Dictators who achieve power through force of arms face special difficulties in consolidating their rule because many of their supporters control sufficient weapons to oust them. Because of the ease of ouster, the dictator’s promises to share are credible, but his supporters’ promises of support if he shares may not be. When factions divide the seizure group, those included in the dictator’s inner circle cannot credibly commit their subordinates to support the dictator even if he shares power and spoils. Dissident factions may stage rogue coups. Consequently, power-sharing bargains between the dictator and his armed supporters cannot be maintained. Dictators in this situation often try to counterbalance their armed supporters with unarmed ones. To do this, they organize civilian support networks – parties. We show that factionalism within armed seizure groups increases the likelihood of post-seizure party creation. We also provide evidence that post-seizure party creation helps dictators to survive. Party creation protects dictators from coups, as would be expected if it were a strategy for reducing the dictator’s vulnerability to ousters launched by an unreliable military support base. It is associated with both longer dictator tenure and longer regime survival.