated Mao as one of the leaders of the Central Soviet Area, declaring in their document, “The mandated Central Bureau of the Central Soviet Area comprises nine people: Xiang Ying, Ren Bishi, Qu Qiubai, Wang Jiaxiang, Cai Hesen, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Gu Zuolin and Li Wenli.” As the Comintern did not consider Mao Zedong or the others qualified enough to serve as a secretary, they suggested “having Zhou Enlai, or Xiang Zhongfa, or Zhang Guotao enter the Central Bureau as the secretary.”35
While not yet the supreme leader of the CCP, Mao, with the Comintern’s endorsement, self-declared himself the symbol of the Red Army and the party. He contended that he was the central authority within the Central Base Area and was the Comintern’s hand in China (Gao, Reference Gao2000, p. 119). The Comintern was well aware of the existing dynamics. Its representative reported the conflict incited by Mao’s power consolidation within the party and the army such that:
Mao Zedong has demoted Zhu De to merely executing his commands, stripping him of virtually all his executive powers … Mao and Peng Dehuai have significant disagreements … though they have not yet openly confronted each other … the seasoned political commanders privately harbor resentment towards Mao, and most local party organizations are in opposition to Mao … The delegation holds Mao wholly responsible … the situation is critically serious. I am herein forwarding a report from Zhou Enlai on the matter.36 I suggest that Zhou Enlai immediately escalate the matter to the Politburo for resolution.37
The Comintern, fearing that Mao’s purge in the name of Anti-AB could severely damage the newly established CCP, asked the CCP Central Committee to send a delegation to the Central Soviet Area to mediate. However, in light of Mao’s de facto and official power in the Central Soviet Area, neither the Comintern nor the Central delegation sought to challenge Mao’s authority. Instead, they emphasized the need for unity against the enemy, which effectively amounted to endorsing Mao (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 37–39). Zhou Enlai, in the name of the CCP Central Committee, explicitly validated that in the Central Soviet Area, “the fight against the AB League is absolutely correct and essential.”38
The Anti-AB League movement set a precedent for the violent purging of political opponents and rule through terror within the CCP. Since then, purges within the party and the army have been a continuous occurrence, even during the desperate days of the Long March. The Yan’an Rectification Movement in later years, followed by the Anti-Rightist Campaign and ultimately the Cultural Revolution, were all continuations of this tactic.
General Xiao Ke, who had first-hand experience of these events, commented in the early 1980s: “Our Party had undergone numerous purges: the fight against the AB League, the Reorganization Clique, the Third Party, the Social Democratic Party during the Agrarian Revolutionary War; the Rescue Campaign during the War of Resistance against Japan; the exaggerated Anti-Rightist Campaign and the CR’s campaign against capitalist roaders post-National Liberation; all share striking similarities.”39 Recalling the terror of the Anti-AB League, he said, “The movement wrongfully executed leading cadres, leaving the Red Army in a very difficult situation. The Second Corps had previously grown to 20,000, but only 4,000 or so remained by the time it merged with the Sixth Corps” (Xiao, Reference Xiao1997, p. 214).
Official CCP documents acknowledge that the Anti-AB League campaign killed 70,000 CCP members and Red Army soldiers (Hu, Reference Hu1991, p. 307). Many high-ranking CCP cadres were killed during the Anti-AB League campaign, 21 of the most prominent ones being listed in the Zhongguo dabaike quanshu (Encyclopaedia of China; Editorial Board of China Encyclopedia, 1993). In 1983, authorities in Jiangxi province posthumously recognized 238,844 victims of the campaign as martyrs (Li, Reference Li2009).
Since the Anti-AB League campaign, an atmosphere of terror has been created within the CCP. A contemporary report by the CCP Jiangsu Provincial Committee portrayed the campaign as creating an environment where “everyone felt insecure.” Deng Xiaoping conceded in the same year that the campaign had “instigated a climate of terror that made comrades afraid to express their ideas.”40 The move from suppressing dissent to inciting widespread terror required the involvement of many people and the active implementation of ruthless measures. This transformation would not have been possible without the institutional genes of secret societies inherited by the CCP and those of the Bolsheviks instilled by the Comintern. As was observed in the secret societies and among the Russian Bolsheviks, the creation of a climate of terror within the party was a prerequisite for producing an unshakeable leader.
The type of purging campaign seen in the Anti-AB League in the Central Soviet Area was enacted in other Communist bases. Notably, the arrest of the CCP leaders in the Shaanxi–Gansu base area on the eve of the Red Army’s incursion into that area had the most significant historical impact (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 244–245). Nie Hongjun, then Chairman of the CCP’s Northwest Military Commission, recounted receiving “a letter from the Shaan-Gan-Jin Provincial Committee” in September 1935. This letter disclosed that the Commission’s officials arrested in the purge “have confessed that many senior leaders, including Liu Zhidan and Gao Gang, are rightist counterrevolutionaries, and that … Liu and Gao should be arrested immediately.” Nie recounted that, “Liu Zhidan was arrested as soon as he returned to the base … followed by the arrests of Gao Gang, Xi Zhongxun [Xi Jinping’s father], Liu Jingfan, and others from the front line.” In addition, more than 200 individuals were executed (Nie, Reference Nie2005, pp. 17–21, 41–47).
Xi Zhongxun later recalled being detained in a prison where “pits had been dug for burials,” adding, “we were in danger of being buried alive at any moment” (Xi, Reference Xi1979). Mao Zedong eventually released Liu, Gao, and other senior leaders. Gao became Mao’s main follower until his suicide in 1954 during an internal power struggle. A year later, the highly respected Liu died mysteriously on the front lines of a minor battle, the only high-ranking leader in CCP history to die under such unusual circumstances. Thereafter, Mao replaced Liu as the authoritative leader in the revolutionary base of Shaan–Gan–Ning, initially established by Liu (Chang and Halliday, Reference Chang and Halliday2006, pp. 144–147; Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 243–248).
Operating the machinery of a totalitarian party, Mao pioneered the strategy of using mass movements to purge opponents, even years before Stalin’s Great Purge. Mao’s methods not only preceded Stalin’s but were also distinct in nature. While Stalin relied on formal institutions such as the secret police to instill terror, Mao utilized the informal system of mass movements to create a more pervasive sense of terror under the guise of eliminating hostile forces. Hence, instigating mass movements to induce a Red Terror became a fundamental strategy for Mao to establish his personal authority and control over the entire party. This was a strategy he repeated roughly every decade.
The most impactful of these movements were the Yan’an Rectification in the early 1940s, the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950s, and the CR, which spanned the 1960s and 1970s. The Red Terror compelled the entire nation, including all party cadres, to submit unconditionally to authority – a form of submission that was passed down through generations. This unwavering obedience under the shadow of terror gave rise to a supreme leader and the absolute power that this leader held. From these beginnings, a rudimentary totalitarian system was synthesized in China’s Central Soviet Area. It was based on the institutional genes of its past and those imported from Soviet Russia. Once this system took root, it began to spawn its own institutional genes.
10.4.2 The Comintern and the Supreme Leadership of the CCP
Establishing the supreme leadership of a totalitarian party is a necessary condition for the party to exist and operate independently. The Comintern could support the establishment of the CCP but it could not directly produce a capable party leader on its own. Therefore, both the Comintern and Mao, who held the most substantial de facto power within the CCP, shared similar motives in establishing leadership for the CCP.
By the late 1930s, despite having already established his de facto authority within the CCP and the Red Army, Mao was not yet the official leader of the CCP Central Committee, and the CCP was still a branch of the Comintern. In 1937, to legitimize his de facto power, Mao sent his long-time confidant Wang Jiaxiang to Moscow to seek the Comintern’s support.41
Reportedly, on the eve of Wang’s return to China after serving as the representative to the Comintern in Moscow for more than one year, the General Secretary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, told Wang that, “Mao’s leadership will be supported by the Comintern and Wang Ming should no longer serve in a leadership role.”42 In August 1938, Wang returned to Yan’an carrying this historical milestone message. Mao immediately convened a meeting of the Central Committee and had Wang convey the directive from the Comintern to the Politburo (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 169–173).
Several weeks later, at the end of September, Wang delivered Dimitrov’s message at the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CCP in Yan’an. This confirmation established Mao’s leadership across the party. Subsequently, as the supreme leader, Mao delivered an extensive report for two to three consecutive days. All CCP leaders, including the previous top leader Wang Ming, who had been appointed by the Comintern, expressed their support and praised Mao as a leader (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 173–177). At the conclusion of the plenum, the expanded 6th Central Committee sent a telegram to Stalin and Dimitrov stating, “Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov, your directives are entirely correct … under your leadership and assistance, and the correct leadership of our party’s Central Committee … a historic transition has been achieved.”43 Mao later stated that, “the 6th Plenum determined the fate of China” and “without the directive from the Comintern, it would have been difficult for the 6th Plenum to resolve the issues” (Mao, Reference Mao1996, vol. 3, p. 425).44
Since the establishment of the CCP, the party leaders’ legitimacy and power were all derived from the Comintern as they all had been appointed by the Comintern. The Comintern frequently replaced them, much as the CCP Central Committee frequently replaced local party officials. Mao Zedong was not any exception either before 1927, when, as a mid- and upper-level cadre of the CCP, his position in both the CCP and the KMT was determined by the Comintern. However, what made Mao special since 1938 was that he was the only CCP leader recognized by the Comintern on the basis of his de facto power,45 a power he had established through the creation of the Jinggang Mountains and northern Shaanxi bases and his ruthless purge under the guise of the Anti-AB League campaign.
Although Mao became the supreme leader of the CCP after the 6th Plenum, there were still differing opinions within the CCP and factional leaders who had competing power with Mao. Moreover, Wang Ming had closer ties with Stalin and the Comintern. In any totalitarian party, the leader must possess absolute authority and the party must be completely subservient to him. Furthermore, internal party factions must be eliminated.
The party needs a leader with absolute authority and the individual serving as the leader requires this absolute authority even more so. Therefore, totalitarianism inevitably produces absolute authority, which cannot be achieved without simultaneously creating myths and terror on a mass scale within society. Lenin pioneered totalitarianism and absolute authority. After Lenin’s death, Stalin established absolute authority by instigating even more extreme terror within the party after he won the power struggle (as discussed in Chapter 8). Now it was Mao’s turn in China.
While Mao had managed to establish absolute authority in certain parts of the party and the army through the Anti-AB League campaign, his authority was not yet fully consolidated throughout the entire party. But now, armed with the endorsement as the top leader of the CCP from the Comintern, Mao was ready to take the next step.
The Yan’an Rectification, which commenced in 1941 and spanned over two years, marked a critical juncture in establishing Mao as the totalitarian leader of the entire party. It was only after this campaign that the CCP acknowledged Mao as its true supreme leader. With a supreme absolute leader, the CCP transformed itself from a branch of the Comintern into an independent, communist totalitarian party.
The power and legitimacy of the CCP’s upper echelons came from the Comintern, and Mao was no exception. However, in order to establish his absolute authority, Mao had to purge those Comintern-aligned individuals who did not entirely submit to his rule. As Bukharin and his allies were purged by Stalin, Wang Ming’s patrons in Moscow were also removed, paving the way for Mao to purge Wang. The purge began by eroding Wang’s power and severing Wang’s ties with the Comintern. At an enlarged Politburo meeting in September 1941, under the pretext of criticizing Bukharin, Mao initiated the dissolution of the group of Comintern-aligned “internationalists” spearheaded by Wang Ming, which included high-ranking CCP leaders such as Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang. Once Wang Ming was divested of power, the leading “internationalists” in the party had no choice but to surrender to Mao (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 261–295).
Complementing the creation of terror, the creation of myths is another crucial element in establishing absolute authority. In this regard, Mao took a leaf out of Stalin’s book. After taking control of the party through purges, Stalin personally fabricated miracles by rewriting the history of the CPSU, authoring the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (Stalin, Reference Stalin1975). This book was propagated by Central Committee resolutions and Comintern directives, which systematically mandated that all CPSU branches and all foreign Communist parties study and disseminate it.
During his tenure as the CCP representative to the Comintern, Ren Bishi, a close aide of Mao’s, not only helped convince Stalin of Wang Ming’s serious mistakes but also promptly relayed Stalin’s purges to Mao. Moreover, he swiftly delivered the newly published Short Course to the CCP, instructing an immediate full translation and organizing party-wide study sessions (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 187–188). Upon receiving those instructions, Mao promptly declared the rectification campaign with studying the Short Course as the core.46 This move achieved two ends. Not only did he gain Stalin’s support but Mao was also able to use the same tactics as Stalin, namely fabricating miracles by rewriting the history of the CCP, to establish his legitimacy and absolute authority. In 1942, Mao penned Historical Issues, on the basis of which the Resolution on Certain Issues in the History of Our Party was passed at the 7th Plenary Session of CCP’s 6th Congress in 1945.
The Yan’an Rectification, a mass movement designed to create a Red Terror, holds particular importance in the establishment of totalitarianism with Chinese characteristics, as it served as a model applied and re-applied many times in the following decades. During the Cultural Revolution, Wang Ming aptly described it as a rehearsal for the Cultural Revolution (Wang, Reference Wang2004). The first major step in launching this mass movement was Mao’s comprehensive report delivered at the Yan’an Central Party School in February 1942. Mao then encouraged prominent writers such as Xiao Jun, Ding Ling, and Wang Shiwei to actively participate in the Rectification, using them to counteract what he called the dogmatic internationalists. Lured by him, these writers criticized the bureaucratism of the CCP and inequality in Yan’an, eliciting an enthusiastic response from both inside and outside the party, including senior CCP cadres. Subsequently, criticism of the CCP flooded in (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 299–332). However, this “liberalization” lasted only a few weeks before the direction of the movement took a sharp turn. Under Mao’s leadership, the CCP Central Propaganda Department issued the historical document known as the April 3rd Decision (Li, Reference Li1986, p. 486), requiring the party’s leading organs at all levels to lead the rectification and each individual to reflect on his/her entire history.47
In addition to the Anti-AB-League style approach that Mao invented on his own, the CCP also systematically learned from the Soviet Union about purging. A key person in this regard is Kang Sheng. He had been the head of CCP’s Special Operations Section (the CCP’s “Cheka”) from 1932 and became the deputy head of the CCP’s delegation to the Comintern in 1933. He received systematic training from the KGB (Committee for State Security; the Main Directorate of State Security, then known as GUGB) and directly participated in purging the so-called Trotskyists among the CCP members in the Soviet Union, which earned him a position as an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1935. Upon his return to Yan’an in 1939, Mao appointed him to lead the CCP’s intelligence and political security agency (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 226–228).
The mass terror campaign began in mid-April 1942 at a Politburo meeting, where Kang Sheng identified a wall poster of the Central Youth Committee as a tool of the KMT’s secret service. Mao explicitly stated at the meeting that the rectification should, “Implement censorship, in the process of which identify counterrevolutionaries and eliminate them.” Subsequently, Kang Sheng declared Wang Shiwei as a Trotskyist and a spy. The Central Political Research Department then exposed the anti-party group led by Wang Shiwei. In this context, at the end of November, Mao formally announced that “the rectification … should pay attention to the struggle against spies” (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 411–417). Later, Wang Shiwei was executed, only to be posthumously rehabilitated by the CCP in 1991.
As with the Anti-AB League and Stalin’s purges, torture was widely used in the rectification. Through interrogations, the so-called Zhang Keqin Case was fabricated, “revealing” a vast list of spies. As a result, virtually all revolutionary youths who had defected to Yan’an from KMT-controlled areas were suspected of being spies, marking the beginning of the brutal purge phase of the Rectification (Shi, Reference Shi1992, pp. 195–197). To conceal its brutal nature, the CCP referred to the detention of the revolutionary youth as “saving” them, naming this spy-catching campaign the Rescue Movement. Thousands were arrested in April 1943 alone. A single prison, known as the “Social Department” (the CCP’s KGB-like organization), housed some 3,000 people while the vast majority of those under scrutiny were confined within their respective units (a term used by the CCP to refer to schools or institutions). Thousands died, including many who committed suicide under brutal torture (Chang and Halliday, Reference Chang and Halliday2006, pp. 21–22). Bo Yibo, vice premier of the PRC and Bo Xilai’s father, recalled uncovering a place in Yan’an where hundreds of “rescued” people were detained and forced to admit they were spies, many of whom showed signs of mental instability (Bo, Reference Bo1996, p. 362).
Just as the Jacobins and Bolsheviks each made their unique contributions to creating the Red Terror, the CCP’s notable invention was the mass movement, a more accurate term for which would be the mass terror movement. During these movements, work units became prison cells and colleagues turned into jailers. The terror created in this manner surpasses that of physical incarceration and even execution. As the purpose of creating terror is to ensure that the majority obeys orders, imprisonment and execution alone are not good enough because these approaches only directly affect a handful of people. In contrast, a mass movement invented by the CCP could create terror that easily threatens everyone. A person conducting interrogations today could be the one interrogated tomorrow. No one is safe in this system.
Mao proudly declared that “100 percent” of the people in the party and the army were rectified by him (Li, Reference Li1988, pp. 349–350). Among that 100 percent, the most important were the senior cadres of the CCP. Included in this group were the so-called “dogmatists” led by Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian who were purged from the leadership. The so-called “empiricists” who were led by Zhou Enlai and included Chen Yi and Peng Dehuai were first stripped of their power in the party and the army. Then, in the process of being “rectified,” while developing fear and awe of Mao, they found themselves being grateful to him for his forgiveness which allowed them to survive the serious mistakes they had admitted to. The totalitarian machine they themselves participated in leading and implementing, by persecuting them, prompted them to admire and worship Mao and to become Mao’s apostles. Senior officials like Zhou, Chen, Peng, and others solemnly admitted and reviewed the serious mistakes they had committed, thanking Mao for his guidance and tolerance (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 615–625).
One of the purposes of the Rectification was to make Zhou Enlai, a former boss of Mao, completely submit. To accomplish this, the General Learning Committee was set up in July 1943, with Mao serving as the director and Liu Shaoqi and Kang Sheng as deputy directors. Officially, the task of this committee was to criticize the so-called empiricist faction allegedly led by Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai. Right at the start of the criticism, Zhou declared, “Comrade Mao Zedong’s direction is the direction of the CCP! Comrade Mao Zedong’s route is the route of China’s Bolsheviks!” But this was to no avail. Under sustained pressure, Zhou ultimately made self-criticisms for five consecutive days during the rectification study meetings, reviewing his own mistakes at several key historical phases. The movement lasted for three months. Zhou finally stated: “I truly and wholeheartedly believe in Mao Zedong’s leadership” (Central Literature Research Office of the CCP, 1998).
Establishing the personality cult of the leader is a prerequisite for any totalitarian party and creating such a cult is inseparable from terror. The personality cult of Stalin in the Soviet Union arose from the Great Purge (see Chapter 8). In a similar vein, a wave of glorification of Mao was set in motion by all senior CCP cadres during the Rectification Movement, in which, according to Mao, everyone was rectified. Not only Zhou Enlai but also CCP elders such as Wu Yuzhang and Xu Teli, along with senior generals Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Chen Yi, fervently praised their leader. Moreover, there was even sound support from former heads of the CCP, Wang Ming and Bo Gu, who had been appointed by the Comintern. In the autumn of 1942, Deng Tuo, the editor of the CCP’s leading newspaper, the Jinchaji Daily,48 published an editorial coining the term “Maoism.” Fearing it might arouse Stalin’s resentment, Mao personally suppressed the term “Maoism.” However, in July 1943, at the peak of the Red Terror, Wang Jiaxiang, who was undergoing rectification as a representative of the “erroneous line,” invented the term “Mao Zedong Thought.” It was publicly promoted by Liu Shaoqi in the same month. In 1945, at the 7th National Congress of the CCP, Liu formally proposed that the theoretical foundation of the CCP was Mao Zedong Thought (Gao, Reference Gao2000, pp. 606–614).
The CCP had thus established a leader with absolute authority, a group of makers of the absolute leader led by Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi, senior cadres defending the absolute leader led by Zhou Enlai, and a large number of mid- and lower-level cadres and party members who blindly obeyed the absolute leader. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the Second World War, Stalin stopped talking about the world proletarian revolution and disbanded the Comintern to allay the suspicions of the American and British allies about the Soviet Union. As a result, the CCP was transformed from a branch of the Comintern into a largely independent, communist totalitarian party with its own absolute leader.49
