One must begin by translating between two languages – modern American andold English. The contemporary term “hybrid warfare” refers to astruggle between a conventional force, perhaps with unconventional elements,against an enemy that combines regular and irregular components, usually assumedto be guerrillas. When applied to the British imperial experience between 1700and 1970, that term takes a broader meaning. It refers to conflicts between aregular army (usually aided by paramilitary forces) against four kinds of enemy.Ranked in order of frequency, these foes include conventional forces, rangingfrom phalanxes resting on spear and shield to units using European weapons andtactics; some mixture of unconventional and conventional forces; irregularforces that avoided a guerrilla strategy, because it exposed their populationsto attack, but instead battled English forces on their frontiers by usingconventional weapons in unconventional ways; and guerrillas who harassedconventional forces whom they allowed to occupy their villages. Hybrid warfareis one of the few areas where Britain had anything approaching a modernconception of doctrine, complete with manuals that distilled experience andguided action. The British expressed its sense through ideas such as“small wars” or “imperial policing” and linked thesetechnical matters to political ones, especially issues of colonial policy. TheBritish experience with hybrid warfare ranged from triumphant to incompetent. Toilluminate past patterns and modern ideas, to reflect trends and variationswhile avoiding overgeneralization from any instance, this experience is bestapproached through a broad framework, combined with case studies.

These experiences stem from a context that runs like a thread across continentsand centuries. European states developed armies unique on earth. Then theyconquered it. From 1500 onward, they regularly fought major wars in which onlythe strongest survived, through a constant competition to produce armies and toimprove them. State finances were honed to this end, as were administration andpolitics. Compromises between monarchs and nobles produced an officer corps,technically competent and politically loyal, with authority over the armies ofthe state. States maintained the best forces they could fund. They could becomestronger simply by raising revenues and regiments. For non-European countries,conversely, to raise taxes was to create crisis, and to improve armies was toendanger the state. European polities became the most militarized and militarilyeffective on earth.