At the core of any totalitarian regime lies a totalitarian political party, the nature of which defines the regime’s character. From the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic by the CCP in 1931 to the formation of the People’s Republic later on, the fundamental character of these regimes has remained consistently totalitarian. However, although the Comintern founded the CCP based on CPSU principles, as discussed in Chapters 8 and 10, the unique institutional genes of China and the external environment that the CCP faced resulted in certain differences between the two Communist parties. These differences led the CCP to adopt tactics that slightly diverge from those of the CPSU, with the totalitarian nature of the party constant. Regrettably, from the 1940s to the present, many individuals both within and outside China have been deceived by these tactics, leading them to misunderstand the true nature of the CCP and to falsely believe that it is not a genuine Communist Party.

A factor that profoundly influenced the Russian Bolshevik strategy was its intimate relationship with the constitutional movement of Russian populist socialism. Prior to the establishment of the Bolsheviks, most of Russia’s intelligentsia believed that the goal of political parties and revolution was to establish a constitutional government and that constitutionalism was their basis of legitimacy, despite their advocacy against private property rights. Among the various factions of radical intelligentsia, the Bolsheviks, fundamentally opposed to constitutionalism, emerged from an environment striving for constitutional governance. Lenin had to persuade his followers of the rationale against constitutionalism and the Bolsheviks had to make great efforts to conceal the essence of their opposition to constitutionalism, disguising their agendas and actions that violated it. Later, after the Bolsheviks bloodily suppressed their opponents and seized political power, it was still necessary to create a Soviet charter in the guise of a constitution that violated the principles of constitutionalism. This was the first article of the Russian Soviet Constitution of 1918 drafted by Lenin, the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People. Since then, all totalitarian regimes followed this disguised approach in law-making, including the Fascists and the Nazis.

In contrast, the CCP has almost no connection with constitutionalism. Among the major founding members of the CCP, none had ever participated in the struggle for constitutionalism. They had almost no connection with the constitutional reform at the end of the Qing dynasty or the Republican Revolution. Even the few early CCP members who had participated in the Republican Revolution did so with the aim of “saving the country” through constitutionalism, rather than taking constitutionalism as a goal. After the Comintern reorganized the KMT, the latter implemented the principles of totalitarianism: One Doctrine, One Party, One Leader. It demanded that “everyone in the country abides by the doctrine of our party” (Sun, Reference Sun2011, p. 282), striving to unify the thought of the entire population with the Three Principles of the People and aiming to monopolize national power. The KMT central government declared, “Our Party rules the country by the Party, and all officials under the Party and government must join the Party,”¹ with paramount power to be held by the party’s leader. And Sun had said years earlier that the KMT is a revolutionary party, not a political party (see Chapter 9). He also asserted that the premier had the final say on the resolutions of the party’s Central Executive Committee.

With China’s long-standing institutional genes of a hierarchical imperial system and secret societies, it was relatively easy to introduce the similar institutional genes of a totalitarian party into the country. From the inception of the CCP, the Comintern implemented Leninist principles of high centralization, obedience, and iron discipline throughout the party. It also instituted a one-party dictatorship in the newly established Chinese Soviet regime. But in order to fully seize power and establish a Soviet regime in China under the full control of the party, the Comintern directed the CCP to build a united front and attract as many people as possible, including those dedicated to liberal, constitutional democracy. Under this guiding principle, the CCP not only promised to abide by the principles of constitutionalism but even presented itself in a distorted way as actively promoting constitutionalism, winning widespread support at home and abroad. However, as soon as the party seized national power, all such undertakings were scrapped.

11.1 The Establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic

The institutional genes of the Chinese imperial system, which was more autocratic and centralized than Tsarist Russia, led to a lack of independent political forces and a foundation for establishing independent political parties in China. Thus, the parties that emerged in post-Qing China, including the early CCP, the early KMT, the China Democratic League (CDL), and others, were all predominantly composed of intellectuals. During the Anti-Japanese United Front and the War of Liberation, the CCP, under the guidance of the Comintern, adopted a strategy similar to that of the Bolsheviks before the October Revolution, that is to say, using constitutionalism as a main unification instrument and using the promotion of direct democracy and nationalism as a tool to counter the KMT and win support from intellectuals and democratic parties. This approach misled many Western intellectuals and governments into believing that the CCP was not a true communist party, fundamentally impacting US policy towards China.

As previously mentioned, after representatives of the Comintern entered China in early 1920, La Jeunesse, presided over by Chen Duxiu, had dramatically shifted from advocating the value of science and democracy to promoting class struggle, violent revolution, and proletarian dictatorship. A decade later, in 1931, under the guidance of the Comintern, the CCP established the Chinese Soviet regime, officially proclaiming “all power to the Soviets,” directly applying the slogan designed by Lenin for the October Revolution.

Bulletin No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, signed by Mao Zedong and others declared, “From today onwards, within the territory of China, there is … the Chinese Soviet Republic … its banner is … to establish a Soviet government throughout China.”² Article One of the Outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic adopted at the Second All-China Congress of Soviets in 1934 stipulated that the task of this constitution “is to guarantee the power of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship in the Soviet areas and to achieve its victory throughout China. The purpose of this dictatorship is … to transform it into the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Article Two stated, “The Chinese Soviet power … is the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.” Article Six declared, “The Chinese Soviet power … aims to achieve nationalization of land.” It stipulated that the organizational form of the state is the democratic centralist system of worker-peasant-soldier representative assemblies; it designated the All-China Central Executive Committee of the Soviets as the highest organ of power.

The essence of this constitution came from the 1924 Constitution of the Soviet Union. It is particularly worth noting that democratic centralism is the basic principle of the totalitarian party invented by Lenin. Russia’s Soviets were not originally established by the Bolsheviks, with many non-Bolshevik members within the Soviets. Therefore, it was impossible for the constitution of the Soviet Union to impose democratic centralism on the Soviet administration in early years. But the Chinese Soviet was completely established by the CCP and there was no distinction between the party and the Soviet regime from the beginning. Moreover, the Chinese people generally lacked an understanding of the essence of democracy. Even intellectuals who did not support communism were not sensitive to or concerned about the implications when “democracy” was replaced with “democratic centralism.” Therefore, from the first constitution, the party principles became the regime’s principles, which have continued to this day. After the Long March, when the central authority of the Chinese Soviet moved from Ruijin to Yan’an, the official name of the regime was changed to the Chinese Soviet People’s Republic.

On December 12, 1936, Zhang Xueliang, the General of the Northeast Army who had close ties with the CCP, staged the Xi’an Incident, arresting Chiang Kai-shek and requesting that he stop suppressing the Communists in favor of a united front against Japan (K. Yang, Reference Yang2006). In order to ease Japanese pressure on the Soviet Union, Stalin, through the Comintern, required that the CCP cooperate with the KMT.³ Under this pressure, an agreement for a united resistance against Japan was reached between the KMT and the CCP in September 1937. According to the agreement, the CCP and its regime were recognized by the KMT government. The CCP regime henceforth was renamed the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, a special administrative region of the ROC. The Red Army of the CCP was reorganized as the 18th Army (also known as the Eighth Route Army) and the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army.

After gaining official recognition, the CCP was once again able to openly establish a united front. Temporarily downplaying its objectives of land revolution and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, the CCP began its campaigns against the KMT dictatorship in a covert manner by advocating constitutionalism. This was paired with strategies aimed at attracting all possible forces to strengthen itself and the revolutionary base areas.

Publicly, CCP leaders expressed opposition to the KMT’s one-party dictatorship, telling media both within and outside China that the CCP is not a true Communist Party and has always sought constitutional democracy. This propaganda strategy employed by the CCP during this period not only led to substantial development of the party but also garnered support from the American public and government. This set the stage for its manipulation of US–China policy up to this present day.

Mao Zedong said, “Now some people who have always opposed constitutionalism are also talking about it…. They push one-party dictatorship in the guise of constitutionalism, like serving up wine while selling vinegar … They talk about constitutionalism while denying the people any freedom … We must … strive for democracy and freedom, and must establish a new democratic constitutional government.”⁴ Liu Shaoqi stated in the same year, “It is a malicious rumor that the CCP wants to seize power and establish a one-party dictatorship. The CCP opposes the one-party dictatorship of the KMT.”⁵ Talking to American reporters in 1944, Mao said, “We do not seek to achieve the communist social and political system of Soviet Russia … We neither demand nor plan for proletarian dictatorship … We do not advocate a collectivism that would discourage individual creativity … We believe in and practice democracy, adopting the ‘three-thirds system’ and limiting the possibility of any one-party dictatorship.”⁶ The CDL leader, Huang Yanpei, recorded that in a conversation with Chinese democrats, Mao once said, “We have found a new way, … democracy … Only by letting the people supervise the government will the government dare not slack off. Only when everyone takes responsibility will the government outlive its leadership” (Huang, Reference Huang1945, p. 65).

The “three-thirds system,” as dubbed by Mao Zedong, was a covertly designed electoral system that ensured CCP rule. Many individuals, both Chinese and foreigners, were misled by this system due to its democratic appearance. This system was implemented in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia and Shanxi–Hebei–Chahar border areas starting from 1939. Its central stipulation was that one-third of the elected representatives should come from the CCP, another third from the CCP-aligned left wing, and the remaining third from the centrists. The elected government was obligated to adhere to the principle of Leninist democratic centralism (Zhang, Reference Zhang1994, pp. 334–335). These tactics bear a striking resemblance to Lenin’s control of Soviet elections prior to the October Revolution. Moreover, similar methods have been used by the CCP to manipulate elections in Hong Kong after the territory’s sovereignty reverted to China. Because China’s institutional genes lacks a tradition and culture of constitutionalism, it was common for people to mistake the politics of the revolutionary base as a nascent form of constitutional democracy. This in itself was one of the main contexts for the mass exodus of young intellectuals to Yan’an at the time (see Chapter 10).

The CCP’s emphasis on constitutional propaganda was primarily aimed at counteracting the KMT and any attempts to establish constitutional rule in China. In 1931 after the Northern Expedition, the KMT promulgated the Provisional Constitution of the ROC. The provisions specified that the KMT would rule the country (known as the party-state) during the period of political tutelage and once half of the provinces in the country had implemented public elections, a constitutional convention would be convened to establish a constitution and end the period of political tutelage. In 1943, the KMT central government announced that a constitutional convention would be held one year after the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan to implement constitutional governance. The CCP immediately prioritized strategies preventing the implementation of constitutional governance. Just as Lenin used the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” to counter Russia’s Constituent Assembly, the CCP Central Committee immediately issued instructions stating that the KMT’s discussions on constitutional governance were intended to “deceive the people” and proposed the convening of a congress of people’s representatives in the liberated areas: “The Central Committee has decided that our party should participate in such constitutional activities in order to attract as many democratic individuals as possible to our side” (Central Committee Archives, 1992, vol. 14, p. 178).

The CCP’s proactive propaganda on constitutionalism was aimed not only at domestic audiences but also at the US government. Among the most successful propaganda efforts was Mao’s speech at the CCP’s 7th Congress, “On Coalition Government.” The US government interpreted Mao’s speech as a genuine intention and it shifted its policy from unconditionally supporting the Nationalist government to advocating for a democratic coalition government that included all parties. Meanwhile, the CCP was secretly mobilizing its troops. In early August 1945, before the end of the Second World War, Mao ordered the armed forces of the CCP to seize power throughout the country. However, Stalin, for strategic reasons related to the secret Yalta agreement on the postwar order among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, urged Mao to enter into peace talks with the Nationalist government. Mao, accompanied by Zhou Enlai and the US ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, agreed to negotiate with the KMT government in Chongqing at the end of August (Yang, Reference Yang2005, pp. 184–187).

The US government took Mao’s proposal for a coalition government at face value and mistakenly made it the cornerstone of its policy towards China. It limited its support for the KMT, hoping to avoid a civil war in China and to establish a democratic system of multi-party cooperation. The new ambassador, General George C. Marshall, exerted significant pressure and influence on both the KMT and the CCP, promoting a political consultative conference involving multiple parties and attempting to pave the way for constitutional rule in China (Hsü, 1970, pp. 632–634). History has shown that this was a fundamental misjudgment of Chinese history and politics, as well as of the Soviet Union, the Leninist parties, and the CCP. The profound consequences of this misjudgment are still evident today.

On the surface, the Chongqing peace talks appeared to have borne fruit in terms of constitutional development. The KMT, the CCP, and other democratic parties began to hold political consultation meetings to debate the specifics of the constitution. However, twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai revealed in his criticism of Liu Shaoqi in 1967 that the CCP’s engagement in constitutional arrangements with the KMT was merely a ruse. He exposed the true purpose of the CCP’s participation in the constitution and political consultation meetings, saying, “After the old CPPCC [Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] meeting, I returned to Yan’an and reported to Chairman Mao…. Chairman Mao said that this peace was to stall for time, to help us build up our strength and train our army. We … should strengthen the agrarian revolution and prepare for war” (Lee, Reference Lee1993, p. 127).

On the surface, the KMT and the CCP each put forward their principles for constitution-making at the CPPCC meetings. The KMT proposed indirect democracy and centralization of power, while the CCP, in disagreement, pushed for a more radical proposal of direct democracy and federalism.

Specifically, the KMT proposed that the National Assembly, elected by the people, should exercise the right to vote, the right to impeach, the right to popular initiative (allowing citizens to propose new laws or amendments to existing laws or the constitution), and the right to referendum (allowing citizens to approve or reject laws or policies that have already been passed). The central government would consist of five constitutional bodies: the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan. The localities would be ruled by the central government and the president would possess semi-independent and centralized powers.

In contrast, the CCP and the Democratic League demanded a form of direct democracy similar to that of Switzerland, with all voters exercising the four powers directly. They sought a relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches akin to a parliamentary system, so as to limit the powers of the president as much as possible. They also insisted on a federal system with decentralized local authority.

After four rounds of discussions, the KMT made concessions on all of these issues and on January 25, 1946, all parties agreed on a draft constitution (Lee, Reference Lee1993, pp. 247–250), which is essentially the constitution implemented in Taiwan today.

Zhou Enlai, the chief representative of the CCP at the political consultative conference, said in a report to Marshall on January 31:

At the time, not only CCP cadres, the majority of China’s democratic parties, and many intellectuals but even the US government represented by the ambassador to China, Stuart Stanton, had unwavering faith in the declarations of the top CCP leadership (Lee, Reference Lee1993, pp. 284–286).

To the public, the CCP Central Committee issued a directive on February 1, stating that, “China has henceforth entered a new stage of peaceful democratic construction … the party will cease its direct command of the army.” However, at the CCP Central Committee meeting ten days later, Mao and Liu said just the opposite. They firmly opposed the idea of nationalizing the army (Yang, Reference Yang2005, pp. 208–209).

Later, on November 30, 1947, Mao reported to Stalin the CCP’s plan, stating, “by the final victory of the Chinese revolution, following the models of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties other than the CCP should disappear from the political stage.”⁷

When the United States decided not to support the KMT government, the Soviet Red Army took a series of actions to strengthen the CCP army. From early March to mid-April 1946, the Soviets abruptly withdrew their troops en masse from several cities in Northeast China, handing over strategic locations and arms (including captured Japanese armaments) to the CCP forces. This directly led to the outbreak of civil war across the Northeast (Yang, Reference Yang2005, pp. 209–214).

Nevertheless, the KMT government still tried to convene a constitutional assembly in November. The CCP claimed that the KMT’s provision violated the Political Consultative Conference’s resolution that a coalition government should be established before the assembly and was therefore illegal. On November 15, the National Constituent Assembly was formally convened. Representatives from the KMT and three other parties held 90 percent of the total seats, while the CCP and Democratic League representatives, who held 10 percent of the total seats, boycotted the meeting. On December 25, 1946, the Assembly passed the “Constitution of the Republic of China.” However, the Nationalist government cited the civil war as the reason for postponing the enactment of this constitution, which was not fully implemented in Taiwan until 1987. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party not only completely disavowed the constitution it had participated in formulating on the grounds that the KMT had illegally convened the National Congress but also took this as an opportunity to formally declare all-out war with the KMT (Lee, Reference Lee1993, pp. 417–438).

General Marshall, who considered it his duty to mediate the civil war, announced the cessation of aid to the Nationalist government just as the Assembly convened. Nevertheless, when he was recalled to the United States a few weeks later, he commented, “The Assembly has indeed passed a democratic constitution, which is in line with the principles set by the Political Consultative Conference in all major aspects and includes all the key points demanded by the CCP, yet it is most unfortunate that the CCP deemed it inappropriate to participate in the Assembly” (quoted in Lee, Reference Lee1993, p. 433).

But General Marshall might not have known that the situation was much worse than he thought as the CCP also fully utilized the opportunity to debate constitutional matters for propaganda purposes and to prepare for the seizure of power. Such a strategy was learned from the Bolsheviks, who used the parliament as a propaganda tool during the years of constitutional reform in Tsarist Russia (see Chapter 8). One important strategy the CCP’s use of constitutionalism as a tool for united front politics was to promote provincial (i.e., liberated area) constitutions. In 1945, while discussing the draft constitution at the 9th Political Consultative Conference, Wu Yuzhang, on behalf of the CCP, proposed learning from the parliamentary systems of the advanced democratic countries like Britain and the United States to limit central power. He thought China should adopt bottom-up universal suffrage with provinces as autonomous units, with provincial governors elected by the people, provincial autonomy, and provincial constitutions. The military would not serve any one individual or factions (Lee, Reference Lee1993, pp. 235–236). By promoting autonomy for the provinces, the CCP not only attempted to affirm the legitimacy of the liberated areas but also to claim that it was truly democratic. The propaganda was so successful that the CDL not only echoed it but also enthusiastically propagated it vigorously (Lee, Reference Lee1993, pp. 239–240).

The CCP advanced a form of disguised “constitutionalism,” assuring one-party leadership in each liberated area. In April 1946, the Principles of the Constitution of the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Area were passed. This new constitution not only lacked any references to a proletarian dictatorship but also emphasized that the upper chamber of the assembly, known as the Congress of People’s Representatives, would wield power. Representatives at all assembly levels would be selected through direct popular vote and these representatives would elect government officials. Both the government and the representatives were held accountable to each other and to the electorate.

Other liberated areas adopted constitutions mirroring these principles, such as the Common Program of Governance for the Democratic Administrations of the Northeast Provinces and Cities, the Program of Governance for the People’s Administration of North China, and the Program of Governance for the Autonomous Administration of Inner Mongolia.

Interestingly, all these new constitutions of the liberated areas bore no relation to the Leninist constitution, nor did they exhibit any links to the constitution of the Chinese Soviet. Specifically, all the crucial terms such as proletarian dictatorship, socialism, and deprivation of private property were conspicuously absent.

The actions of the CCP impressed Chinese people and observers around the world, leading them to believe that, aside from its name, the party was no longer communist. It appeared that the liberated areas were moving towards universal suffrage and judicial independence, at least according to their constitutions (Yang et al., Reference Yang1987). Actually, this entirely misleading characterization of the CCP had already been conveyed to an American journalist two years earlier, in 1944, when Mao declared to Harrison Forman, “You’ve seen it … we are no longer the so-called Communist Party in the Soviet sense … The name of our political party … is not important … What is important are the contents and practices, not the name!” (Forman, Reference Forman1988, p. 200).

However, regardless of the CCP’s rhetoric, the liberated areas remained under totalitarian control, albeit disguised. Once the party succeeded in seizing power, it demonstrated through its actions that its constitutionalism advocacy was merely a united front strategy for seizing power. Three years later, on September 29, 1949, on the eve of formally establishing the People’s Republic of China, the CCP officially replaced all the “constitutions” recently established in each liberated area. It achieved this by passing the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which served as a de facto interim constitution.

The fundamental principles of this Common Program reverted to those of the Chinese Soviet Constitution, created in the early 1930s under the guidance of the Comintern. Among other provisions, it stated, “the people’s democratic dictatorship should be led by the working class” (Article 1) and “democratic centralism should be implemented at all levels of government agencies … people’s governments at all levels must be subordinate to the Central People’s Government” (Article 15). All of these principles fundamentally contradicted the constitutional principles that the CCP had proposed during the previous Political Consultative Conference debates on the constitution.

The first constitution of the PRC, adopted in 1954, further affirmed that the country was led by the Chinese Communist Party, effectively establishing a one-party system. At this juncture, the CCP mirrored what Lenin and the Bolsheviks had achieved in Russia between 1917 and 1918, establishing a totalitarian regime on the Chinese mainland. From that point onward, the institutional genes of totalitarianism continued to evolve and deepen within China.

11.2 Mobilization and Domination: Land Reform and the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries

Unprecedented centralization of power and resources is a prerequisite for any totalitarian regime. Achieving this requires forcibly depriving the majority of their basic rights, a move that is bound to encounter significant resistance. As such, unprecedented levels of violence and terror must be employed to counter this resistance and establish a totalitarian system. However, violence on such a scale necessitates the unleashing of frenzied mobs across society and totalitarianism can only emerge in places where this phenomenon can occur. This was the case in Münster during the Middle Ages, Paris during the French Revolution (Chapter 6), Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution (Chapter 8), and even more so in China during the Communist Revolution. Chapter 10 discusses the internal violence of totalitarian parties. Similarly, a totalitarian party’s process of controlling society relies on initiating a brutally violent revolution throughout society, as this is a necessary condition for societal control. Given the conditions fostered by China’s institutional genes, the earliest and most widespread violent movement launched by the CCP was land reform.

One of the CCP’s revolutionary goals was to establish a system in which the party could control all property rights, including land rights. Soon after establishing the Chinese Soviet, its constitution stipulated that it aimed to “nationalize the land” (Article 16 of the Outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic). This goal, clearly contrary to the basic interests of the peasants, was completely incompatible with the peasants’ incentives. Totalitarian regimes depend on mass movements for large-scale social and military mobilization. Without massive peasant mobilization, there would have been no Communist revolution or Communist rule. Indeed, in the second year after its establishment, the CCP declared at its Second Congress that, “China’s 300 million peasants are the most crucial component of the revolutionary movement … when a large number of poor peasants can unite with workers, the success of the Chinese revolution is guaranteed” (Shi et al., Reference Shi1985, p. 103).

To mobilize the peasants, the Comintern-CCP resorted to using Leninist deception tactics, crafting a temporary slogan for equal land division, which was in line with the peasants’ interests. Historically, land redistribution had been used as a tactic to mobilize many peasant revolts throughout Chinese history, most notably during the Taiping Rebellion, which both Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong admired. However, in the communist totalitarian revolution, land reform was used as a stimulus for the peasant movement rather than to establish an egalitarian system of private land ownership. This differentiated the CCP’s revolution from traditional peasant uprisings in China. Shortly after the formation of the CCP and the reorganization of the KMT, the Comintern urged both parties to launch a peasant movement. It encouraged the CCP to utilize traditional secret organizations like the Red Spear Society to spur the movement while prompting both parties to ignite peasant revolutions through land reform.

The CCP proclaimed that the Chinese peasant movement led by Mao was, in fact, first carried out by the KMT but initiated and guided by the Comintern, which discussed the issue of launching peasant workshops with Sun Yat-sen and Liao Zhongkai in 1924.⁸ Under the Comintern’s auspices, the newly reorganized Kuomintang established the Peasant Movement Committee, with Mao Zedong and Song Ziwen serving as members. Backed by Wang Jingwei, Mao Zedong assumed the role of acting Minister of the Central Propaganda Department of the KMT and took control of the Peasant Movement Institute. This was the first time that Mao played an important role in the Chinese Communist revolution.⁹

Mao’s seminal work, A Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, composed while he headed the Peasant Movement Institute, gave an enthusiastic account of spontaneous violent tendencies within the peasant movement. In this work, Mao explored and summarized ways to harness these spontaneous violent tendencies to mobilize the masses, inciting larger-scale violent movements. He systematically legitimized violence, contending that it was necessary for initiating mass movements and revolutions. This work subsequently became the CCP’s first theory on using violence and served as the fundamental guiding principle for decades of revolutionary movements launched by the CCP. Forty years later, during the CR, Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing, quoting passages from this text that incited violence, successfully turned the CR into a widespread killing spree at Red Guard mass rallies.

Soon, the theory of violence was given a chance to come into full play. After Chiang Kai-shek staged an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist coup on April 12, 1927, the Comintern organized an emergency meeting known as the “August 7th Conference.” At that meeting, Mao famously stated, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The conference also declared, “China has entered a period of agrarian revolution.”¹⁰ The Central Committee went on to map out plans for the Autumn Harvest Uprising under the slogan, “Uprising, killing all the landlords and oppressing gentries.”¹¹ The specific instructions issued by the Central Committee were to “exercise Red Terror as far as possible” (cited in Zhao, Reference Zhao1983, p. 87).

Guided by violent revolution and Red Terror principles, the CCP established its earliest revolutionary bases, the Luhaifeng and Jinggang Mountain Soviets, and immediately launched land reform there, mobilizing poor peasants and expanding military and financial resources.

A directive issued by the Central People’s Commission for Land stipulated that, “we must deepen the land reform … not only all the land but also all the property of the landlord class should be confiscated and distributed to the poor, … only in this way can the poor workers and peasants … fight enthusiastically … this is the most effective way to consolidate Soviet power …”¹² The Soviet Land Law promulgated by the Chinese Revolutionary Military Committee under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong in 1930 clearly stipulated that “immediately after the overthrow of the power of the landlords by a riot, all private or collective … fields, mountains, forests, ponds and houses must be confiscated and returned to the Soviet government.”¹³

Within three months of the establishment of the CCP’s first regime, 1,686 “landlords, gentries, and counterrevolutionaries” were killed in Haifeng County alone and some 10,000 people from Haifeng and Lufeng counties fled to Shantou and Hong Kong.¹⁴ Senior CCP leaders later admitted that the brutal land reform coupled with the Anti-AB purges (see Chapter 10) and the war had reduced “the population of the old base areas by nearly 20 percent.” It was also admitted that in the massively depopulated Soviet bases, “the CCPs killed even more [Communists] than the KMT did. Many good cadres were killed by our forces” (Qiu, Reference Qiu2011, p. 139).

Land reform proved effective in mobilizing the masses to join the Red Army. In the Central Soviet Area, which had a population of only 2 million, the Red Army expanded by 110,000 from 1933 to 1934 alone (Chen, Reference Chen1998, p. 279). However, this “red expansion” and the relentless violence associated with it exhausted both the human and material resources of the Soviet area. This forced the CCP regime to rely heavily on looting the local wealthy and properties in other regions as its primary source of revenue.¹⁵ Fearful of being robbed, people in surrounding areas made every effort to avoid trading with the Central Soviet Area, causing its economy to wither and leaving it in a state of self-imposed isolation. This unsustainable pattern of plunder led to a severe economic disaster in the Central Soviet Area.

Historians believe that all these factors ultimately threatened the survival of the Red Army in the Jinggang Mountains, forcing the CCP to abandon the Central Soviet Area and begin the Long March (Song, Reference Song2019, pp. 178–198). In fact, the confiscation of landlords’ property and the so-called “looting the rich” were very similar to the traditional peasant revolts and banditry of Imperial China. The reason the CCP could carry out such large-scale violence in the so-called Soviet areas was that those areas, such as the Jinggang Mountains base, were mostly ruled by bandits, for example, the Brotherhood (see Chapter 10), and the associated institutional genes were already deeply rooted there.

As the Second World War approached, Stalin instructed the CCP to set aside land reform and instead collaborate with the KMT in resisting Japan. This strategic move aimed to keep Japan in check and prevent any attack on the Soviet Union. Following the Xi’an Incident and the transformation of the CCP Soviet regime into a regional administration under the national government, the CCP transitioned from violent land reform to milder policies. Additionally, the CCP officially recognized private land rights by law.¹⁶ These steps helped the CCP to mask its true intentions, thereby consolidating its base and gaining wide-ranging support both domestically and internationally.

However, as the war against Japan neared its end, the CCP resumed land reform as a means to expand its armed forces and seize power. Land reform aimed to mobilize poor peasants to forcibly dispossess all landowners and wealthy peasants of their land, which was then equally distributed among poor peasants. The slogan was, “Land to the tiller” (Bo, Reference Bo1996, pp. 416–417). As the purpose was mobilization, the CCP intentionally refrained from providing legal or policy definitions for landlords or peasants subject to dispossession. Instead, these definitions were left to be decided by the peasants participating in the movements. In addition to incitement, the party also regulated an approximate percentage, such as 5 or 10 percent, as landlords and rich peasants. This proportion was stipulated from above.

As most of the poor peasants lacked the motivation to engage in large-scale violence, full mobilization of the masses, which relied on inciting “class hatred” and violence, was necessary to reach the targets set by their superiors (Zhi Xiaomin, see Song, Reference Song2019, p. 235). Once poor peasants were sufficiently mobilized to seize land and property for themselves, their interests aligned with those of the CCP regime (Qin Hui, see Song, Reference Song2019, p. 552). This alignment meant that protecting the liberated areas was equivalent to protecting their newly acquired land, thereby providing a strong incentive for them to enlist in the army and support the front.

Mao Zedong instructed the Northeast Liberated area that, “Our party must provide the people of the Northeast with tangible material benefits so that the masses will support us and oppose the KMT’s attack” (Mao, Reference Mao1960, pp. 1124–1125). By material interests, he was referring to land. Liu Shaoqi said, “When land reform is carried out thoroughly and the masses are well mobilized, the power is infinite…. Implementing land reform is the most essential part of striving for victory in the patriotic war of self-defense” (Liu, Reference Liu1981, Vol.1, pp. 394–395). The land reform was indeed a magic formula for expanding the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) power and a primary source of the PLA soldiers’ morale during the “Liberation War” (and also in the later Korean War). In the Jin-Hebei-Lu-Yu border area alone, for instance, as a result of land reform, “240,000 labor reformed peasants joined the army … and the number of guerrillas and militias increased to over one million. Millions of militia workers joined the army, supported the front line and engaged in enormous war services” (Bo, Reference Bo1996, pp. 416–417).

This round of land reform was not only much larger in scale than the one in the Chinese Soviet region a decade earlier but also significantly bloodier, both in design and reality. Unlike the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, who primarily relied on the Cheka to instigate terror, the CCP mainly used mass movements, such as land reform, to incite violence and terror. Just like the Cheka in Russia, the terror created from land reform was a general tool, targeting not only enemies but also party members and cadres.

The Directive on the Land Issue, drafted by Liu Shaoqi and other top leaders (known as the May 4 Directive), was issued by the CCP Central Committee, triggering a violent phase of land reform. Following this, Liu directed the party press to incite class hatred among the masses through various propaganda means.¹⁷ He called for land reform to be tied to party rectification, mobilizing the masses and launching intense struggles.¹⁸ Rectifying the party meant motivating party cadres and members to use violence proactively and brutally, or risk finding themselves in trouble.

The CCP condoned horrific torture by “the masses” and used struggle sessions to stoke “popular anger.” Executions occurred without trial, further inciting hatred and violence. Anyone accused of being a landlord, a local tyrant, a gentry, or a counterrevolutionary could be brutally tortured or even killed due to “popular anger.” Even CCP cadres with dissenting views were purged in this manner.

Taking Shanxi’s land reform as an example, cadres in the Jinsui region initiated an exceptionally violent campaign after being criticized by Liu Shaoqi for not being thorough enough in implementing the land reform. According to official CCP records, 2,074 people died during the land reform in Xing County. Of these, 1,152 were killed, 859 committed suicide, and 63 died from freezing or of starvation. Two-thirds of those killed were classified as “landlords and rich peasants” and one-third were poor peasants. In the violent party rectification that accompanied the land reform, 357 CCP cadres died in the Jinsui region, including 7 at the county level and 33 at the district level (Song, Reference Song2019, pp. 262–264).

To mobilize the masses to join the army and lend their full support to the “War of Liberation,” violent land reform was launched in nearly all of the “liberated areas.” The level of violence was strongly correlated with the need to mobilize military support. During the three years of land reform, mainland China economically, and sometimes physically, wiped out the so-called landlord and gentry classes. However, since the vast majority of the killings occurred during mass movements, there are hardly any statistical figures available. Historians can only estimate the death toll caused by land reform through demographic statistics. Song’s estimate places the death toll at 4.7 million.¹⁹

Inciting class hatred to mobilize the masses, utilizing the mobilized masses to create pervasive terror and then suppressing the masses through their participation in terror actions – this is a method repeatedly employed by totalitarian parties to seize power and establish a totalitarian regime. The party then uses this terror to centralize power, establish absolute authority, and compel obedience from everyone. The Bolsheviks relied on inciting class hatred among soldiers, workers, and citizens to initiate a violent revolution. The CCP, in the rural liberated areas, whipped up class hatred among the poor peasants to launch a violent revolution, thus establishing the first totalitarian regime in the countryside.

Applying similar approaches to cities, the CCP launched the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (Zhenfan yundong) a few months after seizing national power by force. It was the first nationwide mass movement centered in the cities to establish and consolidate a totalitarian system. The 1950 Instructions on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries was the first step in promoting a comprehensive campaign to create terror. Similar to the Hunan Peasant Movement, Anti-AB League campaign, Yan’an Rectification Movement, and Land Reform movement, the key part of launching this movement was to incite violence. Mao instructed that the suppression “is not so much about killing a few counterrevolutionaries, but more about mobilizing the masses” (Yang, Reference Yang2009, pp. 234–236). More specifically, Mao said, “Some tyrants must be killed first, otherwise the masses will not dare to rise” (see Mao, Reference Mao1989, vol. 2, p. 138).

Although it was necessary to create internal terror to establish the absolute authority of a totalitarian system, the CCP tried to hide this campaign of terror from the outside world because the regime had not yet been consolidated. To provide a cover, this large-scale suppression campaign was launched the day after Chinese troops were sent into North Korea. On October 10, 1950, Mao Zedong himself presided over the adoption of the historically significant “Double Ten Directives” on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. Liu Shaoqi further explained, “When the gongs and drums of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea resound so loudly, those of land reform and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries are not heard as much, making it easier to implement them” (Yang, Reference Yang2009, pp. 234–236). Mao Zedong told the Minister of Public Security that it was a “once-in-a-millennium” opportunity to carry out large-scale killings, “Don’t waste this opportunity; the chance to suppress may only come this once, and it won’t come again … You must make good use of this capital” (Yang, Reference Yang2009, pp. 234–236).

In order to rapidly create an atmosphere of terror, Mao instructed that 1 to 1.5 per thousand of the local population should be killed in areas that were particularly hostile to the CCP, while 0.5 per thousand should be killed in ordinary areas. Additionally, he directly issued concrete instructions to various regions. He demanded that Shanghai “arrest more than 10,000, kill 3,000 … and after the arrests, the first batch should be killed within half a month, and then a batch should be sentenced every few days. Only then will the masses believe that we will kill and they will actively help us.” He further instructed that “more should be killed in Nanjing” and demanded the central and southern regions to “kill several batches on a large scale … kill eight or nine thousand people in Guangdong this year.”

Mao was very excited about Beijing’s plan to kill another 1,500 people after 150 people were killed there, saying, “killing counterrevolutionaries is more uplifting than having a downpour after a drought, say the people.” He hoped that other large and medium-sized cities “could kill several batches of counterrevolutionaries.”

Subsequently, Shanghai arrested 8,359 people on April 27 alone. Three days later, 285 people were executed and then a batch was executed every few days, resulting in nearly 2,000 people being killed within half a year (Yang, Reference Yang2009, pp. 189–203). More than half a million people were killed nationwide in the first few months of the campaign alone. The death toll was higher than the sum of the casualties on both sides in the three largest battles of the Civil War (Yin, Reference Yin2014).

A few years later, Mao proudly explained why mass killings had been necessary for the campaign against counterrevolutionaries, saying, “It was necessary to suppress counterrevolutionaries and kill a million people … when the rightists attacked in 1957, we turned against them, and our opponents have not risen for years now … Out of more than six hundred million people, we wiped out a million-plus in the campaign against counterrevolutionaries … it should be hailed” (Li, Reference Li1988, p. 302).

Creating terror through violence and ruling by terror is not just a characteristic of the CCP or Mao personally. The essential institutional components used to create violence and terror are part of the institutional genes of totalitarian regimes. Every totalitarian communist regime in world history, from the seizure of power to nationalization and total control, has invariably relied on violence and terror. These tools are necessary to confront the total resistance of the dispossessed, suppress challengers to power, and silence dissenters.

11.3 Emergence of Regionally Administered Totalitarianism during the Revolutionary Era

The regionally administered characteristics of the Chinese Soviet regime prior to 1950 had a profound impact on the evolution of Chinese totalitarian institutions. From the start, Chinese Soviet areas were established and operated with a significant degree of autonomy in various rural regions. Except for highly centralized decision-making on ideology, party lines, strategic policies, and top personnel appointments, each local Soviet regime for its survival was responsible for its administration, finance, and military affairs within its jurisdiction.

Above all, the specifics of where and how to establish the Soviet regime were unpredictable and entirely dependent on the outcomes of uprisings. Thus, the initial instructions from the Comintern regarding uprisings were to instigate full-scale rebellions wherever possible and establish Soviet regimes. In practice, Chinese Soviet regimes established through uprisings were scattered in remote areas where the KMT military presence was weak and hard to reach. This resulted in these Soviet regimes being isolated from each other in terms of communication, finance, military, and commerce.

Furthermore, at that time, the CCP was under the direction of the Comintern in all matters and did not have a substantial central leadership, leaving the Chinese Soviet areas largely to their own devices.

The first Chinese Soviet regime was the Hailufeng authority established by Peng Pai and Ye Ting. Later, Mao Zedong and Zhu De established the second Chinese Soviet regime in the Jinggang Mountains area previously controlled by the Brotherhood, which became the central seat of the Chinese Soviet Republic due to its successful expansion. The Shaanxi–Gansu border area authority established by Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, and Xi Zhongxun was the third significant Chinese Soviet regime. In addition, there were many smaller Chinese Soviet regimes in different areas.

All of these Chinese Soviet areas were relatively independent in administration, finance, and military affairs, with their leaders enjoying substantial autonomy. Each Soviet area had its own laws, regulations, banks, and even its own banknotes. The Soviet governments of western Fujian, Hunan Province, the Hubei–Henan–Anhui region, and the Hunan–Jiangxi region all had their own organic laws, which set the system and determined their rules of governance (Zhang, Reference Zhang1994).

During the Anti-Japanese War, these quasi-federal CCP bases further solidified. As the CCP participated in the 1945 Political Consultative Conference to discuss constitution-making, it proposed that each province independently draft its own constitution, an effort to strengthen its influence scattered across various regions. Consequently, the CCP instructed all large liberated areas, such as the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Area, the Northeast United Front Liberated Area, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Area, to establish their area-specific constitutions and parliaments, and they held elections in their respective jurisdictions in 1946 (Zhang, Reference Zhang1994, pp. 583–594).

By doing so, the CCP not only challenged the KMT and its constitution-making efforts but also solidified the illusion that it was not a communist party. This tactic further strengthened public support for the CCP both domestically and internationally. Additionally, it further embedded the power of local factions within the CCP, laying a deeper foundation for subsequent institutional evolution in China.

It is interesting to note that a formal Chinese Soviet Federation did indeed exist in the history of the CCP. After the CCP abandoned the Central Soviet Area and embarked on the Long March, Zhang Guotao, the leader of the Fourth Front Red Army, established the Northwest Federal Government of the Soviet Republic of China in Beichuan County, Sichuan Province, in May 1935 (Lu, Reference Lu2011; Zheng, Reference Zheng1989).

Zhang Guotao argued that, “the Chinese Soviet Central Government can no longer exercise its functions … the Northwest Federal Government that we are organizing as per the needs will remain as a part of it when the Chinese Soviet Central Government is able to perform its duties” (Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, p. 213). Following this, the Central Red Army (the First Front Red Army) and Zhang’s Fourth Front Red Army joined forces in Sichuan. The strength of the Fourth Front Red Army was seven to eight times greater than that of the Central Red Army.

According to Zhang’s recollections, he and Mao had disagreements on strategic issues. Mao then led a small portion of the troops and senior cadres to leave the main force of the Red Army. To restore the leadership structure of the CCP and the main force of the Red Army, Zhang convened a meeting of the vast majority of senior CCP cadres who had marched with the two armies, including Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and Ren Bishi, to establish the Provisional Central Committee.²⁰

However, the Comintern ultimately chose to support Mao in this power struggle (Wang, Reference Li and Wang2006, pp. 585–589; Zhang, Reference Zhang1991, pp. 294–308, 420, 432). The Comintern and CCP Central Committee dissolved the Northwest Federal Government and there was no official federation thereafter.

Nevertheless, the various Chinese Soviet areas, which had always operated in a quasi-federal manner, were not affected by the change of name and the operation of this system continued until the early 1950s. For instance, there was no unified system in the CCP-controlled areas until 1951 in terms of banking, currency, and finance but rather, each liberated area decided for itself. Since its establishment, the four Chinese Soviet areas such as the Haifeng–Lufeng region and the Jinggang Mountains each established their own banks, issued currency within their jurisdictions, and resolved their own financial issues. The currency issued by the Chinese Soviet National Bank established in 1932 had a larger circulation range but was still only limited to the Soviet areas located in southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Other Chinese Soviet areas, such as the northern Fujian, eastern Jiangxi, Fujian–Zhejiang–Jiangxi, Hubei–Henan–Anhui, northwestern Anhui, and Hunan–Jiangxi regions, all established their own Soviet banks, issuing currency to circulate within their own areas. After the Central Soviet Area moved to the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia region, a northwest branch of the Soviet National Bank was established in 1935 and issued currency. Moreover, in practice, there was no national bank or common currency across all Chinese Soviet areas (Xu, Reference Xu2008, pp. 27–33). At the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP had established seven major base areas composed of nineteen smaller bases in fifteen provinces across the country. Each of these major base areas had its own independent bank, issued currency that circulated within its own area, and handled its own financial matters (Xu, Reference Xu2008, pp. 42–50).

The liberated areas during the War of Liberation and their banking and monetary systems all inherited this quasi-federal operation. However, the large-scale war, which brought together troops from various liberated areas, posed a significant challenge to the disintegrated financial system. For instance, in the Huaihai Campaign, CCP troops from everywhere used the currencies of the six liberated areas. In response, the CCP had to set a fixed exchange rate between the currencies and establish a unified national bank in order to eventually issue a unified currency (Xu, Reference Xu2008, pp. 67–68) and a nationally unified finance system.

In June 1948, the CCP established its first Central Ministry of Finance and in December, it merged several banks in the liberated areas of the north to form the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), issuing Renminbi (RMB) and banning foreign currency from circulation. The first liberated areas to unify their domestic currencies, in the form of the RMB, were those of northeast China and Mongolia in early 1951 (Xu, Reference Xu2008, pp. 75–83). The RMB became the single currency across the southern provinces only later when Communist control was stabilized.

One of the fundamental features of the CCP’s totalitarian regime before 1950 was that each liberated region enjoyed administrative and financial autonomy within its jurisdiction under highly centralized control over politics, ideology, and military strategy. That system was neither designed by the Comintern nor the CCP but evolved during the CCP’s struggles for its survival and expansion based on pre-existing institutional genes. Under the imperial junxian system, local authorities at all levels, from the provinces to the counties, had relatively complete governmental functions. Local governments were fully responsible for administration and operations within their jurisdictions. The central government controlled the appointment of officials and the revenue targets. On the premise of ensuring officials’ loyalty to the central government and meeting tax obligations, local governments, except for in matters involving the regular army, were left to manage local issues independently.

Beginning in the Song dynasty, local governments were prohibited from intervening in the affairs of the regular army in an effort to prevent local powers from challenging the emperor and to avert the emergence of a feudal aristocracy. However, as the Qing dynasty neared its end, the imperial army proved incapable of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion, leaving the Qing Empire on the brink of collapse.

In a desperate move, the imperial court encouraged local authorities to develop their own military power to counter the rebels. As a result, forces like the Xiang Army, the Huai Army, and later the Beiyang Army, emerged, their strength surpassing that of the empire’s old regular army. From that point on, these local armies became the primary military forces of the empire.

This alteration of the institutional genes of the junxian system played a significant role in the eventual collapse of the Chinese Empire and was inherited by successive Chinese regimes.

During the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese Empire, having lost central control, was forced to rely on provincial forces, including the powerful Beiyang Army, to combat revolutionary forces. This was the institutional background that made it possible for provinces to declare independence from the empire. As a result, when the Republic of China was established in 1912, it did not have a unified national army. The independent and powerful military forces in each region became the de facto power in the political struggles. Under this system, following the “Second Revolution” launched by the KMT, the country descended into a chaotic warlord era.²¹

Even after the Northern Expedition, the KMT’s central army was unable to fully control the country. Under such circumstances, the CCP’s local forces relied on the development of local secret societies, peasant associations, and local armed forces to seize power from the local governments and establish local Soviet regimes. The few successful local forces grew and collectively formed the backbone of the CCP power. However, these relatively independent forces also challenged the central authority, something intolerable for a totalitarian party. To establish united and absolute leadership, Mao labeled the CCP’s major local forces as “mountaintops” and criticized the so-called “mountaintop-ism” as sectarianism during the Yan’an Rectification Movement. Mao chose the term “mountaintop” because the establishment of Soviet areas in the Jinggang Mountains and Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia regions bore similarities to the hilltop bastions of China’s “heroes of the Greenwood” (the Chinese version of Robin Hood).

The inherent characteristic of the CCP regime, which consisted of a multitude of local “mountaintops” or autonomous regions, was a significant obstacle to centralization. However, given the CCP’s primary objective at the time – to marshal all possible resources to seize national power – recognizing these autonomous “mountaintops” and maintaining their existing power structures provided a compelling incentive to senior cadres and was therefore seen as a strategic choice.

Moreover, Mao Zedong’s primary concern was not the local powers but rather his rivals within the party’s central leadership. The fragmented power structure meant that establishing authority within the party without the support of the various “mountaintops” was difficult. In this regard, Mao was in a stronger position than those appointed by Moscow, as he was more attuned to the realities on the ground and more adept at navigating the complexities of the local power dynamics. That is, Mao needed to utilize the collective power of various “mountaintops” to weaken his rivals at the center.

At the 7th National Congress of the CCP, Mao declared “mountaintop-ism” to be a feature of the Chinese revolution that must be officially recognized. He stated that the elimination of “mountaintop-ism” was a future task.²² Gao Gang later reflected on Mao’s strategy of appeasing the “mountaintops” at the 7th National Congress, saying, “Chairman Mao … deliberately suppressed the advancement of personnel from the First Army Corps of the Jinggang Mountains, who were directly related to him, and he promoted personnel from other army corps and regions” (Yang, Reference Yang2009, part 1, p. 371). Consequently, in the 7th Central Committee of the CCP, nearly 77 percent of the members represented various “mountaintops,” while only a little more than 23 percent were from the central authorities (Wang and Wang, Reference Wang and Wang2015). It was with the backing of these various power bases that Mao was able to officially assume the position of the supreme leader of the CCP.

At the onset of the newly established PRC, the CCP’s fundamental political, economic, and military forces were distributed across six major administrative regions. Each region had a Central Bureau of the CCP. Most of the top CCP leaders were also regional leaders with their own power bases in the regions they governed. These included Liu Shaoqi, Bo Yibo, and Nie Rongzhen of the North China Bureau, Gao Gang of the Northeast Bureau, Chen Yi and Rao Shushi of the East China Bureau, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Deng Zihui, and Ye Jianying of the South Central Bureau, Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun of the Northwest Bureau, and Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and He Long of the Southwest Bureau. Indeed, these regional leaders either hailed from these areas, had spent more than a decade working there, or possessed considerable prestige underpinned by actual power in the region they administered (like Gao Gang) (Yang, Reference Yang2009, part 1, pp. 370–371). As a result, each had genuine authority tied to the areas under their respective jurisdiction instead of depending solely on power delegated from the Central Committee.

Indeed, the CCP’s fragmented power structure was, in some ways, an institutional legacy from a collapsing empire, that is, the local armies of the late Qing dynasty, and its successor, the warlord era of the ROC. However, within the typical imperial junxian system, local officials’ power at all levels had to be granted through appointments from the imperial court and they could not possess their own local forces. The imperial court had to maintain a monopoly on power to prevent the emergence of an aristocracy or local power blocs. Mao and the CCP leadership were acutely conscious of the logic and power structure inherent in this institutional gene.

What is more crucial is that the CCP, as a totalitarian party, had always strived to establish a Soviet system since its inception. The new China not only sought complete Sovietization but also relied on comprehensive assistance from the Soviet Union. And a Soviet-style totalitarian system necessitated absolute and high-level centralization.

It was therefore imperative to change the power structure of the CCP regime and eliminate all the real regional powers for the sake of full Sovietization and the consolidation of power, even though these local powers were also abiding by totalitarian rule. The first step in this process was to move the top leaders, who held real regional power, to central leadership positions, effectively stripping them of their local power bases.

In early 1953, coinciding with the commencement of the first Five-Year Plan, several regional leaders including Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Deng Zihui, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Zhongxun were simultaneously transferred to Beijing to assume various central party-state positions. Among them, Gao was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the State and put in charge of the State Planning Commission. This commission was responsible for nearly all industries in China and Gao oversaw thirteen departments, reflecting the significance of this position. This change in leadership roles marked a key step in the CCP’s path to centralizing its power and aligning with the Soviet model.

The intense power struggle that occurred during the centralization of power reflected the deeply rooted local powers within the CCP. This struggle formed the foundation for later institutional changes. The Northeast Bureau, under Gao Gang’s leadership (unlike the multiple-leader format of other regional Bureaus), was China’s most robust economic region at that time. Gao was also a critical figure in the founding and development of the Northwest Bureau and he played a significant role in supporting both the Liberation War and the Korean War. Therefore, he was well known to and trusted by Mao and also received support from most of the top military figures. All of these factors arguably positioned Gao as the party’s most potent regional leader. His transfer to the central authority was a significant move in the process of centralizing power, reflecting Mao’s strategy to dilute local powers while simultaneously strengthening central control.

According to Gao’s secretary, Mao relocated the five regional leaders to Beijing with the aim of diminishing their local powers and controlling the “vassal princes.” Simultaneously, he sought to restrain the influence of Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai by forming a triumvirate with them and other regional leaders, effectively redistributing power and establishing a new balance within the central party leadership (Zhao, Reference Zhao2008, p. 76). In multiple private conversations with Mao, Gao learned that Mao was significantly dissatisfied with the work of the central government. Believing himself to fully understand Mao and to hold substantial power, Gao took the initiative to form an alliance with another “warlord,” Rao Shushi, and instigated a power struggle against Liu, Zhou, and Bo Yibo (Zhao, Reference Zhao2008).

However, Gao and Rao lost that power struggle and were labeled as being counterrevolutionary, which further accelerated the centralization of power. By mid-1954, the central government had completely dissolved the six major administrative regions, whose powers were handed over to the central government, and general administration was transferred to provincial and municipal governments (Yang, Reference Yang2009, part 1, p. 374). From then on, military and political powers were highly concentrated at the central level and the party-state system in China became highly consistent with that of the Soviet Union, laying the foundation for the further establishment of a thoroughly Soviet-type totalitarian system.

11.4 Sovietization: Building a Full-Fledged Classical Totalitarian System

The slogan, “Today’s Soviet Union is tomorrow’s China” (People’s Daily, October 15, 1951), which was most prevalent in the 1950s, underscores the significance of complete Sovietization. In fact, after seizing power, the CCP’s most crucial task in establishing a comprehensive totalitarian regime was to transplant the Soviet totalitarian system in all respects. The intent was to create a centralized and tightly controlled political structure, mirroring the Soviet Union’s highly centralized and state-controlled economic and political systems.

Before the CCP took over national power, in July 1949, Liu Shaoqi wrote to Stalin, proposing to fully emulate the Soviet Union’s national organization, economic planning and management, culture and education, and party organization, while also soliciting Soviet assistance in all these areas.²³ The Soviet Union promptly and systematically responded, providing assistance that directly facilitated and expedited China’s complete adoption of the Soviet system. The institutional elements transplanted during this process are not only deeply embedded in China’s system but have also evolved into integral components of its institutional genes, to the extent that many people, including experts, erroneously believe that they developed independently within China.

The drafting of the PRC Constitution was among the most symbolic parts of the process of complete Sovietization. Initially, the CCP Central Committee planned to temporarily hold off on drafting a constitution and instead use the Common Program of the CPPCC. However, from 1952 onwards, Stalin put pressure on Liu Shaoqi and others who were visiting the Soviet Union for assistance, insisting that the CCP must pass a constitution as soon as possible (Central Literature Research Office of the CCP, 1996). The reason for this insistence was that a formal constitution would help the Soviet-led socialist camp, including the newly established PRC, to refute critiques from Western countries directed at the socialist nations. After extensive negotiations, the CCP Central Committee agreed to draft a constitution with the assistance of Soviet experts.

In 1954, the first constitution of the PRC, reviewed by Stalin himself, was adopted (Zhang, Reference Zhang2014). This constitution was fundamentally a revised version of the Soviet Constitution. One of the most significant differences from its Soviet counterpart was that this constitution acknowledged the land rights of peasants and the property rights of entrepreneurs. This was due to strategic considerations. The CCP had just come to power, largely by forming a united front with peasants and the national bourgeoisie. Whether for the consolidation of power or economic reasons, the CCP was not yet in a position to openly and immediately strip away these rights. However, right after passing this constitution, the CCP publicly announced that it was transitional, hinting at future changes in line with the Soviet model.

Indeed, total party control of society’s assets is the foundation of a totalitarian system. A few months after the enactment of the 1954 Constitution, the CCP launched nationwide campaigns for agricultural collectivization and the transformation of industry and commerce, effectively revoking all the provisions of the constitution that protected private property rights. This was strikingly similar to Lenin’s betrayal of his own constitutional promises when the Soviet Union was first established (see Chapter 8).

In the countryside, CCP cells, established in every village following the land reform, directed the collectivization of local holdings into agricultural cooperatives. By directly heading these cooperatives, the party effectively took complete control of the land and the peasants. Meanwhile, in the cities, a massive drive for “joint state–private ownership” was launched, aiming to comprehensively transform private businesses and reshape the capitalist bourgeoisie. The first significant move was taken in 1952 with the name of the Five Anti Campaign, which avoided ownership issues at that time. The campaign targeted capitalists under the pretext of fighting against bribery, tax evasion, fraud in labor and materials, theft of state property, and espionage targeting state economic information.

Much like the land reform movement, the Five Anti Campaign applied high pressure on capitalists through a mass movement, creating a climate of fear. The movement caused difficulties for private enterprises and even led to the death of many capitalists, including by suicide. Ultimately, it coerced the so-called national capitalists – domestic entrepreneurs who were originally a central focus of the CCP’s united front – into “willingly donating” their assets to the government “with fanfare.” By 1956, virtually all private enterprises in China had been nationalized (Yang, Reference Yang2009, pp. 455–505).

Thus, the CCP’s goal, as clearly defined in its party charter when it was first established – to “eliminate the private ownership of capitalists, to confiscate machines, land … and other means of production and return them to social ownership” – was accomplished. A Soviet-type system of property rights was achieved in a distinctively Chinese way, with the party controlling all means of production. This laid the foundation for the establishment of a complete totalitarian system.

Apart from control of property rights throughout society by the party-state, a thorough transplantation of a Soviet-type totalitarian system also required formalizing party control in all areas. Besides the economy, crucial domains that needed to be controlled included domestic security and the legal system, the propaganda system, the education system, and the United Front system. On the economic front, the most vital tasks entailed establishing a central planning system, setting up mechanisms for bureaucratic resource allocations, and implementing macro- and micro-management strategies.

In terms of the security and judicial system, as early as 1927, following the model of the Bolshevik’s Cheka, the CCP established a Special Operations Section responsible for intelligence and political defense work. After establishing the Chinese Soviet regime, the CCP set up a rudimentary Soviet-style judicial system. Upon the founding of the PRC, the CCP formally established a comprehensive national system of public security, prosecution, and justice under the party’s unified leadership.

Legislation in China was entirely controlled by the party through the People’s Congress, which was under party control. However, due to the unrelenting waves of political campaigns, legislative work in China was largely paralyzed until the end of the Cultural Revolution. With neither civil nor criminal law in place, the PRC truly was a lawless state (Mao even described himself as a lawless leader during the Cultural Revolution). The only official laws applied at a significant scale were the Provisions for Punishing Counterrevolutionaries.²⁴

The CCP often refers to its judicial and law-enforcement system as a “sword,” signifying its role in consolidating power. At the founding of the PRC, the internal security force was essentially an offshoot of the regular army and the first Minister of Public Security was the highly decorated general Luo Ruiqing.

Propaganda is another fundamental instrument of totalitarianism. The CCP refers to propaganda as the “pen,” placing it alongside the “gun” and the “sword” as the foundational elements of power and control. Indeed, under the guidance of the Comintern, the CCP’s activities began with propaganda.

A totalitarian system implies that the party not only directly engages in propaganda but also controls all discourse, press, and performing arts throughout society. Additionally, the party controls culture, arts, media, and the social sciences, turning them into tools for propaganda. Drawing on the CPSU’s comprehensive control over propaganda, the CCP, upon its establishment, formally instituted a system governed by the party’s Central Propaganda Department, exerting control over all media, culture, literature, art, and social science institutions.

Government bodies like the Ministry of Culture, the Central Broadcasting Bureau, and the Division of Philosophy and research institutions in the social sciences, among others, all fell under the party’s absolute control. All previously non-government cultural, arts, media, and social science organizations that were willing and able to survive were henceforth placed under the management of the respective party-state departments. All ministries and their subordinate institutions were required to set up party committees or branches, led by party-appointed secretaries, to carry out the commands of the Central Propaganda Department. This allowed the CCP to maintain control over culture, art, and media, particularly their content.

However, Soviet universities had been formed through a cultural revolution (a concept coined by Lenin) and a series of transformations after 1917. The CPSU controlled Soviet universities both organizationally and ideologically, establishing a totalitarian education system. From ideology to specific subject content, from teaching methods to research methods, most professors in China were out of step with Soviet-style higher education. The restructuring of faculties thus fundamentally weakened the existing system of universities and provided the basic institutional conditions for the introduction of a fully Sovietized system of higher education and Soviet experts into Chinese universities.

The first step in Sovietizing China’s education system took place in higher education. Upon establishing the Ministry of Education in 1952, the CCP immediately launched a program to restructure faculties in line with the Soviet model.

Modern higher education in China had originated from the West. Most universities were established during the Beiyang period, and leading professors at the best universities, research institutes, as well as the Academia Sinica (the predecessor of the Chinese Academy of Sciences [CAS]) were primarily trained in the West. These institutions represented the most Westernized and liberalized facets of China.

Although the Tsarist Russian higher education had also originated from the West, Soviet universities were forged through a Leninist cultural revolution and a series of transformations after 1917 (see Chapter 8). The CPSU maintained organizational and ideological control over Soviet universities, thereby establishing a totalitarian education system. From ideology to specific subject content and from teaching methods to research methods, most professors in China were at odds with Soviet-style higher education.

In order to fundamentally weaken the existing university system, the CCP embarked on a restructuring of faculties, laying the basic institutional groundwork for the introduction of a fully Sovietized system of higher education. This restructuring also facilitated the entry of Soviet experts into Chinese universities.

Following this restructuring, universities lost their autonomy and fell under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. All departments within public universities were entirely reorganized according to the plans set forth by the Ministry and all private universities were dissolved or taken over by the Ministry.

This drastic transformation fundamentally altered the structure of top universities. They transitioned from Western-style institutions to replicas of the Soviet system, a change that marked a significant departure from their former status. Three-quarters of science and engineering professors nationwide were transferred from their original institutions and the total number of universities in the country dropped from 211 to 183 (Li, Reference Li2003).

Specific universities underwent radical changes. Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University, for example, transitioned from multidisciplinary universities to engineering schools. Their existing faculties of arts, sciences, law, and agriculture were abolished and professors from these disciplines were transferred to other universities or the CAS.

Across all universities, there were significant cuts in the humanities, arts, and social sciences. Many leading professors in these fields were removed from teaching positions and placed in the CAS, where teaching responsibilities were non-existent. Soviet experts were introduced into the CAS and top universities to guide the restructuring process, thereby fundamentally transforming China’s higher education and research systems.

Compared to other fully Sovietized areas, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP had distinctively Chinese characteristics. The concept of the United Front was a strategic invention of the Bolsheviks that was exported to China. After the Comintern established the CCP, it instructed CCP members to join the KMT and form a united front with the KMT in order to strengthen their political and military influence. Since then, the United Front work has been a core strategy of the CCP and the UFWD has been one of its central organs.

However, in the Soviet Union, once anti-Bolshevik forces were domestically eliminated, the United Front became irrelevant to internal governance. Therefore, after Stalin dissolved the Comintern, although the CPSU still adhered to the principle of the United Front in the context of the world revolution, the Soviet Union no longer maintained a United Front organization domestically.

In contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, the UFWD has been one of the most influential bodies of the CCP since its establishment in 1938. The UFWD has not only managed the United Front work but has also overseen a significant portion of intelligence activities. Even though the name of the UFWD has changed over time, it has consistently been led by the top leaders of the CCP, such as Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi.

Independent democratic parties, including pro-CCP factions of the KMT, were once targets of the United Front work before 1949. After the establishment of the PRC, particularly after 1957, all of these parties essentially became subsidiaries of the UFWD, with their budgets allocated by the UFWD. Moreover, the role of the UFWD has since been expanded to include control over religious institutions, as well as all churches and temples nationwide. Additionally, the UFWD is responsible for intelligence and united front work related to various regions and groups such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, Xinjiang, the business community (capitalists), intellectuals, and overseas Chinese, among others.

The central planning system that China established, such as the Chinese State Planning Commission and the State Statistics Bureau, mirrored the model of the USSR in everything from name and organizational structure to operations. The newly created People’s Bank of China followed a similar pattern. It served dual roles as China’s central bank and the country’s sole commercial bank,²⁵ thereby monopolizing the commercial banking sector. Much as in the Soviet Union, the bank was directly under the State Council and lacked independence in all respects. All private banks were either shut down or nationalized and incorporated into the PBOC. With state-owned banks and the comprehensive nationalization (collectivization) of the economy, China’s economic system was fully aligned with that of the Soviet Union. This effectively realized Lenin’s vision, which he had articulated years before the October Revolution in his book State and Revolution, of a nation with one enterprise and one bank, that is, a nation where the party-state is the sole holder of property rights.

One of the most important elements in the institutional genes of any system is the set of beliefs, rules, and specific execution techniques formed in that system. It might have been feasible to establish a preliminary totalitarian system in the relatively small and rudimentary Chinese Soviet areas through ideology, propaganda, and organized violence. However, without the necessary skills and knowledge, it would have been challenging to establish a modern totalitarian system throughout China. At the time of its founding, China was one of the world’s poorest countries and few people had received a higher education. Those who had were trained in Western or traditional Chinese education systems. Even if they were politically subservient to the CCP, they would have found it challenging to directly serve in a centrally planned economy. As such, China lacked the human and material foundation necessary to establish a comprehensive modern totalitarian system, including a centrally planned economy.

The pressing challenge in establishing a complete modern totalitarian system was to train a large number of cadres as quickly as possible to accept the entire set of beliefs and rules and to master the specific totalitarian execution techniques, skills, and know-how. The comprehensive assistance that the Soviet Union provided to China met this need just in time, playing a crucial role in establishing a totalitarian system in the country. The Soviet Union dispatched a considerable number of experts and advisors to China for guidance, training, and education. This was most concentrated in central departments, such as those related to the centrally planned economy, the CAS and top universities, and key Soviet aid projects.

From 1949 to 1960, the Soviet Union sent 18,000 advisors and experts to China, with most of them arriving during the First Five-Year Plan period (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, p. 214). Between 1954 and 1957, the Soviet Union provided China with 4,261 teaching syllabi (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, pp. 214–216). The number of people China sent to the Soviet Union for study and training was several times this figure. Moreover, Russian was primarily the only foreign language taught in Chinese middle schools and universities at the time and the teaching materials for universities all came from the Soviet Union.

Training personnel on a large scale is essential for full Sovietization. Renmin University of China (RUC) was the most representative in this aspect. As the faculty restructuring devastated all of China’s top universities in the humanities and social sciences, Renmin University, originating from North China University in the liberated area of North China, virtually overnight became the most important university and research base in the social sciences in China. This was achieved through teaching provided directly by a large number of Soviet experts. Within a few years, nearly 100 Soviet experts joined RUC, including 10 in law and 35 in economics (in political economy, statistics, industrial economics, agricultural economics, and trade economics (see Wu et al., Reference Wu2013).

With the help of the Soviet experts, RUC trained a large number of specialists to implement a classic totalitarian system. It established a Soviet-style teaching system in China and provided teaching materials for all universities by translating and simplifying Soviet teaching materials. Experts trained by this system were placed in key positions for central planning, the judicial system, government agencies, and other universities. Taking important positions in the Soviet-style system, they became essential for the totalitarian system to be able to function fully. RUC thus became the most important base for talent, policy, and scholarship in China.

The Soviet-style judicial and economic system established during that period, as well as the system of teaching and research, has since become deeply embedded in China’s judicial, economic, and teaching systems and become part of the PRC’s institutional genes. Today, even after decades of reform and opening-up, China’s political, judicial, and economic systems are still based on the foundation laid down at that time. The faculties of law and economics in most universities and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences are still partly under the shadow of the system set up by the Soviet Union.

Institutions are established and evolve through their operation, rather than being created from classroom instruction. The Soviet Union not only aided China in formulating its First Five-Year Plan but also provided comprehensive guidance in executing the entire plan. Soviet assistance came in the form of systematic manpower, equipment, project management, and technology, touching upon every aspect of the central plan from design to execution.

In 1951, the Soviets provided China with a proposal for the formulation of the First Five-Year Plan, based on the principles of the Soviet Central Plan. According to correspondence between Liu Shaoqi, the CCP Central Committee, the CPSU, and the Soviets’ chief economic advisors, China’s First Five-Year Plan was not only jointly formulated by China and the Soviet Union but also had to be sent to the CPSU’s Central Committee for the record (see Chen Reference Chen2020, p. 85).

China, the world’s most populous country at the time, established a Soviet-style communist totalitarian regime and became a member of the socialist group led by the Soviet Union. This was a great achievement of the CPSU in the world communist revolution. Strengthening China’s communist totalitarian system was in the common interests of both the CCP and the CPSU. Indeed, the Soviet Union had already massively aided China before the First Five-Year Plan. Between 1950 and 1952, Soviet aid constituted over 70 percent of all newly invested fixed assets in China, with the majority centered on heavy industry, which is fundamentally important to the economy. Beyond financial and material aid, Soviet experts also helped in plant location selection, design and technical document provision, and in providing guidance on installation and operations, among other aspects. The Soviets mobilized a force of over 30,000 individuals dedicated to assisting China. From 1950 to 1953, the Soviet Union donated a total of 120,000 books to 300 Chinese institutions and provided 2,928 sets of scientific and technical documents. Furthermore, 1,210 Soviet experts were dispatched to China to provide assistance, while the number of Chinese students and technical personnel sent to the Soviet Union for learning and training was several times this figure (Shen, Reference Shen2016a, pp. 182–185). Many of those who studied in the Soviet Union became pillars of the PRC, including Jiang Zemin, who later became general secretary of the CCP, and Li Peng, who became premier of China.

With significant assistance from the USSR, by the mid-1950s, China established a comprehensive Soviet-style modern industrial system. Of all the newly established basic and defense industrial capacity, 70–80 percent, or even 100 percent, was built with Soviet assistance. Most notable among these were the 156 key projects built with Soviet aid and the other 992 large-scale construction projects partially aided by the Soviet Union. The total amount of Soviet aid to China during these years was equal to 7 percent of the Soviet Union’s national income in 1959. Between 1950 and 1959, the Soviet Union unconditionally provided 31,440 sets of complete scientific technical documents, 12,410 sets of machinery and equipment design sketches, and 11,404 sets of complete technical documents to China (Shen et al., Reference Shen2016a, pp. 214–216). This new industrial system served as the material foundation for the Soviet-type totalitarian system in China, which was implemented by the newly trained Sovietized bureaucrats and technicians. As a result, China not only recovered from the extreme poverty brought about by war and revolution but also fundamentally came to resemble the Soviet Union, albeit it remained much poorer than the USSR. However, the development of totalitarianism in China did not converge with the Soviet trajectory, as the institutional genes of totalitarianism have continued to evolve within China.